

CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE STUDY OF
SELJŪQ INSTITUTIONS

by

Ann K. S. Lambton

Thesis for the Degree of Ph.D.

June, 1939.

ProQuest Number: 11010488

All rights reserved

INFORMATION TO ALL USERS

The quality of this reproduction is dependent upon the quality of the copy submitted.

In the unlikely event that the author did not send a complete manuscript and there are missing pages, these will be noted. Also, if material had to be removed, a note will indicate the deletion.



ProQuest 11010488

Published by ProQuest LLC (2018). Copyright of the Dissertation is held by the Author.

All rights reserved.

This work is protected against unauthorized copying under Title 17, United States Code
Microform Edition © ProQuest LLC.

ProQuest LLC.
789 East Eisenhower Parkway
P.O. Box 1346
Ann Arbor, MI 48106 – 1346

A.K.S. Lambton

Abstract of a thesis for the degree of Ph. D. (1939)

Subject;- "Contributions to the study of Seljūq
Institutions."

After an introductory chapter on the territorial structure of the Great Seljūq Empire, the thesis aims at describing various Seljūq institutions, and the conditions under which they developed. The functions of the central government, the military organisation and the position of the Turkish amīrs to the state are discussed. An outline is given of provincial government and local administration, and some aspects of urban life are briefly examined. The last chapter deals with the attitude of the Great Seljūqs towards the caliphate. In giving a general outline of some of the most important features of the Great Seljūq period, an attempt has been made to present a more detailed account of these institutions than has been hitherto available.

The following work is the result of my own researches. Those aspects of the Seljūq period which I have investigated have not previously been examined in detail. I have examined those sources available to me and attempted to describe various Seljūq institutions. I think I am right in stating that this is a first attempt to make a detailed study of this subject.

CONTENTS

Preface

Chapter I.	The Territorial Structure of the Seljūq Empire	1
	i. The Ghuzz Movement.	
	ii. The Sultān.	
	iii. Directly Administered Areas.	
	iv. Indirectly Administered Areas.	
Chapter II.	The Central Government	54
	i. The Wazirate.	
	ii. Financial Administration.	
Chapter III.	The Army	129
Chapter IV.	Amīrs and Atābegs	168
Chapter V.	Iqtā'āt	209
Chapter VI.	Local Administration	275
Chapter VII.	The City	293
Chapter VIII.	The Great Seljūqs and the Caliphs of Baghdād	343
Bibliography	385

57-151, 165 ff, 224-5, 2-13 ff.

PREFACE.

The Seljūq period marks a turning point in the history of western Asia. Its primary importance was an ethnological one. The Seljūqs were not invaders who came and went, but were the leaders of a tribal migration, who became almost by chance the rulers of a vast empire.¹ They introduced the Turks as a permanent element in the population of western Asia, and thus altered the balance of the population, of which formerly the important elements had been Arab and Persian. The Seljūq movement had also a subsidiary religious and economic importance. It made possible the reunification of the Sunnī world, against which the Crusaders were unable to achieve a lasting success; upon the ruins of the Seljūq empire arose the Atābeg dynasty of Mawṣil, which in turn gave rise to the Ayyūbid dynasty, before which the Christian kingdom of Jerusalem was ultimately to perish. The emergence of these powers as the defenders of Sunnī Islam would have hardly been possible, but for the Sunnī revival which took

¹ That they did so was due largely to the fact that a succession of military leaders coincided with a complete breakdown of settled government in the lands of the Eastern caliphate.

place under the Seljūqs. They were not themselves responsible for this revival, but only for creating the conditions which made such a revival possible. Not only, however, is the Seljūq period important in the history of Islām as being a period of Sunnī revival, it is also marked by the appearance and widespread development of that phase of the Bāṭinī movement which is known among the Arab historians as ad-da'wat al-jadīda. It is not, however, with these aspects of the Seljūq period that the present work is concerned, but rather with certain aspects of the organisation of the Great Seljūq empire.

The field of these studies is limited in time to the period extending from the beginning of the Seljūq movement down to the death of Sanjar in 552⁽¹¹⁵⁷⁾ and in space to the area over which the central imperial government exercised control. The Seljūq kingdoms of Syria, Anatolia and Kirmān, in so far as they became virtually independent of the Great Seljūq sultān, lie outside the field of the present work, and have only been referred to where their development throws light upon the institutions of the Great Seljūq empire.

Various aspects of the civil and military administration from the year 485 (1092) to the year 511 (1117) have already been briefly described by Sanauallah in "The Decline of the

Seljūqid Empire", while Siddiqi in "Caliphate and Kingship in Medieval Islam" has dealt fully with the theoretical aspect of the caliphate and its relations with the sultanate, and no attempt will be made to go over the ground already covered by these two works.

It remains for me to record my thanks to my supervisor, Sir E. Denison Ross, for his kindness and advice throughout my studies. It is with deep gratitude that I also express my thanks to Professor H. A. R. Gibb for his guidance and many helpful suggestions during my researches. I have lastly to thank Professor Tritton and Mr. Taqizadeh for their help in translating various passages, and Mr. Minovi for his advice on different matters.

CHAPTER I.

THE TERRITORIAL STRUCTURE OF THE SELJŪQ EMPIRE.

i. The Ghuzz Movement.

Towards the end of the 4th and the beginning of the 5th century A.H. various tribes in Turkistān were in a state of unrest, and showed a general tendency to move westwards. Among these were the Ghuzz, who were migrating in separate and often independent groups. One of such groups was that led by Seljūq b. Duqāq, who settled in Jand in 345 (956/7).¹ In 375 (985) the Seljūq Ghuzz, or a section of them, were again on the move, and we are told that they migrated from Turkistān into Transoxania, because their pastures were insufficient to supply their needs, and settled in Nūr Bukhārā and Sughd of Samarqand.² There they took part in the struggles of the various local rulers and gradually increased in power.

Other groups of Ghuzz were probably meanwhile also passing into Khurāsān, but the first large movement did not

¹ Seljūq had been in the service of one of the Turkish leaders, but hearing that one of the latter's wives had advised his destruction on the grounds that he was plotting against her husband, he migrated to Jand (A.S.D. 2; I.A. IX.322).

² T.G. 434; Bart'old: Turkestan 257.

occur until 420 (1029) when Maḥmūd b. Sebuktegīn, after seizing Isrā'īl b. Seljūq, ordered the tribes under him to migrate into Khurāsān.¹ According to Gardīzī 4000 tents crossed the Oxus into Khurāsān during the reign of Maḥmūd,² and it is presumably to this occasion that he refers. These Ghuzz, after creating disturbances, were subsequently dispersed.³ Some 2000 tents went to Iṣfahān, while a more numerous group went to Balkhān Kūh.⁴ Other bodies of Ghuzz seem to have pushed on into Āzerbāijān, for on Maḥmūd's death Mas'ūd b. Maḥmūd wrote to the Ghuzz in that province, and a thousand of them joined his service.⁵

Meanwhile the principal Seljūq leaders, Tughril Beg,

¹ The story of Maḥmūd's meeting with Isrā'īl, and his questioning him as to how many men he could furnish him (Maḥmūd with in case of need is well known. Giving an arrow to Maḥmūd, Isrā'īl said 100,000 would come to him if he sent the arrow to the Seljūq horde, while a second arrow would fetch 50,000 horse from Balkhān Kūh, and his bow would bring 200,000 horse from Turkistān. (R.S. 90-3; T.G. 435; R.D.f.237b, 238a; A.S.D. 3; I.K. III.225) The custom of summoning the tribes by sending them an arrow was also found among the Urtuqids. Dā'ūd b. Suqman in case of need would send an arrow to invite the Turkoman tribes to join him (Receuil des Histoires des Croisades. Historiens Orientaux, vol.II. part II.pp.70,1).

² G. 85.

³ G. 89,90; I.K. III.225-6.

⁴ I.A. IX.323-4; 266. A group numbering 1500 under Qizil were for a time at Rei with 'Alā ud-Dawla (I.A. IX.269).

⁵ At their request Mas'ūd gave an amnesty to the Ghuzz whom Maḥmūd had dispersed, and Qizil, Būqā, Kūktāsh and other leaders joined him, but after a time they returned to their predatory habits (B.71).

Chaghri Beg Dā'ūd and Baighā, who succeeded Mikā'il b. Seljūq in the leadership of his followers, had remained in Trans-oxania, and moved to the borders of Khwārazm in 425 (1033/4), because they had fallen out with 'Alītegān's sons in Nūr Bukhārā.¹ On the death of Hārūn the Khwārazmshāh in 426, they were obliged to move again, for they feared that Shāh Malik, who had already attacked them in 425, would fall upon them, once the protection of Hārūn had been removed. Accordingly, 700 of them suddenly crossed the Oxus into Khurāsān. Their numbers rapidly increased - whether other groups followed them across the Oxus, or whether they were joined by Ghuzz already in Khurāsān is not clear - but when they reached Marv and Nasā, the combined numbers of the Seljūqs and Nayāliyān (?Yanāliyān) were 10,000 horse.²

Having entered Khurāsān, the Seljūqs asked permission to live under Mas'ūd's protection, and offered to send some of their number to serve at his court. Further, in return for permission to settle at Nasā and Farāva, they offered to prevent any disturbances arising in Balkhān Kūh, Dihistān, Khwārazm or the neighbourhood of the Oxus, and to attack the Turkomans of 'Irāq and Khwārazm.³ This suggests that the

¹ B. 856-7; 859.

² B. 582. It seems likely that they were joined by bodies of Ghuzz already in Khurāsān. Ibn Isfandiyār states that when Mas'ūd returned from Jurjān, he learnt that 2000 Turkomans had reached Marv and been joined by Yaghmūr and Būqā (p.235).

³ B.538.

Ghuzz who had entered Khurāsān at an earlier date and moved on into 'Irāq, and also those who were in Khwārazm were independent groups of Ghuzz, and that it was therefore only after success had come to the Seljūqs that they came to be regarded as the leaders of the Ghuzz in general.¹ On the other hand Isrā'il's reported statement that a token from him would bring the Ghuzz of Turkistān and Balkhān Kūh to the help of Mahmūd² supports the view that the Seljūqs were the hereditary leaders of the Ghuzz in general. Further Ibn ul-Athīr states that the Ghuzz who had gone to Rei under Qizil were the subjects of Ibrahīm Yanāl, Tughril Beg and Dā'ūd,³ while Tughril Beg in a letter to Jalāl ud-Dawla in 435 (1043/4) claimed the Ghuzz who had migrated westwards before the main movement of the Seljūqs as Seljūq subjects.⁴

It is unnecessary to go into the somewhat complicated history of the struggle between the Seljūqs and Mas'ūd, which culminated in the defeat of Mas'ūd at Dendenqān in Ramadān 431(1040). During this period the Seljūq leaders, Tughril Beg, Dā'ūd and Baighū acted together in a kind of loose confederation. Demanding fresh pastures, they harried the Ghaznavid forces, but avoided direct conflict with them whenever

¹ In Muharram 428 they complained to Mas'ūd of other Turko-mans coming into Khurāsān from Transoxania and from Balkhān Kūh (B. 627-8).

² See above p. 2, 1n.

³ I.A. IX.272.

⁴ *ibid.* 275.

possible, and took possession of districts whenever the Ghaznavid forces withdrew, but evacuated these on their return.¹ The nature of the Seljūq movement, and of the Ghuzz movement in general, was that of a tribal migration. There were no centres to which they returned after making their raids; and they were, moreover, accompanied by their families and flocks. Gradually, however, as increasing, though not uninterrupted success attended the efforts of the Seljūqs, they became transformed into military conquerors.² They began to appropriate to themselves the rights of rulers and to have their names included in the khutba and to strike coins.³ The final point in this transition was marked by the battle of Dendenqān, which brought to an end the effective resistance of the Ghaznavids in Persia.⁴ After this it only remained for the

¹ A.S.D. 5-12; G.101,106-8; B. 610-1; 627-8; 775-6; R.D.f.238b; T.N. 129.

² Cf. 'Abd as-Samad, Mas'ūd's wazīr who said when Tughril Beg, Dā'ūd and Baighū entered Khurāsān, "up to now we were dealing with shepherds ... now amīrs who are seizing provinces have come." (B. 584).

³ Bart'old: 12 Vorlesungen, p.105.

⁴ It is interesting to note that, according to Baihaqī, the Seljūqs were on the point of leaving Khurāsān before Dendenqān, because of the loss and distress they had suffered on account of Mas'ūd's superior power and equipment. Dā'ūd, however, had taken the view that Mas'ūd would pursue them and write to the local leaders to oppose them if they went to Dihistān, as some of them proposed doing, without first fighting Mas'ūd. The other Seljūq leaders took his advice, and they joined battle with Mas'ūd at Dendenqān (B. 775-6).

Seljūqs to consolidate their conquests in Khurāsān and the neighbourhood, and to continue their conquests westwards.

In due course the majority, if not all the Ghuzz, became associated with the Seljūqs, but control and unity was never fully established over the movement as a whole, which was composed largely of semi-independent bodies each acting virtually on its own behalf. As the Seljūqs advanced westwards, the tendency was admittedly for the Ghuzz to be absorbed by them, but the control of the central imperial government did not extend over any but the nearer bodies. The outlying groups, although nominally acknowledging the overlordship of the Seljūqs, continued to act on their own behalf, in spite of this nominal association. Atsiz b. Abaq, who took Jerusalem on his own account from the Fāṭimids, and the whole of Palestine with the exception of Ascalon, is an example of a semi-independent Ghuzz leader. He did, admittedly, finally recognise Tutush as suzerain,¹ but he cannot be regarded as having been under any central control during his earlier exploits, nor did his recognition of Tutush in fact imply any control by the central government over him.

The geographical extent of the operations of the Ghuzz was thus far wider than the extent of the central imperial structure of the Seljūq empire, which comprised a much

¹ Q. 112.

narrower area than that usually included under the name of the Seljūq empire.¹

The central imperial structure of the Seljūq empire, although it arose out of the Ghuzz movement, was nevertheless a reintegration of the Perso-Arab empire. Foreign to the subject population though the Seljūqs were by origin, their Muslim upbringing prepared them for a rapid acceptance in its broad outlines of the imperial tradition - and with this the cultural institutions - of the civilized Muslim world. But the old usages of the steppes and the nature of their armed forces necessarily produced some modification of the imperial structure. Politically, the Seljūq empire was a loose confederation of semi-independent kingdoms over which the Great Seljūqs exercised nominal sovereignty. Only during the last five years of Malikshāh's reign was any degree of unity achieved. Generally speaking, the Seljūqs were opposed to central control and in any case the central government had not the power to maintain permanent control over the different parts of the empire. Both the Seljūq kingdom of Rūm and the Seljūq kingdom of Syria broke away at an early date from the Great Seljūqs, and developed along more or less independent lines, governed

¹ Not only did the Seljūqs fail to incorporate within their empire groups of Ghuzz in Asia Minor and Syria, they failed also to unite their Central Asia brethren, against whom Sanjar eventually had to fight (cf. Bart'old: 12 Vorlesungen p.112).

by local conditions. Similarly, the Seljūqs of Kirmān, although subject perhaps to a greater degree of interference from the Great Seljūqs, were virtually independent, and exerted little influence on the general course of events.

ii. The Sultān.

The Great Seljūq dominion can be divided into three main periods: the period of expansion under Tughril Beg, during which the latter was gradually transformed from the joint leader of a nomadic migration into the ruler of a large territorial empire, the autocratic period under Alp Arslān and Malikshāh, during which the Great Seljūqs were at the height of their power, and the decay and final break-up of the Great Seljūq empire from the death of Malikshāh to the end of Sanjar's reign.

The Seljūq family, whether by hereditary right or by virtue of their success as military leaders, were regarded, or came to be regarded, as the leaders of the Ghuzz. Their original conception seems to have been of the leadership vested in the family as a whole, and of a loose confederation of tribes led by different members of the Seljūq family. This conception survived in a modified form throughout the Great Seljūq period, and is seen in the tendency to assign

provinces to minor members of the Seljūq family and in the growth of the Seljūq dynasties of Rūm, Syria and Kirmān. In the beginning it seems that the status of Tughril Beg, Dā'ūd and Baighū was virtually equal. Gradually Tughril Beg established his position as the supreme leader of the Ghuzz; he did not, however, exercise this position to the exclusion of his brothers, especially Dā'ūd.¹ Indeed the lack of jealousy and family rivalry among the Seljūqs is a marked feature of the movement during its early period, and is seen in the later period also in the spirit of conciliation shown by different sultāns on various occasions to rebellious princes.

Once the early period of expansion was over and the Seljūqs found themselves in possession of a large territorial empire, inhabited to a great extent by people possessing a higher culture than their own, the conception of the ruling khān's family as the guardian of the tribe or group of tribes was in due course inevitably replaced by the Persian ideal of an autocratic sovereign, which prevailed in the conquered territories, foreign though this was to the Turkoman conception. Towards the end of Tughril Beg's reign this ideal had already begun to influence the conquerors, and by the

¹ In some cities in Khurāsān the khutba was read in the name of Tughril Beg and in others at the same time in the name of Dā'ūd (Bart'old, p.306). Further in 438(1046/7) the khutba was read in Ibrāhīm Yanāl's name in Hulwān (I.A. IX. 363), and at ad-Daskara in 440 (1048/9) (I.A. IX.376). On the other hand I.K. states that Tughril alone (of his people) pretended to sovereign authority (III.222).

time of Alp Arslān it had been adopted by them, even if in a somewhat modified form.¹

Dā'ūd, as governor of Khurāsān, like his sons after him, did not dispute the consolidation of Tughril Beg's position as the supreme leader of the Ghuzz. Ibrahīm Yanāl also seems to have acquiesced in this at first.² Further, the local rulers seem to have recognised Tughril's predominant position. When Abū Kālījār wished to negotiate for peace with the Seljūqs in 439 (1047/8), it was to Tughril Beg he sent,³ and not to Ibrahīm Yanāl, although the latter was the leader of the Ghuzz in the Jibāl. In 441 (1049/50) the family unity of the Seljūqs was, however, temporarily disturbed by Ibrahīm Yanāl, who refused to hand Hamadān over to Tughril Beg. The latter then defeated his half-brother, but instead of disgracing him, offered him the option of returning to his former position or remaining with him, the latter of which alternatives he chose.⁴ Subsequently in 450 (1058) Ibrahīm Yanāl

¹ Various survivals from the tribal period are found in the royal insignia. On the Seljūq chatr was shown a bow and arrow (Muḥammad Ibrahīm, p.10); the tughrā also contained a bow and arrow (Bu.152; Muḥammad Ibrahīm, p.10). Alp Arslān before the battle of Manāzkird clothed himself in white and tied a knot in the tail of his horse (Köprülü: Les Institutions Juridiques. p.32).

² When Tughril Beg came to Rei in 434(1043/4) Ibrahīm Yanāl handed over to him the city and other towns which he had conquered and himself went to Sīstān (I.A. IX.347). In the same year Tughril sent him with an army to Kirmān (I.A. IX.349-50), while in 437 (1045/6) Ibrahīm Yanāl went, at Tughril's command, to the Jibāl to conquer it (I.A. IX.360).

³ I.A. IX.365.

⁴ *ibid.* 380.

rebelled again and was eventually captured by Alp Arslān b. Dā'ūd and put to death.¹ Yāqūtī b. Dā'ūd and Qāwurd b. Dā'ūd also joined forces with Tughril Beg on this occasion, but Muḥammad and Aḥmad, sons of Irtāsh joined Ibrahīm. Of other members of the Seljūq family, Qutulmish seems to have preserved amicable relations with Tughril. Rasūltegīn, son of Tughril's mother, on the other hand seems to have acted as a more or less independent marauder; in 449 (1057/8) he went with Fūlād, the Dailamite to plunder Arrajān which had been assigned by Tughril Beg to Hazārasp b. Bankīr.²

The loose confederation over which Tughril Beg had attempted to establish some kind of central control was far from being firmly united by the time of his death. It was perhaps only to be expected that it would be his own relations, above all, who would resent such an attempt to curb their freedom. Ibrahīm Yanāl had already done so during the life-time of Tughril Beg, and on the latter's death difficulties at once arose. Al-Kundurī, in accordance with Tughril's will, put Sulaimān b. Dā'ūd on the throne, but seeing that the amīrs opposed his accession, he proclaimed Alp Arslān sultān in Qazwīn and had the khutba read in Rei in the names of both Alp Arslān and Sulaimān.³ Meanwhile Baighū b. Mikā'il, governor

¹ I.A. IX.444. Al-Basāsīrī is stated to have incited Ibrahīm Yanāl to rebel (Q.87).

² I.A. IX.436.

³ I.A. IX.18-9.

of Herāt rebelled (456), but Alp Arslān, after defeating him, was reconciled to him.¹ Qutulmish also rebelled, and Alp Arslān accordingly returned from Nīshāpūr in Muḥarram 456 (December 1063-January 1064) to Rei. On reaching Dāmghān, he sent to Qutulmish, commanding him to abandon his rebellious intentions. The latter, however, paid no heed, and so Alp Arslān advanced and defeated him at Rei.² On this occasion Alp Arslān seems to have considered abandoning the traditional policy of conciliation towards his family, for he ordered Qutulmish's relations, including his son Sulaimān, and those of his followers who had been captured, to be killed. Nizām ul-Mulk, however, interceded successfully for them, and advised that they should be deprived of all the privileges of governorship and kingship, and sent to live on the frontiers.³ Having put down these rebellions, Alp Arslān's position as sultān was established, and he had little more difficulty from his relatives, with the exception of Qarā Arslān, who rebelled unsuccessfully in Kirmān in 459 (1066/7). After defeating him Alp Arslān reinstated him in Kirmān in his former position.⁴

It may well be that the opposition which Alp Arslān

¹ I.A. X.22.

² *ibid.* 23-4.

³ R.D. f.240b; I.A. X.24; T.G.480.

⁴ I.A. X.36-7.

encountered from Baighū and Qutulmish was a turning point in the relations between the sultān and his family. It seems not unreasonable to suppose that Alp Arslān may have realised that to keep even a limited control over the different members of his family a standing army, loyal to himself, was necessary. Further as the conception of an autocratic ruler began to replace the conception of the ruling khān, so was the moral basis of the Seljūq authority weakened, and some substitute had to be found for the former tribal loyalties, by which the Seljūqs had held their position. To some extent this was replaced by the central government, which supplied an element of unity, but it was only effective as long as it was supported by a strong central control. Under Alp Arslān and Malikshāh this condition was fulfilled, and the latter especially, largely by means of a strong standing army, succeeded in imposing some measure of control throughout the empire.

Alp Arslān before his death appointed Malikshāh his walī-‘ahd, and distributed the kingdom among his relatives (see Chapter V.), in order to lessen their opposition to this.¹ Nevertheless Malikshāh's succession was not undisputed. Qāwurd, ruler of Kirmān, on the death of Alp Arslān determined to make himself master of the kingdom.² According

¹ I.A. X.52; I.K. III.440; A.S.D. 41.

² According to the A.S.D. he wrote to Malikshāh, stating he was more fitted to succeed Alp Arslān on the grounds that he was the eldest brother of the latter, while Malikshāh was only a young son (p. 56).

to one account, some of Malikshāh's amīrs wrote to Qāwurd asking him to come,¹ and when battle took place between Malikshāh and Qāwurd, many of the former's army were favourably inclined to Qāwurd.² The latter nevertheless was defeated, and subsequently killed. His rebellion did not, however, involve the disgrace of this branch of the Seljūq family; they continued to rule in Kirmān, and in 472 (1079/80) Malikshāh, when he went to Kirmān, confirmed Sulaimānshāh b. Qāwurd as ruler of that province.³ In 473 Takash, to whom Malikshāh had assigned Balkh and Tukhārīstān,⁴ rebelled, after being joined by 7000 men whom Malikshāh had dismissed from his army. He made himself master of Marv, Tirmidh, and elsewhere, and set out for Nīshāpūr, intending to conquer Khurāsān. Malikshāh, hearing of his revolt, immediately set out for Khurāsān, and made peace with Takash without joining battle.⁵ In 477 (1084/5) the latter again rebelled,

¹ Muḥammad Ibrahīm, p.12-3.

² I.A. X.53.

³ *ibid.* 74-5. According to Muḥammad Ibrahīm, Malikshāh as a result of Qāwurd's revolt marched to Kirmān with a large army, determined to root out Qāwurd's family. Sultānshāh took refuge in Bardsīr and Malikshāh departed after seven-teen days (p.17).

⁴ I.A. X.64.

⁵ *ibid.* 76.

and this time Malikshāh defeated and captured him, and had him blinded.¹ Yet another attempt to establish independence in the eastern provinces was made by Tughril b. Yanāl in 482 (1089/90), but Malikshāh prevented this by playing off Ya'qūb, the brother of the king of Kāshghar, against him.²

In Syria, which Malikshāh had assigned to Tutush in 470 (1077/8), Malikshāh's nominal authority seems to have been recognised, though twice Malikshāh had to intervene in person.³ In 484 (1091) Tutush came himself to Baghdād to pay homage to Malikshāh.⁴

Malikshāh, as stated above, did succeed at the end of his reign in establishing some kind of unity. This was due, not so much to loyalty of the members of his family towards him, for as is shown above some of them did rebel against him, but rather to his superior military strength, which enabled him to march against and defeat rebellious princes.

Tughril Beg had held his position in part by hereditary right but primarily by his own prestige and prowess, which singled him out from the other members of his family, but in measure as the emphasis began to shift, towards the end of his reign and subsequently, to a hereditary and autocratic

¹ I.A. X.88-9.

² *ibid.* 116.

³ See Gibb: *The Damascus Chronicle of the Crusades*, pp.20-1.

⁴ I.A. X.133.

basis of power, the sultān tended to appoint his successor from among his own children. In so far, however, as the tradition of the tribal period had not been completely abandoned, this inevitably met with opposition from other members of the family in cases where it involved the elevation of a child to the throne.¹ Malikshāh, and other sultāns after him, all left comparatively young boys or children to succeed them, and consequently the death of a sultān was almost always followed by struggles for supremacy among his surviving uncles, brothers and cousins. Such struggles had, admittedly, not been lacking in the earlier period also, but from the death of Malikshāh onwards, this state of affairs was more marked, partly because the situation was complicated by the growing power of the amīrs, who endeavoured to put their own nominees on the throne (see Chapter IV.). Further there was also a personal factor, which was probably not unimportant. Whereas Tughril Beg, Alp Arslān and Malikshāh had been outstanding figures, the quality of the subsequent sultāns, with the exception of Sanjar and perhaps also to a lesser degree

¹ It seems the succession of Malikshāh was disputed by Qāwurd partly because of his youth (cf. A.S.D. 56; Muḥammad Ibrāhīm, p.12,13). Similarly Sanjar opposed the succession of Mahmūd b. Muḥammad on the grounds of his youth (I.A. X.386).

of Muḥammad b. Malikshāh, was not very high.¹

On the death of Malikshāh, the superficial unity imposed towards the end of his reign collapsed, and the struggle for power immediately arose. Turkān Khātūn succeeded in placing her son Maḥmūd (b. 480 (1087/8)) on the throne,² but she was ultimately unable to defeat the opposition which crystallized round Barkyāruq, even though she eventually tried to secure the aid of Ismā'īl b. Yāqūtī from Āzerbāijān to do so.³ Tutush, ruler of Syria, also made a determined effort to obtain the sultanate, but was finally defeated by Barkyāruq in Ṣafar 487 (1094).⁴ With the failure of this attempt to unite Syria with Persia and the eastern provinces, Syria receded once more into the background. Nominally the Great Seljūq sultān was recognised in that country, but the control exerted by him over Syrian affairs was negligible. It is moreover significant that when Muḥammad b. Malikshāh sent a Seljūq army under ~~al-~~^{G. Bursuq} Bursuq to Syria in Ramaḍān 509 (1115), Seljūq vassals in

Bursuq ^{it} if they were dissipated and given to indulgence. Barkyāruq was addicted to wine (I.K. I. 251), while his entourage at the beginning of his reign seems to have been an evil one (Bu. 277). Sulaimān b. Muḥammad and his wazīr, Fakhr ud-Dīn Abū Tāhir were similarly dissipated (Bu. 212), while under Maḥmūd b. Muḥammad immorality was general (Bu. 113). Malikshāh b. Maḥmūd was also addicted to wine (R.S. 249).

² I.A. X.145.

³ *ibid.* 152; U.H.S. 74. Her death in Ramaḍān 487 (1094) was followed shortly by Maḥmūd's (I.A.X.163).

⁴ I.A. X.158; Grousset I., L.LI.

Syria united with the Christians in opposition to it.¹

Barkyāruq meanwhile established himself as sultān, and by 490 (1097), when he recovered possession of Khurāsān, of which Arslān Arghū had made himself master on the death of Malikshāh,² he was recognised over the whole of Persia with the exception of Kirmān and 'Irāq. He was not however to remain in undisputed possession for long. In 492 (1098/9) his brother Muḥammad rebelled against him, and for the next few years he was engaged in a struggle for the sultanate with Muḥammad. Finally after many vicissitudes he established in 497(1103/4) a slight supremacy, but it had been achieved only at the cost of general disorder throughout the country, and a decline in the prestige of the sultanate. Moreover by the terms of the peace Muḥammad's status was virtually that of an independent ruler. Barkyāruq was not to thwart him in the tabl in the territory from the Sefīd Rūd to the Bāb al-Abwāb, Diyār Bakr, Mawsil, Syria, 'Irāq and Ṣadaqa's domains, nor (Barkyāruq's) was his/name to be mentioned alongside Muḥammad's in these districts, and correspondence between them was to be through

¹ I.A. X.356. The object of this expedition was not merely a counter Crusade. Its intention was also to bring Syria once more under the control of the Central government - not only Frankish Syria but also Muslim Syria. But in this it failed (Cf. Grousset I.496-500).

² Bu. 236.

the medium of the two wazīrs.¹ Hence the kingdom was divided into two virtually independent principalities. On his death-bed in 498 (1105) Barkyāruq nominated his son Malikshāh as his successor, but although the khutba was read in the latter's name in Baghdād (Rabī' II.), Muḥammad soon succeeded in establishing himself as sultān (see also Chapter IV.).²

Under Muḥammad b. Malikshāh the rule of the Great Seljūq sultān extended once more over the whole of Persia, with the exception of Kirmān, and although his reign did something to restore the prestige of the sultanate, the unity of the empire was never again effectively reimposed. Rūm was virtually independent, while in Syria, although the Great Seljūq sultān was nominally recognised, he did not exert any effective control.³ Sanjar meanwhile, in Khurāsān, was nominally governor on behalf of Muḥammad, but was in fact all but independent; he was occupied in laying the foundations of his power, which was to enable him after the death of Muḥammad, to make himself sultān.

When, on the death of Muḥammad b. Malikshāh, Sanjar established himself as sultān after defeating Maḥmūd b. Muḥammad, whom Muḥammad had nominated as his successor, at Sāva (Jumādī I. 513(1119)),⁴ he did not transfer the seat of his government

¹ I.A. X.254; Bu. 239; T.G. 453.

² I.A. X.262.

³ Grousset I. 479.

⁴ I.A. X.387-8; M.Z. 47-8;

to a more central position, and allowed a Seljūq prince to rule in the Western provinces of Persia and in 'Irāq. This may have been due perhaps to the fact that he had not any personal following outside Khurāsān, or that the pressure upon the eastern frontiers of the latter province was such that he thought it unwise to absent himself permanently from that region; or, lastly, it may be that the reason was partly a personal one, for Ibn ul-Athīr states that Sanjar's mother, who was Maḥmūd's grandmother, persuaded him to make peace with Maḥmūd.¹ In any case he gave back to Maḥmūd his domains with the exception of Rei,² and himself returned to Khurāsān. The status of Maḥmūd and that of his successors was that of a malik, although they used the title of sultān. The support which Maḥmūd and the sultāns after him received from Sanjar failed moreover to deter other Seljūq princes on their own initiative or on the initiative of different amīrs and atābegs from rebelling against him. Thus the arrangement was highly unsatisfactory, and Sanjar was forced to interfere on various occasions. Khurāsān was, it seems, an unsuitable place from

¹ I.A. X.388.

² He retained Rei as a precaution in case Maḥmūd should rebel again (I.A. X.389). According to the A.S.D. he retained also Māzandarān, Tabaristān, Qumis, Dāmghān, and the district from Dombāvend to Khurāsān (p.89), while the T.G. states he kept something in the possession of his dīwān in every district (p.458).

from which to exert control over the rest of Persia and 'Irāq, and Sanjar proved quite unable either to restrain the increasing ambitions of the amīrs and atābegs or to prevent the ultimate disintegration of the empire.

iii. Directly Administered Areas.

The Seljūq empire may be divided into directly administered and indirectly administered areas. The division was not a constant one, and the extent of the area directly administered varied from time to time. The general tendency was for the directly administered areas gradually to increase up to the death of Malikshāh and subsequently to decrease.

The directly administered areas were chiefly composed of the capital and the surrounding districts. Tughril Beg levied taxes in Gīlān and Ṭabaristān and appointed governors,¹ but this perhaps scarcely amounted to direct administration. Marv, which Dā'ūd made his capital, was apparently always directly administered.² Similarly Iṣfahān,³ and possibly a

¹ Ibn Isfandiyār, p.236.

² Sanjar, when Bakhtiyār, the Ghuzz leader, asked to be assigned Marv, said, "This is the dār ul-mulk. It is not permissible for it to be an iqṭā' belonging to anyone." (I.A. XI.117).

³ Part of Iṣfahān was assigned by Sanjar to Seljūqshāh b. Muḥammad in 512 (Bu. 122; A.S.D.90).

district surrounding it extending to the confines of Rei, Qazwīn, Hamadān, Kermānshāh, Fārs, and Yazd, was directly administered throughout the major part of the period. Part of the province of Fārs, Khūzistān and 'Irāq were at various times also directly administered.¹ Baghdād was under a kind of dual control exercised by the sultān and the caliph, until the latter part of the period, when the caliphate emerged as a succession state of the Seljūq empire.² Sanjar, when he reinstated Maḥmūd b. Muḥammad as ruler of the western provinces of Persia, is said to have retained various places, including Rei, in the possession of his dīwān (see above), but these do not seem in fact to have been directly administered by him. Rei was assigned to al-Muqarrab Jawhar and subsequently to 'Abbās.³ On this occasion Sanjar also made various assignments to Tughril b. Muḥammad and Seljūqshāh b. Muḥammad, and various amīrs took or had already taken possession of different districts, so that no land remained under Maḥmūd's dīwān, and the only source of revenue remaining to him was confiscations.⁴

¹ Muhammad b. Malikshāh had an 'āmil in Khūzistān and in Fārs, which suggests that districts in those provinces were directly administered by the central government at that time (I.A. X.368; Bu. 111).

² Taxes, however, were during part of the Great Seljūq period collected by the sultān's officials in Baghdād (see Chapter II.). Mas'ūd b. Muḥammad's officials collected "illegal" taxes in Baghdād also (Bu. 178).

³ In the earlier period when Rei was the capital it was presumably directly administered (see also Chapter VI.).

⁴ Bu. 122-3.

iv. Indirectly Administered Areas.

The vast majority of the territory of the Great Seljūq empire (i.e. the area over which the Central Imperial Government had control) falls under this category. Firstly there were "settled" areas, administered by former local ruling families, secondly "tribal" areas, and thirdly areas alienated from the direct administration of the central government ^{as iqṭāʿs} (see Chapter V.I.). The extent of the territory falling under these sub-divisions was not constant, and in so far as the members of former local ruling families, in "settled" or "tribal" areas, were assigned or farmed part of the lands they formerly held, this group merges into the last group. At the beginning of the period the greater part of the country was administered by the former local ruling families as Seljūq vassals or governors. Centralisation gradually increased up to the death of Malikshāh, after which the practice of making assignments to the Turkish amīrs and others grew, until the directly ~~administered~~ areas were almost negligible. In this section only the areas administered by members of former local ruling families and tribals areas will be dealt with. The settled areas comprised chiefly such districts as were still held by the Būyids during the early years of the Great Seljūq empire, and various districts in the Caspian regions, which were ruled by local dynasties, while the tribal areas included

Arab, Kurdish and Turkomān territory.

The relations of the Great Seljūqs with the former ruling families, whether in settled areas or in tribal areas may be divided roughly into three phases. Firstly, during the early years of the Ghuzz expansion, the Seljūqs, and the Ghuzz generally, were looked upon by the local rulers as a reserve of mercenaries upon whom they could draw in their quarrels.¹ During this phase the payments the Ghuzz received from the local rulers were not tribute, as they are often represented, but rather payments to mercenaries for their services, and hence, quite naturally, when the Ghuzz left the district these payments ceased.² This phase was rapidly succeeded by another.

As the Seljūqs conquered large districts, although in some cases they drove out the former/^{local} ruler, in many cases they confirmed the latter in his possessions, or in part of them, as their vassal. Such a policy of indirect administration was

¹ The employment of the Ghuzz by Mas'ūd b. Maḥmūd and 'Alā ud-Dawla has already been mentioned.

² In 434 (1042/3) Tughril Beg imposed an annual tribute of 27,000 dīnārs on Kāmṛū (I.A. IX.348). Subsequently in 434 Tughril besieged Qazwīn, and Kāmṛū and Mardāwīj b. Bassū, whom Tughril had made governor of Jurjān in 433 (I.A. IX.340) made peace with him for 80,000 dīnārs (I.A. X.348). In 434 Tughril Beg obtained from the Salarid ruler of Tārim a sum of money (see p. 25 note 2 below), while in 454 (1062) Tughril made another expedition to Tārim and fixed a tribute of 100,000 dīnārs and 100 garments upon Musāfi, its ruler (I.A. X.15).

probably forced upon the Seljūqs by circumstances. They were nomads with little experience of settled government. Clearly they could not hand over to their fellow-tribesmen extensive territories, of which they suddenly found themselves in possession, for the latter, in addition to their inexperience of administration, in all probability looked upon the settled population merely as booty. Further in the absence of a strong central government, if the Seljūqs were to maintain control of the conquered territories they had to obtain the goodwill of the population, or at least their acquiescence. This was certainly not likely to be achieved by handing them over to the Ghuzz.¹ Moreover, not only was it in the field of administration that the Seljūqs appeared to have been unable to dispense with the help of the local ruling families; their relations with Hazārasp b. Bankīr suggest they were also in need at this time of an experienced diplomat.² The

¹ Naturally the local people preferred the rule of their own people to that of the Ghuzz. When Tughril Beg assigned Balad to Hazārasp in 448 (1056/7), the people of the country fled there (I.A. IX.432).

² On more than one occasion Hazārasp played the part of a peacemaker between Tughril Beg and the local rulers. In 448 (1056/7) Nūr ud-Dawla b. Dubais and Quraish b. Badrān sent to Hazārasp asking him to mediate for them, and he obtained pardon for them, but they refused to join Tughril unless Hazārasp went to them and gave them an oath for their safe conduct. Tughril accordingly sent him to them, but they still feared and eventually sent representatives to Tughril, but refused to go themselves (I.A. IX.433). In 451 (1059) Hazārasp again mediated for Nūr ud-Dawla with Tughril (I.A. X.5).

following incident also suggests this. When Farāmarz, ruler of Iṣfahān sent his wazīr, Abū'l Fath Rāzī, on an embassy to Tughril Beg, the latter made Abū'l Fath his wazīr.¹

The third phase, which began perhaps towards the end of Tughril Beg's reign, is marked by the establishment of administration by Seljūq officials. From this statement the Arab and Turkomān areas must, however, generally speaking, be excluded. Whereas the Kurdish and other local tribes in Persia were placed under the control of provincial governors and others, the Arab and Turkomān tribes were left chiefly under their own leaders. Throughout these different phases, but especially during the period of expansion, the relations of the Seljūqs with the local ruling families were marked - with exceptions, such as the case of the Būyid, ar-Raḥīm - by a spirit of compromise, which also characterised their relations with one another, as stated above.²

The Seljūqs probably realised that they were foreigners in the conquered territories, and that in so far as they did not exterminate former ruling families, it was essential for them to keep on good terms with these, and if possible to merge them into the Seljūq imperial structure. This was all

¹ T.S. 260-1. Eventually Abū'l Fath was allowed to resign. He then became wazīr to Abū Kālījār.

² For example when Tughril Beg demanded 200,000 dīnārs from the Salārid ruler of Tārim in 434 it was finally settled that the latter should give obedience and some money (I.A. IX.348).

the more necessary in view of the fact that the Seljūqs, generally speaking, failed to win either the goodwill or the support of the general mass of the people, between whom and the Turkish governing classes there was always some opposition. Firstly, in order to control the local leaders, hostages were taken from them. These resided at the sultān's court as a kind of insurance against rebellions by their relatives.¹ For example, Tughril Beg took one of the sons of Su'dān b. Abī'sh Shawk, the Kurd, as a hostage in 444 (1052/3),² while in 446 (1054/5) he took Abū Manṣūr Wahsūdān b. Muḥammad ar-Rāwādī's son as a hostage.³ Other sultāns also followed this practice. 'Alī b. Shahriyār, one of the sons of the Ispahbad, Shahriyār b. Qarīn as-Sarī, was sent as a hostage to Muḥammad b. Malikshāh's court.⁴ Further after Dubais made peace with the sultān and the caliph in 516 (1122/3), it was agreed that his son Manṣūr should be sent to the court as a hostage.⁵ The enlisting of tribesmen in the royal army was also, in a way, a form of taking hostages to ensure the good behaviour of the tribes to whom they belonged (see Chapter III.).

¹ Nizām ul-Mulk recommended the policy of holding hostages at court (S.N. 93).

² I.A. IX.408.

³ I.A. IX.410-11.

⁴ Ibn Isfandiyyār p.242.

⁵ I.A. X.398.

Secondly, in order to merge the former ruling families into the Seljūq imperial structure, the Seljūqs followed a policy of making marriage alliances with persons of local influence.¹ Tughril Beg married Abū 'Alī b. Abī Kālījār in 445 (1053/4) to a Seljūq woman, and made various assignments to him (see Chapter V.).² Alp Arslān married Hazārasp to his sister in 462 (1069/70), and when Hazārasp died, he gave the latter's bride to Muslim b. Quraish.³ Further Malikshāh married the latter in 479 (1086/7) to his daughter, Zulaikhā Khātūn, and assigned to him Raḥba and other places.⁴ Ibrāhīm b. Quraish was also married to a Seljūq woman, namely Ṣafiyya, Malikshāh's aunt.⁵ Dā'ūd's daughter Arslān Khatun, who had been married to the caliph al-Qā'im, was married to 'Alī b. Abī Maṣṣūr Farāmarz b. 'Alā ud-Dawla Abī Ja'far b. Kākūya in 469.⁶ Qāwurd, malik of Kirmān, followed a similar policy.

¹ The tendency to make marriage alliances with the local leaders is found even in the early period of the Ghuzz expansion. A group of Ghuzz under Kūktāsh and Maṣṣūr invited Abū Kālījār to settle with them and rule over them allying themselves to him in marriage. However when Abū Kālījār came to them they set upon him and he fled (I.A. IX.271).

² I.A. IX.404.

³ *ibid.* X.41.

⁴ *ibid.* 105.

⁵ *ibid.* 150.

⁶ Bu. 49. Arslān Khātūn had left Baghdād on hearing of the death of her brother Alp Arslān. Al-Qā'im subsequently died and she then married 'Alī b. Abī Maṣṣūr.

He is said to have had forty daughters, some of whom he gave to the Būyids, but the majority of whom he gave to the 'Alids.¹ 'Alā ud-Dawla Garchāsp b. Farāmarz b. Kākūya, governor of Yazd, was married to Sitāra, sister of Muḥammad b. Malikshāh and Sanjar.² The Mazyadids do not seem to have been incorporated in this way until Mas'ūd b. Muḥammad gave his daughter in marriage to Ṣadaqa b. Dubais b. Ṣadaqa in 531 (1136/7) in order to have a hold over him,³ while in 532 (1129) Mas'ūd was married to Ṣufrā, the daughter of Dubais b. Ṣadaqa.⁴ 'Ali b. Shahriyār b. Qarīn was offered by Muḥammad b. Malikshāh the hand of his sister in marriage, but he, fearing the jealousy of his elder brother, suggested the honour should be accorded to his elder brother. The sultān approved this suggestion and the marriage contract was drawn up.⁵ The Ispahbad Tāj ul-Mulūk b. 'Alī b. Mardāwīj was also married to a sister of Sanjar.⁶

¹ Muhammad Ibrāhīm, p.13. The policy of making marriage alliances was also followed by the Seljūqs in their relations with external rulers, such as the Ghaznavids and the Khāqān.

² I.A. X.387; U.H.S. 69.

³ I.A. XI.30.

⁴ *ibid.* 43; I.K. I.506; M.Z. 99.

⁵ Ibn Isfandiyār, p.243.

⁶ *ibid.* p.66.

The most important local ruling family in Persia and 'Irāq at the time of the advent of the Seljūqs was the Būyid.¹ On the death of Jalāl ud-Dawla in 435 (1044), his nephew Abū Kālījār successfully disputed the succession with his heir al-'Azīz.² In 437 (1045/6) he prepared to challenge Ibrāhīm Yanāl, who was pushing his raids into the S.W. Jibāl and Lūristān, but was incapacitated by an outbreak of disease among his transport animals. Meanwhile Abū Maṣṣūr b. 'Alā ud-Dawla, who had rebelled against Abū Kālījār, went to Kirmān and gave allegiance to Tughril Beg, but on the latter's return to Khurāsān in 437 he returned to the allegiance of Abū Kālījār.³ Subsequently Tughril besieged him in Iṣfahān for nearly a year, and when he finally took the city he assigned to Abū Maṣṣūr the districts of Yazd and Abarqūya.⁴ In 439 (1047/8) Abū Kālījār resolved to ally himself with the Seljūqs. Tughril Beg welcomed his advances and instructed

¹ In this section I am much indebted to the article by Bowen entitled *The Last of the Buwayhids* (J.R.A.S. 1929, pt.II.). The territories in the possession of the Būyids at this time comprised only 'Irāq, Khūzistān, Fārs, Kirmān and Umān. Mas'ūd had conquered Iṣfahān from them (Bowen, p. 228). Tughril Beg when he defeated Mas'ūd told Farāmarz b. Kākū that he should be given Iṣfahān and Rei (B. 788).

² Al-'Azīz spent the next five years moving from one provincial court to another begging assistance wherewith to assert his rights, but always in vain. He tried to obtain help, among others, from Ibrāhīm Yanāl (Bowen p.233).

³ I.A. IX.361.

⁴ *ibid.* 385.

Ibrāhīm Yanāl to encroach no further upon Būyid territory. The pact was cemented by the marriage of Tughril to a daughter of Abū Kālījār and Fūlād Sutūn b. Abī Kālījār/^{married a daughter} of Dā'ūd.¹ This alliance divided the Būyids into two groups, and Tughril was able to use one in defeating the other.² On two occasions he actually helped Fūlād against ar-Raḥīm with reinforcements; once in 444 (1052/3) and again in 446 (1054/5) when he supplied him with a force of Turkomāns to conquer Khūzistān.³ On this occasion Fūlād succeeded in driving ar-Raḥīm back into 'Irāq. In 447 when Tughril Beg entered Baghdād he assigned Kermānshāh to Abū 'Alī b. Kālījār (see Chapter V.)⁴ and meanwhile seized and killed ar-Raḥīm.⁵ This latter event marked the end of the Būyids as a dynasty, but a branch of the Būyid family still continued to rule in Yazd as Seljūq governors for some time. Muḥammad b. Dushmanziyār b. 'Alā ud-Dawla Abī Ja'far b. Kākūya was governor of that city under Barkyāruq,⁶ while 'Alā ud-Dawla Garchāsp b. Farāmarz b. Kākūya was in the service of Muḥammad b. Malikshāh⁷ and

¹ Bowen p.233-4.

² See Bowen pp.234-7.

³ I.A. IX.414.

⁴ ibid. 422.

⁵ ibid. 421.

⁶ I.A. X.220-1.

⁷ Bu. 122.

governor of Yazd under Mahmūd b. Muḥammad.¹

In the Caspian provinces there were various local dynasties. Tughril Beg's relations with the Salārids of Tārim have already been mentioned. The Ispahbads in Tabaristān continued to rule locally throughout the Great Seljūq period. Nuṣrat ud-Dīn Rustam b. 'Alī b. Shahriyār b. Qarīn's power extended over Jājarm, Jurjān, Bistām and Dāmghān to Muqān,² but the rule of the other members of this dynasty was not over such an extensive area. A Seljūq army under Mas'ūd b. Muḥammad, sent by Sanjar to Astarābād to take Shahriyār Kūh from the Ispahbad, Ḥusām ud-Dawla Shahriyār b. Qarīn, was severely defeated in 521 (1127), and Mas'ūd, having lost half his army, fled with Jāwulī to Jurjān.³ Sanjar, infuriated by this reverse, sent Bazghash to avenge it, but the latter was eventually recalled by Sanjar without having achieved any success.⁴

¹ I.A. X.387. When he delayed in coming to pay homage to Mahmūd, the latter assigned Yazd to Qarāja as-Sāqī, and 'Alā ud-Dawla joined Sanjar.

² Ibn Isfandiyār, p.60.

³ ibid. 246. The cause for this expedition was that Sanjar had commanded the Ispahbad to wait on him. The latter, on the ground of his advanced age, apologized and offered to send his sons instead. Sanjar, angered at this, sent Mas'ūd against him. The Ispahbad was joined by Kiyā Buzurg ad-Dā'ī ilā' l Haqq (b. al-) Ḥādī with 5000 Dailamites and afterwards by his son, Shāhi Ghāzī.

⁴ Ibn Isfandiyār, p.246.

At different times various Seljūq princes and others took refuge with the Ispahbads. Mas'ūd b. Muḥammad twice went to 'Alā ud-Dawla 'Alī b. Shahriyār b. Qarīn, firstly when al-Mustarshid was assassinated (529/1135), and secondly when he quarrelled with Tughril b. Muḥammad, he brought his women-folk thither and placed them in the palace of the Ispahbad's son, Shāhi Ghāzī, and himself received help to enable him to return to 'Irāq.¹ Tughril himself, after being defeated by Mas'ūd in Rajab 527 (1133), also fled to the Ispahbad in Ṭabaristān.² Ṣadaqa, ruler of Ḥilla, was another who took refuge with the Ispahbad on one occasion.³

The Kurds formed an important element in the population of the Great Seljūq empire. They were found chiefly in Kurdistān and al-Jazīra. They took an active part in the struggles between the Seljūqs under Ibrāhīm Yanāl and the Būyids. Su'da b. Abī 'sh Shawk, owing to family quarrels, joined Ibrāhīm Yanāl, who promised to conquer for Su'da what his father had held, and sent a body of Ghuzz with him to Ḥulwān.⁴ Subsequently Su'da was captured by his uncle Muḥalhil and Surkhāb. In 439 (1047/8) some of the Kurds together with a section of Surkhāb's army seized the latter because of his oppression

¹ Ibn Isfandiyār p.59.

² Bu. 155; Ibn Isfandiyār, p.59.

³ Ibn Isfandiyār, p.60.

⁴ I.A.IX.363.

and took him to Ibrāhīm Yanāl, who demanded the release of Su‘da. Surkhāb refused this demand, but his son, ‘Askar, set Su‘da free, and came to Ibrāhīm to ask for Surkhāb's release. Ibrāhīm refused and so ‘Askar wrote to the caliph and Abū Kālījār offering them obedience.¹ The following year Ibrāhīm Yanāl made an agreement with Su‘da, that the latter should conquer whatever was not in his (Ibrāhīm's) possession. Su‘da accordingly conquered ad-Daskara and the surrounding country.² Subsequently in 445 (1053/4) Badr b. Abī’sh Shawk came to Tughril Beg and asked him to send to Su‘da to obtain his uncle Muhalhil's release. Su‘da thereupon returned to the allegiance of ar-Rahīm, but was defeated by Ibrāhīm Ishāq and Sakht Kamān whom Tughril had sent with Badr.³

The Kurdish dynasty of the Marwānids, although one of the more important local ruling families at this time, was nevertheless unable to resist the Seljūqs effectively. In 441 (1049/50) the khutba was read by Naṣr b. Marwān in the name of Tughril Beg,⁴ and in 448 (1056/7) when Tughril besieged Hazīra b. ‘Umar, which belonged to Naṣr, the latter sent to him promising to pay tribute, and subsequently sent

¹ I.A. IX.366.

² *ibid.* 376.

³ *ibid.* 408.

⁴ *ibid.* 372.

to Tughril many presents, including 100,000 dīnārs.¹ During the reign of Malikshāh the Marwānid ruler tried to re-establish his independence, and read the khutba and struck coins in his own name. Malikshāh accordingly assigned Diyār Bakr to Fakhr ud-Dawla b. Jahīr in 476 (1083/4), and sent him with an army to conquer it.² In 478 (1085/6) Fakhr ud-Dawla also conquered Amid, Mayyāfāriqīn and Jazīra b. 'Umar from the Marwāhids.³ This was virtually the end of Marwānid rule, although the last Marwānid possession, al-Hattakh (var. السلخ) was not finally lost to Ḥusām ud-Dīn Tīmūrtāsh b. Ilghāzī, the Urtuqid, till 532 (1137/8).⁴

Although the Marwānid kingdom was thus destroyed, the Kurdish tribal areas were not thereafter directly administered by the Great Seljūqs. The majority probably remained under their local chieftains, many of whom were little more than highway robbers.⁵ Moreover since one of the principal Kurdish areas fell within the governorship of Mawṣil it was the ruler of that district, rather than the sultān, who had

¹ I.A. IX.433. Bundārī states that when Alp Arslān came to Diyār Bakr in 463 Naṣr b. Marwān offered him 100,000 dīnārs, which sum he returned (p.36).

² I.A.X.83.

³ *ibid.* 93.

⁴ I.A. XI.43.

⁵ When Alp Arslān heard a body of Kurds were practising highway robbery in the district of Hulwān, he sent an army against them and made Beg Arslān governor of that district (A.S.D. 34-5).

to solve the Kurdish problem.¹

In 'Irāq and al-Jazīra there was in addition to the Kurdish problem, an Arab problem, and this the Great Seljūqs never really solved. The slightest weakening of the central government was usually followed by disorders on the part of the bedouin.² Further, generally speaking the Arabs of this region, and to some extent the Kurds also, had Shi'a leanings, and accordingly were ready to support 'Alid movements against the Seljūqs. This was not due, however, only to sectarian differences, but also to a general inclination of the tribes to support a distant ruler, in this case the Fāṭimid caliph of Egypt, rather than a near one.

At the beginning of the period the 'Uqailids were the most powerful of the Arab rulers. Quraish b. Badrān apparently in the beginning thought it wise to side with the Seljūqs, and

¹ Jayūsh Beg, governor of Mawṣil (509 (1115/6)) attacked and took many of the fortresses belonging to the Hakkāriyya, Zūzān, and Bashnawīyya Kurds, and dispersed the Kurds so that the roads were made safe and the people reassured. Later Zangī, ruler of Mawṣil, in person and through his deputy Nasīr ud-Dīn Juqur, attempted to subdue the Kurdish tribal area within his domains, for these Kurds preyed upon the population of the neighbourhood and laid the country waste. In 528 (1133/4) he reduced the Hamīdiyya Kurds, took a number of fortresses which belonged to the Muhrān-iyya, and also seized 'Alī, the leader of the Rabiyya (I.A. XI.7-9): and in 541 (1146/7) he besieged Ḥusām ud-Dīn al-Bashnawī because he did not wish there to be a malik in the middle of his domains (I.A. XI.71). After the death of Zangī, Zain ud-Dīn 'Alī assigned the Hakkāriyya country to Qarāja, ruler of the 'Imādiyya, and conquered the remaining fortresses of the Hakkāriyya (I.A. XI.8).

² The death of both Tughril Beg and Malikshāh was followed by outbreaks of the bedouins of 'Irāq (I.A. X.17, 147).

when Tughril Beg came to Baghdād in 447^(1055/6) he joined him.¹ In the following year he was captured by Nūr ud-Dawla Dubais and al-Basāsīrī when they defeated Qutulmish, with whom Quraish had been. They seem to have won him over^{to} the 'Alid cause, and all went to Mawṣil, where they read the khutba in the name of the Fāṭimid al-Mustanṣir.² It may be that Quraish had realised that the Seljūqs were more powerful than he had originally thought, and that were he to side with them he would merely become a vassal, or perhaps even be gradually dispossessed of his possessions altogether, and hence threw in his lot with the opposing forces.

Tughril Beg's relations with him are marked ~~with~~ by the usual spirit of compromise; he attempted by means of assignments to incorporate the 'Uqailīd domains within the Great Seljūq empire. He marched on Mawṣil when Quraish, Nūr ud-Dawla and al-Basāsīrī rebelled, but made peace with Quraish and Nūr ud-Dawla, and assigned Nahr ul-Malik, Bādūrayā, Anbār, Hīt, Dujail, Nahr Baiṭar, 'Ukbarā, Awānā, Takrīt, Mawṣil and Naṣībīn to the former.³ Subsequently in 450⁽¹⁰⁵⁵⁾ al-Basāsīrī again joined Quraish, but when Tughril marched on Mawṣil they fled to Naṣībīn.⁴ Meanwhile Ibrāhīm Yanāl rebelled.

¹ I.A. IX.419.

² *ibid.* 430.

³ *ibid.* 433; Bu. 12.

⁴ *ibid.* 440.

Tughril was forced to go in pursuit of him to Hamadān, whereupon al-Basāsīrī, Quraish and others came to Baghdād and read the khutba in the name of the Fāṭimid caliph.¹ A further attempt was made to bring the 'Uqailids into closer relations with the Great Seljūq empire, when Sharaf ud-Dīn Muslim b. Quraish, who succeeded his father in 453 (1061), was married, as stated above, to Alp Arslān's sister. Alp Arslān, when he came to Baghdād in 458 (1066), also assigned to Muslim b. Quraish Hīt, Anbar, Ḥarbā as-Sinn and al-Bawāzīj;² but this was probably merely official recognition of Muslim's possession of these places.³

During the reign of Malikshāh, the 'Uqailids began temporarily to expand westwards. In 472 (1079/80) Sharaf ud-Dawla took Aleppo in the absence of Tutush, who had conquered it in the previous year, and Malikshāh, in answer to his request, confirmed him as farmer of that city.⁴ Subsequently Muslim b. Quraish tried once more to obtain help from the

¹ I.A. IX.440-3.

² *ibid.* X.35.

³ It seems that Alp Arslān subsequently became displeased with Muslim b. Quraish, and shortly before the sultān's death the latter set out with the naqīb un-nuqabā for Alp Arslān's court. While on the way news of Alp Arslān's death reached them and so they joined Malikshāh and were present with him in his battle with Qāwurd (I.A. X.54).

⁴ I.A. X.74.

Fāṭimids, and in 474 (1081/2) he appealed to the Fāṭimid caliph for aid to surround Damascus in Tutush's absence on the Syrian coast. The latter, however, returned and defeated Muslim.¹ Meanwhile it seems that Malikshāh determined to reduce the power of the 'Uqailids and in 477 (1084/5) he sent 'Amīd ud-Dawla b. Jahīr to take Mawṣil, sending with him Aqsunqur and Urtuq b. Aksab.² Muslim b. Quraish had meanwhile been reinforced by Ibn Marwān, and eventually Malikshāh himself set out to conquer Muslim's domains, but when news reached him of Takash's rebellion in Khurāsān, he returned and sent Mu'ayyad ul-Mulk b. Nizām ul-Mulk to Muslim to make peace with him. Mu'ayyad ul-Mulk then brought Muslim b. Quraish to Malikshāh to whom he paid homage.³ Muslim b. Quraish was subsequently killed at Antioch in battle with Sulaimān b. Qutulmish, who had refused to pay him tribute. Sulaimān then took possession of Aleppo.⁴ The power of the 'Uqailids disappeared with Sharaf ud-Dawla Muslim b. Quraish. Various members of

¹ I.A. X.82.

² *ibid.* 87; Bu. 70-1.

³ I.A. X.86-8; A.M. 14; Q. 117. Muslim b. Quraish bribed Urtuq to let him escape, and after this Malikshāh sent Mu'ayyad ul-Mulk to him (Bu. 70).

⁴ I.A. X.91.

his family held minor posts subsequently, but none attained to his influence and power.¹ In 479 (1086/7), Malikshāh assigned Raḥba and the surrounding districts, Ḥarrān, Sārūj, Raqqā and Khābūr to Muḥammad b. Muslim b. Quraish,² but in 482 (1089/90) Malikshāh seized his brother Ibrāhīm and sent Fakhr ud-Dawla b. Jahīr to Mawṣil, which he conquered.³

With the disappearance of the 'Uqailids, the only important Arab kingdom remaining within the Great Seljūq Empire was that of the Mazyadids of Ḥilla, who became the leaders of the Arab revolt in 'Irāq and the neighbourhood against the Seljūqs. The Mazyadids were Shī'as, and their tendency to support the 'Alid movement has already been noted. During the reign of Malikshāh the Mazyadids began to increase in importance. This was due perhaps to the fact that the influence of the 'Uqailids was on the wane in al-Jazīra, and that they were looking westwards rather than eastwards for expansion; the Mazyadids hence had no important Arab rivals to contend with, and the Great Seljūqs moreover at this time had apparently little desire to administer the Arab tribal area directly.⁴

¹ Sālīm b. Malik still held Ja'bar in 540 (1145/6), which Malikshāh had given to the 'Uqailid ruler when he had taken Aleppo (I.A. XI.71).

² I.A. X.105.

³ ibid. 149.

⁴ Their inability to do so was probably one of the reasons which induced them to keep the Mazyadids in power. When the Banī 'Amir plundered Baṣra in 483 (1090/1) Gawhar A'in went with Ṣadaqa to Baṣra to right the matter (I.A. X.122). When Muḥammad b. Malikshāh assigned Kūfā to Qā'imāz in 498 (1104/5), he ordered

In 474 (1081) Bahā ud-Dawla Maṣṣūr b. Dubais was confirmed in his father's possessions and an annual tribute of 40,000 dīnārs placed upon him.¹ He died in 479 (1086) and was succeeded by his brother Saif ud-Dawla Ṣadaqa,² who became a powerful figure in 'Irāq and al-Jazīra. Ṣadaqa's policy after the death of Malikshāh was to weaken the position of the Great Seljūqs by encouraging their internal dissensions, thereby to enable him to establish his independence. To a considerable extent he succeeded, but two principal factors limited his influence. In the first place he was a Shī'a, and hence the caliph, although he was obliged on various occasions to turn to Ṣadaqa for help, (see Chapter VIII.) was ultimately an obstacle to the latter's expansion, in the same way as Ṣadaqa for his part limited the caliph's power. Secondly Ṣadaqa's power was based chiefly upon the Arab tribes round Hilla and to some extent on the Kurdish tribes in that neighbourhood also, and these formed a somewhat unstable basis of power.

(Continuation of Note 4 of previous page.)

Ṣadaqa to protect Qā'imāz from the Khafāja (I.A. X.272-3). On the other hand during the reign of Tughril Beg, the Seljūqs had had direct relations with the Khafāja. In 452 (1157) Tughril reinstated Muḥammad b. al-Akram al-Khafāji as amīr of the Banī Khafāja and returned to him the governorship of Kūfā, and farmed to him his (Tughril's) private domains there (I.A. X.8; see also Chapter V.).

¹ Bu. 67; I.A. X.78.

² I.A. X.99; see also E.I. article Ṣadaqa b. Maṣṣūr.

Broadly speaking, their desires were limited by plunder and they had little interest in making permanent territorial conquests. Further, Ṣadaqa, in spite of his influence in Ḥilla, was not able to exert a close control over the Arab tribes such as the 'Ubāda or the Khafājā.¹

At first Ṣadaqa supported Barkyāruq, but nevertheless withheld his annual tribute, and when Barkyāruq sent his wazīr, Abū'l Maḥāsin ad-Dihistānī to him in 494 (1101) demanding over 1,000,000 dīnārs which had become due over a number of years, Ṣadaqa read the khutba in the name of Muḥammad b. Malik-shāh.² In spite of Barkyāruq's efforts to make peace, Ṣadaqa refused to agree unless Abū'l Maḥāsin was surrendered to him, and when Barkyāruq refused to do this, he went to Kūfa and seized Abū'l Maḥāsin's iqṭā', and turned out from it the sultān's deputy.³ From then on Ṣadaqa opposed Barkyāruq in 'Irāq.⁴

¹ When the Khafāja and 'Ubāda quarrelled in 499 (1105/6), Ṣadaqa secretly helped the Khafāja (I.A. X.276), but subsequently summoned the 'Ubāda and offered to help them take vengeance on the Khafāja (I.A. X.290-1).

² I.A. X.209.

³ *ibid.* 209-10.

⁴ In 496 (1102/3) Ṣadaqa made a pact of loyalty to Muḥammad b. b. Malikshāh with Ilghāzī and Suqmān and Yanāl (I.A. X.243). Suqmān, Ilghāzī and Ṣadaqa then began to plunder the country whereupon the caliph sent to Ṣadaqa asking him to stop this. He agreed on condition Sumishtegīn, Barkyāruq's shihna was turned out of Baghdād, and this was done in Rabi' II.496 (I.A. X.247). In Jumādī I.497(1104), Ilghāzī, however, read the khutba in Baghdād in the name of Barkyāruq, whereupon Ṣadaqa sent to the caliph threatening to turn out Ilghāzī (I.A. X.255).

Once Muḥammad b. Malikshāh had succeeded Barkyāruq as sultān, Ṣadaqa no longer continued to support him,¹ perhaps because as sultān he was likely to curb Ṣadaqa's power. Finally in 501 (1107) he rebelled. The immediate cause of this was that Muḥammad b. Malikshāh had demanded from Ṣadaqa the surrender of Abū Dūlaf Surkhāb b. Kai Khusraw, governor of Sāva and Ava, who had taken refuge from Muḥammad with him.² Ṣadaqa refused to surrender him. The caliph then sent to Ṣadaqa forbidding him to oppose the sultān, who also sent to him asking him to join him in a jihād against the Franks. Ṣadaqa again refused, and so Muḥammad prepared to march against him.³ The former, encouraged by assurances of support from Ilghāzī and Jāwulī Saqāwū, determined to fight. The caliph meanwhile tried to negotiate for peace between the two parties,

¹ It is true, however, that in 499 (1105/6) at Muḥammad b. Malikshāh's request he besieged and defeated Ismā'il Arslān-jīq in Baṣrā, after which he appointed a nā'ib over Baṣrā. Muḥammad subsequently sent a shihna and a nā'ib to that city (I.A. X.284).

² Ṣadaqa's court had become a refuge for those in disgrace whether from the caliph or the sultān, Tāj ur-Ru'asā, son of the sister of Amīn ud-Dawla Abū Sa'd b. al-Mawṣilāyā, who had been accused by Barkyāruq's wazīr of inclining the caliph towards Muḥammad b. Malikshāh took refuge with him in Rabī' I.495 (December 1102/January 1103) (I.A. X.241-2). Abū'l Qāsim 'Alī b. Jahīr, who had been dismissed from the caliph's wazirate also took refuge with Ṣadaqa in Ṣafar 500 (1106) (I.A. X.305).

³ The 'amīd, Abū Ja'far Muḥammad b. al-Ḥusain al-Balkhī, had meanwhile made mischief between Ṣadaqa and Muḥammad, saying Ṣadaqa's power and independence had increased (I.A. X.306).

but failed. Ṣadaqa was then killed in the ensuing battle in Rajab 501 (1109).¹

This revolt of Ṣadaqa was not only due to the question of his "honour" and his refusal to surrender Surkhāb b. Kai Khusraw, which furnished the immediate reason for it, but was probably also the avowed revolt of the Arab element against the hegemony of the Turkish element.² With the death of Ṣadaqa this movement largely collapsed. It no longer threatened the Great Seljūqs in 'Irāq, although Dubais b. Ṣadaqa, whom Muḥammad appointed to succeed his father,³ it is true, intrigued against the Seljūqs until the end of his life, and lost no opportunity of urging minor Seljūq princes to rebel. His position and influence was, however, greatly inferior to that of Ṣadaqa.⁴ When Muḥammad made him ruler of Ḥilla, he also appointed Sa'īd b. Ḥamīd al-'Umarī, Ṣadaqa's ṣāhib jaish, to be governor of Ḥilla.⁵ It seems, moreover, that Muḥammad took

¹ I.A. X.307-11.

² cf. Grousset I.519.

³ I.A. X.314.

⁴ He held at one time apparently the office of deputy shihna of 'Irāq, from which he was dismissed in 513 (1119/20) (I.A. X.394). It does not seem that the sultān any longer relied upon the Mazyadid ruler to control the bedouin. When the Banī Khafājā in 536 (1141/2) created disorders in 'Irāq, Mas'ūd b. Muḥammad sent troops against them (I.A. XI.59,60).

⁵ I.A. X.330.

Dubais away with him, and that he only returned to Hilla on the accession of Maḥmūd b. Muḥammad.¹ The appointment of Dubais in spite of his father's revolt is in keeping with the Great Seljūq policy of toleration and compromise, and also perhaps significant of the inability of the Great Seljūqs to administer Arab areas except through their own leaders. Nevertheless Dubais ~~probably~~ lost control more and more over the Arab tribes and it ^{is probably} ~~was~~ largely ~~to~~ this cause that the decline of the Mazyadids ^{is to} ~~can~~ be ascribed.

In the family struggles of the various Seljūq princes after the death of Muḥammad b. Malikshāh, and in the struggles between the Seljūqs and the caliph in 'Irāq and the neighbourhood, Dubais played an active part. His efforts were not however attended by the success that Ṣadaqa's efforts were. He failed to extend his influence in 'Irāq or al-Jazīra. Moreover, on two occasions he was forced to leave the neighbourhood and to go to Syria. Finally he was killed by Mas'ūd b. Muḥammad outside Khūy in 529 (1134).²

¹ A.M. 42; Bu.111.

² I.A. XI.18; Kamāl ud-Dīn, p.664; T.M. f.165b. In the struggle between Maḥmūd and Mas'ūd, the sons of Muḥammad, Dubais sided with the latter (I.A. X.395), and when Mas'ūd was defeated by Maḥmūd in 514 (1120), he plundered 'Irāq in spite of remonstrances from the caliph and the sultān (I.A. X.397-8; M.Z. 55). Finally the caliph sent al-Bursuqī to turn Dubais out of Hilla in 516 (1122); al-Bursuqī was defeated (I.A. X.422), but in the following year (517) he avenged his defeat, and Dubais went to Syria (I.A. X.430). Subsequently the latter joined Tughril b. Muḥammad, whom he induced to attack 'Irāq in 518 (1124/5) (I.A. X.441; Q.210).

Dubais was succeeded by his son Ṣadaqa, on whose death in the battle between Mas'ūd b. Muḥammad and Dā'ūd b. Maḥmūd in 532 (1137), Mas'ūd appointed Muḥammad b. Dubais to succeed him, with Muḥalhil b. Abī'l 'Askar to administer his affairs.¹ Muḥammad b. Dubais was turned out by his brother 'Alī in 540 (1145).² As a result of numerous complaints against the latter's

(Continuation of Note 2 on previous page.)

When, however, the caliph and al-Bursuqī marched to meet them they left 'Irāq and eventually joined Sanjar in Khurāsān (I.A. X.445). There Dubais continued to make trouble, and finally induced Sanjar to set out for 'Irāq, having told him that Maḥmūd b. Muḥammad and the caliph had agreed to oppose him (I.A. X.459). On his return to Khurāsān, Sanjar sent Dubais to Maḥmūd, and ordered the latter to reinstate him in Hilla.

In 523 (1129) Maḥmūd b. Muḥammad's wife, Sanjar's daughter, who was occupied with Dubais' affairs and in averting evil from him, died, and from then on he was treated with less leniency by Maḥmūd. In the same year Maḥmūd fell ill in Hamadān; Dubais thereupon seized one of his sons, and went to Hilla, which he reached in Ramadān. Maḥmūd sent Qizil and Aḥmadīlī after Dubais, and shortly afterwards followed them to 'Irāq himself. The caliph meanwhile had assembled troops, and Dubais after failing to win the satisfaction of either the caliph or Maḥmūd, plundered Baṣrā and went to Syria (I.A. X.461). There he was captured by Tāj ul-Mulūk Būrī, who handed him over to Zangī (I.A. X.470). He remained with Zangī and came with him to 'Irāq in 526 (1132); ~~when~~ Mas'ūd b. Muḥammad, Seljūqshāh b. Muḥammad and the caliph, having made an alliance against Sanjar, the latter ordered them to attack 'Irāq (I.A. X.477). They were, however, defeated by the caliph (I.A. X.478). After this Dubais never again regained his position.

¹ I.A. XI.40.

² *ibid.* 69,70.

oppression, Mas'ūd b. Muḥammad finally assigned Ḥilla to Salārkurd in 542 (1147/8),¹ but in the following year (543) 'Alī recovered possession of Ḥilla.² On his death in 545 (1150) the Mazyadid territories were absorbed by the Zangids.

In Fārs there were various tribal areas. Generally speaking these were not directly administered. The most important of the tribes in Fārs were the Shabānkāra. Alp Arslān made an expedition against them in 459 (1067).³ Faḍlūya, the Shabānkāra leader, afterwards revolted and was defeated by Nizām ul-Mulk.⁴ By 492 (1098/9) the Shabānkāra had, however, increased in power and gained the mastery over Fārs owing to the disputes among the other tribes there. Unar was sent against them by Turkān Khātūn, but in spite of an initial victory he was unable to hold the province.⁵ Subsequently Jāwulī Saqāwū subdued the Shabānkāra and other tribes in Fārs and dismantled various castles,⁶ but since he had been assigned Fārs, the problem of controlling the tribal areas of Fārs was not the direct concern of the sultān. During the

¹ I.A. XI.80-1.

² *ibid.* 88.

³ I.A. X.37; R.S. 118.

⁴ E.I. Article on the Shabānkāra.

⁵ I.A. X.192.

⁶ F.N. 157-8, 167.

reign of Mahmūd b. Muḥammad there was another insurrection of the Shabānkāra owing to the wazīr Naṣīr b. 'Alī ad-Darkazīnī ill-treating them.¹

Lastly there was the problem of the Turkomān tribes. Firstly there were those tribes who entered Persia with or about the same time as the Seljūqs, and secondly those who remained in Central Asia and moved into Khurāsān and the neighbourhood towards the end of the Great Seljūq period, and finally overran Khurāsān on the death of Sanjar. Of the first group many pushed on into Asia Minor and Syria and do not concern us here. Others remained in the provinces over which the central government exercised control. Some of these were incorporated into the service of the sultān (see Chapter III.), but the majority continued to follow a nomadic or semi-nomadic existence. This involved not only a constant movement from summer to winter pastures, but also migration in search of new pastures.² The general tendency throughout the period was for the tribes to continue to move in a westerly direction, especially towards Syria.³ The main concentrations of

¹ E.I. Article on Shabānkāra.

² For example, a tribe of Turkomāns named Ṣalghar, under a certain Qarābulī, came to Surkhāb b. Badr b. Muhalhil's country in search of new pastures. Surkhāb opposed them, but they defeated him, and spread through his domains with the exception of Duqūq and Shahrazūr (I.A. X.238).

³ In 527 (1132/3) a numerous body of Turkomāns from al-Jazīra crossed into Syria and raided Tripolis (I.A. X.480-1).

Turkomāns were to be found in al-Jazīra,¹ 'Irāq,² and Āzerbāijān,³ and to some extent in Khūzistān also.⁴ Such concentrations were not however necessarily constant throughout the Great Seljūq period.

Until the death of Malikshāh the Turkomān problem did not become acute. The power of the central government held them in check. The weakening of the Great Seljūq empire on the death of Malikshāh and the subsequent dissolution of the kingdom created by Tutush in Syria restored the freedom of the Turkomāns, and within two or three years several of them had succeeded in founding independent principalities.⁵ Several of them were officers of the sulṭān, notably Ilghāzī b. Urtuq, who was shihna of Baghdād on behalf of Muḥammad b. Malikshāh in 495 (1101/2),⁶ and this fact, that the Turkomāns were officers of the sultāns, helped them to transform themselves quickly into small territorial princes, when the central authority declined.

¹ Barkyāruq met a large group of Turkomāns when he went from Baghdād to Shahrāzur in 493 (1099/1100) (I.A. X.199).

² When Mas'ūd al-Bilālī, Albaqish Kūn Khar, and Tarshah came to 'Irāq in 549 (1154/5), many Turkomāns with their families and flocks joined them (I.A. XI.129).

³ Ismā'il b. Yāqūtī, when he set out from Āzerbāijān to join Türkān Khātūn to aid her against Barkyāruq, assembled many of the Turkomāns (I.A. X.152).
(1135-6)

⁴ Dā'ūd b. Maḥmūd after his defeat at Marāgha in 530, assembled many Turkomāns and others in Khūzistān, and their numbers exceeded 10,000 horse (I.A. XI.30).

⁵ Gibb: The Damascus Chronicle, p.25.

⁶ I.A. X.225; Tutush also appointed a Turkomān shihna of Baghdād, named Yusuf b. Abaq in 488 (1095) (I.A. X.166).

Various Turkomān leaders succeeded in establishing themselves in some strong fortress, which formed a point of union and refuge for plundered riches¹; but by far the most important Turkoman leaders were the Urtuqids, who became the rulers of Diyār Bakr and elsewhere. The kingdom they founded resembled on a smaller scale the Seljūq kingdom in so far as the same tendency to divide the kingdom among different members of the family, one of whom was the ruling khān, is found, but whereas the Seljūqs eventually maintained themselves by the support of Turkish slaves and freedmen, the basis of the Urtuqid power during the Great Seljūq period remained nomadic. The centre of Ilghāzī's power was Diyār Bakr, and not Syria, which was the scene of most of his activities, apart from the period when he was shihna of Baghdād, and for every campaign he had to return to Diyār Bakr to assemble his Turkomān followers.²

The founder of Urtuqid power was Urtuq b. Aksab, who as governor of Hulwān was sent by Malikshāh to help Fakhr ud-Dawla b. Jahīr, who was besieging Sharaf ud-Dawla Muslim b. Quraish in Āmid in 447 (1055/6). The latter bribed him to

¹ Such a one was Qipchāq b. Arslān of Shahrāzūr. No one attacked him because of the impregnable nature of the country in which he had established himself, and his power and the number of his Turkomān followers increased, until Zangī attacked and defeated him in 534 (1139/40) (I.A. X.150).

² Cahen: Diyar Bakr ... J.A. 1936, p.237.

effect his escape,¹ and Urtuq, knowing this would compromise him with Malīkshāh, entered the service of Tutush and became governor of Jerusalem on the latter's behalf in 479 (1086/7).² This tendency of the Turkomāns to unite with the Arabs was a marked feature of the time, and is seen especially in the subsequent relations of the Urtuqids and the Mazyadids. Dubais b. Ṣadaqa was married to a daughter of Īlghāzī³ and he took refuge with the latter from the caliph and the sultān in 515 (1121/2).⁴ Further Īlghāzī and Suqmān b. Urtuq had united with Ṣadaqa and Yanāl in support of Muḥammad b. Malikshāh against his brother Barkyāruq in 496.⁵ This alliance between the Urtuqids and the Mazyadids was temporarily disturbed in 497 (1104) when Īlghāzī read the khutba in Baghdād in the name of Barkyāruq after the latter had made peace with Muḥammad,⁶ whereupon Ṣadaqa threatened to turn Īlghāzī out of Baghdād. However, when Ṣadaqa rebelled against Muḥammad in (1107-8) 501/, Īlghāzī assured him of his support.⁷

¹ I.A. X.86; Bu. 70. According to Bundārī, Urtuq was angered at the domination of Fakhr ud-Dawla.

² I.A. X.96; I.K. I.171.

³ I.A. X.395.

⁴ I.A.D. ⁵ 398.

⁵ I.A. X.243.

⁶ *ibid.* 272.

⁷ *ibid.* 308.

Urtuq was succeeded in 484 (1091) by his son Suqmān, to whom Tutush assigned Jerusalem, and when the Fāṭimids took that city in 489 (1096), Suqmān went to ar-Ruhā and Ilghāzī to 'Irāq,¹ where he eventually became shihna of Baghdād as stated above. Gradually the Urtuqids began to increase their power. Suqmān b. Urtuq came to help Mūsā, the Turkomān governor of Mawṣil against Jigirmish in 495 (1101/2) and Mūsā gave him Kaifā.² Yāqūtī b. Urtuq took Mārdīn in 498 (1104/5), which district subsequently passed into the possession of Suqmān.³ Meanwhile Balak b. Urtuq who had lost Sārūj to the Franks had taken Anā and al-Ḥadītha.⁴ The chief Urtuqid leader at this time was however Ilghāzī.

During the reign of Muḥammad b. Malikshāh the power of the sultān was sufficient to limit Ilghāzī's independence,⁵

¹ I.A. X.193.

² I.A. X.235-6.

³ Yāqūtī was succeeded by his son 'Alī, and when he proposed handing Mārdīn over to Jigirmish, governor of Mawṣil, Suqmān took it away from him and gave him assignments in Jabal Jawr in place of Mārdīn (I.A. X.268-70).

⁴ I.A. X.252. In 498 Ilghāzī appointed Balak over the Khurāsān Road district in 'Irāq to restrain the Turkomāns from plunder (I.A. 272).

⁵ In 508 (1114/5) he submitted to the sultān's governor, al-Bursuqī, who was on the way to Syria, and sent an army with him under his son Ayyāz. Al-Bursuqī subsequently seized Ayyāz because Ilghāzī refused to appear before him. Ilghāzī then went to Kaifā to obtain help from the governor, his nephew Rukn ud-Dawla Dā'ūd b. Suqmān, and they defeated al-Bursuqī and freed Ayyāz towards the end of the year. (I.A. X.351-2).

and when Muhammad sent ~~a threatening letter~~ to Īlghāzī who had defeated al-Bursuqī in 508, Īlghāzī took refuge with Tughtegin, ruler of Damascus, and made a pact with him and the Frankish governor of Antioch.¹ The last years of Īlghāzī's life were years of real power; by this time Muḥammad b. Malikshāh had died (511/1117) and Īlghāzī was no longer threatened in the east by a relatively strong sultanate.² On Īlghāzī's death in 516 (1122) his domains were divided among his sons and nephew (see Chapter V.). The subsequent fortunes of the Urtuqid dynasty belong rather to the history of the Zangid Atābegate than to the history of the Great Seljūqs.

Secondly were the Ghuzz who had remained in Central Asia and on the borders of Khurāsān. Towards the end of the Great Seljūq period that branch of them whose pastures were in Khatlān, one of the districts of Balkh, had become very numerous

¹ I.A. X.352.2. Īlghāzī then set out for Diyār Bakr to collect the Turkomāns and to return. He was captured en route by Qirkhān b. Qarāja, governor of Homs, but set free in return for Ayyāz, whom Qirkhān took as a hostage.

² In 511 the people of Aleppo handed the city over to him, and he, after making a truce with the Franks and appointing his son Husām ud-Dīn Tīmūrtāsh over the city, returned to Mārdīn to collect soldiers (I.A. X.372-3), and in the following year Mayyāfāriqīn was handed over to him at the command of the sultan (T.M. f.161a). In 513 (1119/20) and 514 (1120/1) Īlghāzī made successful raids upon the Franks (I.A. X.390; 400). On the other hand when the muslims of the north of Armenia summoned him against the Georgians in 515 (1121/2), after first conquering numerous localities in Rūm, he finally suffered a severe defeat with his allies Dubais b. Ṣadaqa, Tuqān Arslān of Arzan and Tughril Beg of Arrān; this affair, however, did little to shake his authority (Cahen, p.236-7).

They were apparently in direct relations with Sanjar. Some of their number served at his court and were probably hostages for the good behaviour of the remainder.¹ They paid an annual tribute of 24,000 sheep to the sultān's kitchen (matbakh).² These were collected by an official sent by the khwānsālār, who used to oppress them and haggle over the sheep, and demand bribes from the Ghuzz leaders. The latter refused to give him bribes, and one day they killed him in secret. The khwānsālār did not dare tell the sultān and so paid their due himself. Finally he told Qumāj, governor of Balkh, who informed the sultān. Qumāj then made an offer to punish the Ghuzz if he was made military governor over them, and to pay 30,000 sheep to the royal kitchen. This offer was accepted. When, however, Qumāj sent to the Ghuzz demanding the customary tribute, they refused to pay on the grounds that they were the special subjects of the sultān and did not come under the jurisdiction of anyone else.³ The ultimate result of this was the defeat of Qumāj by the Ghuzz in battle, and subsequently the defeat and capture of Sanjar himself in 548 (1153).⁴

¹ Qaraghud and Tūtī Beg were at court (Bu. 257).

² According to the U.H.S. it was 25,000 sheep (p.101).

³ R.S. 178; T.G. 460-1.

⁴ R.S. 178-9.

CHAPTER II.

THE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT.

i. The Wazirate.

The keystone of the central government was the wazīr. He was in charge of virtually all aspects of the administration over which the central government had control, including finance and justice. He was also paymaster of the army in so far as this was paid in cash, and took part himself in military campaigns. He was in addition a court official, and lastly, to some extent, he was charged with the supervision of religious matters. Nizām ul-Mulk, in his exposition of administrative theory in the Siyāsāt Nāma, stresses the importance of the wazirate.¹ It is moreover probably true, that when the wazīr was strong and able, the administrative system worked fairly well, but when he was weak, the system broke down. There were, of course, other factors influencing the matter, but the personal factor was of enormous importance during the Great Seljūq period.

The extent to which the wazīr controlled the administration to the exclusion of the sultān differed from time to time, according to the personal qualities of the wazīrs and the

¹ S.N. 150. He attributes the fame of former kings to their wazīrs.

sultāns concerned. Nizām ul-Mulk, although in practice he had in many respects a free hand himself, emphasizes the importance of the personal supervision of every branch of administration by the sultān. He states, "the condition of the wazīrs must be enquired into, and the way in which they carry out their office, for the soundness and the corruption of the ruler and the country depend upon the wazīr. When the wazīr is of good conduct and judgment, the kingdom flourishes and the army and subjects are contented, quiet and wealthy, and the ruler happy at heart, but when the wazīr is of evil conduct, indescribable confusion appears in the kingdom, and the ruler is always distressed and afflicted in mind, and the kingdom disturbed."¹ It may well be that Nizām ul-Mulk nevertheless intended the wazīr to have a free hand in the details of the administration, for, although he stressed the necessity of a close supervision of all matters by the sultān, he did not recommend the issue of orders directly from the sultān, on the grounds that such orders, if frequently issued, would lose prestige.² The infliction of punishments such as execution, the cutting off of hands or feet, and emasculation, however, were the prerogative of the sultān, and any encroachment of these was to be severely punished.³

¹ S.N. 18-19.

² *ibid.* 66.

³ *ibid.* 66-7.

The wazīr in his various capacities was the head of the dīwān, which was divided into various departments, each dealing with a particular branch or branches of his many duties. The two principal departments were the dīwān uz-zamām wa'l istifā and the dīwān ul-inshā' wa't-tughrā.¹ The latter was concerned primarily with the supervision of incoming and outgoing correspondence. It is possible that it had also charge of the pigeon post and couriers.² The Seljūqs used the pigeon post at times, if not regularly.³ The holder of the office of tughrā'ī, who was the head of this branch of the administration, did not necessarily need to be an able or intelligent man; the chief requisite was "curved" handwriting (الخط القوسي)⁴. The dīwān ul-istifā was concerned with finance and the keeping of accounts. The head of this office was the mustawfī; nominally he was subordinate to the wazīr, but his position enabled him at times to attain to great power. The most

¹ Under the 'Abbāsids this bureau was called the dīwān al-inshā' (Maqrīzī: *Kitāb al-Khitāt* ed. Bulaq II.226), and under the Seljūqs it came to be known as the dīwān at-tughrā (Köprülü: *Les Institutions Juridiques ...* p.31).

² Under the Egyptian Mamlūks this was so (see Björkman, p.89).

³ e.g. Mas'ūd b. Muḥammad sent a letter by pigeon post to Khāss Beg, who was besieging Marāgha, when news arrived of Būzāba's advance from Fārs in 542 (Bu. 199).

⁴ Bu. 77.

notable case is that of the mustawfī, Majd ul-Mulk al-Balāsānī (see p.113). Malikshāh's mustawfī, Sharaf ul-Mulk Abū Sa'd Muḥammad b. Manṣūr (d. 494 (1100/1)) was also a prominent figure.¹

As head of the administration the wazīr to some extent appointed the officials of the dīwān, and also the officials in the directly administered area. Al-Kundurī appointed al-'Izz Abū Sa'd, whom he had seized when he was wazīr to ar-Raḥīm, overseer of 'Irāq.² It was probably Nizām ul-Mulk who, more widely than any other wazīr, made appointments. In 481 (1088/9) when the people of Marv demanded redress at the royal court from the 'āmil, who was placed over them, Nizām ul-Mulk gave that office to Sharaf ud-Dīn Abū Ṭāhir b. Sa'd ud-Dīn b. 'Alī al-Qummī, who subsequently became head of Sanjar's mother's dīwān and then wazīr to Sanjar;³ on another occasion Nizām ul-Mulk appointed his grandson, 'Uthmān b. Jamāl ul-Mulk, ra'īs of Marv.⁴ This is but one of the many instances of his giving office to members of his family. Another case was the appointment of his son, Mu'ayyad ul-Mulk, to be head of the dīwān ul-inshā' in succession to Kamāl ud-Dawla.⁵ Nizām ul-Mulk is also credited by Bundārī with

¹ It is said that he had a complete suit of clothes for every day of the year and always wore what was seasonable (I.A. X.143) (Bu. 36).

² Bu. 10.

³ D.V. 190.

⁴ I.A. X.138.

⁵ Bu. 57.

having systematized the ranks of the scribes (kātibs).¹ Mu'ayyad ul-Mulk, when wazīr to Barkyāruq, appointed Sa'd ul-Mulk Abū'l Maḥāsin mustawfī.² Abū'l Qāsim ad-Darkazīnī, when he persuaded Sanjar to appoint him his wazīr in 526 (1131/2), being at that time already wazīr to Tughril b. Muḥammad, to which office Sanjar appointed him, did not give up this position, but appointed Zāhīr ud-Dīn 'Abd ul-'Azīz al-Ḥamīdī to deputise for him in Sanjar's wazirate.³

The chief aspect of the wazirate was the financial one. The sources of revenue were largely regulated by the wazīr, who was expected to keep the finances of the state in a healthy condition and to keep sufficient in reserve for emergencies. Further it was his business to improve the resources of the country and to increase the revenues of the state, without causing injury to the cultivation of the land.⁴ The keeping of the accounts of public income and expenditure was the work of the dīwān ul-istifā, but the presentation of these to the sultān was the duty of the wazīr. The method of keeping accounts appears to have been a somewhat cumbrous one. On one occasion Alp Arslān is said to have asked Nizām ul-Mulk

¹ Bu. 54.

² Idāq. I.304.

³ Bu. 246-7.

⁴ For details concerning the revenue, see below.

for a balance sheet. The wazīr replied that it would take two years to complete. Ḥasan aṣ-Ṣabbāḥ, who was at that time employed in the dīwān, said he could prepare it in forty days. The sultān accordingly charged him with the matter. Nizām ul-Mulk had to agree, but he feared lest he should be dismissed on account of this. On the day the balance sheet was to be handed to the sultān, Nizām ul-Mulk sent his secretary with a bribe to Ḥasan's scribe to induce him to show the statement to Nizām ul-Mulk first. Nizām ul-Mulk took the account and found no criticism to make against it. Accordingly he thought of a wile; saying it was nonsense, he threw it down on the floor, so that the leaves were scattered. At that time the debit and credit sides were written on different pages, and the latter were not numbered, hence if the pages were disarranged, some time was required to put them in order again. Ḥasan's scribe then picked up the leaves in disorder. When the time appointed for the audience came, Ḥasan wanted to show the sultān the statement, but finding the pages in disorder, he began to rearrange them. The sultān ordered him to hurry, but Ḥasan kept saying, "Just a minute, just a minute." Nizām ul-Mulk then broke in and said, "How shall an ignorant man finish in forty days a book, which it takes a learned man two years to complete? The result of that is nothing but 'just a minute, just a minute.'" The sultān was angry with Ḥasan, who, as a result of this

episode, left the court. Because of this incident the method of keeping accounts was altered. The debit and credit sides were after this written on one sheet, and the pages were numbered.¹

Nizām ul-Mulk under Malikshāh, and perhaps to a lesser extent under Alp Arslān also, probably controlled, not only the details of the financial administration, but also to a considerable extent financial policy itself. There are various references to wazīrs after him repealing and imposing taxes,² but more often the sources attribute such actions to the sultāns. Kamāl ud-Dīn Muḥammad b. al-Ḥusain, who was appointed wazīr to Mas'ūd b. Muḥammad in 532 (1137/8), made a determined effort to reform the abuses of the financial administration. He organised the collection and payment of taxes, and revived practices which had become neglected. To do this he exposed the fraudulent practices of the officials and others,³ and tried to break the power of the amīrs and to prevent their corrupt practices. He achieved some measure of success and succeeded in collecting the taxes with greater regularity

¹ T.G. 440-1.

² On the death of the wazīr as-Samīramī, Maḥmūd b. Muḥammad repealed the mukūs and taxes on merchants and dealers, which as-Samīramī had levied (I.A. X.425). Kamāl ud-Dīn Muḥammad b. al-Ḥusain is said to have dropped the mukūs (I.A. XI.42). (See p.120)

³ I.A. XI.42.

than any wazīr after Nizām ul-Mulk.¹ Eventually, however, he paid the usual penalty of opposing the amīrs and lost his life (see Chapter IV.).

In so far as the army was paid in cash, this was supervised by the wazīr (see Chapter III.). His subordinate, who was in special charge of this, was the 'ārīd ul-jaish'.² The fact that the wazīr paid the army gave him great influence over the military classes, but in measure as the army came to be paid less in cash and more and more by grants of land, so the control of the wazīr, as head of the "civil" administration, over the military machine declined. Recruitment, as well as the payment of the standing army, seems to have been also a recognised function of the wazīr during the time of Nizām ul-Mulk. The latter, when accused of misappropriating the revenue during the reign of Malikshāh admitted to having spent part of the revenue (legitimately) upon the standing army.³ Sa'd ul-Mulk Abū'l Maḥāsin, Muḥammad b. Malikshāh's wazīr also assembled soldiers in the sultān's service.⁴

¹ Bu. 169-70; D.V.212.

² Abū'l Maḥākhīr al-Qummī and subsequently 'Izz ul-Mulk b. al-Kāfī al-Iṣfahānī, was 'ārīd ul-jaish' during the wazirate Sa'd ul-Mulk Abū'l Maḥāsin (Bu. 86). Anūshīravān b. Khālīd was at one time 'ārīd ul-jaish', in which office he was succeeded by Shams ul-Mulk b. Nizām ul-Mulk (Bu. 92).

³ I.A. X.84 (~~see also Chapter V.~~).

⁴ Bu. 83.

It is unlikely that the wazīr, although he was head of the "civil" administration, controlled or had much influence in the granting of assignments, except in exceptional cases. In any case, it seems certain that there was no officially recognised system of control exercised by the wazirate over the granting of iqtā's, and that hence large parts of the country together with the revenue, or part of it, were alienated from the control of the wazirate. The extent to which the wazīr was able to exert influence in the matter depended therefore upon his personality. Nizām ul-Mulk, at the height of his power, had no doubt considerable influence in the matter. After the capture of Aleppo and the submission of the ruler of Shaizar, Naṣr ul-Kinānī, he advised the sultān to give Aleppo and its governships, Ḥamā, Maṇbij, Laodicea and what was attached to them to Qāsīm ud-Dawla Āqsunqur. This was apparently because Nizām ul-Mulk was jealous of the latter's growing influence.¹ The sultān accordingly assigned these places to Āqsunqur and they remained in his possession until his ^{death} ~~execution~~ in 487 (1094).² Nizām ul-Mulk was moreover accused by Abū'l Maḥāsin b. Kamāl ul-Mulk, the sayyid ur-ru'asā, to the sultān in 476 (1083/4) of assigning the governorships.³

¹ A.M. 11.

² *ibid.* 17.

³ I.A. X.84.

Arslān Arghū, when he desired to obtain the assignment of Khurāsān, sent concerning this, not only to Barkyāruq, but also to his wazīr Mu'ayyid ul-Mulk b. Nizām ul-Mulk.¹ 'Izz ul-Mulk Tāhir b. Muḥammad al-Burujirdī, Mas'ūd b. Muḥammad's wazīr, also was said to assign the provinces independently of Mas'ūd.² Sanjar's wazīr, Naṣīr ud-Dīn Maḥmūd b. Abī Tauba, is another case of a wazīr who made assignments. He gave part of Rei to ad-Darkazīnī in 526 (1131/2). The governor of Rei on behalf of the muqṭa' al-Muqarrab Jawhar, however, prevented ad-Darkazīnī taking possession of this.³ Mas'ūd b. Muḥammad's wazīr, Kamāl ud-Dīn, who attempted, as stated above, to reform the financial administration, only gave iqtā's and allowances to the amīrs according to the numbers of their armies.⁴

In so far as justice was not administered by the sharī'a courts, it came under the supervision of the wazīr. By Great Seljūq times the sharī'a courts probably only dealt with matters relating to family affairs and inheritances; hence the jurisdiction of the wazīr as a judicial official extended over an extremely wide field. In the words of the Naṣā'ih Nāma, "the wazīr had every day to give decrees about

¹ I.A. X.179.

² *ibid.* XI.42.

³ Bu. 143.

⁴ R.S. 230; U.H.S. 121.

all kinds of subjects and all kinds of people."¹ The mazālim court seems to have existed throughout Great Seljūq times. At the beginning of the period it may perhaps have been the occasion of an exceptional appeal for redress to the sovereign in person. Such was probably the mazālim court held by Tughril Beg in Nīshāpūr in 429 (1038).² However, although Nizām ul-Mulk maintains in his "ideal" theory that it was indispensable for the ruler to hold a mazālim court twice a week in order to exact redress from the unjust, to dispense justice and to listen to the words of his subjects without intermediary,³ the majority of the Great Seljūq sultāns, with rare exceptions,⁴ in all probability delegated this function to their representatives. In this case it was probably the

¹ N. f.1b.

² I.A. IX.312; Bu.7.

³ S.N. 10. This recommendation was based chiefly upon expediency and not upon love of justice: "always there will be many persons at the court demanding redress for injustice, and if they do not receive an answer they will go away, and foreigners and envoys who come to the court and see this complaining and disturbance will think that great tyranny takes place at this court." (p.207).

⁴ Malikshāh's justice was such that no one dared to commit an injustice against anyone else; he was not separated from those who demanded justice, but listened to grievances and gave justice personally (R.D. f.243a). Many stories are told of his justice. Once when he was hunting near Iṣfahān, some of his ghulāms took an old woman's cow, killed and ate part of it. The old woman came to Malikshāh, who gave her a sum of money and seventy cows in exchange, and punished the ghulāms (R.D. f.168a,b). Another story is told of his punishing a mamlūk who had taken a poor man's water melon without paying for it, by giving him to the latter as a slave, so that he (the mamlūk) had to buy his freedom (A.S.D. 73; Bu. 64-5; I.K. III.443).

wazīr who represented the sultān.¹ Thus the mazālim court over which the wazīr presided became, as Amedroz states, not an exceptional appeal to the sultān in person, but an everyday application to his representative to be dealt with according to a settled practice.²

The majority of cases which came before the wazīr and his subordinates were probably related chiefly to the collection of taxes and litigations. The execution of their judgment, it seems, was carried out by the military.³ Even quite trivial matters appear to have come before the wazīr. Nizām ul-Mulk relates how in the days of Alp Arslān an 'āmil who owed some money to the treasury died. To pay off this debt a garden in his possession was seized. When his children claimed redress on the grounds that the garden had been part of their

¹ e.g. Kamāl ud-Dīn Muḥammad b. al-Ḥusain put right grievances (I.A. XI.42).

² Amedroz: The Mazālim Jurisdiction in the Ahkām as-Sultāniyya of Mawardī, J.R.A.S. 1911, pt.II. p.655.

³ cf. S.N. p.68. "A great number of ghulāms are sent from the court; some carry farmāns, other are without farmāns. All cause vexation to the people and they extort sums of money from them. For a litigation of which the value is 200 dīnars, a ghulam goes and exacts 500. The people in this way are exterminated and become poor. Ghulāms must not be sent except when the affair is important, and must not be allowed to depart except with a royal farmān, and it must be settled with the ghulam, "the value of the litigation is so much: exact no more than this."

inheritance from their mother, Nizām ul-Mulk ordered it to be returned to them.¹

The following story which is related in the Muntakhabī Tārīkhi Nāṣirī suggests that although the sultān may have delegated the administration of justice to the wazīr, nevertheless the latter referred to him before giving a decision even in comparatively small matters. Some one in Khūzistān reported to Nizām ul-Mulk that a wealthy man had died, leaving no heir except a sister's child, and that he had great wealth, which ought to go to the state treasury. Nizām ul-Mulk, although he mentioned this matter three times to Malikshāh, could get no answer from him, the sultān saying he would tell him on the following day. On the morrow, however, he set out for the chase, and Nizām ul-Mulk, in his eagerness to augment the royal treasury, followed him. On his return from the chase, Malikshāh passed through the camp bazaar, and since he was hungry ordered one of his attendants to get some wheaten cakes (tūtmāj). These were brought to the camp and the sultān sat down with his amīrs to eat them. These cakes sufficed for all the amīrs and their attendants. After having eaten Malikshāh asked his attendant how much they had cost. The latter told him four and a half dāngs.

¹ N. f.1b, 2a.

Malikshāh paid this, turned to Nizām ul-Mulk and said, "So considerable a number of followers have eaten their fill at the cost of four and a half dāngs, therefore it would be the height of inhumanity to covet the property of orphans."¹ This story may well be apocryphal, but nevertheless it probably indicates the kind of conditions which existed at the time.

In spite of the importance of his position, the wazīr was probably accessible to all. A story is related of how a poor woman came to Nizām ul-Mulk asking for help. He began to speak to her and she to him, but one of his hājibs showed his disapproval of this. Nizām ul-Mulk then reproved him and said, "I took you as a servant only for such occurrences. Amīrs and prominent persons, they have no need of you." He then dismissed the hājib.²

In view of the military nature of the Great Seljūq system it is not surprising that the wazīr in addition to his administrative functions also had military duties. He was expected to accompany the sultān on military campaigns,³ and also on

¹ T.N. 141-2.

² I.A. X.54.

³ Instances of the sultān being accompanied by his wazīr are numerous. Nizām ul-Mulk was with Alp Arslān when he met Qutulmish in battle in 456 (1064) (I.A. X.24). During Alp Arslān's expedition to Āzerbāijān in 459 (1055/7), Nizām ul-Mulk captured the fortress of Bihinzād, and Alp Arslān increased his rank and jurisdiction as a result (I.A. X.199). Al-Khatīr Abū Mansūr al-Maibudī Muḥammad b. Malikshāh's wazīr was entrusted by Muḥammad with the defence of one of the gates of Iṣfahān during the siege in 495 (1101/2) (I.A. X.228).

occasion to undertake expeditions himself.¹ At one time (circa 502), it seems indeed that the wazīr in Kirmān was also the leader of the army.² In some cases it seems, further, to have been the wazīr and not the sultān who actually despatched military expeditions.³

The wazīr was also a court official, and as such had various functions. Firstly, he probably supervised the expenditure and arrangements of the royal household and court, but since there was no clear distinction between the state revenue and the sultān's personal income, he did this perhaps in his capacity as the head of the financial administration. Kamāl ud-Dīn Muḥammad b. al-Ḥusain, Mas'ūd b. Muḥammad's wazīr, for example, supervised the sultān's expenditure on provisions and payments in cash for pensions (مؤونة السلطان ووظايفه).⁴ The

¹ Alp Arslān sent Nizām ul-Mulk to Fārs at the head of a large army in 464 (1071/2) and he besieged Fadlūya (I.A. X.48-9; F.N. 166; N. f.23b-24b). Nizām ul-Mulk Ahmad b. Nizām ~~iel~~-Mulk when wazīr to Muḥammad b. Malikshāh was sent on an expedition to Alamūt in Muḥarram 503 (1109) (I.A. X.335).

² I.A. X.364.

³ Nizām ul-Mulk sent an army to besiege Alamūt after hearing Ḥāsan aṣ-Ṣabbāh had taken it (I.A. X.216). Sanjar's wazīr al-Mukhtass Abū Naṣr Ahmad b. al-Faḍl sent an army against the Bāṭinīs of Turāithīth and Baihaq in 520 (1126) (I.A. X.445).

⁴ I.A. XI.42.

majority of the court officials were mamlūks and members of the standing army (see Chapter III.) and in the later period, at least, probably did not in practice come under the jurisdiction of the wazīr, whose supervision of the court was probably confined to financial matters. Secondly, he was the sultān's representative on ceremonial occasions. On the accession of a new caliph, it was the wazīr who usually gave the oath of allegiance to him on behalf of the sultān. On the death of al-Muqtadī 'Izz ul-Mulk b. Nizām ul-Mulk, the wazīr, mourned his death with other officials and prominent men, gave the oath of allegiance to the new caliph al-Mustazhir and then went to Barkyāruq to take from him an oath of allegiance.¹ In 479 (1086/7) when the caliph gave an audience to Malikshāh and his amīrs, Nizām ul-Mulk presented the latter one by one to the caliph.² When the caliph al-Qā'im's daughter was betrothed to Tughril Beg in 454 (1062), documents were written in the name of al-Kundurī.³ In the following year when Tughril came to Baghdād al-Kundurī went to the caliph's palace to demand his daughter.⁴ When the caliph asked for the hand of Malikshāh's daughter in 474 (1081/2), the sultān commanded

¹ I.A. X.157. * When, however, al-Mustarshid was assassinated in 529 (1134/5), Mas'ūd b. Muḥammad wrote to Bak Aba, the shihna of Baghdād to give the oath of allegiance to ar-Rāshid (I.A. XI.17).

² I.A. X.103; Bu.74.

³ I.A. X.14.

⁴ *ibid.* 15.

Nizām ul-Mulk to go with Fakhr ud-Dawla b. Jahīr, the caliph's wazīr and envoy, to discuss the matter with Arslān Khātūn, who had been married to al-Qā'im.¹ When the matter had been arranged and the sultān's daughter was eventually taken to the caliph's palace, she was escorted there by Nizām ul-Mulk (see also ~~Chapter VIII.~~^{p. 85}).² The wazīr Kamāl ud-Dīn Abū'l Barakāt ad-Darkazīnī was Mas'ūd b. Muḥammad's wakīl in the marriage of the caliph to Fāṭima b. Muḥammad in 531 (1137);³ while Nizām ul-Mulk Ahmad was mutawallī on behalf of Muḥammad b. Malikshāh's sister when she was married to the caliph al-Mustazhir in 502 (1109).⁴

Further the wazīr was the intermediary between the sultān on the one hand and foreign rulers, vassals and to some extent governors on the other. Hence he had almost diplomatic functions. Envoys presented their petitions and desires to the wazīr, who informed the sultān.⁵ When Malikshāh sent to Samargand in 466 (1073/4) to put down the revolt of Īltegīn, the latter sent a letter to Nizām ul-Mulk excusing himself.⁶ Jigirmish, when he heard of Barkyaruq's death sent to Sa'd

¹ I.A. X.77.

² *ibid.* 106.

³ *ibid.* XI.31.

⁴ *ibid.* X.330.

⁵ S.N. 89.

⁶ I.A. X.52.

ul-Mulk Abū'l Maḥāsīn, wazīr to Muḥammad b. Malikshāh, offering obedience to Muḥammad, and Sa'd ul-Mulk took Jigirmish to the sultān's presence.¹

Although the wazīr was, at times, in charge of the court and its upkeep, he was not generally speaking in charge of the sultān's treasury, over which there was a treasurer responsible only to the sultān. Anūshīravān b. Khālīd was treasurer to Muḥammad b. Malikshāh, and as such was favoured with private audiences.² When Abū Ḥāshim, ra'īs of Hamadān, paid Muḥammad b. Malikshāh 700,000 gold dīnārs to counter intrigues against him (see below), Anūshīravān was sent to Hamadān to collect the money, which he paid into the treasury. Muḥammad then entrusted to him the administration of this money.³ This sum was therefore presumably acquired by the sultān personally and not for the state.

Lastly the wazīr exercised a general supervision over the religious institution.⁴ In so far as he was concerned with religious matters, it was firstly no doubt to prevent any tendency towards unorthodoxy, and secondly to supervise

¹ I.A. №.264.

² Bu. 89.

³ *ibid.* 90.

⁴ cf. A diploma issued for one of the great wazīrs preserved in a collection of documents known as at-Tavassul ilā't Tarassul (~~see Chapter V. p.~~), by which the wazīr was given general charge of "civil" and religious affairs (pp. 75-7).

practical matters such as the administration of endowments.¹ The early sultāns, Tughril Beg, Alp Arslān, Malikshāh and Muḥammad b. Malikshāh were all strictly orthodox, Ḥanafīs by rite, and during the early period of Great Seljūq rule, the wazīr was probably required to be a majority Sunnī, i.e. a Ḥanafī of a Shāfi'ī.² Alp Arslān indeed apparently frequently expressed his regret that Nizām ul-Mulk was a Shāfi'ī (and not a Ḥanafī). He would say, "Alas, if my wazīr had not been a Shāfi'ī, he would have had (greater) authority and prestige."³ Nizām ul-Mulk's predecessor, al-Kundurī had been a fanatical Ḥanafī.⁴ He had instituted the cursing of the rāfiḍīs and

¹ cf. Bundārī, who states Nizām ul-Mulk supervised the awqāf (p.55). In keeping with the wazīr's position as the supervisor of religious affairs, and it might almost be said with his position as the guardian of religious orthodoxy, was the patronage and building of schools by wazīrs, notably Nizām ul-Mulk. The latter was also a zealous patron of learned and holy men. His court was frequented by doctors of the law and sūfīs, towards the latter of whom he was very beneficent (I.K. I.413). Al-Ghazālī relates that when he left Nishāpūr on the death of the imām ul-ḥaramain, he went to the army, where he met with an honourable reception from Nizām ul-Mulk. A number of men of eminent talent were at that time at the wazīr's court, and al-Ghazālī had some public conferences with them (I.K. II.622).

² Nizām ul-Mulk makes this a condition for holding the office of wazīr (S.N. 151).

³ S.N. 88.

⁴ Bu. 28-9.

ash'arīs from the mimbars, which practice Nizām ul-Mulk subsequently abolished.¹ The latter, however, was nevertheless fanatically opposed to any unorthodoxy in religious belief or practice.² This fanaticism, both on the part of the sultāns and the wazīrs, was relaxed as time went on. No longer was it necessary for a wazīr to be a Ḥanafī or a Shāfi'ī. Indeed, Anūshīravān b. Khālīd, who was wazīr to Maḥmūd b. Muḥammad in 521 (1127) and to Mas'ūd b. Muḥammad in 529 (1134/5), was a Shī'a.³ Sa'd ul-Mulk Abū'l Maḥāsin, Muḥammad b. Malikshāh's wazīr, was so far from being orthodox as to have conspired with Bāṭinīs in the fortress of Shāhdiz outside Iṣfahān, while Muḥammad was besieging them.⁴

It was not unknown for the sultān's wazīr to hold also the position of wazīr to a malik, appointing himself a deputy to carry out one of these offices, as did ad-Darkazīnī. Nizām ul-Mulk seems to have held during the reign of Alp Arslān, in addition to the wazirate of the sultān, also that of Malikshāh. A diploma of Alp Arslān conferring this upon him is preserved, but it seems that Nizām ul-Mulk nevertheless continued to be wazīr to Alp Arslān until the latter's death. In this diploma he was instructed to watch over the welfare of

¹ I.A. X.141.

² cf. S.N.

³ I.A. X.452; XI.11.

⁴ U.H.S. 89; Bu. 84. I.A. merely records that he acted with treason towards the sultān (X. 304).

the subjects and to see to the affairs of Malikshāh, preserving a happy medium between their interests.¹

The wazīr had, during the reigns of the first three Seljūq sultāns and probably later also, direct access to the sultān; official business was, however, also transacted through the medium of an official known as the wakīldār, whose duties were to act as an intermediary between the sultān and the wazīr, and to bring answers to letters. His position was more privileged than that of the hājibs. He had to be eloquent and bold in difficult situations, prepared to swallow angry words, independent in establishing proof if necessary, forbearing, and understanding the different moods and characteristics of the sultān.² In the later period the wakīldār was in all probability superseded by the amīr hājib, who was, however, a member of the military classes, and not of the bureaucracy. He, according to Bundārī, received orders in person from the sultān and transferred them to the sultān's wazīr.³ This development is significant of the changing emphasis in Great Seljūq society

¹ Collection of Letters (Abū'l Qāsim Ivaghli Haidar) ^{B.M.} add. 7688 f.3b-4b. Plurality of office was common in the Seljūq empire. For example Muḥammad al-Jawzaqānī was amīd of Baghdād. Muḥammad b. Malikshāh made him tughrā'ī; he also had charge of the wazirate of Gawhar Khatun, Ismā'il b. Yāqūti's daughter; Muḥammad's wife (Bu. 92). The amīd of Khurāsān, Muḥammad b. Mansur an-Nasavī was in 456 (1064) also amīl of Baṣrā (A.S.D. 32).

² Bu. 86.

³ *ibid.* 107.

and the increasing militarisation of the state.

The pay of the wazīr was chiefly, if not entirely, by assignments of land or its produce (see Chapter V.).¹ In addition he seems by custom to have been entitled to a proportion of the total revenue. This did not, however, go straight into the wazīr's pocket, for there seem to have been various recognised items of expenditure which this money went to meet. In 476 (1083/4) Nizām ul-Mulk, when accused by Tāj ul-Mulk Abū'l Ghanā'im of misappropriation of the revenue, as stated above, admitted to taking one tenth of the revenue, which he had spent on the standing army, alms (ṣadaqāt), gifts and endowments (awqāf).²

It seems to have been a recognised practice for officials to take a percentage of the money passing through their hands. The following story illustrates this. There was a certain

¹ Kamāl ud-Dīn ash-Shahrazūrī, when wazīr to Zangī, apparently received 10,000 amīrī dīnārs annually, whereas others (?wazīrs or officials) only received 500 dīnārs (A.M. 113). This would seem a comparatively small sum, and it may perhaps be assumed that the wazīr had in addition an iqṭā', and perhaps augmented his salary from other sources also.

² I.A. X.84-5. Tāj ul-Mulk accused Nizām ul-Mulk of spending 300,000 dīnārs annually on the fuqahā and sūfīs (A.S.D.68). According to the Sirāj ul-Mulūk, Nizām ul-Mulk spent 600,000 dīnārs annually upon building houses of learning for the fuqahā, madrasas for the ulamā, ribāts for the pious, the righteous and the poor, and gave them pensions (p.217).

'amīd of 'Irāq who held office for a year, during which period he acquired great wealth. On one occasion when Mas'ūd b. Muḥammad came to 'Irāq he asked for the accounts. The 'amīd summoned a mushrif known as Ibn ul-Ḥakīm by the people of Baghdad, and asked him to draw up the accounts in such a way that what he (the 'amīd) had taken would not be noticed. The mushrif answered, "I do not dare to cover up anything, and for every item I mention I must produce a note. Rely upon me to hide much of the crimes that are hidden, and many of the uncanonical taxes, but I cannot do otherwise than collect together what you have taken by way of abundant commodities and open benefits." They finally agreed 50,000 dīnārs should be entered in the accounts without stating that the 'amīd had taken this sum. The 'amīd then offered Ibn ul-Ḥakīm 2,000 dīnārs to enter this sum in the accounts in such a way that it would not attract notice, in the hope that the wazīr would neglect it. The mushrif, however, refused and said, "I must make a single and separate mention of it." He did this and the first thing the wazīr, 'Izz ul-Mulk al-Burujirdī's eye fell upon was that entry, and when he was told what it was, he struck it off and said, "How do you permit yourself to add to the account what is taken from it by way of his (the 'amīd's) recognised allowances (rusūm) and the allowances of his servants? This man stayed at court two years getting into debt, and when he has recovered his financial position and obtained

recognised allowances, it is not generous to take these back from him, for the office was only given him that he might benefit from it."¹

A further and not unimportant source of wealth for the wazīr was confiscations and fines from former wazīrs and others, (see below) while bribery, as regards the more unscrupulous wazīrs, if not all the wazīrs, also formed a not insignificant source of income to them particularly before the wazirate declined. The court, as stated elsewhere (see Chapter IV.) was a hotbed of intrigue. As long as the wazīr was the most important and influential man in the kingdom, those who desired office whether at court or in the provinces, and also those who feared they had incurred the sultān's displeasure, no doubt endeavoured to buy his support. The latter may further even have threatened to discredit individuals in the eyes of the sultān unless he received a sum of money from them. Mu'īn ud-Dīn Abū Naṣr b. Aḥmad al-Kāshī, who was wazīr to Sanjar, towards the end of his life had a proclamation made throughout the kingdom to the effect that whoever had given money or goods by way of bribes to Mu'īn ud-Dīn, the wazīr, was to refer to his wakīls and to take back the amount, and he summoned the qāḍīs and besought them to exert themselves in the matter.² The great wazīr Nizām

¹ Bu. 179.

² D.V. 198.

ul-Mulk was himself not above bribery! When Malikshāh seized and blinded the sayyid ur-ru'asā, Abū'l Maḥāsīn b. Kamāl ul-Mulk, in 476 (1083/4) after the latter had accused Nizām ul-Mulk and his friends of misappropriating the revenue of the state, his father, Kamāl ul-Mulk, who was the mustawfī and a supporter of the wazīr, gave Nizām ul-Mulk 200,000 dīnārs.¹ This is, moreover, significant of the vast increase in bribery since the beginning of the Great Seljūq period. When al-Kundurī sought to buy Nizām ul-Mulk's favour after Tughril Beg's death he offered him only 500 dīnārs.²

The intrigues were not, however, all on one side. The wazīr himself was also obliged to spend large sums of money to retain the favour of the sultān, and if possible to prevent his rivals intriguing against him. For example, on one occasion when Alp Arslān sent an envoy to Shams ul-Mulk, ruler of Transoxania, Nizām ul-Mulk, who was wazīr at the time, sent a certain Dānishumand Ushtur with the sultān's envoy to tell him what occurred. It so happened that Shams ul-Mulk's own envoy (who had been to the Seljūq court) mentioned that Nizām ul-Mulk was a rāfiḍī. Dānishumand at once wrote^{to} the wazīr. The latter was greatly perturbed at this, and spent 30,000 gold dīnārs to prevent this report, false though it was,

¹ I.A. X.85. According to Bundārī, Kamāl ul-Mulk gave 300,000 dīnārs to the sultān's treasury (p.57).

² I.A. X.20; Bu. 28.

reaching the sultān's ears.¹

The expenses of the wazīr, apart from those he incurred on behalf of the sultān in connection with the standing army, gifts and endowments as mentioned above, were chiefly bribes or presents, and the upkeep of his own "private" army. The wazīr, like other prominent persons, had his own troops, and the "private" army of a wazīr such as Nizām ul-Mulk was of considerable size (see Chapter III.). His court was, moreover, the refuge of innumerable persons who sought redress, or office, or some other favour. When Nizām ul-Mulk came to Baghdād in 480 (1087/8) with Malikshāh, many beggarā and others came to his court, and none went away disappointed. When he left Baghdād he ordered the gifts to be counted and they were found to amount to 140,000 dīnārs. The second time he came to Baghdād he did not give presents in the customary way, until Abū Sa'īd Mu'ammār b. Abī 'Amāma, the wā'iz remonstrated with him, after which he resumed his former practice.²

From the large sums which passed in these various intrigues, and also from the considerable sums which the sultāns confiscated from their wazīrs (see below) it will be seen that many of the wazīrs were comparatively wealthy men. Abū Ja'far Muḥammad b. Nizām ul-Mulk had unlimited jewels and other possessions, and 1,000,000 dīnārs in cash was found belonging to him when Sanjar seized him.³

¹ S.N. 88-90.

² T.S. 272-7.

³ I.A. X.385.

The qualifications required of one who was to fill the office of wazīr were numerous and varied. According to the Naṣā'ih Nāma the wazīr had in the first place to have some knowledge of all subjects, so as to be able to take part in discussions at court, while in the second place it was indispensable for him to be deeply versed in accounts and history, for upon a knowledge of these two arts financial affairs and sovereignty respectively depended.¹ Further, as stated above, it was understood in the early Great Seljūq period that the wazīr should be orthodox in his belief.

In view of the technical aspect of the functions of the wazīr it is not surprising the office should usually have been filled by a man who, by training and sometimes by family tradition also, belonged to the bureaucracy. The most striking case of family attachment to the wazirate is that of the Nizāmī family. Many of the sons and grandsons of Nizām ul-Mulk after him were wazīrs. This, however, can probably be accounted for largely by the popularity and reputation of Nizām ul-Mulk. It was certainly not due to the merits of his descendants (see below). 'Izz ul-Mulk was wazīr to Barkyāruq,² Mu'ayyid ul-Mulk to both Barkyāruq and Muḥammad b. Malikshāh,³

¹ N. f.34a.

² I.A. X.148-9.

³ *ibid.* 159; 195.

'Imād ul-Mulk Abū'l Qāsim to Arslān Arhgū,¹ Fakhr ul-Mulk to Sanjar and Barkyaruq,² Nizām ul-Mulk Ahmad to Muhammad b. Malikshāh,³ and Shams ul-Mulk 'Uthmān to Maḥmūd b. Muḥammad.⁴ His grandson Nāṣir uḥ-Dīn Tāhir b. Fakhr ul-Mulk was wazīr to Sanjar,⁵ and Nāṣir ul-Mulk b. Mu'ayyid ul-Mulk was wazīr to Muḥammad b. Malikshāh;⁶ his great-grandson Nizām ul-Mulk Abū 'Alī al-Ḥasan b. Tāhir b. Fakhr ul-Mulk to Sulaimānshāh,⁷ and his nephew Shihāb ud-Dīn Abū'l Maḥāsin was also wazīr to Sanjar.⁸

Al-Kundurī who became wazīr to Tughril Beg was the son of a dihqān of Kundur; he studied in Nishāpūr, and then became the hājib ul-bāb at the sultān's court and subsequently wazīr.⁹ Nizām ul-Mulk apparently began his career in the

¹ I.A. X.179-80.

² *ibid.* 288.

³ *ibid.* 304.

⁴ R.S. 203; I.A. X.424.

⁵ R.S. 167.

⁶ Bu. 82.

⁷ I.A. XI.121.

⁸ R.S. 167; Bu. 245; I.A. X.385.

⁹ A.S.D. 23. According to I.K. al-Kundurī had been a kātib (III.290-1), while according to the T.S. he had a varied career before entering the wazirate. He studied fiqh and then became land agent to Abū Muḥammad Shāfi'ī, who subsequently handed over to him his deputyship at Tughril Beg's court. The sultān liked him and gave him the office of post-master (؟ انبا اضا). Subsequently he made him governor of Khwarazm, but having gone to that province al-Kundurī rebelled. Tughril defeated him, castrated him and subsequently made him wazīr (p.261. cf. A.S.D. 24).

service of Ibn Shādān, 'amīd of Balkh, who kept accusing him of misappropriation of goods, and used to confiscate his possessions, until finally Nizām ul-Mulk fled to Marv and joined Dā'ūd. The latter sent him to serve his son Alp Arslān and refused Ibn Shādān's demand for his return.¹

Normally wazīrs rose to that rank from subordinate positions in the dīwān. Sa'd ul-Mulk Abū'l Maḥāsin, who became wazīr to Muḥammad b. Malikshāh had been mustawfī;² Mukhtaṣṣ ul-Mulk al-Kāshī before he became wazīr to Sanjar was head of the dīwān ur-rasā'il³ and mustawfī,⁴ after he had been wazīr to Gawhar Khātūn, the sultān's wife;⁵ Kamāl ul-Mulk as-Samīramī was also in Gawhar Khātūn's wazirate, after which he held the office of ishrāf al-mamlaka;⁶ he subsequently

¹ I.K. I.413.
D.V. 100-1. According to I.A. Nizām ul-Mulk was with an amīr called Yākhīr, the leader of Dā'ūd's 'askar, who gave him only enough to live on and confiscated at the end of every year what he had over. Nizām ul-Mulk became disgusted at this, and after placing his sons Mu'ayyid ul-Mulk and Fakhr ul-Mulk in a safe place, fled (A.M. 20).

² I.A. X.304.

³ Bu. 89.

⁴ ibid. 96.

⁵ ibid. 90-2.

⁶ ibid. 101-4.

became mustawfī¹ and finally wazīr to Maḥmūd b. Muḥammad;²
 and Mu'ayyid ud-Dīn^{al-Marzubān} who became wazīr to Mas'ūd b. Muḥammad
 was formerly tughrā'i.³ 'Imād ud-Dīn Abū'l Barakāt ad-Darka-
 zīnī who was also wazīr to Mas'ūd had been 'ārīḍ ul-jaish;⁴
 'Izz ul-Mulk ad-Dihistānī who became wazīr to Bakryāruq had
 been an 'amīd;⁵ while Naṣīr ud-Dīn al-Muzaffar al-Khwarazmī,
 at one time wazīr to Sanjar, had been at the beginning of his
 career an inspector (mushrif) of the royal kitchen (maṭbakh)
 and stables, after which he was promoted to being mushrif of
 the revenue of the kingdom, and finally to the wazirate.⁶
 There are also various instances of a man who had been employed
 in the caliph's dīwān being appointed wazīr to the sultān.
 Ar-Rabīb Abū Mansūr b. Abī Shujā', who became wazīr to Maḥmūd
 b. Muḥammad, had been wazīr to the caliph.⁷ He was appointed
 on the suggestion of other officials, who did not wish a strong
 man to be given office, lest their freedom should be thereby
 curtailed, and they therefore recommended someone who was em-
 ployed by the caliph.⁸ Anūshīravān b. Khālīd, who was wazīr

¹ Bu. 107.

² ibid. 115.

³ ibid. 170.

⁴ ibid. 166.

⁵ I.A. X.154.

⁶ D.V. 199.

⁷ I.A. X.349.

⁸ Bu. 106.

to both Maḥmūd b. Muḥammad¹ and to Mas'ūd b. Muḥammad,² was also wazīr to the caliph in 526 (1131/2).³ Very exceptionally there are cases of wazīrs being appointed from other classes. Muḥammad b. Sulaimān al-Kāshgharī, who became wazīr to Sanjar, had been at the beginning of his career a merchant, while Abū'l Qasīm ad-Darkāzīnī was the son of a peasant.⁴

The appointment of the wazīr, in view of the existing state of affairs, was obviously often the cause for intrigue, and there are instances of the office actually being bought. Fakhr ul-Mulk b. Nizām ul-Mulk came to Barkyāruq after he had defeated Tutush in 488 (1095). He gave him many presents, including a jahramī pavilion (sarāparda) and a tent (nawbatī) of atlas, weapons and jewelled implements, Arab horses, hunting birds and an armourer's hop (zarrādkhāna), and became wazīr.⁵ Mu'ayyid ul-Mulk b. Nizām ul-Mulk, after being captured by Barkyāruq when he defeated Muḥammad b. Malikshāh in 494 (1101), gave 100, 000 gold dīnārs to Barkyāruq to become wazīr.⁶ Qumāj bought Sanjar's wazirate in Muḥarram 516 (1122)

¹ I.A. X.452.

² *ibid.* XI.11.

³ *ibid.* X.480. Nizām ul-Mulk Ahmad b. Nizām ul-Mulk, after he had been wazīr to Muḥammad b. Malikshāh, was appointed wazīr to the caliph (I.A. X.425).

⁴ Bu.114.

⁵ R.S. 143.

⁶ R.S. 147; U.H.S. 80; R.D. f.245b. Actually Mu'ayyid ul-Mulk was killed before the transaction was completed.

for 1,000,000 Nīshāpūrī dīnārs for Muḥammad b. Sulaimān al-Kāshgharī. The latter had, because of his knowledge of Turkī and his expenditure in bribes, ingratiated himself with the sultān, and had become tax-collector of Balkh.¹

The most eminent of the Great Seljūq wazīrs was Nizām ul-Mulk. Al-Ghazālī compares him to the Barmakids.² There is little doubt that he enjoyed a great reputation among all classes of the population, including the army.³ His personal prestige^{is} shown by the caliph's reception of him on the occasion of the 'aqd between the caliph and Malikshāh's daughter in 474 (1081/2). As the sultān's followers were going to the caliph's court on this occasion, Nizām ul-Mulk at the caliph's command rode while the other great men walked. When they reached the caliph's audience, the wazīr was put on a throne (masnad), and he was given a khil'a with a taraz "in the name of the just and perfect wazīr, Nizām ul-Mulk, radī amīri'l mu'minīn", which was reputed to be the first time this laqab was given to a wazīr.⁴ Previous to this when Nizām ul-Mulk's

¹ D.V. 191.

² Naṣīhat ul-Mulūk, p.100. Bundārī also praises him (p. 53).

³ Tāj ul-Mulk Abū'l Ghanā'im desired Nizām ul-Mulk's dismissal, but he was not able to obtain this because of the inclination of the soldiers towards him (A.S.D. 67).

⁴ D.V. 158; N. f.22a. cf. I.K. I.413 who states the caliph allowed Nizām ul-Mulk to be seated in his presence.

daughter, the wife of 'Amīd ud-Dawla b. Jahīr died in 470 (1077/8) when giving birth to a son, who also died, they were both buried in the caliph's palace. According to Ibn ul-Athīr "it was not customary to do this to anyone, it being done out of respect for her father."¹

It was not only Nizām ul-Mulk who enjoyed great prestige. To some extent this seems to have extended to his family also. When the sayyid ur-ru'asā Abū'l Maḥāsin Muḥammad, son of Kamāl ul-Mulk head of the dīwān ul-inshā', who was his father's deputy in the dīwān, became Nizām ul-Mulk's son-in-law, a pavilion was put up for him, and kettle-drums struck for him; he also had a standard, horses and retinue.² Two members at least of the Nizāmī family were moreover "touchy" about their prestige. Nizām ul-Mulk during the reign of Alp Arslān offered the wazirate of the sultān's son, Malikshāh, to his own son Jamāl ul-Mulk. The latter refused on the grounds that it was beneath his dignity. He said, "one like me will not be wazīr to a boy!"³ Subsequently he became governor of Balkh. The other was Mu'ayyid ul-Mulk. When he came to Baghdād in 466 (1073/4), his reception was cancelled because the floods were out. He thought, however, that the caliph had not wished to receive him, and when the two naqībs and the qāḍī ul-quḍāt came

¹ I.A. X.74.

² Bu. 58.

³ Bu. 68.

to him, he refused to see them, saying that the caliph had schemed against him. The caliph then sent someone to him to offer his excuses, and gave him a robe of honour.¹ Mu'ayyid ul-Mulk later, when he became wazīr, tried to arrogate to himself royal insignia, but was prevented from doing so.²

After Nizām ul-Mulk's death, the prestige which he had enjoyed as an administrator appears to some extent to have been transferred to his sons. Fakhr ul-Mulk b. Nizām ul-Mulk, when on his way to help Barkyāruq, fell into Tutush's hands in 487 (1094), and was spared on account of the popularity of his father with the population; Yāghī Siyān further advised Tutush to make him wazīr, in order to incline the people favourably towards his (Tutush's) house.³ Moreover, when, after the death of Nizām ul-Mulk, the wazīrate began to decline and weakness appeared in the kingdom, his son 'Izz ul-Mulk, in spite of his weak and evil character, was appointed to the wazīrate in the hope that he would re-establish order therein.⁴ Through Naṣīr ul-Mulk Muḥammad b. Mu'ayyid ul-Mulk b. Nizām ul-Mulk, although he was ignorant and lacking in experience, Bundārī states that the dīwān ul-inshā', of which he

¹ Bu. 47.

² ibid. 67; R.S. 147-8.

³ I.A. X.158.

⁴ Bu. 77.

was head, during the wazirate of Abū'l Maṣāsin ad-Dihistānī, had prestige.¹ Similarly, when Muḥammad b. Malikshāh seized the wazīr Sa'd ul-Mulk Abū'l Maḥāsin in Shawwāl 500, he appointed in his stead Abū Naṣr Aḥmad b. Nizām ul-Mulk with the laqabs of his father, Qawām ud-Dīn Nizām ul-Mulk Ṣadr ul-Islām, on the grounds that the country had been prosperous during the wazirate of Nizām ul-Mulk.²

To what exactly Nizām ul-Mulk's popularity was due is not altogether clear. According to his own account, he strove to be just in his dealings with the people, and in the giving of decrees,³ but it is difficult to believe, in view of his treatment of al-Kundurī, that he did not stoop to the usual intrigues and bribery practised at the time. He did, it is true, counsel moderation and toleration on various occasions.⁴ Further he was no doubt an able administrator. He was probably also a good judge of character; Bundārī states that he selected each man for the work he was best suited for, and gave him office accordingly.⁵

¹ Bu. 85.

² I.A. X.304.

³ cf. The story of Nizām ul-Mulk and the 'āmil (^{see above p.65} N. f. 1b-2a). After relating this story Nizām ul-Mulk said that he never thereafter gave a decree until he had thoroughly investigated the matter (N. f. 1b-2a).

⁴ When Alp Arslān, after his defeat of Qutulmish, wanted to kill the prisoners he had taken, Nizām ul-Mulk persuaded him to forgive them (A.S.D.32).

⁵ Bu. 54.

During the reign of Alp Arslān, Nizām ul-Mulk enjoyed great influence, while under Malikshāh he was the virtual ruler of the kingdom for some twenty years.¹ The fact that many of his sons held office under him inevitably increased his power, although it also roused the sultān's jealousy (see below). Various incidents which are related bear witness to the power of the Nizāmī family. Jamāl ul-Mulk b. Nizām ul-Mulk, while governor of Balkh heard that Ja'farak, the sultān's jester had slandered his father, and attributed the wazirate to Ibn Bahmanyār. He was enraged at this, and set out for the sultān's court, took Ja'farak from before the sultān, beheaded him, and then successfully plotted to poison Ibn Bahmanyār.² Another interesting case is the refusal of Mu'ayyid ul-Mulk b. Nizām ul-Mulk, while tughrā'ī to Malikshāh, to give a post on the sultān's order to Ja'far Zawzanī, the nā'ib of the previous tughrā'ī. Ultimately, however, he was forced to do so.³

Malikshāh appears to have resented the influence of Nizām ul-Mulk, and Bowen states that one aspect of his reign was the history of repeated attempts by the young sultān to assert himself, but always in vain.⁴ In 472 (1079/80) Nizām ul-Mulk

¹ cf. Bowen: Nizām ul-Mulk (E.I.).

² Bu. 68-9; I.A. X.79-80.

³ J.H. f.192a,b. (Or.2676).

⁴ E.I. Article on Nizām ul-Mulk.

suffered a momentary setback. Ibn 'Allān, a Jew, who was the farmer of Baṣrā, took refuge with Nizām ul-Mulk from Khumārtegin and Gawhar A'in. They, since they were personal enemies of the wazīr, slandered Ibn 'Allān before the sultān, who accordingly ordered him to be drowned. Nizām ul-Mulk after this kept away from the royal cortège for three days. He then made a feast for the sultān and gave him many presents, and remonstrated with him for having drowned Ibn 'Allān. Malikshāh nevertheless farmed Baṣrā to Khumārtegin.¹ At one time Malikshāh showed favour to the sayyid ur-ru'asā Abū'l Maḥāsin and Ibn Bahmanyār, who plotted against Nizām ul-Mulk;² finally Abū'l Maḥāsin fell and Malikshāh seized and blinded him, while Ibn Bahmanyār was killed as stated above by Jamāl ul-Mulk. In revenge for the death of Ibn Bahmanyār, however, Malikshāh contrived the murder of Jamāl ul-Mulk.³ Lastly, in a final attempt to get rid of Nizām ul-Mulk, he made a favourite of Tāj ul-Mulk Abū'l Ghānā'im.⁴ There was a feud between the wazīr and Tāj ul-Mulk, who conspired against him with Sadīd ul-Mulk Abū'l Ma'ālī, and Majd ul-Mulk al-Balāsānī.⁵ Tāj ul-Mulk was, in fact, generally believed to have been implicated in

¹ I.A. X.75².

² Bu. 57.

³ I.A. X.79-80.

⁴ cf. E.I.

⁵ Bu. 58-9; T.S. 281; I.K. III.151.

the assassination of Nizām ul-Mulk.¹

Generally speaking, of the wazīrs who held office after Nizām ul-Mulk, few were either popular or able.² Kamāl ud-Dīn Muḥammad b. al-Ḥusain has already been mentioned. Kamāl ul-Mulk as-Samīramī was, according to Bundārī, well versed in the affairs of the wazirate, and restored the prestige of the sultanate of 'Irāq,³ but according to Ibn al-Athīr and the Mir'āt uz-Zamān he was tyrannical and unjust.⁴ Bundārī states that Mu'ayyid ul-Mulk b. Nizām ul-Mulk was peerless in his time,⁵ but Ibn al-Athīr records that he was miserly and of evil nature towards the amīrs.⁶ Qawām ud-Dīn b. 'Alī ad-Darkazīnī was an evil character. In the words of Bundārī "no one was kind to him, but that he (ad-Darkazīnī) killed him."⁷ He had, it seems,

¹ R.S. 135; I.K. I.415. Nizām ul-Mulk's assassination was also attributed to an emissary of Ḥasan as-Sabbāḥ (see E.I.).

² This falling off in the character of officials was not confined to the wazīrs, but generally speaking extended through all ranks of the bureaucracy. Nizām ul-Mulk was served in the dīwān by able and intelligent men (Bu. 56-7), but after his death there was apparently a striking change.

³ Bu. 119-20.

⁴ I.A. X.425; M.Z. 66.

⁵ Bu. 78.

⁶ I.A. X.206.

⁷ Bu. 114; The T.G., however, records that he was able (p.464).

almost a lust for blood and murdered many persons. He conspired with a number of Bāṭinīs to murder the qāḍī, Zain ul-Islām al-Hawawī in 518 (1124/5), because he feared the latter would reveal his (ad-Darkazīnī's) true nature to Sanjar.¹ Others he murdered were 'Alā ud-Dawla, the ra'īs of Hamadān, 'Ain ul-quḍāt al-Miyānchī, one of the great imāms of Hamadān, the malīk 'Alā ud-Dawla Garchāsp b. 'Alī in Yazd, whom he had disgraced, and the ra'īs of Sāva.² Mahmūd b. Muḥammad, whose wazīr he was, apparently permitted him to persecute and kill the great men of the state openly.³ When Sanjar came to the Jibāl in 526 (1132) ad-Darkazīnī obtained a number of signed orders from him on the pretext that these would be necessary for the administration of the kingdom after Sanjar returned to Khurāsān. These, however, ad-Darkazīnī used to order the death of different persons.⁴

'Izz ul-Mulk b. Nizām ul-Mulk, wazīr to Barkyāruq, was lacking in judgment and ability; he spent his time largely in drinking, and was finally dismissed because he was unable to carry out the obligations of his office.⁵ Abū'l Maḥāsin ad-Dihistānī, who was also wazīr to Barkyāruq, had, according to

¹ Bu. 131-2.

² *ibid.* 137-8.

³ *ibid.* 133.

⁴ *ibid.* 152-3.

⁵ *ibid.* 77; D.V. 178.

Bundārī, neither ability nor virtue; he was long-handed in tyranny and took away estates from their owners and assigned them to other people.¹ The baseness of Naṣīr ul-Mulk b. Mu'ayyid ul-Mulk who eventually became wazīr to Muḥammad b. Malikshāh has already been commented on.² Similarly Khaṭīr ul-Mulk al-Maibudī, another of Muḥammad's wazīrs was lacking in the necessary training for the wazirate, and was obstinate, cunning, deceitful and dishonest.³ Muḥammad b. Sulaimān al-Kāshgharī, wazīr to Sanjar, was evil-natured, grasping, lying and hated alike by rich and poor (khwāss o 'āmm).⁴ Various others of the descendants of Nizām ul-Mulk appear also to have been worthless. Diyā ul-Mulk was not suited to the wazirate, and after his dismissal remained twelve years in prison.⁵ Ṣadr ud-Dīn Muḥammad b. Fakhr ul-Mulk, Sanjar's wazīr was corrupt, and when he took many valuable jewels for himself on the occasion of the conquest of Ghazna by Sanjar, the latter was angry

¹ Bu. 82; I.A. on the other hand states that he was generous, liberal and good-natured (X.230).

² Bu. 82.

³ *ibid.* 94.

⁴ D.V. 192.

⁵ Bu. 93.

and a number of people beat Ṣadr ud-Dīn Muḥammad to death.¹ Shams ul-Mulk 'Uthmān was extortionate and tyrannical, and when a number of prominent persons in 'Irāq sent a complaint to Sanjar, the latter forwarded this to Maḥmūd b. Muḥammad, whose wazīr he was, and Maḥmūd killed him.² According to Bundārī it was largely ad-Darkazīnī, who was responsible for the intrigue which resulted in Shams ul-Mulk's death.³

From what has already been stated it will be seen that the wazīr's task was not an easy one. The dangers and difficulties of his office are described in the Naṣā'ih Nāma (Wasāyā Nāma) of Nizām ul-Mulk. Actually this document was probably not the work of the famous Nizām ul-Mulk,⁴ but whoever was its author, it does give a clear picture of conditions prevailing during the Great Seljūq period. The author warns his son to avoid the wazirate, which, he states, although it was second only to the sultanate in influence, was a very dangerous office.⁵ The greatest danger attaching to it was that the wazīr was forced to vex several thousand persons - small

¹ D.V. 188-9. I.A., however, states that Muḥammad b. Fakhr ul-Mulk accomplished for Sanjar, because of the inclination of the people towards him, what could not have been accomplished by numbers of soldiers (X. 386).

² D.V. 209.

³ Bu. 168.

⁴ For a discussion of this document see Bowen: The sar-gudhast-i sayyadnā, the "Tale of the three Schoolfellows", and the wasaya of the Nizām ul-Mulk (J.R.A.S. Oct. 1931).

⁵ N. f.1a.

and great, rich and poor - in the hope of gaining the satisfaction of one person (i.e. the sultān), which satisfaction was nevertheless never acquired.¹ Inevitably the ruler became jealous of the wazīr, and suspected him of corruption.² Further, although the wazīr might accomplish many matters successfully for the state and effect numerous economies, yet he seldom, if ever, obtained real gratitude or praise for his work. Such actions the courtiers did not bring to the notice of the sultān; on the other hand, if some slight damage occurred to the state through the wazīr, it was not forgotten, and even if the sultān were to refrain from mentioning it himself, his courtiers would bring it to his notice.³ The question of retaining the goodwill of the courtiers was a difficult one for the wazīr, for he had to restrain them and their followers from taking possession of the property of the state, and if knowledge reached him that they had done so it was his duty to tell the sultān.⁴

² To illustrate this the author relates a story of Nizām ul-Mulk and the Imām ul-Ḥaramain al-Juwainī. The former complained to the latter of Alp Arslān's secret ill-feeling towards him, in spite of his almost superhuman efforts in the interests of the state. The Imām al-Ḥaramain replied that since the wealth and property of the sultān were in the hands of Nizām ul-Mulk, inevitably the sultān suspected him of corruption. The Imām ul-Ḥaramain further went on to say that some of the demands the sultāns made on their wazīrs were impossible of fulfilment (N. f.2b,3a,b).

¹ N. f.2b.

³ N. f.4a,b.

⁴ N. f.3b,4a.

Secondly, the wazīr was in danger of incurring the dissatisfaction of the sultān's sons. If their desires were opposed, or they were not given full control or allowed to interfere in financial or other matters, they tended to believe that any opposition which they encountered was the fault of the wazīr, in spite of the fact that these matters were in reality in the hands of the sultān. Hence they became ill-disposed towards him. Moreover inexperienced courtiers, desirous of self-advancement, would encourage them in this, hoping thereby to become favourites themselves.¹ The following story, if true, illustrates this difficulty. On one occasion when a son was born to Muḥammad b. Malikshāh, Malikshāh asked what he was to be called. Muḥammad said, "Sultān Bāyazīd", the child having been born near Bastām. Malikshāh applauded this, and gave the revenue of Bastām to him for the expenses of the cradle, midwives and foster-mothers. By chance the child died after two days, but for over seven years Muḥammad continued to receive the equivalent of the revenue of Bastām by virtue of these words. He did not dare ask for a renewal of the grant, or to mention it to the nobles of the court, for fear it should be revoked, nor did he allow Nizām ul-Mulk to mention it to the sultān in a private audience. The wazīr also did not consider it

¹ N. f.6a.

expedient to do this, for he knew the sultān's decree would not be in accordance with Muḥammad's wishes, and that the latter would consequently attribute the failure to renew the grant to his (Nizām ul-Mulk's) shortcomings or intrigue. Accordingly throughout those years Nizām ul-Mulk paid the equivalent of the taxes of Bastām to Muḥammad out of his own estates in Qūmis.¹

Another story is related which again, if true, shows how difficult was the position of the wazīr in consequence of the corruption and intrigue of the followers of the sultān's sons. On one occasion, tribute and presents were brought from Byzantium, at a time when Malikshāh, as a young man, was wintering in Rei. His instructions were to investigate the affairs of all who came from Byzantium, Georgia, Syria and 'Irāq, and to send them on to the court accompanied by a trustworthy official. Byzantine envoys arrived, and Malikshāh ordered the 'amīd Manṣūr to examine the tribute and presents they had brought. Among these were bales of cloth, of all colours, each colour being in a separate box. Manṣūr took the bales of white cloth, either with or without the knowledge of Malikshāh, and forced the Byzantine envoys to erase the mention of this cloth from the list they had with them. Meanwhile spies had sent Nizām ul-Mulk news from Rei that Malikshāh one day had mentioned his ability and efficiency, and

¹ N. f.6b-7b.

how not a single dīnār could be taken, but that he (Nizām ul-Mulk) disclosed it, to which the 'amīd Mansūr had replied, "It is all the result of the sultān's power, otherwise one could easily sell the ox of Tūs so that he himself would not know." The 'amīd came to the sultān's court with the Byzantine envoys, and when the tribute and presents they had brought were shown, Nizām ul-Mulk wondered why there was no white cloth. He asked the envoys, who gave a non-committal reply. Then he turned to the 'amīd, and sensed that the latter's demeanour had immediately altered; Mansūr, meanwhile, before Nizām ul-Mulk asked him about the cloths, said, "White is not a colour." Nizām ul-Mulk was disturbed in his mind about the matter, and after the Byzantine envoys had gone, sent two men to their lodgings to seize the documents they had with them. These revealed nothing, and Nizām ul-Mulk asked forgiveness of the 'amīd for having entertained suspicions as to his integrity. The 'amīd, however, was proud and afterwards made various remarks to Malikshāh, saying, "the peacock of the court, that honest Gabriel, tried to find fault with me," which revived Nizām ul-Mulk's suspicions. Then he remembered that the Byzantine empress had also sent her servants with presents to Alp Arslān's wife, and a list of these had been included in the presents sent to Alp Arslān; he thought, therefore, that conversely a list of the presents to Alp Arslān might be included with the presents to his wife. ~~She~~

She was at this time at Rādekān recovering from an illness, and so Nizām ul-Mulk sent to her, and had the list of presents, which were in a sealed case, brought to the dīwān. Nizām ul-Mulk then summoned in private the leader of the Byzantine envoys, who told him what had happened. He was much exercised in his mind as to what he should do, for if he were to disclose the matter, Malikshāh might well be turned against him. Eventually he wrote a rubā'ī to the 'amīd, in which he said, "Put out of your head royal pride. Do not aspire to being a peacock. Leave it to Gabriel. Now bring back all the woollen cloths of Cyprus, and do not call the man of Tūs the ox any more." The 'amīd protested his innocence, and finally Nizām ul-Mulk, for the sake of the honour of Malikshāh's court, became satisfied with the assurance that the 'amīd should not repeat those words, while he himself agreed not to mention the episode.¹

Thirdly, was the problem of maintaining friendly relations with the amīrs, or at least of avoiding their enmity. This proved an increasingly difficult task, and cost more than one wazīr his life (see Chapter IV.). In his official business, the wazīr was continually having to associate with the amīrs, and it was therefore difficult for him not to be friendly with them on the one hand, or not to fall out with them on the other. Either course had its dangers.² The grounds given

¹ N. f.8b-10b.

² N. f.10b.

in the Naṣā'ih Nāma for avoiding friendship with the amīrs are curious. The author states that they were a class who were always seeking the loss and disadvantage of one another, and since friendship demanded enmity with the enemies of one's friends, friendship with the amīrs was impossible, for, being all of mixed feelings towards one another, friendship with all logically involved enmity with all. Thus friendship with them collectively was impossible, and friendship with them individually was dangerous, for it attracted the enmity of those who were excluded from the friendship. Further, friendship of the wazīr towards the amīrs engendered the suspicion and the ill-feeling of the sultān.¹ Once, when Nizām ul-Mulk was on a campaign with Alp Arslān, he alighted, while investigating the numbers and conditions of the soldiers prior to distributing among them money, at the tent of Altūntāq, a Turkomān, the leader of the amīrs of the dīwān. He did this to honour Altūntāq, and stayed a short while with him. Alp Arslān, however, attributed his visit to ulterior motives, and although Nizām ul-Mulk had several disputes with Altūntāq over affairs connected with the dīwān, to such an extent that they both wanted to resign, the sultān thought it was a pretence, and never got rid of his suspicion, on account of which Nizām ul-Mulk, according to his own account, suffered much loss.²

¹ N. f.10b, 11a.

² N. f.11a, b.

Lastly, according to the Naṣā'ih Nāma, the wazīr was in danger from his own subordinates - scribes, tax-collectors and other officials. He had to share with them the general benefits of office, and even to give them the lion's share. He had to raise them from poverty to riches, from weakness to power, from misery to prosperity and from insignificance to fame, until finally they would seek to encompass his destruction; and even if they happened naturally to be inclined towards good faith, others would not be lacking who would induce them to quarrel and to oppose the wazīr.¹

The author of the Naṣā'ih Nāma warns his son from trying to avoid this danger by appointing his relatives and friends to office, for that led, he stated, to even greater evils. The case of Nizām ul-Mulk himself illustrates this. He had appointed his sons to different offices throughout the kingdom, in order that they should keep him informed of all that went on. Turkān Khātūn, Malikshāh's wife, however, became ill-disposed towards him. She wanted the sultān to make her son, Mahmūd, his heir-apparent, but since Barkyāruq appeared to be a more suitable candidate, her desire was not accomplished for her. She put down this failure to Nizām ul-Mulk's lack of ardour in her cause, and continually attributed seditious motives to him, which resulted in a change of outlook on the part of Malikshāh towards him. All she could accuse him of was that he had divided the kingdom among his children, but nevertheless

¹ N. f.14b,15a.

these words had the desired effect on the sultān.¹

From Ibn ul-Athīr's account also it would seem that Nizām ul-Mulk's appointment of his sons and grandsons to office aroused Malikshāh's jealousy. When Qūdam shihna of Marv complained that he had been seized by Nizām ul-Mulk and his grandson, the ra'īs of Marv, Malikshāh wrote to the wazīr reproaching him, "these thy children have each one of them gained the mastery over a large district and govern a large province, but this does not satisfy them, and they exceed what is politic and desire to do this and that." Nizām ul-Mulk defended himself, but this event roused the sultān's jealousy and led him to plot against the life of the wazīr.²

From the foregoing it will be seen that intrigue was rife among all classes: the royal family itself, the courtiers, the amīrs and the officials, generally speaking. This tended to the formation of factions in the bureaucracy, and when a wazīr fell, his supporters usually fell with him. The earliest case of the dismissal of a wazīr was the result of intrigue during this period was that of al-Kundurī in 456 (1064), as the result of the efforts of Nizām ul-Mulk.³

Subsequently various factions, as mentioned above, were

¹ N. f.15a,b; cf. T.G. 447.

² I.A. X.138-9; cf. also Bu. 59-60.

³ I.K. III.294; I.A. X.20.

formed against the latter. The one headed by Tāj ul-Mulk Abū'l Ghanā'im was ultimately successful, in so far as Tāj ul-Mulk succeeded his rival in the wazirate, while Majd ul-Mulk al-Balāsānī and Sadīd ul-Mulk Abū'l Ma'ālī replaced Nizām al-Mulk's devoted henchman, Sharaf ul-Mulk Abū Sa'd, the mustawfī,¹ and Kamāl ud-Dawla Abū'r Riḍā, the 'ārīd respectively.² There are numerous other cases of subordinate officials falling when the wazīr fell. When Sa'd ul-Mulk Abū'l Maḥāsin was dismissed from Muḥammad b. Malikshāh's wazirate, both the mustawfī, Zain ul-Mulk Abū Sa'd b. Hindū and the 'ārīd ul-jaish, 'Izz ul-Mulk b. al-Kafī were dismissed.³ Similarly aṣ-Ṣafī Awhad, mustawfī under ad-Darkazīnī, was killed by the sultān shortly after the latter fell, and his people fined 200,000 dīnārs.⁴

In view of the existing circumstances the wazīrs and other officials all schemed for the downfall of any possible rivals. The unscrupulous probably also schemed against the appointment of any honest or relatively honest man to office. This perhaps partly explains the opposition to Anūshīravān b. Khālīd. He became nā'ib to the wazīr, Khaṭīr ul-Mulk al-Maibudī. The latter thought he was a spy on behalf of the

¹ Bu. mentions Sharaf ul-Mulk's excellence (p.31).

² Bu. 56; they also had their own deputies (p.57).

³ Bu. 85-6.

⁴ Bu. 157.

sultān, and other officials of the dīwān, following his lead, also opposed Anūshīravān and held back his salary and allowances.¹ Similarly when Anūshīravān subsequently became wazīr to Maḥmūd b. Muḥammad, the tughrā'ī, ash-Shihāb As'ad, and the mustawfī, as-Safī Abū'l Qāsim, and the amīr ḥājib, Arghan, and his wife plotted against him; Anūshīravān accordingly resigned, and was succeeded by ad-Darkazīnī, who had won Arghan over with bribes.² Anūshīravān then retired to Baghdād. Ad-Darkazīnī, in spite of the fact that Anūshīravān had advanced him money when he had been imprisoned, seized his property, taking a house he had built on the Tigris by bringing forward false witnesses.³

Intrigue having become the general rule, few wazīrs failed to make use of their position to levy fines upon their enemies and rivals and to confiscate their possessions. Indeed, as stated above, this was an important source of wealth for them. In 493 (1099/100) the possessions of the Banī Jahīr, who had formerly been employed in the caliph's wazirate, were sold and the proceeds went to the sultān's wazīr, Mu'ayyid ul-Mulk b. Nizām ul-Mulk.⁴ The latter was himself killed in the

¹ Bu. 100.

² Bu. 136-7. On a former occasion ash-Shihāb As'ad and as-Ṣafī had successfully plotted for the dismissal of Anūshīravān from office (Bu. 125).

(³ Bu. 137.

⁴ I.A. X.203.

following year. His possessions were taken by the wazīr al- /
 Abū'l Maṣāsin ad-Dihistānī.¹ When, however, al-'Izz was
 killed in 495 (1101/2), his possessions were shared chiefly
 between the sultān and his successor in the wazirate.² When
 ad-Darkazīnī was murdered and was succeeded by Sharaf ud-Dīn
 'Alī b. Rajā, the latter began to fine the followers of ad-
 Darkazīnī.³

Khaṭīr ul-Mulk al-Maibudī intrigued against al-Muwaffaq
 Abū Tāhir al-Khātūnī and demanded 100,000 dīnārs from him,
 summoned him from Jurjān and took all his money.⁴ Abū'l
 Qāsim ad-Darkazīnī made many confiscations; he fined Qutligh
 ar-Rashīdī, the ustād ud-dār of Maḥmūd b. Muḥammad, 80,000
dīnārs and subsequently 30,000 dīnārs, Jamāl b. Manāra a mer-
 chant of Hamadān, 30,000 dīnārs, Fakhr ud-Dawla b. Abī Hāshim
 al-Ḥasanī, ra'īs of Hamadān, 20,000 dīnārs, Zarqān, ra'īs
 of Tabrīz, 70,000 gold dīnārs, and Tāj ud-Dīn Dawlatshāh b.
 'Alā ad-Dawla, and the latter's mother and wazīr 150,000
dīnārs.⁵ Ad-Darkazīnī also tried to obtain large sums of
 money from the mustawfī, aṣ-Ṣafī. The latter offered Tughril
 b. Muḥammad, whose wazīr ad-Darkazīnī was, 100,000 dīnārs not
 to be surrendered to him.⁶ 'Imād ud-Dīn al-Kātib also

¹ I.A. X.231.

² *ibid.* 231.

³ Bu. 156-7..

⁴ Bu. 97-8.

⁵ Bu. 148.

⁶ Bu. 147.

relates how ad-Darkazīnī persecuted his ('Imād ud-Dīn's) family. His uncle 'Azīz ud-Dīn was a nā'ib in the dīwān ul-istifā in the time of Maḥmūd b. Muḥammad. Sanjar sent an envoy to demand the inheritance of his two daughters, both of whom had died after being married to Maḥmūd. Ad-Darkazīnī deputed someone to say to Maḥmūd that Sanjar would be satisfied in this matter with the witness of al-'Azīz, whose integrity he (Sanjar) trusted. He advised him to imprison al-'Azīz, and to pretend the latter had acted corruptly in connection with this matter. Maḥmūd rejected this idea. Ad-Darkazīnī then offered him 300,000 dīnārs to imprison al-'Azīz; Maḥmūd agreed and al-'Azīz was imprisoned in **Takrīt** (525/1131).¹ Maḥmūd then sent to ad-Darkazīnī demanding the promised money. The latter delayed in sending it, and sent to Iṣfahān and seized 'Imād ud-Dīn's father, Ṣafī ud-Dīn and his uncle Diyā ud-Dīn, imprisoned them and took their estates.² Such of their estates as remained were subsequently seized by al-Burujirdī, Qarāsunqur's wazīr.³

An interesting story is related of Aḥmad b. Nizām ul-Mulk, who, while wazīr to Muḥammad b. Malikshāh, determined to attack the sayyid Abū Hāshim, ra'īs of Hamadān. He gave the

¹ The M.Z. mentions that al-'Azīz was fined and imprisoned by Maḥmūd b. Muḥammad in 521 (p.77), and also records his imprisonment by ad-Darkazīnī in Takrīt (p.86).

² Bu. 139-40.

³ Bu. 168.

sultān 500,000 dīnārs to hand him over. Abū Hāshim learnt of this and went to Iṣfahān by an unknown road, and asked the sultān's intimates to send him with a khādim to the sultān at ^{night,} To Lālā Qarātegīn, who was appointed to do this. Abū Hāshim gave at once 10,000 dīnārs. When he was taken to the sultān's presence, he offered the sultān 800,000 dīnārs, instead of 500,000 which Aḥmad b. Nizām ul-Mulk had offered, if he would hand over the wazīr to him. Muḥammad accepted his offer, and gave Aḥmad to Abū Hāshim to wreak his vengeance.¹

Another wazīr, who oppressed and fined the people was Shams ul-Mulk b. Nizām ul-Mulk, wazīr to Maḥmūd b. Muḥammad. He was hated by the people. He appointed as his deputy one al-Kāmil b. al-Kāfī al-Iṣfahānī, who was equally hated. The

¹ R.S. 162-5; U.H.S. 91-3; T.G. 456. According to the latter Abū Hāshim gave the sultān 700,000 dīnārs. Bundārī's account is slightly different. According to him a number of prominent persons wanted al-Mutawwaj b. Abī Sa'd al-Hamadani to become ra'īs and so they united against Abū Hāshim, proposed to confine him to his house with his children and imposed a fine of 700,000 gold dīnārs upon him, apart from what was confiscated from his numerous retainers. Because of this opposition to him Muḥammad b. Malikshāh was turned against Abū Hāshim and sent his treasurer, Anūshīravān, to collect the money. After Anūshīravān had paid the fines into the sultān's treasury in Iṣfahān, he told the sultān of the plot against Abū Hāshim, and so Muḥammad reinstated him as ra'īs, and sent him magnificent presents and robes of honour (Bu. 89-90; see also I.A. X.332-3).

first thing the latter did was to imprison the preceding wazīr, Kamāl ul-Mulk as-Samīramī's family, and to order the return of the allowances (rusūm) and pensions (idrārāt), which as-Samīramī had had. He further wrote to the provinces and demanded that all who had received pensions (ṣadaqa) for two years past, whether in cash or in kind, should return the same.¹

From what has gone before, it is not surprising that the position of the officials in general and of the wazīr in particular was extremely insecure.² Nizām ul-Mulk himself, in spite of his power, had evidently no confidence in the security of his position. The fact that he should have considered it necessary to have his own spies throughout the kingdom is adequate proof of the atmosphere of intrigue and distrust.³ He himself was able to maintain his position until ^{his} assassination, but after his death the security of the wazīr's position decreased and wazīrs succeeded one another often with great rapidity. This was due to the increase of intrigue, and partly also to the prevailing financial stringency, for the dismissal of a wazīr and the confiscation of his goods by the sultān was

¹ Bu. 126-7, 99.

² A change of sultān also frequently involved a change of wazirate, for the wazīr was the servant, not of the state, but of the sultān.

³ cf. p.78.

a means of temporarily relieving this. The readiness with which the later sultāns listened to intrigues against their wazīrs contrasts with the earlier period. Alp Arslān on one occasion when he received a letter slandering Nizām ul-Mulk, gave it to him and said, "If they are right in what they have written, repair your nature and mend your ways, and if they lied then forgive them their slip."¹ Further, as stated above, when Abū'l Muḥāsīn, the sayyid ur-ru'asā, accused Nizām ul-Mulk and his friends in 476^(1083/4) of misappropriating the state revenue and offered to extort money from ^{the wazīr} him, if he was handed over to him, the sultān seized, blinded and imprisoned him.²

From the death of Malikshāh onwards, the number of wazīrs, who escaped either being murdered or imprisoned and whose goods were not confiscated on dismissal, is small. Barkyāruq seized and killed Mu'ayyid ul-Mulk in 494 (1100/1) and confiscated his possessions.³ An earlier example is that of the malik Arslān Arghū, who exacted 300,000 dīnārs from his wazīr 'Imād ul-Mulk b. Nizām ul-Mulk in 490 (1097) and killed him.⁴ Muḥammad b. Malikshāh imprisoned his wazīr,

¹ I.A. X.51.

² *ibid.* 85.

³ *ibid.* 206.

⁴ *ibid.* 180. According to Bundārī, 'Imād ul-Mulk was ^{Bars} Burī/b. Alp Arslān's wazīr, and when Burī Bars was killed Arslān Arghū seized and fined 'Imād ul-Mulk 300,000 dīnārs and then killed him (p.236, A.S.D. 85-6).

al-Khaṭīr al-Maibudī, and with him two of the children of al-Kāfī and their sister, who was the wazīr's wife, and imposed a fine of 150,000 dīnārs upon them.¹ Maḥmūd b. Muḥammad seized and killed Kamāl ul-Mulk as-Samīramī in 516 (1122/3) and took his treasury.² In the following year Maḥmūd also seized and killed the wazīr Shams ul-Mulk b. Nizām ul-Mulk.³ Tughril b. Muḥammad killed his wazīr ad-Darkazīnī in 527 (1133).⁴ Sanjar also killed Muḥammad b. Fakhr ul-Mulk b. Nizām ul-Mulk and took his possessions. The latter treated the amīrs with contempt, so they complained of him to Sanjar who accordingly killed him.⁵

During the reigns of Tughril Beg, Alp Arslān and Malikshāh the wazīr was, after the sultān, the most influential person in the kingdom. Al-Kundurī, Tughril Beg's wazīr, in accordance with the latter's will, placed Sulaimān b. Dā'ūd on the throne on Tughril's death. Seeing he was not generally supported, he

¹ Bu. 105.

² Q. 206-7. According to I.A., he was assassinated by a Bāṭinī (I.A. X.424).

³ I.A. X.433-4; Bu. 128. Sanjar's wazīr Abū Tāhir al-Qummī, who was an enemy of the Nizāmī family, induced him to do this.

⁴ I.A. X.483; Bu.154.

⁵ I.A. X.385.

proclaimed Alp Arslān as sultān instead,¹ and endeavoured at the same time to win over the latter's wazīr, Nizām ul-Mulk; he failed to do so and was superseded by his rival in the wazirate.² It is noticeable that it was a question, on this occasion, of the rivalry between the two wazīrs and not between the rival amīrs, whose ambitions later dominated the question of the succession of the Great Seljuq sultāns. Similarly when Alp Arslān was on his deathbed, he charged Nizām ul-Mulk with authority over the accession of his heir-apparent Malikshāh.³ From the death of Nizām ul-Mulk onwards, as stated above, the wazirate began to decline. The fact that the caliph, when he agreed to Turkān Khātūn's request to read the khutba in the name of her infant son Maḥmūd, stipulated that Tāj ul-Mulk Abū'l Ghanā'im, the wazīr, should be in charge of all officials and taxation and that Unar, the leader of the army, should act on Tāj ul-Mulk's advice,⁴ is perhaps an indication that the military classes were beginning to oppose the wazīr and were seeking to dominate him. Under the later Great Seljūq sultāns there was a striking change in the position of the wazīr relative to the amīrs (see also Chapter IV.). It is perhaps significant of the decrease in

¹ I.A. X.18,19.

² *ibid.* 20.

³ *ibid.* 51; Bu. 45; cf. T.G. 443.

⁴ I.A. X.145.

the wazīr's power that when Barkyāruq died in 498 (1104), Ayyāz, Malikshāh b. Barkyāruq's atābeg went with Malikshāh to Baghdād and sent the wazīr al-Maibudī with Barkyāruq's corpse to Iṣfahān, a comparatively unimportant task.¹ When Muḥammad b. Malikshāh was dying, no one entered to him except his amīr ḥājib, 'Alī b. 'Umar b. Sarma.² Maḥmūd b. Muḥammad when he was dying in 525 (1131) appointed his son Dā'ūd as sultān with the wazīr, Abū'l Qāsim ad-Darkazīnī, and the atābeg, Aqsunqur Aḥmadīlī, to see over his affairs.³ Dā'ūd did not become established as sultān; Sanjar appointed in his stead Tughril b. Muḥammad in 525 and made ad-Darkazīnī his wazīr.⁴ When Sanjar assigned Khwārazm to the malīk Sulaimānshāh b. Muḥammad in 533 (1138/9) he appointed for him not only a wazīr and an atābeg, but also an amīr ḥājib.⁵ The amīr ḥājib of Mas'ūd b. Muḥammad, 'Abd ar-Raḥmān Tughrā'īrak, was the virtual ruler of his kingdom for a time.⁶ Indeed by this time the wazīr was quite overshadowed by the powerful amīrs. Kamāl ud-Din Muḥammad b. al-Ḥusain made an attempt, as stated above, to restore order in the kingdom and to re-establish the prestige of the wazirate, but he failed

¹ I.A. X.261.

² Bu. 108.

³ I.A. X.471.

⁴ *ibid.* X.477.

⁵ *ibid.* XI.44.

⁶ *ibid.* XI.59; Bu.175.

and lost his life in the attempt.

It was, moreover, not only in relation to the amīrs that the importance of the wazīr declined. Other officials tended also to increase in influence relatively as the wazirate declined. This is illustrated by the case of Majd ul-Mulk al-Balāsānī, the mustawfī, and Fakhr ul-Mulk b. Nizām ul-Mulk, wazīr to Barkyāruq. Power was in the hands of the former, the latter being merely a figurehead.¹ That Majd ul-Mulk did not seize the wazirate himself may have been because he thought he would be safer as mustawfī, and could still concentrate in his own hands all power without drawing so much attention to himself.

Further, as the wazirate declined in importance, the wazīr was no longer the intermediary between the sultān and the various branches of the administration. Instead of reports passing through the hands of the wazīr who represented them to the sultān, there was a tendency for the sultān, in so far as he exercised control, to deal with the heads of the departments individually. This does not mean that in the early period all business invariably went through the wazīr, or that in the later

¹ Bu. 79. On the defeat of Tutush in 487 Majd ul-Mulk went to Isfahān and proceeded to win the favour of Barkyāruq's mother. He then seized and blinded the mustawfī Abū 'Alī and took that office himself.

period the reverse was the case - practice varied from time to time, and the most that can be stated is that the general tendency was as mentioned above. Maḥmūd b. Muḥammad, for example, used daily to ask the mustawfī for the daily register and accounts and to go through these, and similarly he used to ask the ʿārid for his registers.¹

It was probably due to the increasing danger of the wazirate and to the general lowering of moral standards in official circles that there appeared, after the death of Malikshāh, a tendency - not admittedly a very marked one - to avoid the wazirate. The prevailing financial stringency forced the wazīr, as head of the financial administration, to practice extortion in the collection of taxes,² and this was, no doubt, repugnant to many. This objection to office on what may almost be termed religious grounds was not a tendency confined to the Great Seljūq period. But it did not become noticeable during that period until after the rule of Malikshāh.³ The author of the Naṣā'ih Nāma expresses it, and warns his son not to choose the wazirate after him, and tells him not to be deceived by worldly vanities "because of the delights of that office (i.e. the wazirate) in the beginning

¹ R.D. f.251a.

² When Abū'l Maḥāsin ad-Dihistānī was appointed wazīr to Barkyāruq, there was no money or revenue, and he did of necessity what made the people fear him (I.A. X.230).

³ There are however instances of minister wishing to resign office probably on such grounds, before Nūr Malikshāh's own mustawfī, Sharaf al-Mulk gave 100,000 dīnārs to resign office (I.A.X.223).

are not worth the regret~~it~~ it entails in the end; in truth they are a dream and nothing but a delusion, to which is joined the punishment of the next world."¹ Anūshīravān b. Khālīd refused Muḥammad b. Malikshāh's invitation to become deputy wazīr but was forced to accept.² Subsequently he resigned or was dismissed. When he was again summoned to take office he agreed, but unwillingly.³ Another case was that of 'Azīz ud-Dīn Abū Naṣr b. Ḥamīd, the mustawfī, who refused Maḥmūd b. Muḥammad's offer of the wazirate and recommended the sultān to appoint Abū'l Qāsim ad-Darkazīnī.⁴ Subsequently al-'Azīz offered his resignation from the office of mustawfī.⁵ Ibn Dārast apparently preferred the wazirate of Būzāba to the wazirate of the sultān Mas'ūd b. Muḥammad; this was not due to religious scruples, but it is striking proof of the decline in popularity and power of the sultān's wazirate.⁶

¹ N. f.la.

² Bu. 99.

³ I.A. XI.47; T.S. 301.

⁴ Bu. 129.

⁵ Bu. 135.

⁶ I.A. XI.77; see also Chapter IV.

ii. Financial Administration.

In view of the fact that the extent of the directly administered area varied from time to time, as stated in Chapter I., there were probably considerable fluctuations in the revenue. The general tendency was for this to decrease towards the end of the period, by which time the major part of the country had been alienated from the control of the central government. Similarly the various items, and the amount received from each source, underwent considerable change.

The taxes were collected by tax-collectors ('āmils) of the central government. Practice varied locally. In some cases taxation may have been levied on individuals, in others upon the inhabitants of a locality as a whole, some local man being responsible for the collection and payment of this to a tax-collector. In Baghdād the shihna was to some extent concerned with the collection of taxes. Al-Bursuqī, while shihna, was collecting taxes in 518 (1124) when news arrived of his dismissal from office. He then handed the matter over to his ^{and successor} deputy/Yaranqush.¹ It was not, however, the invariable practice for the shihna of Baghdād to collect taxes. Muḥammad

¹ I.A. X.439. When Mas'ūd b. Muḥammad sent Ismā'īl b. Chahār-dāngī and Albaqish Kūn Khar on an expedition to Fārs and Khūmīstān, they were to defray their expenses by collecting taxes in Baghdād. They failed, however, to do so, for when they advanced on 'Irāq, the shihna prepared to resist them (I.A. XI.51).

b. Malikshāh in 494/5 (1101/2) appointed Abū'l Ma'ālī al-Mufaḍḍal b. 'Abd ar-Razzāq over the collection of taxes.¹ Taxes were collected probably both in cash and in kind. The money and goods so obtained, or what remained after defraying current expenses, were paid into the treasury.

It was probably during the reign of Malikshāh that the revenue of the empire was highest. In the Tārīkhi Guzīda, Hamdullāh Mustawfī states that the annual revenue of Malikshāh's kingdom was 10,000,000 currency dīnārs.² He also records that it was reported in the isālati Malikshāhī that the revenue in the days of Malikshāh amounted to 215,000,000 and odd gold dīnārs (i.e. 'Abbāsī dīnārs) and since these dīnārs were to be reckoned at $2\frac{1}{3}$ (currency) dīnārs of his day, the sum amounted to somewhat over 500,000,000 (currency) dīnārs.³ This figure is, of course, absurd. The entire revenue of the Islamic Empire in the time of the early 'Abbāsids was only some 25 million dīnārs.⁴ He also states

¹ I.A. X.225.

² T.G. 449. The sum is given in tūmāns; a tūmān was the equivalent of 10,000 currency dīnārs (Nuzhat, transl. p. 33).

³ of Persia excluding Khurāsān during his time
Nuzhat ul-Qulūb, p.27. He further states that the revenue / amounted until the first years of Ghazān Khān to 17,000,000 currency dīnārs, after which it reached 21,000,000 dīnārs.*

⁴ Von Kremer: Ueber das Budget des Harun in VII. International Congress of Orientalists, Vienna, 1888.

*when he wrote, however, it did not probably amount to half that sum.

that he had seen an account on the handwriting of his great-grandfather Amīn ud-Dīn Naṣīr, the mustawfī, who was accountant to the treasury of 'Irāq in the time of the Seljūqs, according to which Persian 'Irāq in those days paid in the currency of his own time 25,200,000 and odd (currency) dīnārs.¹

A relatively important item in the revenue at the beginning of the Great Seljūq period was the land tax, but in the course of time it became an almost negligible item, for the majority of the land was alienated from the control of the central government. The land tax was probably collected both in cash and in kind. In theory it fell due after the harvest, but in practice it was probably often demanded before the harvest, which caused considerable hardship to the cultivators.² Alp Arslān is said to have taken the land tax (kharāj) in two annual instalments.³

In so far as the land tax and other items of the revenue

¹ Nuzhat ul-Qulūb, p.48. Some MSS. give 2,568,000 dīnārs, which seems a more likely figure (Nuzhat, transl. p.55). Hamdullāh states that in his time by reason of the ruin of the country, this sum had been reduced to 350,000 (currency) dīnārs.

² cf. Nizām ul-Mulk, who writes, "The tax-collectors must be charged to treat well the people of God, and only to take the due amount (from them in taxation) and also to demand that with civility and courtesy." He further stresses the fact that the taxes were not to be demanded before they fell due, because this led to the ruin and dispersal of the peasants. Also if the āmil were to take anything in excess from the peasants, he was to be removed from office. (S.N. 18).

³ A.S.D. 30; I.A. X.51.

were farmed, they brought in a certain sum annually to the state treasury; the amount of land farmed was, however, insignificant compared with the land which was alienated in the form of military and administrative iqtā's (Chapter V.).

The chief source of revenue was in all probability "illegal" taxes (mukūs). As regards these there was a constant conflict between religious scruples and financial practice. Those sultāns who desired to observe the religious law tended to revoke "illegal" taxes, but never with lasting success, and with disastrous results upon the revenue. Mention of the revocation of "illegal" taxes is frequent, and from this very fact it is clear that their repeal was either not carried out, or was shortlived. Malikshāh in 479 (1086/7) ordered the abolition of the mukūs levied upon traders for all kinds of merchandise in 'Irāq and Khurāsān.¹ He also suppressed all tolls and duties (khafarāt) throughout his dominions.² Muḥammad b. Malikshāh, on his arrival in Baghdād in Sha'bān 501 (1108), abolished mukūs, customs dues (الضرائب ?), market dues (دارالبيع), transit dues (الاجتيازات) and similar dues which were levied in 'Irāq and all his provinces,

¹ Q. 118; I.A. X.105.

² I.K. III.441. khafarāt were sums paid by travellers for an escort or safe conduct when passing through dangerous country (445, 3n). Malikshāh also abolished pilgrim dues (معاونة) in 481 (1088/9) and ear-marked an equivalent sum from the produce of 'Irāq. Formerly it had been the custom to take from every district seven gold mithqāl (T.G. 444).

and tablets concerning this were hung up in the markets.¹ When he went back to Iṣfahān, "illegal" taxes were again levied on the merchants, according to custom. Muḥammad, on his return to Baghdād, was told of this, whereupon he confirmed the repeal of these taxes and warned those who disobeyed.² Tughril Beg, on the other hand, reimposed in 455 (1063) what the ra'īs of the two 'Irāqs had abolished by way of confiscations of inheritances and mukūs.³ Maḥmūd b. Muḥammad, on the advice of his wazīr, as-Samīramī, decided to renew the mukūs in 'Irāq in 515 (1121). Actually he refrained from doing so immediately, taking as a warning against this outbreaks of fire in the sultān's palace in Baghdād and in the jamī' of Iṣfahān.⁴ It seems that the mukūs were, however, renewed, for on the assassination of as-Samīramī in 516, the sultān revoked what he (as-Samīramī) had renewed of mukūs, and also abolished the taxes which the wazīr had imposed on merchants and dealers.⁵ Kamāl ud-Dīn Muḥammad b. al-Ḥusain,

¹ I.A. X.317; 369; Q. 162.

² Q. 162.

³ I.A. X.16. According to Nāṣiri Khusraw, Tughril Beg, when he took Iṣfahān, commanded the taxes to be remitted for three years (N.K. 92-3).

⁴ I.A. X.420.

⁵ *ibid.* 425. The M.Z. also states as-Samīramī renewed the mukūs in Baghdād (p.66).

Mas'ūd b. Muḥammad's wazīr, let fall the mukūs, but it seems unlikely that this repeal came into force, or if it did, it was extremely short-lived. He did not become wazīr till 532 (1137/8), and in 533 he was murdered;¹ in the same year Mas'ūd, when he came to Baghdād, revoked the mukūs and wrote tablets to that effect, which were placed on the gates of the jamī's and sūqs.² In 541/^(1146/7)the mukūs in Baghdād were again abolished in Baghdād.³

A not unimportant source of revenue was confiscations and fines from dismissed officials and others. Tughril Beg confiscated in 449 (1057/8) from Tāj ud-Dīn b. Sākhta, the 'Alīd, and from Ibn Simḥā, the Jew, in Baṣra, 100,000 and 20,000 dīnārs respectively.⁴ Under Alp Arslān there were said to have been no confiscations.⁵ Subsequently this practice became common and, as stated in Chapter I., the only source of revenue remaining to Maḥmūd b. Muḥammad's dīwān was confiscations.⁶ Muḥammad b. Malikshāh seized Abū Qāsim al-Ḥusain b. 'Abd al-Wāḥid, the ṣāḥib makhzan, and Abū'l Faraj, son of the ra'īs ur-ru'asā, in 502 (1108/9), confined them at his residence

¹ I.A. XI.42.

² *ibid.* 47.

³ M.Z. 113.

⁴ I.A. IX.436-7.

⁵ I.A. X.51.

⁶ Bu. 122-3.

and finally set them free on condition they gave him some money.¹ Tughril b. Muḥammad fined Ṣafī ud-Dīn, the mustawfī, 200,000 dīnārs in 526 (1131/2).² These examples could be multiplied (see also p.109).

A further source of revenue was from the buying of offices and from presents from those who wished to secure or regain the sultān's favour. The buying of the office of wazīr has already been mentioned (see p. 84). A considerable amount of money also passed in securing provincial governorships (see also Chapter IV.). It is possible the granting of khil'as and similar honours were conditional upon the giving of money to the sultān or his officials. Kāmyār, to whom Muḥammad b. Malikshāh handed over Zain ul-Mulk Abū Sa'd al-Qummī, the mustawfī, pretended when he got to Rei, Zain ul-Mulk's home, that the sultān had given Zain ul-Mulk a khil'a in return for a certain sum of money, and obtained thus much money from al-Qummī's people, after which he killed Zain ul-Mulk.³

Tribute was paid to the Great Seljūqs by various rulers and vassals, but this can hardly be regarded as a regular source of revenue. Various local rulers during the early

¹ I.A. X.330.

² A.S.D. 102.

³ I.A. X.345. Ibn ul-Athīr states that the reason for this was that Zain ul-Mulk had abused the caliph and the sultān. Bundārī gives rather a different account of the death of Zain ul-Mulk. He states that a group of amīrs and others persuaded the sultān to hand Zain ul-Mulk over to them for 200,000 dīnārs. They then killed him and made the sultān forget the 200,000 dīnārs which Ibn ul-Kāfī, the deputy wazīr had misappropriated (p. 96).

Seljūq period made sundry payments from time to time to the Seljūqs. For example, Farāmarz, ruler of Iṣfahān, paid an indemnity of 100,000 dīnārs to Tughril Beg (see also Chapter I.).¹ The Byzantine emperor, Romanus, agreed after his capture by Alp Arslān to send as "jizya" 1,000 dīnārs a day.² It appears that some kind of annual payment or present was in fact made for a time (see p.97). Malikshāh is also reputed to have received "jizya" from the Byzantine emperor.³ The ruler of Shīrwān agreed during the reign of Malikshāh to pay an annual tribute to the Great Seljūq state, which was finally fixed at 40,000 dīnārs. This sum, however, was not regularly paid.⁴ Sanjar imposed a tribute of 1,000 dīnārs a day to be paid from the taxes of Ghazna to his treasury, and he established in that city an 'āmil from his dīwān to collect this.⁵

There were various other minor items of taxation. The nomads in some cases were apparently taxed by the central government so much per tent.⁶ The Ghuzz on the borders of Khurāsān as stated above (see Chapter I.) paid at one time an annual tribute of 24,000 sheep to Sanjar. Various crafts also

¹ T.S. 260-1.

² R.S. 119-20.

³ I.A. X.143.

⁴ Bu. 128.

⁵ R.S. 168; T.G. 458.

⁶ A.M. 91.

probably paid special dues to the dīwān. Those who quarried millstones in Khullār in Fārs paid 700 dīnārs annually to the dīwān.¹

The most important charge upon the revenue was the payment and upkeep of the standing army and the cost of military expeditions. Secondly there was the upkeep of the royal court,² and thirdly the expenses of the administration and the payment of officials. The latter, however, were largely paid by assignments (see Chapter V.). Lastly, among incidental expenses were the giving of alms at Ramaḍān and other times, gifts and awqāf (see above). Alp Arslān gave in alms annually at Ramaḍān 1,000 dīnārs in each of the following cities, Balkh, Marv, Herāt and Nīshāpūr, and 10,000 dīnārs in his court.³ Malikshāh used to give alms to the extent of 10,000 dīnārs.⁴ Sanjar was liberal in his gifts. On one occasion it is said that on five consecutive days he distributed the greater part of the contents of his treasury, and gave over 700,000 gold dīnārs, while the value of the horses and garments he bestowed was even greater.⁵

1 F.N. 146.

2 This involved a considerable expenditure for those at court were numerous. Alp Arslān used to have slaughtered every day 50 head of sheep and these, with other food, were partaken of by the amīrs and the poor (A.S.D. 54).

3 A.S.D. 30.

4 Bu. 65.

5 *ibid.* 251; I.K. I.600-1.

The surplus revenue was paid into the treasury, but, as stated above, it is difficult to draw a clear line of demarcation between the sultān's personal treasury and the state treasury, indeed, there probably was no such distinction. Generally speaking, the sultāns were accompanied wherever they went by their treasuries. In addition some of them, notably Alp Arslān and Malikshāh, had stores of money in different strongholds scattered throughout the kingdom. The purpose of these were chiefly military. Alp Arslān had such a store in the fortress of Gīv near Farrāhān, so that if he should travel from Khurāsān to 'Irāq or vice versa, he could repair from there anything of which he was short. On one occasion when Alp Arslān reached there on his way to Anatolia, money sufficient for the expenses of the expedition, which was expected to be a long one, amounting to 1,000,000 dīnārs were taken from the fortress.¹ Malikshāh had similar stores. When he reached Nīshāpūr in Rabī' II. 465 (1073), he took much wealth from the fortress of Quhandiz and tried to incline therewith the amīrs of the 'askār towards him.² Malikshāh, during his reign, probably accumulated considerable stores, but these were dissipated by the succeeding rulers. Turkān Khātūn, when she

¹ N. f.30a,b. Zangī, the atābeg of Mawṣil, followed a similar practice, having stores in Mawṣil, Sinjār and Aleppo, so that if trouble broke out in one of these places and he was prevented from getting at the treasury there, he would be able to obtain money from one of his other stores (A.M. 143)

² A.S.D. 56.

went to Iṣfahān after the proclamation of her son Maḥmūd as sultān, distributed the stores (ذخایر), which had been accumulated over a long period.¹ Later when Barkyāruq came to Iṣfahān to besiege the city, she emptied the treasury and gave the amīrs and members of the standing army gold without stint.² Barkyāruq seems frequently to have been in difficulty for money. In 493 (1099/100), when Abū'l Maḥāsin became wazīr to him, no revenue or money remained.³ Further, when Barkyāruq reached Baghdād in 494 (1101), he had no funds and sent to the caliph for help; after negotiations, the latter sent him 50,000 dīnārs.⁴ Muḥammad b. Malikshāh, during his reign appears to have accumulated once more considerable sums. 'Imād ud-Dīn relates that he found a balance sheet (tafṣīl) in the hand of his uncle, 'Azīz ud-Dīn, in which the treasury of Muḥammad b. Malikshāh contained 18,000,000 dīnārs apart from gold ornaments (صیاعات), precious jewels and garments embroidered with gold and silver thread (الثياب المجدنية).⁵ On his deathbed, Muḥammad ordered 200,000 dīnārs to be dispersed to make his enemies and those who had complaints against him content.⁶ On his death, his

¹ Bu. 76.

² R.S. 141.

³ I.A. X.230.

⁴ *ibid.* 209.

⁵ Bu. 141.

⁶ *ibid.* 108.

amīr ḥājib, 'Alī Bār, is said to have entered the treasury and taken boxes of jewels.¹

At the beginning of the reign of Maḥmūd b. Muḥammad, his followers emptied the treasury he had inherited from his father.² During his reign the area under his control was greatly diminished and the revenues consequently reduced. Bundārī relates how Maḥmūd b. Muḥammad and his officials lacked funds even to provide the daily allowance of beer. They sent out, therefore, to the brewer a number of empty boxes from the treasury, so that he should sell them for what they would fetch and obtain what he needed with the proceeds.³ Maḥmūd, on another occasion, asked Shāpūr, who had been Muḥammad b. Malikshāh's khāzin, for some perfume made of musk and other ingredients (عَابِيَّة), and Shāpūr asked a few days' delay in which to procure it. Maḥmūd then said, "Tell the company how much perfume there used to be in my father's treasury." Shāpūr answered, "In the fortress of Iṣfahān there was nearly 180 riṭl of it in gold, silver, crystal and china vessels, and we had in the "field" treasury (خَزَانَةُ الصَّبَةِ) 30 riṭl."⁴ Mas'ūd b. Muḥammad's treasury was also usually empty. Such revenue as arrived from the

¹ Bu. 114.

² *ibid.* 112, 141.

³ *ibid.* 141; I.K. III.337.

⁴ Bu. 141-2.

outlying districts he used to distribute in his audience at once.¹ Of the later sultāns Sanjar was probably the only one who had a relatively well-filled treasury. Rare and valuable objects, necklaces, jewels, pearls, priceless pendants, purses full of money and garments were collected in his treasury. His jewels were in sealed drums. When he needed anything from them, he would take out what he required and then reseal the drums.² It appears that Sanjar's treasury was kept at Marv.³

¹ R.S. 226.

² Bu. 251-2.

³ When he was engaged with the Qarā Khitāy in 532 (1137/8) the Khwārazmshāh, Atsīz, captured Marv by assault and took Sanjar's chests of jewels. Subsequently Sanjar invaded Khwārazm and recovered these (Bu. 257).

CHAPTER III.

THE ARMY.

During the early period of expansion the Seljūqs drew their power from the Turkomān tribes, but once they had begun to meet with success it was not long before they became, from having been merely the leaders of a tribal migration, rulers of a vast military empire. This transformation involved a change in the basis of their power. It was no longer possible for them to depend only upon tribal forces. The problem facing them was to find some more stable element, whose interest would be bound up with theirs as a dynasty, and which would therefore maintain them in power. The way in which the Seljūqs attempted to solve this problem was not a new one; they sought to maintain their position by mercenary armies composed of slaves and freedmen.¹ This solution - even if it did not prove adequate in the long run - in addition to assuring, temporarily at least, the maintenance in power of the Seljūqs, was also in addition a solution in part to the

¹ The standing army of this period is usually termed 'askar' by the muslim historians. The term jund was applied in contradistinction to 'askar' to local troops. These were probably maintained in the provinces by the sultān but did not accompany him on all his expeditions, or were perhaps only called up in emergencies. (Cf. the gratuity Nizām ul-Mulk gave to the ajnad on the accession of Malikshāh, after which they returned to Khurāsān, see note 3 p. 145). Tribal auxiliaries were also sometimes known as jund. The town militia were similarly designated by this term (see Chapter VII.).

administrative problem, for these slaves and freedmen formed a plentiful reserve from which administrative officials could be chosen. Lastly, the royal court being essentially military in character, it is difficult, except in the case of those officials and attendants whose duties brought them into contact with the sultān's ḥaram, to draw a distinction between the members of the standing army and the officials of the court, which was in all probability largely formed by members of the standing army.

In breaking away from tribal tradition there was a danger that if the rupture with the past were too sudden the result would be to alienate the tribes, who were still an important element in the military forces of the sultān. Nizām ul-Mulk in all probability recognised this danger. In the Siyāsat Nāma he states that the Seljūq dynasty was under an obligation to the Turkomāns owing to blood ties and because of the share of the latter in the foundation of the empire; for this reason the disorders created by them could not be suppressed by severe measures. He recommended, therefore, that 1,000 young Turkomāns should be enrolled in the service of the sultān and trained as ghulāms of the court, and this number was, if necessary, to be increased to 5,000 or 10,000.¹ If his suggestion was acted upon it will have tended to make the transformation in the basis of the Seljūq power appear less

¹ S.N. 94.

striking, and it seems reasonable to suppose this change was in fact relatively gradual.

The distinction between slave (mamlūk) and freedman was not an absolute one, nor was there apparently any difference in social status. Either could attain to the highest positions of the state; there are cases of mamlūks and freedmen marrying into the royal house, such as Arghash the Nizāmī who married the daughter of Yāqūtī b. Chaghri Beg,¹ while the atābeg system is further proof of the fact that there was no social stigma attached to the slave or freedman.² Freedom was either bought by the mamlūk, given by the sultān, or, as it were, usurped, for when a mamlūk attained to a powerful position, he became virtually free.

The mamlūks were carefully trained to fulfil their various functions. Large numbers of boys during their training were kept in fortresses, such as Shāhdiz outside Iṣfahān.³ Nizām ul-Mulk gives an account of the system of training prevailing under the Samānids,⁴ and ~~it is probable that the~~^{state} in his

¹ I.A. X.185.

² This is interesting in view of the fact that Isrā'il b. Seljūq when sending a message to the members of his family to fight for Maḥmūd b. Sebuktegīn's kingdom spoke of the latter in contempt as the son of a slave (mawlā) (R.S.91).

³ cf. R.S. 156; U.H.S. 84.

⁴ S.N. 95.

^{day this system had fallen into disuse.}
~~Seljuqs trained their slaves in a like manner.~~ The mamlūks did not all remain at court and many of them held provincial governorships, and generally speaking, only joined the sultān on military campaigns. As provincial governors, they had often ample opportunity to acquire power, and even to establish their virtual independence. Only those mamlūks who belonged to the **standing** army or the royal court will be included in this chapter. Many of these also attained great influence, and in some cases succeeded in dominating the sultān. This seems to have occurred on several occasions during the reign of Sanjar. Bundārī states that the latter used to buy a ghulām, make him a favourite, and invest him with authority; then, after a brief period, it usually happened that the ghulām fell from favour and even lost his life.¹ Such was the fate of the mamlūk Sunqur al-Khāṣṣ. Sanjar at first regarded him as the apple of his eye, gave him full disposition over his treasury and seal, and accorded him royal privileges, ordering his wazīr, Zāhīr ud-Dīn 'Abd ul-'Azīz, to pitch a surādiq for him like his (Sanjar's), to buy for him 1,000 mamlūks to walk at his stirrup, to assign ^{to} him a suitable iqtā' and a treasury like his (Sanjar's), and to establish for him a dīwān with excellent scribes (kātibs) and learned deputies (nā'ibs), so that he should become after two weeks the owner of 10,000 horse. Zāhīr ud-Dīn asked a respite of three months

¹ Bu. 248.

in which to do this, but Sanjar only gave him a month and a half, and Zahīr ud-Dīn in carrying out Sanjar's command spent 700,000 rukniyya dīnārs in twenty days apart from what he spent in iqtā's, allowances (taqrīrāt), governorships (al-wilāyāt), royal paraphernalia and garments. Before two years had passed, Sanjar began to hate Sunqur, who had become familiar with him and dominated him, and so one day Sanjar summoned his amīrs to a private audience by ones and twos and told them to stab Sunqur al-Khāṣṣ as he entered, and this they did.¹ Qā'imāz was another mamlūk with whom Sanjar became intimate. Rivalry then arose between Qā'imāz and the wazīr, Ṣadr ud-Dīn Muḥammad b. Fakhr ul-Mulk b. Niḥām ul-Mulk, which ended in Qā'imāz cutting off the head of the wazīr, and taking it to the sultān. Sanjar became alarmed at his boldness in doing this, and told Qumāj, who had the clearest judgment among his followers, to go and see what Qā'imāz had done to the wazīr, and to murder him. Qumāj replied that this would make a scandal and that Sanjar, in order to preserve his honour, must pretend he had himself ordered the wazīr to be killed. Sanjar took his advice and kept the matter secret, and then after some time had elapsed ordered Qā'imāz to be killed.²

Yet another of Sanjar's favourites was the mamlūk al-Muqarrab

¹ Bu. 249.

² *ibid.* 243-4.

Jawhar; Sanjar wearied of him also and al-Muqarrab was assassinated by the Bāṭinīs with Sanjar's acquiescence.¹

No such difficulty in controlling the mamlūks is apparent under the early Great Seljūq sultāns. From the death of Malikshāh onwards however, there was a striking increase in the power of the mamlūks and amīrs generally. Bundārī mentions especially their increasing disobedience after the accession of Maḥmūd b. Muḥammad.²

The source of supply of mamlūks was varied. The majority were Turks, who themselves or their forebears had been captured or bought on the eastern frontiers of the Islamic world. The Turkomān tribes, who had migrated westwards with the Seljūqs, also, as stated above, provided a recruiting ground, as did probably other tribes, such as the Shabānkāra of Fārs.³ A certain number of Armenians and Georgians,⁴ who had been captured on the western frontiers or who were the children of such captives, were also enrolled in the royal army. After the Turks, however, the most important group was the Dailamites. These, in contradistinction to the Turks, who were cavalry,

¹ Bu. 250...Jawhar was the mamlūk of Sanjar's mother, and when she died in 517 he was transferred to Sanjar's service.

² Bu. 112.

³ cf. S.N. "If there are some Georgians and Shabānkāra it is lawful for such men are good." (p.92). See also below, p. 149.

⁴ Bu. 248.

were chiefly infantry. There were also a number of slave markets throughout the empire. A story is told of Muḥammad b. Malikshāh, who bought a number of mamlūks from some merchants.¹ The price of a mamlūk no doubt varied considerably. Sanjar bought Sunqur al-Khāṣṣ for 1,200 rukniyya dīnārs. He was one of Sanjar's favourite mamlūks (see above), and therefore it may perhaps be assumed that this was the price of a good slave.

Nizām ul-Mulk advocated that the army should be a "mixed" one, on the grounds that this lessened the danger of embroilments, revolts and slackness.² He proposed 2,000 Khurāsānīs³ (i.e. Turks) and 2,000 Dailamites should be kept at court,⁴ and that the royal body-guard should be composed of 200 picked men - 100 Khurāsānīs³ and 100 Dailamites.⁴ In practice although the army was composed of different elements, it seems

¹ I.A.X368-9; A.M. 39. The sum due for these mamlūks was to be paid by the amil of Khūzistān. The latter paid part of it, but held back the payment of the rest. The merchants complained at the sultān's law-court (majlis ul-hakam), and the sultān hearing their story summoned the amil, ordered him to pay the money and punished him.

² S.N. 92.

³ Khurāsānī in the Syrian usage means sappers, but here it presumably means Turks, cf. "When Zangī besieged Ruḥā in 539 (1144/5) the men of Khurāsān and Aleppo who were familiar with the technique of sapping, and bold in carrying it out, set to work and made saps at a number of places which they selected as suitable for their operations" (Q. 279; Damascus Chronicle, p.267).

⁴ S.N. 85.

likely that the Turkish element greatly predominated. In other words, assuming that, broadly speaking, the Turks were cavalry and the Dailamites infantry, the cavalry predominated over the infantry,¹ although in the "ideal" theory of Nizām ul-Mulk they were equal in numbers. When Muḥammad b. Malikshāh, for example, was besieged by Barkyāruq in Iṣfahān in 495 (1102), he had 1,100 horse and 500 foot with him,² but these were of course not necessarily all members of his standing army.

The standing army was divided into groups, each with their own leader. The sultān's body-guard, according to Nizām ul-Mulk, was formed of groups of fifty men over each of which was a naqīb.³ The importance of upholding the prestige of these army commanders, who were to be the spokesmen of the troops to the sultān,⁴ was moreover stressed by Nizām ul-Mulk. Thus, whereas in his "ideal" theory, the population, generally speaking, was to have direct access to

¹ In all the Latin accounts the Turkish cavalry always appears as the most numerous part of any Seljūq force in Syria and the neighbourhood. To at least one Latin chronicler (Fulk of Chartres), all the Turks were mounted, and in western accounts of the First Crusade the infantry is seldom mentioned (cf. Rec. Hist. Crois. Historiens Occidentaux III. 334-5).

² I.A. X.228.

³ S.N. 86.

⁴ *ibid.* 111-2.

the ruler, the soldiers were to be denied this privilege. The commander-in-chief of the army was the sultān. During the early Seljūq period he led the army in person, and the link between the army and the sultān was thus a fairly close one. After the death of Malikshāh, however, the sultān less frequently led the army himself, and delegated this office more and more to others. That this should be so was inevitable in the case of the accession of young boys and children, but the result was a weakening in the ties between the sultān and his army, and a strengthening of the tendency of the soldiers to give their loyalty to their own immediate commanders rather than to the sultān. Not only lack of loyalty to the sultān but also the personal quarrels of the various leaders tended to obstruct military policy. This happened when Maḥmūd b. Muḥammad's army was lead by the isfahsālār 'Alī Bār and Mangubars on the occasion of Sanjar's advance on Rei in 522 (1128).¹ Again, when Mas'ūd b. Muḥammad besieged the assassins in the fortress of Qāhira in the province of Qazwīn, the siege was abandoned because the army was slack and quarrelsome,² but on this occasion it was not due to the absence of the sultān, who was himself leading the army.

The fact that the sultān less frequently led the army in

¹ Bu. 115.

² T.G. 466.

person corresponds with an increasing tendency towards disloyalty on the part of the soldiers. Desertions from one side to the other became a frequent occurrence. Barkyāruq's 'askar with the exception of 200 horse deserted him in 492 (1099), plundered his and his mother, Zubayda Khātūn's tents on account of their dislike of her, and joined Muḥammad b. Malikshāh. They also demanded the surrender of al-Balāsānī, whom they suspected of being a Bāṭinī, in return for which they offered to return to Barkyāruq's obedience¹ (see also Chapter IV.). Muḥammad b. Maḥmūd's army "as was the custom of the Turks" were disloyal and dispersed when Sulaimānshāh rebelled in 548 (1153/4).² Such examples could be multiplied.

The equipment of the standing army was provided by the sultān, or perhaps in part by the soldiers themselves. The cavalry were probably under the obligation to provide themselves with a horse or two horses. When Alp Arslān went from Syria to Āzerbāijān to join battle with the Byzantine emperor, he had with him 15,000 choice men, all of whom had a spare horse.³ The Khurāsān army under Sanjar also had elephants. In 513 (1119/20) when he marched against Maḥmūd b. Muḥammad he had eighteen, and Maḥmūd's horses took fright at them.⁴ The principal weapon of both the cavalry and the infantry was

¹ I.A. X.195-7. It was not only the 'askar but also the amīrs who deserted on this occasion.

² R.S. 262.

³ Bu. 37.

⁴ I.A. X.387-8.

was the bow and arrow. Spears, swords and clubs were also used.¹ For protection shields were used and in some cases the horses had some kind of armour.² The equipment of the sultān's bodyguard was provided by the sultān. It was kept in the royal arsenals and distributed when required.³ Nizām ul-Mulk states "they (the bodyguard) must have good cloths; their arms must be held ready and given them in time of need and taken back when no longer required. Among these arms must be twenty gold swordbelts and gold shields, and a hundred and seventy silver sword belts and shields, also silver spears and khattī spears. Twenty outfits of special weapons set with jewels must also be kept ready in the treasury and whenever an envoy comes from one of the neighbouring states, twenty ghulāms dressed in fine clothes must stand around the throne holding these weapons."⁴

Some kind of siege engine was used. It was probably not very effective for besieged towns, if their provisions were sufficient, in most cases were able to withstand the efforts of the besiegers. It was known as a manjanīq and from it

¹ cf. Zangī who ordered his ajnad to ride with a sword at their waists and a club under their knees. (I.A. XI.91)

² cf. I.A. X.206; Bu. 238. The author of the *Gesta Francorum* states that the ghulāms and their horses were entirely covered with armour (*Histoire Anonyme de la première Croisade*, Bréhier. Paris 1924, p.112).

³ cf. Gibb: *The Damascus Chronicle*, p.38.

⁴ S.N. 85-6.

were hurled missiles, usually stones. Of these there was sometimes a shortage.¹ On occasion, however, manjanīqs were used with effect. Zangī, when he attacked Ba'albek in 533 (1139), is said to have mounted against the city 14 manjanīqs, by which it was bombarded in turn, night and day, until the inhabitants were on the verge of destruction. This went on until news arrived that it had surrendered on terms owing to the greatness of the distress suffered by the inhabitants, the blockade and breaching of the wall.² Perhaps the deadliest siege weapon of the age was the mine. This was employed in Syria during the Great Sekjūq period, but it does not appear that it was used in 'Irāq or Persia at this time. An underground tunnel was driven beneath the foundations of a tower or part of the city wall, shored up with wood, and then set fire to.³ Zangī, at the siege of Edessa in 539 (1144/5), having successfully mined the walls, took the city by assault.⁴ Similarly during the siege of Bānyās by Nūr ud-Dīn b. Zangī in 552 (1157) a tunnel was driven under a tower in the city wall and fire thrown into it, whereupon the tower which had been undermined fell down and the troops forced their way in through the gaps and entered the city.⁵ Jāwulī Saqāwū laid siege to Bālis

¹ cf. Bu. 226.

Chau li Saqqaw

² Q. 269; Damascus Chronicle, p.255.

³ cf. Hitti, pp.102-3; Q.279.

⁴ I.A. XI.65; Q.279.

⁵ Q. 341.

in Ṣafar 502 (1108) for five days, and took it after one of the towers had been mined. On this occasion the tower fell upon the sappers and killed many of them.¹ In a description of a battle between Alp Arslān and the Byzantines, the former is stated to have ordered sacks (الجوايق) filled with straw (التبن) and earth (التراب) to be piled up in heaps on which stood slingers (وراقب المفاليح) throwers of Greek fire (النفاطون), missiles (رواة الحصانات), arrows and spears (المراسل والخطيات).² Greek fire was also used by Muḥammad b. Maḥmūd in the siege of Baghdād in 552 (1157/8).³

The sultān's army in some cases seems to have been accompanied by a field hospital. 'Imād un-Dīn mentions in the Kharīda that Abū'l Ḥakam al-Maghribī was attached as a physician to the camp hospital which always followed Maḥmūd b. Muḥammad's army, to transport which there were forty camels. He also states that as-Sadīd Abū'l Wafā Yahyā b. Sa'īd b. Yahyā b. al-Muzāffar, known as Ibn al-Murakhkhim, afterwards chief qādī of Baghdād in the reign of al-Muqtadī, was a phlebotomist and a physician attached to the same hospital.⁴ The mustawfī 'Azīz ud-Dīn Abū Naṣr Aḥmad b. Ḥamīd appointed a hospital for the sultān's army. It was equipped with instruments, medicines and tents, and staffed by doctors and

¹ I.A. X.325.

² A.S.D. 40.

³ I.A. XI.141.

⁴ I.K. II.82.

orderlies (ghulāms) and for its transport were 200 Bactrian camels.¹

The administration of the army was controlled by a kind of military inspection office,² in which were military registers and through which went all matters relating to military pay. In the registers were entered the names not only probably of the members of the standing army, but also the names of the "landed" amīrs and their troops, together with their equipment, pay and iqtā's.³ The soldiers of Malikshāh's army were stated to have been entered in such military registers (جرايد ديوانی)⁴ and there is no reason to suppose this was not also the practice of other sultāns after him.

Among the various administrative posts filled by mamlūks to do with the daily administration of the army or the court, was the position of ākhur sālār or master of the horse, whose duties included looking after the royal stables, saddlery and (horses') clothing. The 'amīd of Khurāsān, Muḥammad b. Maṣṣūr an-Nasāvī, who had been qaṣṣāb of the sūq al-'askar, was one of the boon companions of Tughril Beg's ākhur sālār, and when the latter died he succeeded him. Subsequently the sultān

¹ Bu. 124.

² cf. I.K. III.296.

³ cf. the statement that Nūr ud-Dīn b. Zangī registered the names of all the ajnad of every amīr in his dīwān and their arms and animals (دریابید) fearing lest the avarice of an amīr should lead him to keep fewer than his contract allowed (A.M. 308-9).

⁴ R.S. 131.

(Alp Arslān?) entrusted him with the control of the officials of the lamps (امارۃ اصحاب المشاعل); he then became a favourite of Alp Arslān, who entrusted to him the kharāj of Nīshāpūr and its environs.¹

The standing army was paid partly in cash and partly by assignments of revenue and land (see Chapter V.). Nizām ul-Mulk stressed the need for holding liquid the wages of those soldiers who did not have iqtā's, so that bills to meet their demands should not be drawn on the treasury without the knowledge of the ruler, and he considered it important that they should be given their pay at the right time. He further advocated that the ruler should give the soldiers their wages with his own hands, to increase thereby their affection and loyalty towards him.² The wages of the body-guard were also to be kept ready.³ In practice the soldiers probably received both actual cash and drafts on the revenue of different places, which were presumably cashed by brokers or others. Bundārī states that Nizām ul-Mulk would for example allot to a soldier (jundī) 1,000 dīnārs annually, half of which would be on a town in Asia Minor (Rūm) and half upon a place in the most distant part of Khurāsān, and this, Bundārī goes on to state,

¹ A.S.D. 32-3.

² S.N. 91-2.

³ *ibid.* 86.

used to be paid immediately without any charge.¹ This was, however, the pay of local troops and not the standing army.

In actual fact in spite of Nizām ul-Mulk's advice the pay of the army was probably often in arrears. Even during the reign of Alp Arslān this seems to have been the case. On one occasion when he made an expedition to Asia Minor, when he reached Rei from Khurāsān, the wages and allowances of the soldiers were overdue.² After the death of Malikshāh there was frequently difficulty in actually finding the money with which to pay the army. This financial stringency was due partly to the practice of assigning large tracts of the country to the amīrs, and the consequent decrease in the directly administered area, and hence in the revenue.

Also in the period following the death of Malikshāh there was no doubt a general decline in the revenue of the directly administered area owing to the prevailing anarchy. When Bark-yāruq was in Baghdād in 494 (1101) he complained to the caliph of a shortage of funds, and his wazīr said to the qādī of

cf. also A.S.D. 68.

¹ Bu. 55. Houtsma, p.58/. This is probably an error for 100 dīnārs. This would then be in keeping by the figures given by Ibn Shaddād, who relates that the revenues from the rural dependencies of Sārūj before the Tatar invasion amounted to 400,000 dirhams and served for the upkeep of 300 soldiers (Cahen: *La Djazira au Milieu du 13ieme Siècle ... R.E.I.* 1934, p.112). One dīnār at this time was equal to about 15 dirhams.

The wife of Kogh Basil, the Armenian, who ruled Samosata, Mar'āsh, Khīshūm and Ra'bān, ruled these countries after her husband's death in 1112; she gathered together a large army of horsemen and footmen and each month she gave 12 gold dīnārs to (each) horseman and 3 dīnārs to (each) foot-soldier. (Gregory Abū'l Faraj, ed. Budge, p.246).

² N. f.30a.

Jabala whose goods he confiscated, "The 'askar ask of the sultān what he has not got, and we desire from you 30,000 dīnārs."¹ The increasing insistence of the demands of the army from this time onwards is notable. Before this any signs of insubordination were rapidly checked. For example, after Malikshāh defeated Qāwurd, his army demanded an increase of allowances (nānpāra), and they gave Nizām ul-Mulk to understand that they would support Qāwurd if their demand was not acceded to. Nizām ul-Mulk talked the matter over with Malikshāh and that night Qāwurd was poisoned and his two sons blinded. This frightened the army and they did not repeat their demand.²

In addition to their regular pay the soldiers received various additions such as accession gratuities,³ and presents on special occasions.⁴ They also by custom received a share of the booty taken in battle or elsewhere. Tughril Beg, after defeating the Ghaznavid forces at Nishāpūr, shared the plunder among his followers,⁵ and after he had made Rei his capital he

¹ I.A. X.212.

² R.S. 127; T.G. 443; R.D. f243a; U.H.S. 60.

³ Nizām ul-Mulk added 700,000 dīnārs to the pay of the ajnad on the accession of Malikshāh after receiving which they returned to Khurāsān (I.A. X.52). This reference refers to local troops and not to the standing army, but similar grants were no doubt made to the standing army also.

⁴ After the capture of Bihinzād in 459 Nizām ul-Mulk gave presents to the soldiers (I.A. X.37).

⁵ B.788.

distributed the wealth he found in it among his army.¹

There was a strongly marked tendency shown by the standing army and the Turks and Turkomāns in general to plunder (see also below). On various occasions the sultāns attempted to check this. When Alp Arslān marched on Iṣfahān on the rebellion of Qāwurd, he issued most stringent orders to his troops against all sorts of looting and violence, in which matters he was so earnest that even in the case of the most favoured of his courtiers and of the dearest of his sons death would have been the inevitable penalty of disobedience.² After Sanjar and Muḥammad b. Malikshāh defeated Barkyāruq in 493 (1100) their 'askar' sacked Dāmghān.³ When Muḥammad b. Malikshāh entered Baghdād in 494 (1101) his 'askar' remained behind on the Khurāsān Road and laid the country waste.⁴ When Sanjar took Ghazna in Shawwāl 510 (1117) his troops acquired unlimited booty and Sanjar in an attempt to restrain them crucified a number of them.⁵ These examples could be multiplied.⁶

¹ T.G. 437.

² Browne: An Account of a rare manuscript history of Iṣfahān, J.R.A.S. 1901, p.668.

³ I.A. X.207.

⁴ ibid. 225.

⁵ ibid. 355.

⁶ It seems to have been the common practice for the troops to oppress the local population. Nizām ul-Mulk warned Malikshāh after he had defeated Qāwurd in 455 (1063) of the evil that would result from this (I.A. X.54). Barkyāruq's troops, when they reached Baghdād in 494 (1101) oppressed the people and took their possessions (amwāl) so that the people wished they would go away (I.A. X.209).

The cost of the annual upkeep of the standing army was no doubt considerable, but it is difficult to estimate what the actual figure was. When Tāj ul-Mulk Abū'l Ghanā'im accused Nizām ul-Mulk before Malikshāh of spending 300,000 dīnārs annually on the ḡuḡahā and sūfīs, Nizām ul-Mulk said in defence of this that the sultān spent double that amount every year on military campaigns.¹ Alp Arslān on one of his expeditions to Asia Minor paid 1,000,000 dirams to his army when he reached Rei en route for Asia Minor.² Sanjar fixed an annual charge of 30,000 dīnārs on Atsīz the Khwārazmshāh, when the latter submitted to him, for the expenses of his (Sanjar's) army, and Atsīz paid this as long as he lived.³ We are unfortunately not told what proportion this formed of Sanjar's military expenditure.

The numerical strength of the royal 'askar varied with the power of the sultān. The 'askars of Alp Arslān and Malikshāh were no doubt considerably larger than those of the later sultāns. The figures which have come down to us must, however be accepted with caution: at most they are only approximate, and, further, the standing army is not always mentioned separately from the sultān's entire military forces, which included the armies of the amīrs and tribal auxiliaries, and hence the figures are confused. Malikshāh when heir-apparent

¹ A.S.D. 68.

² N. f.30b.

³ T.G. 489.

to Alp Arslān had, it seems, 15,000 soldiers attached to him.¹ As sultān he had a large standing army. According to the Rāhat uṣ-Ḥudūr 46,000 horse were always in his service.² It is not certain by any means however that these were all members of his standing army proper, since the names of the amīrs not residing at court were in all probability also included in the military registers.

Nizām ul-Mulk in the Siyāsat Nāma denounced economies in military affairs, whether in the form of reductions in actual numbers of the soldiers, in their provisions or their pay, and advocated rather that the standing army should be increased. The fact that he thought it necessary to mention this suggests that there was a tendency at the time he wrote to carry out economies in military affairs. He clearly realised that the Seljūq empire had been won by the sword and could ultimately only be held by the sword also. "If," he wrote, "the sultān gives 400,000 men salary (جامگی) he will of necessity be master of Khurāsān, Transoxania, Kāshghar, Balāsāghūn, Khwārazm Nīmruz, 'Irāq, Fārs, Syria, Āzerbāijān, Armenia, Antioch and Jerusalem. If he had 700,000 horse in place of 400,000 his kingdom would be greater, and Sind, India, Turkistān, China and Māchīn would be his, and as far as Abyssinia, Berbery,

¹ A.S.D. 47:

² R.S. 131. The T.G. puts the number at 47,000 (p.449).

Asia Minor (Rūm), Egypt and the Maghrib would be in his obedience. If the sultān keeps 70,000 horse out of 400,000, 330,000 will have their names erased from the dīwān and will be added to those who have nothing to hope for from this dynasty. They will abandon all restraint and discipline, make one of their number their leader and attack in every direction and give so much work to the government that the treasury which has been inherited will soon be empty. The kingdom can be held by men and men by gold!"¹ Nizām ul-Mulk's advice was not followed. In 473 (1080/1) Malikshāh after reviewing his army dismissed 7,000 Armenians. The consequences were as Nizām ul-Mulk had foreseen. They joined Takash who shortly afterwards rebelled.² Alp Arslān at Manāzkird had, according to the Rāhat uṣ-Ṣudūr and the Tārīkhi Guzīda 12,000 men,³ but Bundārī and Rashīd ud-Dīn put the number at 15,000;⁴ these, however, were only a selected force and therefore not the whole of his 'askar (see p.166). At the time of his assassination 2,000 slaves were present.⁵ These were perhaps his special body-guard.

The numbers of the standing armies of the sultāns after Malikshāh, as stated above, probably showed a large decrease in

¹ S.N. 144.

² Bu. 66.

³ R.S. 119; T.G. 441.

⁴ Bu. 37; R.D. f.241a.

⁵ U.H.S. 52.

numbers. Generally speaking the standing army numbered not more than 10,000 to 15,000 men. Larger figures are probably exaggerations or perhaps include tribal auxiliaries.¹

¹ Tutush, when he defeated Ibrahim b. Quraish in 486 (1093), had 10,000 men while Ibrahim had 30,000 (I.A. X.50), but when he defeated Barkyāruq in 487 (1094) he had 50,000 men, while the latter had only 1,000 (I.A. X.159). Barkyāruq, when he advanced on Isfahān after Mahmūd b. Malikshāh had been put on the throne there, had 20,000 horse with him. These were probably chiefly the Nizāmiyya mamlūks who had rescued him from Isfahān (U.H.S. 73-4). Muhammad b. Malikshāh, when he defeated Barkyāruq in 493 (1100) had nearly 20,000 men. In the following year when Barkyāruq defeated Muhammad at Hamadān, they had, according to one account 50,000 men and 15,000 men respectively (I.A. X.199), and according to another 15,000 and 7,000 (Bu. 238). Muhammad was then joined by Sanjar, and their joint army when they subsequently came to Hulwān numbered, apart from camp followers, 10,000 horse (I.A. X.210). In 495 (1101/2) at Rūdrawār both Muhammad and Barkyāruq had 4,000 Turkish horse while at Rei in the same year they each had 10,000 (I.A. X.279).

Turkān Khātūn when she died is stated to have had only 10,000 Turkish horse left (I.A. X.163). This suggests she had at one time a larger force. This was hardly a standing army in the usual sense, but probably rather a number of ambitious amīrs who hoped for personal advancement by supporting her cause. Qāwurd, malik of Kirmān, is said to have had in his service 5,000 or 6,000 Turkish horse (Muhammad Ibrahim p.2). Arslān Arhū's son came to Barkyāruq after his father's death with 5,000 horse according to one account (A.S.D. 87), and with 15,000 according to another (Bu.237). Rudwān had 10,000 horse with him when he went to Naṣībīn in 499 (1105/6) (I.A. X.279). Qilij Arslān, when he reached Khābūr in 500 (1107) had 5,000 men with him, but some of his forces had remained with the malik of Rūm fighting the Franks (I.A. X.298). Mahmūd b. Muhammad, when he left Hamadān in Jumādī I. 513 (1119), was at the head of a detachment of 10,000 horse. In the following year when he defeated Mas'ūd b. Muhammad and Jayush Beg at Asadābād in Rabi' I. he had nearly 15,000 men (I.A. X.396). When he went from Baghdād to Hilla in Shawwāl in the same year 1,000 boats ferried his army over the river (I.A. X.398). Mas'ūd b. Muhammad sent 10,000 horse from his askar to help Zangī against the Crusaders in 534 (1139/40) (A.M. 112), from which it can be assumed that his askar at that time numbered considerably more than 10,000. When Mas'ūd b. Muhammad came to

(Continued on next page.)

The royal army was usually accompanied by a host of camp followers. These included persons attached to the sūq al-askar or military bazaar, the sultān's women-folk, his court and treasury. When Muḥammad b. Maḥmūd was preparing to leave Baghdād which he was besieging in 552 (1157)¹ his army mounted guard over the storehouse ((?khail khāna)), sultān's tent (sarāparda), baggage (buna), stables ((? pāygāh)), treasury, sheds ((? chūb khāna)) and girls of the palace.² Barkyāruq, when he reached Iṣfahān in Jumādī I. 495 (1102), had over 15,000 horse with him and 100,000 camp followers (المحواشي).³

(Note continued from previous page.)

Baghdād in 526 (1131/2) he was at the head of 10,000 horse, but these were not mainly members of his standing army, since he is said to have assembled this force in the country of the Turkomān Qafchāq (A.M. 78). When he put Tughril b. Muhammad to flight in Rajab in the following year he had 6,000 horse while the latter had 3,000 (A.S.D. 104; Bu.155). Malikshāh b. Maḥmūd came to Baghdād in 551 (1156) with 2,000 horse (I.A. XI.136). Sanjar, when he fought the Qarā Khitāy in 536 (1141/2), had, according to Bundārī, 70,000 horse with him (Bu. 254). The fact, however, that Bundārī states that the Uz Khān was said to have had 700,000 warriors on this occasion suggests that his figures are not altogether to be trusted.

¹ The text has 550. This is presumably an error for 552. In 550, according to Bundārī, Muḥammad b. Maḥmūd had to give up his project of attacking Baghdād because the amīrs refused to leave their iqtā's (see p. 160 below).

² R.S. 268.

³ I.A. X.228.

The movement through the country of such large bodies of people clearly required some organisation if commissariat difficulties were to be overcome. Nizām ul-Mulk recommended that fodder and provisions should be kept at every stage through which the ruler was likely to pass with his army, so that the local population should not suffer hardship through the 'askar being billeted on them, and the ruler should not be hindered from attaining his object through lack of preparations. To ensure this land was to be acquired in the neighbourhood and the produce not required by the army was to be sold and the proceeds brought to the treasury.¹ Under Malikshāh this plan was to some extent followed (see Chapter V.). After his death it very probably fell into disuse. In any case, whereas Malikshāh had carried out expeditions without apparently experiencing any grave commissariat difficulties, the later sultāns encountered such difficulties. Barkyāruq's forces, after defeating Muḥammad b. Malikshāh near Hamadān in 494 (1100/1101) had to disperse owing to the scarcity of provisions, but Barkyāruq was accompanied, on this occasion, not only by his standing army, but also by the forces of the amīrs.² In spite of Nizām ul-Mulk's advice it seems, moreover, likely that the 'askar lived on the country in which it found

¹ S.N. 91.

² I.A. X.207.

itself and made little or no return for what it took. Mas'ūd b. Muḥammad when he arrived in Baghdād in Rabi' I. 533 (1138) ordered that no soldier (jundī) should halt at the house of any of the people of Baghdād without permission. He made this order at the instigation of his wazīr, al-Kamāl al-Khāzin,¹ and the fact that such an order was necessary suggests that it was a common practice for the soldiers to be billeted on the people. When Maḥmūd b. Muḥammad was in Baghdād some years earlier in 520 (1126), people complained to him that some of his 'askar alighted at their houses and he (Maḥmūd) ordered them to be turned out.²

The mobility of the 'askar was considerable, in spite of the large numbers of its camp followers. These on forced marches did not invariably accompany the 'askar. For instance Alp Arslān, when he went to meet the Byzantines at Manāzkird, sent his baggage and women-folk to Tabrīz.³ On another occasion he is said to have marched with 100,000 men from Balā-sāghūn to the Euphrates to relieve al-Qā'im, who was being pressed by the Byzantines, in sixteen days.⁴ These, of course, were probably not all members of his standing army. Malik-shāh, on hearing of Takash's revolt, went from Aleppo to

¹ I.A. XI.47.

² *ibid.* X.449.

³ Bu. 37.

⁴ Ibn Isfandiyyār, 236. In the *Ṭabaqāti Naḍiri* it is said he covered the distance in sixteen or seventeen days with 180,000 horse (T.N. 135).

Nishāpūr in ten days but only 100 horse remained with him.¹

The Rāhat uṣ-Ṣudūr touches briefly upon military theory, but how far this was carried into practice is uncertain. There were, according to the author, two main types of battle formation: "closed" (پیوسته) and "open" (گسسته), (i.e. the soldiers fought as a body or as individuals). In the former case the army was drawn up in three ways: erect (راست), lying on the ground (خفته) or in a triangular formation (مثلث), and in each case the army was composed of a right wing, left wing, centre and rear-guard (اُتباع؟). The "closed" formation was used when the army was composed entirely of armed cavalry and the battle took place in an open plain, so that the army could be drawn up company by company (جوق), the formation of each company being preferably in the shape of a triangle, the base of which formed the rear.² The choice of battlefield was governed by the equipment and composition of the army. If the royal army was cavalry and the opposing force infantry, an open plain was chosen and the army drawn up in a curved formation (مقوس) with two companies (جوق) on either side forming a kind of support (کربن) and infantry were stationed on either side to prevent the enemy infantry advancing either when the royal army was wheeling (کهر و فر), or when the enemy army was attacking. The infantry was kept together in one place

¹ A.S.D. 64.

² R.S. 218.

and not allowed to scatter. If on the other hand the enemy army was predominantly cavalry and the royal army infantry, a narrow compact battlefield was chosen. The infantry were stationed on the right and left with the cavalry behind them, and the ranks were straight. The infantry were not allowed to go behind the enemy cavalry and another group of infantry was stationed behind the cavalry to guard against enemy ambushes and to support the right and left wings. When the royal army attacked the infantry was moved forward in companies (*فيل*) and the cavalry carried out flanking movements. If the battlefield, however, was situated in open country (*صحرا*), the army drew up in a circle (*دور*) with the experienced fighters (*مبرزان*) facing the enemy. In such a case, the author adds, "victory will be by heavenly chance".

If the royal army happened to be composed entirely of cavalry and the enemy forces of infantry, the army was divided into companies (*موت*) under the leadership of experienced warriors (*مبرزان*). The encampment was pitched far away from the enemy and night attacks (*شبخون*) from the enemy guarded against. When the royal army engaged the enemy, successive attacks were made by different companies so that the enemy was given no respite. If, on the other hand, both armies were infantry or both cavalry, the choice of battlefield depended upon local conditions. The centre was so arranged as to be able to reinforce either flank if

necessary, and groups of warriors were drawn up on the flanks ready to fill a breach wherever it should occur. If in the enemy army there was some redoubtable warrior, a group of men was specially charged with attacking him and following him wherever he went. The ranks on such occasions were curved like a strung bow.

If the enemy army had elephants, the royal army would use chariots (? گردون) and fearful instruments to frighten the elephants and to make them shy. Ambushes were also made and small pits dug before the battle so that the elephants, smelling fresh earth, would refuse to go on. The elephant-drivers were seduced if possible, or attacked and killed, for the elephants were no good without drivers. During the battle a ceaseless hail of arrows was kept up against the elephants, but the army did not directly attack the elephants, but attacked to the right and left of them, for when the men on their flanks flee, the elephants themselves will not work.¹

Gibb describes the tactics of the muslim armies in Syria in the following words. "The usual mode of attack was to take up a position opposite the enemy and to engage first in an archery duel. When the enemy showed signs of weakness, the cavalry charged with their lances and engaged in hand-to-hand fighting with the sword. To charge on an unbroken line seems generally to have been avoided, as well as undue precipitancy

¹ R.S. 219-20.

in engaging the enemy. The Arab cavalry maintained their traditional tactics of advancing and wheeling in simulated flight before reaching the opposing line, then when the enemy started in pursuit, wheeling round again at a prearranged point and charging upon them ... The infantry played little part in the actual battle; the fortunes of the day were decided by the cavalry charge and the infantry of the defeated force were ruthlessly cut down, and taken prisoner by the victorious horsemen."¹ Generally speaking it appears that similar tactics were also followed by the Great Seljūq armies outside Syria. The Turkish cavalry in a like manner would pretend to flee, and having lured their opponents to break their ranks and to start in pursuit, they would then turn and charge.

The Great Seljūq forces, in addition to the standing army which formed the core, included^{also} the private armies of the "landed" amīrs, governors and others, tribal auxiliaries, and occasionally the forces of Seljūq vassals. All amīrs who had attained to a position of any importance and even some "civil" officials had their own "private" armies.² The

¹ The Damascus Chronicle, pp. 39-40.

² Nizām ul-Mulk indeed urged all great men who had large salaries to show ostentation in military equipment and implements of war and to buy military slaves (ghulāms), stating the dignity and honour of an amīr in the eyes of the ruler and of his own companions would be according to the measure in which he carried out this recommendation (S.N. 112).

wazīr, Nizām ul-Mulk, had a considerable force numbering according to one account 20,000 mamlūks.¹ The holders of military or "administrative" iqṭā's, with their contingents, would join the sultān on his military campaigns, after which they would disperse again to their iqṭā's. For example, in 495/ (1102) after Barkyārūq and Muḥammad b. Malikshāh had made peace, their armies broke up and the amīrs went to their iqṭā's.² Mas'ūd b. Muḥammad gave permission to the soldiers who were with him to return to their domains in Muḥarram 531 (1136) when he heard ar-Rāshīd had left Mawṣil, and he (Mas'ūd) remained with 1,000 horse.³

The private armies of the "landed" amīrs were composed also of a nucleus of slave troops to which were added in some cases the forces of the lesser amīrs to whom they had assigned part of their iqṭā's (see Chapter V.). The mamlūks and freedmen of "private" armies were sometimes incorporated on the death of their master into the royal 'askar, forming a division known by the name of their late master. The Nizāmiyya mamlūks played, for example, an important part in the years following the death of Malikshāh, still forming a unit although their original master was no longer alive. They took

¹ A.S.D. 67.

² I.A. X.227.

³ *ibid.* XI.30.

They took Barkyāruq out of the prison into which he had been thrown in Iṣfahān by the orders of Turkān Khātūn, and read the khutba in his name.¹ On other cases these private armies either dispersed on the death of their master or passed on to his heirs. The amīr Ākhur's 'askar on his death in 494 (1100/1) joined Ayyāz, his adopted son and heir.²

The equipment of the private armies, their administration and pay were, broadly speaking, similar to those of the royal standing army. Nizām ul-Mulk stated that the holders of assignments must hold ready the pay of the army³ and in so far as the muqṭa' was under guarantee to provide on demand so many soldiers, it was reasonable that the central government should make such a demand. In fact it was probably often disregarded. Zangī, ruler of Mawṣil, had a large number of Khurāsānīs in his service, forming no doubt part of his standing army. They were paid a large salary (الجامگی الوانرة) which an official of his dīwān collected from diverse sources and divided among them every three months.⁴ A story is related that their pay was delayed on one occasion, and so Zangī summoned the amīr ḥājib and the officials of the dīwān to enquire into this. They were reprimanded and dismissed, and paid the salaries out of their

¹ Their support of Barkyāruq was due to their dislike of Tāj ul-Mulk whom they suspected of being implicated in the murder of Nizām ul-Mulk. Tāj ul-Mulk being with Turkān Khātūn they supported Barkyāruq in opposition to him. Tāj ul-Mulk in 485(1092/3) succeeded in buying over a number of them, but the rest refused to be satisfied and finally killed Tāj ul-Mulk(I.A. XI47).

² I.A. X.205.

³ S.N. 91.

⁴ A.M. 148; see also p. 135, note 3, above.

own pockets.¹ Zangī's army, however, can perhaps hardly be counted as a "private" army since he was to all intents and purposes an independent ruler.

The "private" 'askars, like the royal army, were mobile - perhaps even more so, since they were not accompanied by so many camp followers. Būzāba, on hearing Mas'ūd b. Muḥammad was in Hamādān in 542 (1147/8), advanced from Iṣfahān to attack him, covering a distance of thirty farsakhs, which included mountain passes to Marj Qarātegīn (? مکر ابگان) in a day and a night.²

There was a tendency of the "landed" amīrs, however, to refuse to undertake campaigns at certain times of the year. Muḥammad b. Maḥmūd went to Hamādān in the spring of 550 (1155) intending to go to Baghdād to besiege it. After going several stages, he returned because the amīrs and the army refused to leave their iqtās because it was harvest time. He then returned to Āzerbāijān and after an engagement with his uncle Sulaimānshāh again meditated an attack on Baghdād. Knowing, however, that the army would not leave in summer because of the heat of Baghdād, he made an agreement with them to go in the autumn.³ The refusal of the amīrs to go to Baghdād in summer because of the heat suggests the army, used to conditions on the Iranian plateau, found difficulty in adapting

¹ A.M. 148-9.

² Q. 294-5.

³ Bu. 225.

itself to other conditions. Supporting this is the fact that when Qarāsunqur and Dā'ūd b. Maḥmūd set out from Fārs for Hamadān via Khūzistān many men and animals perished owing to the climate of Khūzistān.¹

A not unimportant element in the royal forces was formed by tribal, chiefly Turkomān, auxiliaries. It was important for the sultān to treat these well, because in addition to being reinforcements for his own army, they were a potential addition to the strength of the enemy. They were extremely mobile and would assemble in a short space of time. Their guiding motive was plunder, and wherever this was to be found there also in all probability were the Turkomāns. Īlghāzī never waged long campaigns against the Franks; only greed rallied the Turkomāns to his standards. They could be seen arriving each with a bag which contained flour and strips of dried mutton. Īlghāzī was forced to count the hours of a campaign, and he returned as soon as possible; for if it were prolonged the Turkomāns disbanded. He had no money (with which he might retain their services).² In 513 (1119), after defeating Roger of Antioch, Tughtegin and Īlghāzī missed an opportunity of taking Antioch owing to the fact that the Turkomāns had hurried ahead to engage the Franks without making preparations for the battle and owing to the preoccupation of

¹ Bu. 172.

² I.A. X.400.

the troops (الناس) in taking possession of the spoils, "wherewith their hands were filled and their spirits fortified, and with whose beauty their hearts were rejoiced".¹ Tribal auxiliaries, Arab, Kurd and Turkomān, were also used by the amīrs and others. The Mazyadīds notably relied largely, if not entirely, on such forces. Şadaqa, when he heard Muḥammad b. Malikshāh had come to Baghdād in Rabī' II. 501 (1107/8), assembled, according to the Akhbār ad-Dawlat as-Saljūqiyya, scattered bands of Kurds, Turks, Daylamites and Arabs numbering 20,000 horse,² while, according to Ibn ul-Athīr, his forces on this occasion numbered 20,000 horse and 30,000 foot.³ Dubais b. Şadaqa in 512 (1118/9) assembled large numbers of Kurds and Arabs and dispersed amongst them much money and weapons.⁴ The Urtuqids also presumably relied largely upon the Turkomān tribesmen.

In addition to the "private" armies of the amīrs there were to be found throughout the Great Seljūq empire bodies of unemployed soldiery, who were ready to join the standard of any leader in the hope of plunder. The existence of such bands facilitated the rebellion of discontented princes and amīrs. Barkyāruq in 488 (1095) left Iṣfahān with a small

¹ Q. 201; The Damascus Chronicle, p.161.

² A.S.D. 80 (? or those who lived in his iqtā').

³ I.A. X.307.

⁴ *ibid.* 378.

party of warriors. By the time he had reached Jūrbādhaqān soldiers had joined him from every quarter and his forces numbered 30,000.¹ Karbūqā and Altūntāq on being released from prison in Aleppo by Ruḍwān (in 489 ?) were joined by many unemployed soldiers (العساكر البطالين).² Jāwulī Ṣaqāwū, after being deserted by many of his followers in Syria in 502 (1108/9), was joined by a body of volunteers (الطوعة).³ The following examples also show the ease with which an army could be collected. Ilghāzī b. Urtuq came to Mārdīn from Aleppo in 513 (1119/10) to collect volunteers (البتطوعة) for a raid against the Crusaders, and nearly 20,000 persons united with him.⁴ These were no doubt mostly Turkomans. Dubais b. Ṣadaqa left Maḥmūd b. Muḥammad in 523 (1129) and advanced on 'Irāq. He arrived with 300 horse, but almost immediately 10,000 horse had collected round him.⁵ These, however, were very probably Arab tribesmen.

As stated above statements relating to the numerical strength of the armies must be accepted with great caution. It is clear, however, that after the death of Malikshāh the size of the "private" armies of the amīrs increased relatively to the size of the standing army of the sultān, until finally

¹ I.A. X.167.

² *ibid.* 176.

³ *ibid.* 326.

⁴ *ibid.* 389.

⁵ *ibid.* 461.

towards the end of the Great Seljūq period the armies of the individual amīrs at times outnumbered the royal army. The forces of the amīrs were not probably generally speaking substantially larger than in the earlier period, but the royal 'askar' had by this time greatly decreased in size. It was indeed this change in the relative strength of the forces, due to a variety of causes, perhaps chief among which was financial stringency owing to the alienation of the majority of the country from the control of the central government, which was one of the most important factors in the downfall of the Great Seljūqs. The 'askars' of the amīrs probably did not number more than a few thousand men - perhaps at the outside five or six thousand men, but on occasion they were able to muster considerably larger forces, being joined by other amīrs or tribal auxiliaries.¹ The 'askar' of al-Muqarrab

¹ Qasīm ud-Dawla Āqsunqur, when marching against Tutush in 487 (1094) had with him 20,000 men according to some, and 6,000 according to others. Reinforcements had reached him from the Banī Kilāb and a group of the ahdās of Aleppo, Dailam and Khurāsān (Kamāl ud-Dīn 708); Yūsuf b. Ābaq, governor of Raḥba, had also joined him with 2500 horse (Kamāl ud-Dīn 707-8). It may be that the latter figure refers to Qasīm ud-Dawla's standing army and the former to all the forces with him, including tribal auxiliaries and other reinforcements. Qūdan and Yāriqtāsh when they rebelled in 490 (1097) had with them 15,000 men and the amīr Dād who was sent against them by Bark-yāruq had not the power to oppose them (I.A. X.182). Some three years later in 493 (1099/1100) the amīr Dād, when he went with Barkyāruq to meet Sanjar, had 20,000 horse (Bu. 238). When Sanjar marched against Ḥabashī b. Altūntāq (? circa 493), the latter who had brought most of Khurāsān, Tabaristān and Jūrjān under his control, had 20,000 men with him and some 5,000 Bātinī horse, followers of Ismā'īl al-Kalakī, governor of Tabas (Bu. 238). Kandoghdi, when he deserted Sanjar in

Jawhar, one of Sanjar's favourite mamlūks, however, is said to have exceeded 30,000 men.¹ 'Abbās, governor of Rei, who was one of al-Muqarrab's mamlūks, was joined by 4,000 of his master's mamlūks after the latter's death,² and when he was with Mas'ūd b. Muḥammad in Baghdād in 541 (1146/7), his 'askar was more numerous than the sultān's.³ The following also illustrates the decrease in the strength of the sultān's forces in relation to the forces of the amīrs. Mas'ūd b. Muḥammad

(Note continued from previous page.)

495 (1101/2) for Qadar Khān, had 6,000 horse with him (I.A. X.239). When Jāwulī Ṣaqāwū defeated Jigirmish near Arbīl in 500 (1106/7) the former had 1,000 horse with him and the latter 2,000 (I.A. X.292). The latter had had 3,000 horse with him in 497 (1103/4) when he had joined Suqman b. Urtuq to fight the Crusaders (I.A. X.256). Jāwulī Ṣaqāwū, when he departed from Mawṣil in 501 (1107/8) left with his wife 1500 Turkish horse apart from others and foot soldiers to defend the city (I.A. X.320). Al-Bursuqī's force when he met Dubais b. Ṣadaqa in 517 (1123/4) numbered 8,000 horse and 5,000 foot. The latter, who was defeated, had 10,000 horse and 12,000 foot (I.A. X.429; A.M. 49), these being probably largely tribal auxiliaries. Qarāsunqur, when he came to Hamadān (circa 533) with the two maliks Seljūq b. Muḥammad and Dā'ūd b. Mahmūd, had 10,000 soldiers (Bu. 170). Jāwulī, when he halted outside Miyānij to intercept Būnāba, who was coming from Fārs to join 'Abd ar-Rahmān b. Tughrā' Irāk, had a large army including 12,000 men with armour and soldiers from Armenia and Arrāniya (Bu. 184). Bursuq b. Bursuq, when he joined the caliph in 529 (1134/5), had 7,000 horse and Iqbāl al-Murshidī, who remained in 'Irāq when the caliph and Bursuq marched against Mas'ūd b. Muḥammad, had 3,000 horse (I.A. XI.15). Qumāj, governor of Balkh, when he marched against the Ghuzz during the reign of Sanjar, had 19,000 horse with him (I.A. XI.116).

¹ Bu. 250. This is probably an exaggeration. According to another account he had (only) 2,000 mamlūks (D.V. 200).
² Bu. 174.

³ I.A. XI. 76.

who was in Hamadān in 542 (1147/8) with 3,000 horse was joined by Ḥaidar, governor of Zanakar (? Zanjān) with 1,000 horse, Akaz with 5,000 horse and Khāṣṣ Beg Balankarī with 12,000 horse.¹

The total forces mustered on occasion by the Seljūq sultān, composed of his standing army, the "private" armies of the amīrs, and the armies of his vassals and tribal auxiliaries were very considerable. Nevertheless the figures here also must be accepted with reservation. Al-Qalānisi states the Islamic army - Turks and tribes - at Manāzkird numbered 400,000,² and according to Ibn an-Nizām/300,000.³ This figure is probably a gross exaggeration because Alp Arslān had sent his baggage and women to Tabrīz and remained only with a selected force.⁴ The Byzantine emperor, according to Bundārī, was with 300,000 men.⁴ When Alp Arslān crossed the Oxus in 465 (1072/3) he is said to have had 100,000 horse with him over and above ghulāms (i.e. members of the standing army) and train (السوار);⁵ other accounts put the numbers at 200,000 and state it took a month to transport them over the Oxus.⁶ In 526 (1131/2) when Sanjar came to the

¹ Q. 294-5.

² Q. 99.

³ U.H.S. 46.

⁴ Bu. 37.

⁵ A.S.D. 53.

⁶ Bu. 44; I.K. III.230.

Jibāl he was said to have 100,000 horse.¹ When he crossed the Oxus in Zū'l Hījja 532 (1139) during a period of six months there assembled with him 100,000 horse; he was joined on this occasion by the rulers of Sīstān, Ghūr, Ghazna, and the maliks of Khurāsān and Māzandarān.² In Muharram 548 (1153) when Sanjar was defeated by the Ghuzz, he was said again to have had 100,000 horse.³ These figures perhaps included large numbers of tribal auxiliaries; they are in any case only approximate. When Maḥmūd b. Muḥammad met Sanjar in 513 (1119) he had 30,000 men. On that occasion 'Alī b. 'Umar, the amīr ḥājib, Mangubars, Ghazghulī, the Banī Bursuq, Sunqur al-Bukhārī and Qarāja as-Sāqī were with him.⁴ Mas'ūd b. Muḥammad had nearly 1500 horse with him in Hamadān in 529 (1134/5) when the caliph marched against him, but after having made peace with most of the neighbouring leaders, his forces increased to 15,000.⁵

¹ I.A. X.476.

² *ibid.* XI.56.

³ *ibid.* XI.116.

⁴ *ibid.* X.387.

⁵ *ibid.* XI.15.

CHAPTER IV.

AMĪRS AND ATĀBEGS.

In the foregoing chapter the composition of the sultān's military forces was briefly touched upon, and it was shown that the "private" armies of the amīrs were an important element in these. The difference between the amīrs and the mamlūks of the standing army was not in any way an absolute one. By origin they were all mamlūks or freedmen, and many mamlūks can be classed better among the amīrs than among the members of the standing army; similarly it is difficult to draw a line of demarcation between the amīrs and atābegs. The latter with rare exceptions were all amīrs, but although the title of atābeg once conferred seems to have been retained by the person to whom it was given, the relationship was not necessarily permanent; the same person might technically be an atābeg at one period but not at another. The composition of the three classes therefore - if they can be termed such - was extremely fluid.

It was also indicated in the preceding chapter that whereas the size of the sultān's standing army after the death of Malikshāh decreased, the military forces of the amīrs tended rather to increase, and that finally the sultāns came more and more to rely, not so much upon the standing army, as upon the forces of the amīrs. This change in the relative strength

of the army of the central government and the armies of the amīrs led to difficulties, for since the ultimate guarantee for the maintainance of the Great Seljūq empire was military force, by alienating this from their direct control and placing it in the hands of the amīrs, the sultāns invited the latter to assert their independence. One aspect, indeed, of the internal political history of the Great Seljūq empire after the death of Malikshāh, and more especially from the reign of Maḥmūd b. Muḥammad onwards, is that of a series of struggles between the amīrs and atābegs to establish their supremacy over the sultān and to set up virtually independent governments. Some, such as the Khwārazmshāh Atsiz, were successful. His father, Muḥammad b. Anūshtegīn, was made governor of Khwārazm by Dād Ḥabashī b. Altūntāq. On Muḥammad's death, Atsiz was confirmed in the possession of Khwārazm by Sanjar.¹ He was the real founder of the dynasty of the Khwārazmshāhs, and as he was by the end of his life virtually a vassal of Sanjar he can scarcely be counted among the amīrs. Bart'old gives an account of his struggles with Sanjar and his foundation of an independent kingdom,² and it is unnecessary to go into details here. But, apart from the Khwārazmshāhs who thus broke away from the Great Seljūq empire,

¹ I.A. X.183.

² Turkestan, pp.324-31.

Khurāsān itself under Sanjar was relatively undisturbed by the struggles of the amīrs,¹ although various mamlūks did succeed, if we are to believe Bundārī, in establishing an undue influence over Sanjar (see Chapter III.). This comparative absence of difficulty with the amīrs was probably due partly to the fact that the situation in Khurāsān was not complicated, as it was in other provinces, by the existence of numerous maliks and atābegs. Further it is possible that Sanjar did not, to the same extent as other sultāns, assign the territory under him to his amīrs.

As a class the amīrs may be divided into three groups: the amīrs who were at the sultān's court, "landed" amīrs, who held provincial governorships, and "wandering" amīrs, who owed no permanent allegiance to anyone, but moved about the empire serving different leaders, or taking possession of districts as opportunity arose. It must not, however, be thought that this grouping was a constant one: the amīrs at court frequently changed, nor is it always easy to distinguish between a "landed" amīr and a "wandering" amīr, particularly in cases where an amīr usurped control of a district and was afterwards given official possession of it by the sultān.

¹ Prior to the reign of Sanjar there were instances of rebellion by amīrs in Khurāsān. In 488 a number of amīrs besieged Nishapur unsuccessfully (I.A. X.171) while in 490 Qūdan and Yāriqtāsh tried to seize Khwārazm but failed. (I.A. X.182).

Once power had been put into the hands of the amīrs they did not hesitate to use it for their own aggrandisement or even to turn it against the sultān, only, whereas they acted against one another or against outside forces, such as the Crusaders, without obtaining first the sanction of the sultān, they seldom directly attacked the sultān or openly rebelled against him without first obtaining the nominal support of some Seljūq prince.¹ This was due partly to the fact that sovereignty was inherent in the Seljūq family, and could therefore only be exercised by an amīr on behalf of a Seljūq prince. Secondly the amīrs as a class had no community of interest.² Their intrigues and jealousies prevented, apart from rare instances, any large measure of co-operation between them, except for a very limited period. The domination of any single amīr was immediately resented by his fellows, and hence it was only through acting on behalf of a Seljūq prince that his cause could obtain sufficient prestige to obtain the support of other amīrs. If the amīrs were nominally fighting for a Seljūq prince, it was theoretically

¹ There are cases of amīrs openly rebelling against the sultān without obtaining the nominal support of some Seljūq prince first, but these are the exception rather than the rule. Unar was induced to do so by Mu'ayyād ul-Mulk b. Nizām ul-Mulk, whom Barkyāruq dismissed from the wazirate in 488(1095). Unar accordingly set out from Rei for Iṣfahān, intending to seize the kingdom, but when he reached Sāva he was assassinated by a Bāṭinī (R.S. 144-5).

² cf. Chapter II. p.100.

possible for any one of them subsequently to establish domination over the prince, but if the cause was openly that of an amīr, the position at once became rather different. It was largely this question of prestige which gave importance to the political atābegate.¹

The existence of such a class of amīrs, having no community of interest with each other, nor yet being identified either with the interests of the sultān or of the population, many of whom had considerable military forces which they used for their own personal advantage, was an important factor in the chronic condition of insecurity which prevailed at this time. The extent to which they formed an unstable element did not become clearly apparent ~~until~~ after the death of Malikshāh, although there had been indications of their instability before this.² The greater control maintained over them in

¹ The question of prestige gained by the presence of a Seljūq prince is illustrated by the following. When a number of amīrs advanced on Baghdād in 548 (1153/4) to recover their iqṭā's which the caliph had seized, they sent to Mas'ūd al-Bilālī, who was at Takrīt, where were imprisoned the two maliks, Malikshāh b. Seljūq b. Muḥammad b. Malikshāh and Arslānshāh b. Tughril b. Muḥammad b. Malikshāh, asking him to bring out for them Arslānshāh so that "the ajnād and the Turkomāns might be strengthened by his presence" (Bu. 216).

² e.g. On the death of Alp Arslān the amīrs intrigued with Qawurd and successfully urged him to rebel. On two occasions Malikshāh seems to have doubted the loyalty of his amīrs, namely, when he marched against Ibrāhīm b. Mas'ūd the Ghaznavid in 482 (1089/90) (I.A. X.111) and when he sent to reproach Nizām ul-Mulk in 485 (1092/3) for seizing the shihna of Marv" (I.A. X.139).

the early period was mainly due, firstly, to the greater military strength of the standing army under Alp Arslān and Malikshāh relative to the forces of the amīrs, and secondly, to the prestige the sultān had acquired owing to the succession of three apparently great leaders in Tughril Beg, Alp Arslān and Malikshāh. On the death of the latter there was no one among his children who was able to exert a strong hand and prevent the anarchy which followed; the success of the different claimants to the throne depended largely upon the measure of support they received from the amīrs, the instability of whose allegiance greatly prolonged the struggle.¹ The dominant figures during the period following Malikshāh's death were nevertheless the Seljūq princes,² whereas in the later period, after the death of Muḥammad b. Malikshāh, outside Khurāsān, it was the atābegs and amīrs who played the chief roles.

¹ One of the reasons which led Barkyāruq to make peace with Muḥammad b. Malikshāh in Rabi' II. 497 (1104) was that during their struggles the power of the amīrs had increased, and "the sultanate was coveted and under the influence of others and the great amīrs preferred this state of affairs and betrayed him (Barkyāruq) to perpetuate their having their own way and to gratifying their arrogance and presumption" (I.A. X.253).

² There is little doubt, however, that those amīrs who supported Turkān Khātūn and her infant son Mahmūd on the death of Malikshāh hoped thereby to bring the sultanate under their own power. When she invited Ismā'il b. Yāqūtī to marry her and to help her in her struggle against Barkyāruq, he left her before the marriage took place because of mutual fear between him and the amīrs (I.A. X.152), who presumably saw in him an obstacle to their own domination.

Muḥammad like Malikshāh left a number of young sons as his successors. Disintegration had already begun on the death of Malikshāh and proceeded rapidly during the struggles between Barkyāruq and Muḥammad. The consequence was that on the death of Muḥammad, the disintegrative processes having already been active for some years - although they had been to some extent checked during the reign of Muḥammad - the ensuing anarchy was proportionately greater than that following the death of Malikshāh.

Even during the reign of Barkyāruq, however, although as stated above the dominant figures were the Seljūq princes, notably Barkyāruq and his brother Muḥammad, various amīrs did succeed in seizing districts for themselves, as, for example, Karbūqā. In 489 (1096) Rudwān had set him and his brother Altūntāq free from the prison in which they had been confined after Tutush had captured them. Karbūqā then took Mawṣil and Raḥba,¹ and in 490/1 (1097/8) he undertook a campaign against the Crusaders.² As governor of Mawṣil he was, however, under the allegiance of the sultān to a greater extent than subsequent governors of that city; in 494 (1100/1) he was sent by Barkyāruq to Āzerbāijān to join Mawdūd b. Ismā'īl b. Yāqūtī.³ After conquering most of that province he died at Khūy in 495 when on his way home.⁴

¹ I.A. X.176-7.

² *ibid.* 188-90.

³ *ibid.* 207.

⁴ *ibid.* 235.

Another example is that of Ismā'īl b. Arslānjq, who was Barkyāruq's nā'ib in Qumāj's iqṭā' in Baṣrā. When the latter went to Khurāsān as atābeg to Sanjar, Ismā'īl made himself independent in Baṣrā. Eventually after varying success in extending his influence he was turned out by Sa'd Muḥammad b. Mudār b. Muḥammad in 495 (1101/2).¹

Every amīr was potentially if not actually the rival of his fellow. Generally speaking the rise of any single amīr served temporarily to unite the other amīrs against him.² Any attempt by one of their number to bring the sultanate directly under his power was immediately opposed. Such was the case of Ayyāz, whom Barkyāruq on his deathbed appointed atābeg to his infant son Malikshāh. When Muḥammad b. Malikshāh followed Ayyāz and Malikshāh to Baghdād, where Ayyāz had the khutba read in the name of his charge, Abū'l Maḥāsin, Ayyāz's wazīr warned the latter that the amīrs, in spite of their professed allegiance to him, only refrained from opposing him because of their lack of numbers and money. Ayyāz accepted his advice and negotiated for peace with Muḥammad to whom

¹ I.A. X.277-9; 232-4.

² The following are a few examples. Maḥmūd b. Muḥammad's amīrs envied 'Alī b. Unar, the greatest of Maḥmūd's amīrs, who had formerly been Muḥammad b. Malikshāh's ḥājib, and they succeeded in turning Maḥmūd against him. 'Alī fled to Khūzistan and the Banī Bursuq killed him on Maḥmūd's orders, in spite of having given him a compact for safety (I.A. X.391-2). The amīrs in 516 (1122) incited Maḥmūd to kill Jāyush Beg, which he did outside Tabrīz (Ramaḍān 516) (I.A. X.426). Similarly Sanjar's amīrs were jealous of one another's advances. When Atsiz attained to a position of high rank, the amīrs made trouble between him and Sanjar (T.G. 487).

the sultanate was handed over.¹

The following incident also well illustrated the chronic condition of instability and distrust prevailing among the amīrs. In 505 (1111) Muḥammad b. Malikshāh sent an 'askar under Mawdūd, governor of Mawṣil to Syria to fight the Crusaders, and Tughtegīn joined Mawdūd at Ma'arrat an-Nu'mān. Some of the amīrs told Tughtegīn that intrigues against him were afoot, and, fearing he would lose Damascus, he secretly made a truce with the Franks. Subsequently in the same year the 'askar dispersed, because Bursuq b. Bursuq had gout, Sukmān al-Qutbī had died and Aḥmadīl, governor of Marāgha, determined to return to ask Muḥammad b. Malikshāh to assign him the possessions of Suqmān b. Urtuq and Tughtegīn.²

Intrigue was rife throughout the empire, as indicated in Chapter II., and the centre of this was the royal court. Those amīrs who remained at court formed a plentiful reserve of rivals to the amīrs who were absent, holding provincial governorships. Hence it was necessary for absent amīrs to keep on good terms with the sultān, for if they failed to do so, they soon found their domains had been assigned to some rival. Illustrating this general condition of distrust and intrigue is the case of 'Abd ar-Rahmān b. Tughlā^{who} Irāk/ when Mas'ūd b. Muḥammad made him governor of Ganjainak and Arrān and atābeg

¹ I.A. X.264-5.

² *ibid.* 341-2; the Damascus Chronicle 114-117.

to his son Malikshāh, asked the sultān to send with him Ildegiz, Khāṣṣ Beg and Bahā ud-Dīn Qaiṣar because he did not feel secure from their enmity if they remained at court while he went away.¹

It was largely because of this chronic condition of intrigue and instability, and the likelihood that their domains would be assigned to a rival that the amīrs, although they attempted to obtain the substance of independence, nevertheless maintained an attitude of nominal submission to the sultān. Further to retain the goodwill of the latter even the strongest amīrs took considerable pains, probably spending large sums of money to this end; in some cases they had in addition their own agents at court to inform them of current developments, and to act as their spokesmen. In 506 (1112/3) Mawdūd, governor of Mawsil, sent his son and wife to the court of Muḥammad b. Malikshāh in Iṣfahān to clear him of accusations which jealous enemies had trumped up against him and thereby inspired the sultān with a certain suspicion of him and aversion to him.²

¹ R.S. 237; U.H.S. 125. When they reached Āzerbāijān these amīrs, whether at Mas'ūd's orders or not, assassinated 'Abd ar-Rahmān (Bu. 197).

² The Damascus Chronicle, 132-3. The following story also indicates the prevailing intrigue and corruption. A number of the amīrs induced Naṣīr ud-Dīn al-Muzaffar al-Khwarazmī, Sanjar's wazīr, to attack al-Muqarrab Jawhar, one of Sanjar's great amīrs. He caused information to reach the sultān that Jawhar had taken money belonging to the dīwān. The sultān commanded the amīrs to investigate this. In the ensuing enquiry Jawhar's wazīr, Siqat ud-Dīn Abū Na'far, said his master had 2000 ghulams in his service and had to take what he

The necessity of retaining the favour of the sultān, felt by the majority of the amīrs, is strikingly shown by the case of Tughtegīn and of Zangī. The former was Duqāq's atābeg and ruler of Damascus, that is to say his domains were outside the effective control of the sultān. In 508 (1114/5) he made a pact with Īlghāzī and Roger of Antioch to rebel against Muḥammad b. Malikshāh. Shortly afterwards Īlghāzī was defeated by Qirkhān b. Qarāja, governor of Ḥoms.¹ Meanwhile a large army was assembled under Bursuq b. Bursuq to fight Īlghāzī and the Franks. In 509 Bursuq b. Bursuq reached Aleppo, and Īlghāzī, Tughtegīn and the Franks assembled to oppose him, but both forces dispersed when winter set in.² Tughtegīn after this took Rafaniyya from the Franks³ and in zū'l Qa'da he came to Baghdād to put matters right with the sultān.⁴ Al-Qalānisī's

(Note continued from previous page.)

needed to provide for them from wherever he could get it easiest. Finally the sultān ordered the enquiry to be continued in his presence. Jawhar was troubled at this and on the advice of the hājib, 'Alī Khairī, decided to make a feast for the sultān, to which 'Alī would bring him, and to put before the sultān as a present all that his enemies accused him of taking. He did this and was forgiven (D.V. 199-202).

¹ I.A. X.352.

² *ibid.* 357-8.

³ *ibid.* 359;

⁴ *ibid.* 360.

account of these events is illuminating. He states, "when the report was noised abroad in the districts of 'Irāq and the court of the sultān of the vigour and boldness with which God had endowed Zahīr ud-Dīn (Tughtegīn) in fighting against the abominable Franks, and what he had granted him of victory over them and slaughter among them, in the defence of the people of Syria and warding off the Franks from them, and of his upright government over them, so that men blessed his name in the assemblies of the citizens and merchants and spoke of him with gratitude in the companies of traders from all parts, a number of high officers at the court of the sultān Ghiyāth ud-Dunyā wa'd Dīn (Muhammad b. Malikshāh) became jealous of him and sought to disparage and calumniate him, desiring to do him an injury, and with the design of thwarting his hopes and undermining his position with the sultān. The sultān's confidence in him was disturbed, and the fact became known and spread abroad in every direction. Zahīr ud-Dīn, being informed of this by letters from his friends, who sought his welfare and were anxious on his behalf, was filled with disquietude. For this reason he set about making preparations to proceed on a visit to the court of the caliph al-Mustazhir and the court of the sultān Ghiyāth ud-Dunyā wa'd Dīn at Baghdād, in order to make a formal acknowledgment of their patronage, and to pay homage to them and gain their goodwill by hastening to them, to lay before them a true account of his situation and to

remove by visiting them the impression which had been created in men's minds. ... He was advised to abandon this project and warned against it, and efforts were made to make him overlook the matter, but he paid no heed to this advice and answered no questions. He prepared for his journey with the utmost energy and thoroughness, and made ready various acceptable gifts to take with him, such as crystal vessels, jewelry, Egyptian stuffs of various sorts, and swift Arab horses, suitable for conciliating these high dignitaries. He set out with his domestic officers and a body of his guards on whose loyalty he could depend on Sunday, 24th zū'l Qa'da of this year (509, 9th April, 1116)".¹ Al-Qalānisi, however, does not mention Tughtegīn and Ilghāzī's rebellion against Muhammad b. Malikshāh, which was probably one of the chief reasons for Tughtegīn's journey to Baghdād. Al-Qalānisi continues that "when he (Tughtegīn) approached Baghdād and the news of his arrival was announced, he was met by a number of the domestic officers from the high prophetic household of the caliph and from the court of the sultān, together with the officers of the state and the notables of the population, who showed him the utmost honour and respect. The warmth of his reception increased the joy of his friends, and broke the power of his detractors and enemies. He made plain the objects for which he had come, and heard nothing but expressions of apology, of

¹ The Damascus Chronicle, 151-2.

praise of his action and of eulogy of his activities, which set him at ease and removed his disquietude. When he proposed to return to Damascus, and received permission to depart, he was honoured by rich robes and magnificent gifts, and received from the sultān a diploma investing him with the military and financial government of Syria, and giving him a free hand in disposing of its revenues at his own discretion and choice.¹ So he set out to return to Damascus with all his affairs in excellent order, safe and sound both himself and all his company, and increased in power and honour, and entered it on 12th Rabī' I. 510 (25th July, 1116)."²

Zangī is also an interesting case. He had taken possession of Mawṣil in 521 (1127) and subsequently established his dominion over Naṣībīn, Sinjār, Khābūr, Ḥarrān, and Aleppo,³ yet in 523 (1129) when he heard the sultān Maḥmūd b. Muḥammad wished to make Dubais b. Ṣadaqa governor of Mawṣil, he sent presents, including 100,000 dīnārs to Maḥmūd, and went himself to his court to deter him from doing so.⁴ This is/one of/many ^{but the}

¹ Q. 192-3; see Chapter V. p.228-9.

² The Damascus Chronicle, p.152-3.

³ I.A. X.454-6. In order to obtain the governorship of Mawṣil Ibn ul-Athīr states he sent a large sum of money to the sultān's treasury (X.454).

⁴ Kamāl ud-Din: History of Aleppo, p.663.

cases which illustrate how the prevailing atmosphere of intrigue affected the position of even the strongest amīrs and governors.

Subsequently in 538 (1143/3) Zangī, whose position by that time was extremely powerful, sent his son Saif ud-Dīn Ghāzī to be constantly with the sultān Mas'ūd b. Muḥammad, hoping thereby firstly to keep himself informed of the sultān's plans and attitude towards him, and secondly to deter Mas'ūd from attacking him.¹

The history of the successive governors of Mawṣil shows how easy it was for the sultān to assign the territories of one amīr to another, and how readily the amīrs would join in an attack upon one of their fellows. In 495 (1102) after the death of Karbūqā, Jigirmish became governor of Mawṣil.² In Muḥarram 500 (1106) Muḥammad b. Malikshāh, displeased with his tardiness in paying homage, assigned his domains to Jāwulī Saqāwū, who defeated and captured him.³ In the following year (501) Mawdūd b. Altūntegīn, at Muḥammad's suggestion, went with a number of other amīrs to take Mawṣil, which he laid siege to and captured in Ṣafar 502 (1108).⁴ Mawdūd

¹ I.A. XI.61-2.

² *ibid.* X.236.

³ *ibid.* X.291-3.

⁴ *ibid.* X.319-20.

was succeeded on his death in 508 (1114/5) by Qasīm ud-Dawla Aqsunqur al-Bursuqī, who was also made atābeg to Mas'ūd b. Muḥammad,¹ but in the following year Muḥammad gave Mawṣil and his other possessions to Jayūsh Beg,² who also became atābeg to Mas'ūd.³

This practice of assigning the domains of a troublesome or powerful amīr to a rival was facilitated by the presence of "wandering" amīrs, who had gathered around them bodies of unemployed troops, which they were ready to place at the disposal of any leader in the hope of plunder. Hence it was usually possible for an amīr to assemble a strong force to go and attack the amīr, who held the territories which had been assigned to him. The "wandering" amīrs also moved about the empire ready to seize any chance of conquering some district for themselves. A typical example is the iṣpahbad Ṣabāwū. In 494 (1100/1) he was with Barkyāruq b. Malikshāh.⁴ The following year he went with Karbūqā to Azerbāijān.⁵ On the death of Barkyāruq he played an active part in trying to obtain the recognition of Malikshāh b. Barkyāruq as sultān, and was excepted from the peace made between Ayyāz and Muḥammad

¹ I.A. X.350-1; Bu. 159.

² I.A. X.260-1.

³ A.S.D. 96.

⁴ I.A. X.203; Bu. 238.

⁵ I.A. X.235.

b. Malikshāh in 498 (1104/5).¹ After the death of Ayyāz, he joined Ruḍwān,² but in 500 (1106/7) went to Damascus, and was assigned the region of Transjordan. On being driven out by the Crusaders, he returned to Damascus,³ and in the following year he went back to 'Irāq, and Muḥammad b. Malikshāh assigned him Raḥba.⁴ In 502 (1108) he was with Jāwulī Saqāwū when the latter was defeated by Tancred and Ruḍwān,⁵ while in 508 (1114/5) he was with al-Bursuqī on his defeat by Dā'ūd b. Suqmān and Īlghāzī.⁶ It is possible that Jāwulī Saqāwū, who became governor of Mawṣil and subsequently governor of Fārs and atābeg to Chaghri b. Muḥammad, was originally also a "wandering" amīr. (see p. 196 .) Even in the reign of Malikshāh there are indications of the existence of "wandering" amīrs such as Sauteḡin. In 466 (1073/4) Malikshāh assigned him Tirmidh⁷ and also Arrān;⁸ in 477 (1084/5) he was in Wāsiṭ and then Baghdād.⁹ Subsequently he joined Ismā'īl b. Yāqūtī in Āzerbāijān,¹⁰ while in 488 (1095) he was in Syria fighting for Ruḍwān against Duqāq.¹¹

¹ I.A. X.266.

² *ibid.* 271.

³ The Damascus Chronicle, 81-2.

⁴ I.A. X.318.

⁵ *ibid.* 326.

⁶ *ibid.* 352.

⁷ *ibid.* 63.

⁸ *ibid.* 194.

⁹ Bu. 71-2.

¹⁰ I.A. X.152.

¹¹ *ibid.* 169.

At the sultān's court there were various groups or classes, all of whom took part in the current intrigues. Among these were the sultān and members of the royal family, including the sultān's wives, who played an important part,¹ the bureaucracy represented chiefly by the wazīr, and the amīrs. Up to the death of Nizām ul-Mulk the amīrs or the military element played a secondary role to the bureaucracy, and the wazīr's influence was greater than that of any of the amīrs. This was due probably to the skill and tact of Nizām ul-Mulk, rather than to any system. After his death the balance began to be disturbed until finally the amīrs and atābegs deprived the "civil" element of all effective power. None of the wazīrs or other "civil" officials after Nizām ul-Mulk really succeeded in reimposing control over the amīrs, and those who tried came to an untimely end. Majd ul-Mulk al-Balāsānī, the mustawfī's attempt ended in his death, as also did that of Mas'ūd b. Muḥammad's wazīr, Kamāl ud-Dīn, who only gave the amīrs grants according to their rank and the

¹ Tughril Beg's nomination on his deathbed of Sulaimān b. Dā'ūd as his successor was due to the influence of Sulaimān's mother who was with him (I.K. III.230). Turkān Khātūn's intrigue against Nizām ul-Mulk because he did not support the claim of her son Māhmūd to succeed Malik-shāh has already been mentioned (see Chapter II. p.101-2). Zubaida Khātūn, Barkyāruq's daughter, Mas'ūd b. Muḥammad's wife dominated the latter, and Qarāsunqur thought it well to be on good terms with her and to carry out her plans (Bu. 60).

numbers of their armies¹ (see below). Shams ud-Dīn Abū'n Najīb ad-Darkazīnī, when wazīr to Muḥammad b. Maḥmūd, seems to have had some success in his dealings with the amīrs. Bundārī states he induced the amīrs to give up something of the territories they had usurped so that the lands in the sultān's possession were increased.² Other wazīrs on the other hand completely failed to impose any control over the amīrs. Such, for instance was Mu'ayyād ud-Dīn al-Marzubān, who became wazīr for a short time to Mas'ūd b. Muḥammad in succession to al-Burujirdī. He was wazīr only in name, the wazīrs of the amīrs having gained the upper hand over him.³

The amīrs were not only quick to oppose the domination of one of their own number, but, once they had begun to assert themselves, they equally resented the attempt of any member of the bureaucracy to establish domination over the sultanate. The case of Majd ul-Mulk Abū'l Faḍl al-Balāsānī clearly illustrates this tendency and also shows the increasing power and arrogance of the amīrs with relation not only to the "civil" government but also to the sultān. Majd ul-Mulk had seized the mustawfī 'Alī b. Abī 'Alī al-Qummī in 488 (1095) and become mustawfī himself, after which he successfully intrigued for the appointment of Fakhr ul-Mulk b. Nizām ul-Mulk to the wazirate.⁴ The fact that he succeeded in establishing his

¹ R.S. 230; U.H.S. 121.

² Bu. 225.

³ Bu. 180.

⁴ I.A. X.179; Bu. 79.

own nominee ~~as~~ wazīr no doubt went far to making his influence predominant. This alone would have been sufficient to awaken the hostility of the amīrs, but in addition he is said to have kept a tight hold on them. In 492 (1098/9) Unar rebelled and sent to Barkyāruq offering to return to his obedience on condition that al-Balāsānī was surrendered to him.¹ Unar was meanwhile assassinated. The opposition to al-Balāsānī, however, was not thereby ended. In Shawwāl of the same year a number of amīrs, including Baighū, the ākhurbeg and the Banī Bursuq, sent to Barkyāruq demanding the mustawfī should be handed over to them on the grounds that he was favourably inclined towards the Bāṭinīs. The sultān, in spite of al-Balāsānī's advice to him to comply with their demands, refused to do so, whereupon the rebels entered Barkyāruq's tent, dragged out the mustawfī and killed him. Barkyāruq, angry at this violation of his honour, fled with ten or fifteen followers to Rei and thence to Iṣfahān and Khūzistān.² This incident was thus apparently due partly to al-Balāsānī being suspected of Bāṭinī tendencies, but it must be remembered that it was a frequent practice to accuse one's enemy of being a Bāṭinī.

¹ I.A. X.192.

² R.S. 145-7; T.G. 452; U.H.S. 79; Bu. 80; I.A. X.196-7. I.A.'s account differs slightly in so far as he states Barkyāruq finally agreed to surrender al-Balāsānī, but made the amīrs promise to spare his life. When ~~he~~ was handed over the standing army killed him before he reached the amīrs.

From intriguing against the wazīr and other members of the bureaucracy to the appointment of their own nominees in the wazirate was but a short step for the amīrs. It was an obvious way for an amīr, who was absent in a provincial government, to control the sultān's policy and to neutralise counter intrigues. As soon as the prestige of the wazirate decreased, it was inevitable this development should happen, although it does not appear that there are cases of amīrs and atābegs actually appointing their own nominees to the wazirate until the reign of Mas'ūd b. Muḥammad. In 533 (1138/9) Qarāsunqur, governor of Arrāniyya, sent his wazīr al-Burujirdī to the sultān Mas'ūd b. Muḥammad on his own behalf and on behalf of the two maliks, Seljūqshāh b. Muḥammad and Dā'ūd b. Maḥmūd, and a number of amīrs, threatening to rebel if Kamāl ud-Dīn, the sultān's wazīr, was not either killed or handed over to them. Mas'ūd submitted to their demand and handed Kamāl ud-Dīn over in Shawwāl 533.¹ Qarāsunqur then established his own wazīr, al-Burujirdī, in the sultān's wazirate.² During

¹ Bu. 170; I.A. XI.42. Mas'ūd and Kamāl ud-Dīn had plotted to kill Qarāsunqur, and having failed to bribe al-Burujirdī to hand over his master, they sent to Būzāba to come from Fārs to kill him. The account of this episode in the R.S. differs somewhat in detail. According to Rāwandī a group of amīrs wrote to Qarāsunqur complaining of Kamāl ud-Dīn. Qarāsunqur, whom Mas'ūd had ordered to go to Fārs with Seljūqshāh to put down Mangubars' rebellion, sent a message to Mas'ūd from Marghzāri Sag refusing to continue until Mas'ūd sent him the head and the right hand of Kamāl ud-Dīn. Mas'ūd finally agreed to his demand (R.S. 230-1; T.G. 465-6).

² Bu. 171.

his wazirate Mas'ūd was, according to Ibn ul-Athīr, sultān only in name.¹ Finally, some time after the death of Qarāsunqur, 'Abd ar-Rahmān b. Tughrā'īrak and other amīrs persuaded the sultān Mas'ūd to seize al-Burujirdī, which he did, handing him over to the hājib Tutār.² Meanwhile Būzāba had become one of the most powerful men in the empire and in 540 (1145/6) he succeeded in having his own wazīr Tāj ud-Dīn Abū'l Fath b. Dārast appointed to Mas'ūd's wazirate, and during his tenure of office the sultān did not oppose him in anything.³ However he only held office for a few months. According to Ibn ul-Athīr he was dismissed from Mas'ūd's wazirate because he preferred Būzāba's service to the sultān's,⁴ while Bundārī states that Mas'ūd allowed him to return to Būzāba in the hope that he would restrain the latter from rebellion.⁵ On the other

¹ I.A. XI.42.

² R.S. 232. According to Ibn ul-Athīr Mas'ūd seized al-Burujirdī in 539 (1144/5) and handed him over to his successor al-Marzbān b. Ubaidallāh b. Naṣr al-Iṣfahānī (XI.67).

³ I.A. XI.69. According to Bundārī Būzāba, 'Abd ar-Rahmān and Abbās appointed Ibn Dārast to Mas'ūd's wazirate in order to control through him the sultān's policy (p.195). If, however I.A. is correct in stating Ibn Dārast became wazīr to Mas'ūd in 540, this cannot have been the case, for 'Abd ar-Rahmān did not join Abbās and Būzāba until after the death of Jāwulī in 541.

⁴ I.A. XI.77.

⁵ Bu. 198.

hand Rāwandī states that Tāj ud-Dīn was dismissed by Mas'ūd after 'Abbās was beheaded in 541 (1146/7).¹ If Bundārī is correct in his statement it shows how the relations between the sultān on the one hand and the amīrs and atābegs on the other were changing. The amīrs, no doubt, still strove to appoint their own nominees to the sultān's wazirate, but the sultān himself also tried to have an agent at the amīr's court; again if Bundārī is right in stating Mas'ūd b. Muḥammad only appointed Shams ud-Dīn b. an-Najīb ad-Darkazīnī his wazīr because of his privileged position with Khāṣṣ Beg in whose employ he had formerly been,² it further shows that the position was rapidly being reversed: it was no longer the amīrs who sought the favour of the sultān, but the sultān who tried to keep in with the amīrs.

THE ATĀBEGS.

The atābegate was a special Turkoman institution, which possibly originated in the social organisation and customs of the Turkomāns. There is, however, no evidence that it was in use under Tughril Beg or Alp Arslān,³ and it is difficult to

¹ R.S. 239.

² Bu. 199.

³ Dā'ūd's appointment of Nizām ul-Mulk to look after Alp Arslān to whom he said, "Consider him (Nizām ul-Mulk) as a parent and disobey not his counsels," (I.K. I.413) can hardly be regarded as an atābegate, at least not in the later sense of the word. Equally doubtful is the appointment of Nizām ul-Mulk wazīr to Malikshāh with the title of īlak or atā (D.V. 156).

explain why it was in abeyance during this period if it was an old Turkomān custom. It was apparently in use under Malikshāh, since 'Alī b. Abī 'Alī al-Qummī is mentioned as having been Barkyāruq's atābeg,¹ as also was Gumishtegīn, the jāndār.² Tutush also appointed atābegs to his sons Rudwān and Duqāq.³ After the death of Malikshāh it became the usual custom for the sultān to appoint for each or some of his sons and for the younger members of the ruling house an atābeg or "father lord". The special feature of the institution was that the atābeg was married to the mother of the prince who was entrusted to his care.⁴ The atābegate had two aspects, a social and a political. In the first place the atābeg was in charge of the education of the prince who was entrusted to him. Such seems to have been the object of 'Alī b. Abī 'Alī al-Qummī's atābegate to Barkyāruq. This case differs from many of the atābegates in

¹ Bu. 77.

² U.H.S. 73; A.S.D.75.

³ I.A. X.168-9.

⁴ This was not invariably so. A notable exception is the case of Mas'ūd b. Muḥammad who had, at different times, various atābegs. Al-Bursuqī became his atābeg on the death of Muḥammad b. Malikshāh (Bu. 159), but Mas'ūd's mother was married by Mahmūd b. Muḥammad to Mangubars (I.A. X.380; Bu.159) who had seized her on the death of Muḥammad before the expiration of her 'idda (I.A. X.391) and it was apparently not till 516 (1122/3), when al-Bursuqī was reappointed atābeg to Mas'ūd, that he married the latter's mother (A.M.46).

so far as Barkyāruq was not made a provincial governor during the reign of Malikshāh. The appointment by Barkyāruq on his deathbed of Ayyāz as atābeg to his infant son Malikshāh¹ seems also to have been predominantly a social atābegate.

Further since in the Seljūq theory of administration there was a marked tendency to give the provincial governments to members of the ruling house (^{also} see/Chapter V.), in cases where the prince to whom a province was assigned was a child or a young man the atābeg attached to him was responsible for the government of the province during the minority of the prince. Hence the atābeg was in effect a provincial governor, and the only difference in status between him and the provincial governor was that his authority, by virtue of his paternal relationship to the Seljūq prince, was greatly enhanced. Since the atābeg was to all intents and purposes a provincial governor it is natural that we find the atābegs were almost without exception Turkish amīrs.² Secondly the atābegate had a political function, one of its objects being to control the prince and to prevent his rebellion in the province assigned to him. Such was probably the dominant reason governing the appointment

¹ I.A. X.260-1.

² 'Alī b. Abī 'Alī al-Qummī who has been mentioned above was an exception, he being a member of the bureaucracy. Many of the atābegs have been mentioned in the preceding pages, in connection with actions or events which have no special bearing upon the atābegate, but were typical of the amīrs as a class.

by Barkyāruq of atābegs for his brothers, Muḥammad and Sanjar. In 486 (1093) he assigned Ganja and its governorships to the former and appointed Qutlughtegīn atābeg to him. In this case the atābegate did not achieve its purpose, for Muḥammad, when he felt himself strong enough, killed his atābeg and took possession of Arrān.¹ Similarly Barkyāruq appointed Qumāj atābeg to Sanjar when he sent him to Khurāsān in 490 (1097) to put down the rebellion of Arslān Arghū.² Maḥmūd b. Muḥammad in appointing Kundoghdī atābeg to his brother Tughril in 513 (1119/20)³ and al-Bursuqī atābeg to his brother Mas'ūd in 516 (1122/3)⁴ probably had a similar end in view. This seems all the more likely in the latter case, in view of the fact that al-Bursuqī had played an important part in the reconciliation between Maḥmūd and Mas'ūd.⁵ In the case of Tughril and Kundoghdī, Maḥmūd did not achieve his object, for although Kundoghdī had instructions to bring Tughril to Maḥmūd, he instead induced him to rebel.³

This was not the only aspect of the political atābegate. It was also used to retain the nominal allegiance of powerful amīrs, and it was this aspect, which, in due course, overshadowed all others. By appointing a powerful and even

¹ I.A. X.194.

² *ibid.* 180.

³ *ibid.* 384.

⁴ *ibid.* 422.

⁵ *ibid.* 415.

rebellious amīr atābeg to a prince, the sultān retained his nominal allegiance, and such conquests as he made were nominally under the sultān's ultimate sovereignty, whereas if the amīr was not made an official atābeg it was more than likely that he would rebel against the sultān in the name of some minor member of the ruling house. As this aspect became more and more marked, the atābeg was often made the nominal as well as the actual governor of the province, and the Seljūq prince was sent with him merely as a matter of form.¹ With the decline of Seljūq power, it was moreover inevitable that in due course the atābegs should substitute their own dynasties for those of their protégés.² Thus the political atābegate became a potent factor in the disintegration of the Great Seljūq empire, which tended to break up into geographical units, virtually independent, yet maintaining nominal submission to the Great Seljūq sultān.

On the one hand the sultān hoped to retain the allegiance of powerful amīrs through the atābegate, while on the other hand the amīrs saw in the atābegate a means to establish their own virtual independence. As stated above sovereignty was inherent in the Seljūq family, and hence it was important for an

¹ Fārs in 502 (1108/9) was assigned to Jāwulī Saqāwū and not to his ward, Chaghri b. Muḥammad (I.A. X.361-2). Similarly al-Bursuqī was made governor of Mawṣil in 518 (1124/5) and not Maḥmūd b. Muḥammad's son (I.A. X.439).

² Gibb: The Damascus Chronicle of the Crusaders, pp23-4. The atābegates of Syria are not included except incidently in this study.

amīr who desired to establish his virtual independence, to secure the person of a Seljūq prince in whose name he could act. The atābegate provided him with a ready means of doing so. Illustrating this tendency of the amīrs to regard the atābegate as a road to power is the admission of the atābeg Qarāja as-Sāqī to Sanjar, when the latter captured him in 526 (1131/2), that he had hoped to kill him (Sanjar) and set up as sultān a prince whom he could dominate.¹ This was indeed probably the hope of many amīrs. In view, however, of the mutual jealousy of the amīrs it was easier for them to establish virtually independent kingdoms under the guise of atābegates in outlying provinces, than to dominate the sultānate itself. Any attempt to do so was, as stated above, immediately opposed, as happened in the case of Ayyāz and Malikshāh b. Barkyāruq. These conditions favoured therefore the growth of independent or virtually independent dynasties in different provinces, such as the atābegates of Fārs, Mawṣil, Azerbāijān and elsewhere.

The political atābegate in its second aspect as outlined above became a dominant feature of Seljūq organisation from the reign of Muḥammad b. Malikshāh onwards. The career of Jāwulī Saqāwū is interesting and illustrates well the relations of the sultān and the amīrs, and shows on the one hand the weakness of the former and on the other the uncertainty of the position of the latter. Jāwulī Saqāwū first becomes

¹ I.A. X.477.

prominent when he established himself in the district between Fārs and Khūzistān. Muḥammad b. Malikshāh after his accession fearing Jāwulī, sent Mawdūd b. Altūntegīn to besiege him there and after seven months Jāwulī finally submitted and came to Iṣfahān to pay homage to Muḥammad. In 500 (1106) the latter assigned to him Mawṣil and the other districts which were in the possession of Jigirmish. Jāwulī set out for Mawṣil, took Bawāzīj and captured Jigirmish near Arbīl. The people of Mawṣil thereupon elected Zangī b. Jigirmish governor in his father's stead and wrote to Ṣadaqa, Qiliḡ Arslān and al-Bur-suḡī, who was shihna of Baghdād at that time, for help. Jāwulī meanwhile besieged Mawṣil, but departed to Sinjār on the approach of Qiliḡ Arslān. There he was joined by ʿIlghāzī b. Urtuḡ and a number of Jigirmish's followers.¹ Subsequently he united with Ruḡwān and took Raḡba. He then defeated Qiliḡ Arslān on the Khābūr, and went to Mawṣil, the gates of which were thrown open to him. Finally he besieged Ḥabashī b. Jigirmish in Jazīra b. ʿUmar, and the latter eventually surrendered.² Having established himself in Mawṣil, Jāwulī Saḡāwū withdrew his allegiance from Muḥammad b. Malikshāh. When the latter made preparations to march against Ṣadaqa in 501 (1107/8) Jāwulī together with ʿIlghāzī b. Urtuḡ sent an

¹ I.A. X.291-5.

² *ibid.* 297-8.

offer of support to Ṣadaqa, and when Jāwulī refused to send any troops to help Muḥammad in this campaign, the latter proposed the spoliation of Jāwulī's domains to the Banī Bursuq, Sukmān al-Qutbī, Mawdūd b. Altūntegīn, Āqsunqur al-Bursuqī, Naṣr b. Muḥalhil b. Abī Shawk, and Abū'l Haijā. Jāwulī thereupon prepared Mawṣil for siege, and leaving his wife to defend the city went to collect reinforcements.¹ He went to Naṣībīn, and was joined by Īlghāzī, albeit somewhat unwillingly, and subsequently by Abū'n Najm and Abū Kāmil Maṣṣūr, the sons of Ṣadaqa. He agreed to go to Ḥilla with them, and they decided to make Bektāsh b. Tutush b. Alp Arslān their spokesman,² presumably hoping thereby to strengthen their prestige. Meanwhile the iṣpahābad Ṣabāwū reached them and advised Jāwulī to go to Syria, firstly because the Franks had made many conquests there, and secondly because the sultān was in or near 'Aṣrāq, and Jāwulī's expansion eastwards would therefore meet with opposition. Accordingly Jāwulī made an alliance with Baldwin of Edessa and Jocelin, and went to Syria, but was ultimately defeated by Tancred in Ṣafar 502 (1108). Meanwhile Muḥammad b. Malikshāh desired to win over Jāwulī and he sent Ḥusain b. Qutlughtegīn to him as a mediator. Jāwulī agreed to submit if

¹ I.A. X.319-20.

² *ibid.* 323-4. In the text is Bektash b. Takash, but this is presumably an error for Tutush, cf. The Damascus Chronicle 77-79 (where Irtash = Bektash).

the siege of Mawṣil was raised, and offered to send his son as a hostage to the sultān's court. Mawdūd, who was besieging Mawṣil, however, refused to send the army away, and before long Mawṣil fell. Jāwulī then, realising he could hope for no success either in Syria or al-Jazīra, decided his only chance of re-establishing his position was to go to the sultān Muḥammad b. Malikshāh, trusting that Ḥusain b. Qutlughtegīn would put in a good word for him. Accordingly he went to Iṣfahān, surrendered Bektāsh b. Tutush to Muḥammad and made his peace with the sultān,¹ who sent him to Fārs in 502 (1108/9) as atābeg to his two-year-old son, Chaghri.²

Muḥammad's lenience towards Jāwulī is strange on this latter occasion. Formerly when he had assigned him Mawṣil, he no doubt hoped to rid himself, temporarily at least, of trouble both from Jigirmish and Jāwulī by pitting them against each other. His subsequent assignment of Fārs to Jāwulī cannot be so easily explained, for at that time Jāwulī had failed to establish himself anywhere, nor was his past record such as to give rise to expectations of loyalty. It may have been that since Jāwulī was married to a daughter of Bursuq, Muḥammad did not wish to run the risk of offending Bursuq by killing

¹ I.A. X.321-7.

² *ibid.* 361-2. He eventually died in Fārs in 510 (1116/7) while preparing for an expedition against Kirmān, after having suffered a defeat by the Kirmān askar. (I.A. X.365).

Jāwulī, but that Jāwulī alive was a potential danger and hence safer in Fārs as an atābeg. Moreover Fārs at the time was in a state of disorder and not effectively under the control of the sultān, and it was possible Jāwulī would succeed in subduing the tribes and if not would at least be kept occupied by them.¹ On the other hand it was apparently Qutlughtegīn and not Bursuq who interceded with the sultān for Jāwulī; the Banī Bursuq moreover had joined Mawdūd in his attack on Maw-
ṣil.

In 504 (1110/1) Muḥammad b. Malikshāh assigned Āva, Sāva and Zanjān to his son Tughril (b. 503) and appointed Shīrgīr atābeg to him.² This also was presumably a political atābegate. Shīrgīr's career sheds some light on the relationship of the atābeg and his charge. On the death of Muḥammad b. Malikshāh, Kundoghdī, who was appointed atābeg to Tughril by Maḥmūd b. Muḥammad, seized Shīrgīr. Sanjar subsequently freed him and he returned to his iqtā' in Abhār and Zanjān. Then in 515/6 (1121/2) he joined Tughril and Āqsunqur Aḥmadilī in revolt in Āzerbāijān, but in 516 peace was made with Maḥmūd.³

¹ Jāwulī did in fact subdue many of the local leaders of Fārs (I.A. X.365).

² I.A. X.384.

³ *ibid.* 421-2. There is some conflict in the sources about these events. Bundārī on the one hand states ad-Darkazīnī recalled Shīrgīr from the siege of Alamūt on the death of Muḥammad b. Malikshāh and imprisoned him together with his son (p.133), while according to the A.S.D., Shīrgīr was dismissed from Tughril's atābegate by Sanjar in 521 (1127) and succeeded by Qarāsunqur (p.98).

When he and his son were eventually killed in Jumādī II. 525 (1131) by the wazīr Abū'l Qāsim ad-Darkazīnī, Tughril resented this, being apparently attached to his late atābeg.¹

The atābegate of Aqsunqur al-Bursuqī over Mas'ūd b. Muḥammad in 508 (1114/5) was also predominantly a political one. Al-Bursuqī when he was appointed atābeg was made governor of Mawṣil at the same time,² and since it was likely that he would follow in the footsteps of former governors of Mawṣil and establish his virtual independence, the sultān perhaps made him an atābeg in the hope of retaining his nominal allegiance. There may also have been a secondary motive in this atābegate, namely, that since al-Bursuqī was ordered to fight the Franks,² Mas'ūd was sent with him in order that he should acquire increased prestige and so be enabled to unite the local leaders against the Crusaders.³ Al-Bursuqī was deprived of the governorship of Mawṣil in 509 (1115/6); after a varied career⁴ Mawṣil was again assigned to him in 515 (1121/2), and

¹ Bu. 143; I.A. X.471.

² I.A. X.350-1.

³ Mawdūd b. Altūnḡegīn may have been made atābeg to Mas'ūd in 505 (1111/2) partly for a similar reason (Bu. 158; I.K. III. 355).

⁴ In 512 (1118/9) al-Bursuqī was appointed shihna of Baghdād by Maḥmūd b. Muḥammad. Mangubars was also appointed to this office, and succeeded in supplanting al-Bursuqī. Peace was made between them, largely because Mangubars was married to Mas'ūd's mother, and al-Bursuqī then went to Āzerbāijān with Mas'ūd b. Muḥammad (I.A. X.374; 378; 380-1). Thence they joined Sanjār in 513 (1119/20). (I.A. X.388). Subsequently al-Bursuqī left Mas'ūd, because Dubais b. Ṣadaqa was intriguing against him, and joined Maḥmūd b. Muḥammad, in whose service he gained pre-eminence (I.A. X.395).

in the following year he was made shihna of Baghdād and re-appointed atābeg to Mas'ūd,¹ who had in the meantime been entrusted to the care of Jayūsh Beg.² In 518 (1124/5) he was dismissed from the office of shihna at the caliph's request and returned to Mawṣil as atābeg to one of Maḥmūd b. Muḥammad's sons with orders to make a jihād on the Franks.³

By the time of Zangī the political atābegate was beginning to take on a slightly different aspect. The tendency of the sultān to make an amīr atābeg in order to retain his nominal allegiance was receding into the background, and was becoming overshadowed by the tendency of the amīrs to take forcible possession of some prince - the sultān's acquiescence being probably largely nominal - in order to increase their prestige. Zangī is a case in point. He had made himself master of Mawṣil

¹ I.A. X.424, ~~RE~~.

² Bu. 121.

³ He accordingly returned to Mawṣil and set out for Syria where he captured Aleppo (I.A. X.439-40). In 519 (1125/6) he made another expedition to Syria (I.A. X.443), and on his return in 520 (1126) he was assassinated by a Bātinī (I.A. X.446). Al-Bursuqī died before he had fully consolidated his power in Mawṣil, but by his efforts laid the foundations of a separate kingdom of Mawṣil before which Frankish Syria was one day to perish (cf. Grousset I.631). He was succeeded by his son 'Izz ud-Dīn (I.A. X.453), but it remained for 'Imād ud-Dīn Zangī to establish after the death of 'Izz ud-Dīn in 521 (1127) (I.A. X.453-5) a hereditary dynasty in Mawṣil, which was to reign for over a century.

after the death of 'Izz ud-Dīn b. al-Bursuqī.¹ At the same period, two Seljūq princes came under his care. One Zangī is said by Bundārī to have ^{been} captured from Dubais, to whom the prince had been entrusted.² If this ~~was~~ so, Zangī may well have kept possession of him in order that Dubais should not be tempted to use the prince's name to extend his territories, perhaps at the expense of his own (Zangī's).³ However that may be, according to Ibn ul-Athīr, Zangī pretended to hold the country in his possession on behalf of the malik Alp Arslān b. Maḥmūd, who was known as al-Khafajī, and that when he sent envoys or answered letters he did so in the name of al-Khafajī, awaiting the day when Mas'ūd b. Muḥammad should die to assemble an army and to seek the sultanate in al-Khafajī's name. As it happened Zangī died before being able to

¹ 'Imād ud-Dīn Zangī was originally in the service of al-Bursuqī. In 516 (1122/3) he was sent to Baṣrā and distinguished himself there in fighting the Arabs (I.A. X.439). He left Baṣrā to seek his fortune in the service of the sultān Maḥmūd b. Muḥammad (A.M. 51). On the death of 'Izz ud-Dīn b. al-Bursuqī, the mamlūk Jāwulī, Naṣīr ud-Dīn Juqur Zangī's nā'ib in Mawṣil and the qādī Bahā ud-Dīn ash-Shahrazūrī successfully intrigued for the appointment of Zangī as governor of Mawṣil, which city Zangī entered in Ramaḍān 521 (1127) (I.A. X.454).

² Bu. 187. There is no reference to Dubais having been made an atābeg. This prince was probably one of Maḥmūd b. Muḥammad's sons whom Dubais seized in 523 (1129) when Maḥmūd fell ill, and took with him to Hilla (I.A. X.461).

³ There is some confusion over the names of these two maliks and the events connected with them. Cf. Bu. 187; I.K. I. 330; A.M. 126-7.

put his plans into action.¹ That an amīr of the power of Zangī, who was in effect a local ruler and not merely an amīr, should be found pursuing such a policy is striking evidence of the uncertainty of the position of the amīrs, and their need of a Seljūq prince to reinforce their prestige. Once, however, that an atābeg had firmly established his power, the dependent prince was allowed to fall into obscurity and the atābeg was able to transmit his province to his descendants as a practically independent ruler.

Mangubars also illustrates the tendency of the amīrs to demand or even force the sultān to entrust to them a Seljūq prince. He made himself master of Fārs in succession to Qarāja as-Sāqī, Seljūqshāh b. Muḥammad's atābeg, whom Sanjar had killed in 526 (1132),² and then wrote to Tughril b. Muḥammad demanding he should send his son Alp Arslān to him, in which case he (Mangubars) would recognise Tughril as sultān. Tughril in due course sent Alp Arslān to him.³

From the reign of Mas'ūd b. Muḥammad onwards Azerbāijān and Fārs were the scene of various attempts by atābegs to establish their independence. The atābeg, Qarāsunqur, governor of Arrāniyya was not content with establishing himself in a

¹ A.M. 126-7.

² I.A. X.477.

³ Bu. 148-9. According to the A.S.D., Tughril made Mangubars governor of Fārs and atābeg to Alp Arslān in 526 (p.101).

predominant position in Āzerbāijān, but also tried to set up his own nominee in the person of Seljūqshāh in Fārs. This attempt, however, was perhaps in answer to Mas'ūd b. Muḥammad and Kamāl ud-Dīn's intrigues against him (see above, p.288).¹ In fact he did not succeed, for although he took possession of Fārs without opposition and handed it over to Seljūqshāh, when he returned to Āzerbāijān Būzāba captured Seljūqshāh and reconquered Fārs.²

Būzāba meanwhile in Fārs had two maliks with him, Muḥammad and Malikshāh sons of Mas'ūd, while 'Abbās, governor of Rei, had with him Sulaimān b. Muḥammad. These two amīrs, perhaps realising that they could not attain to any considerable success as rivals, and in view also of the opposition they would almost certainly encounter from other amīrs, such as Jāwulī, who had succeeded Qarāsunqur in Āzerbāijān on his death in 539 (1144/5),³ should they attempt to establish their dominion,

¹ According to I.A., Qarāsunqur set out for Fārs in 533 (1138/9) to seek vengeance for his son whom Būzāba had killed in battle in 532 (XI.46).

² Bu. 172; I.A. XI.46. Būzāba who had been Mangubars' nā'ib in Khūzistān had taken possession of Fārs on the death of Mangubars (I.A. XI.39-40). According to the R.S., Mas'ūd gave Fārs to Muḥammad b. Mahmūd after the death of Qarāja and the devastation of Fārs, married him to his daughter Gawhar Khātūn, who had formerly been married to Dā'ūd, and put the atābeg Būzāba in charge of his affairs (R.S. 237; T.G. 467).

³ Bu. 174; I.A. XI.52. According to the U.H.S., Sanjar, thinking 'Abbās was becoming too independent, had meanwhile sent Mas'ūd b. Muḥammad to Rei to take him, but 'Abbās had won over Mas'ūd who then went away (p.122).

united together in secret opposition to the sultān, joining each other at Hamadān.¹ Mas'ūd b. Muḥammad, when he realised their intentions, wrote to Jāwulī and Īldegiz who were in Āzerbāijān for help. In the ensuing struggles the rebels were defeated,² but with the death of Jāwulī in Jumādī I. 541 (1146)

¹ I.A. XI.68-9.

² When Jāwulī delayed in answering Mas'ūd's call for help because he feared the sultān on account of his seizure of the wazīr al-Burujirdī, Mas'ūd went to Baghdād. Būzāba and Abbās when they reached Hamadān were joined by various amīrs and they wrote to Jāwulī offering him allegiance. He collected an army and set out for Hamadān accompanied by Dā'ūd b. Maḥmūd and his atābeg Ayyāz and Shīrīn Aqsunqur (Bu.180-1). It is not clear what he actually intended to do when he set out, but when he found the road to Hamadān blocked by snow, he sent by pigeon post to Mas'ūd in Baghdād asking him to join him. The sultān accordingly set out for Marāgha, and joined Jāwulī. Subsequently they advanced against the rebels. When the two armies approached Sulaimān fled one night to Rei, and Abbās when he learnt of this followed him. Būzāba became alarmed also, and set out for Iṣfahān with the maliks Muḥammad and Malikshāh on the following day. Sulaimān subsequently came to Mas'ūd and paid him homage but he was nevertheless imprisoned, for the amīrs said to Mas'ūd that as long as he was at liberty there was no guarantee he would not be seduced by others and made to rebel. Abbās also returned to Mas'ūd. Jāwulī meanwhile, who went in pursuit of Būzāba, sent to him and made an alliance with him, because he felt the sultān, in view of his treatment of Sulaimānshāh, could not be trusted to keep his pacts. Having done so he returned to the sultān. On his return Mas'ūd promised to make him atābeg to his son Malikshāh, who was brought out from the fortress of Barjīn and entrusted to him (R.S. 234-6). Meanwhile tension arose between Jāwulī and the sultān. The former accordingly sent to Būzāba for help. Abd ar-Raḥmān b. Tughra'irak, however, blocked the road and prevented Būzāba joining Jāwulī, who was in Miyānej. The latter then retired to Zanjān where he died in Jumādī I.541 (1146). (Bu. 184-5).

the balance temporarily established was disturbed. The alliance between 'Abbās and Būzāba was replaced by an alliance between 'Abd ar-Rahmān Tughra'irak, 'Abbās and Būzāba. The reason for this was that 'Abd ar-Rahmān wished to obtain the governorships of Arrāniyya and Armenia, which had been in the possession of Jāwulī who was his son-in-law,¹ but knowing he could not achieve this as long as Khāṣṣ Beg b. Balankarī dominated the sultān, he began to make friends with Būzāba; 'Abbās also joined them. Mas'ūd b. Muḥammad, learning of this alliance, which though directed primarily against Khāṣṣ Beg, would, if successful, deprive him of all power also, decided to separate the conspirators. 'Abd ar-Rahmān he sent, as atābeg to Malik-shāh b. Maḥmūd, to Ganja and Arrān where a number of amīrs including Khāṣṣ Beg killed him (see above), while he took 'Abbās with him to Baghdād, and beheaded him on hearing of the murder of 'Abd ar-Rahmān. Būzāba at this marched on Iṣfahān and put Muḥammad b. Maḥmūd on the throne; thence he came to Hamadān where he was defeated and killed in 542 (1147/8).²

¹ Bu. 175.

² R.S. 238-9, 241-2; T.G. 467; Bu. 197-200; I.A. XI.78. When Mas'ūd heard Būzāba had set up Muḥammad b. Maḥmūd as sultān in Iṣfahān he left Baghdād for Hamadān and sent to Khāṣṣ Beg and Shīrgīr in Āzerbāijān for help. Būzāba came slowly from Iṣfahān to Hamadān and hence they were able to reach Mas'ūd, many of whose army had fled, before Būzāba arrived at Hamadān.

Thus one of the rare cases of an alliance among the amīrs was broken up. The effect of this, however, was not so much to strengthen Mas'ūd's power as to put Khāṣṣ Beg in a dominant position. Those amīrs, who might have opposed him, were dead and for the moment there were no others strong enough to do so.¹ Khāṣṣ Beg perhaps more than any other amīr succeeded in bringing the sultanate itself into his power, but it must be remembered that by this time the sultāns of Iraq and Persia (as distinct from Sanjar) ruled over a greatly reduced area. Moreover Khāṣṣ Beg's attempt ended finally in disaster, and shows how difficult it was for an amīr to succeed in such an undertaking. On the death of Mas'ūd b. Muḥammad in 547 (1152) and the accession of Malikshāh b. Maḥmūd, Khāṣṣ Beg ruled alone while the sultān devoted himself to pleasure.² Nevertheless he does not seem to have had any confidence in the strength of his position. According to Rāwandī he always saw Malikshāh on horseback because he feared he would be summoned to a private audience and seized.³ Finally after only four months he deposed Malikshāh on the grounds that he was unfit

¹ İldegiz, Qaiṣar, Albaqish Kūnkhar, Tutār, the hājib, and others left Mas'ūd's service in 543 (1148/9) because they feared Khāṣṣ Beg (I.A. XI.87).

² Bu. 208.

³ R.S. 254-5.

to rule in favour of his brother Muḥammad.¹ A number of amīrs meanwhile plotted with Muḥammad to seize Khāṣṣ Beg, and this was done after the khutba had been read in Muḥammad's name in Ṣafar 548 (1153).²

¹ Bu. 209; T.G. 468.

² Bu. 208-9; I.A. XI.106-7; R.S. 259-61.

CHAPTER V.

IQTĀ'ĀT.

In its widest sense the term iqtā' includes not only the assignment of land or of its produce, but also provincial governorships. The practice of giving assignments of land or of the produce of the land is found in early Islamic times, and is known as iqtā'. The lawbooks recognise this practice and lay down a number of conditions under which such a grant may be made. Too much dependence, however, cannot be laid upon their statements. The state law represents the Islamic ideal, and, as Becker states, what the compilers of the lawbooks most urgently desired and laid down was probably lacking in practice, while that which they severely condemned may well have been the actual practice.¹ Moreover, the jurists, such as Māwardī, deal only with iqtā's in early Islamic times.

Both before and during Great Seljūq times the iqtā' system was undergoing, like the rest of the administration, a process of militarisation, and the principle of conformity with the law was being abandoned, if indeed it ever existed outside the lawbooks. Although the culmination of this process was not reached until the Ottoman and Mamlūk empires, it was

¹ Becker: Islamstudien, I. 218.

widely developed by the time of Nizām ul-Mulk, and one of the most important achievements of the latter was to systematize to some extent the militarised iqtā'.¹ This is not to say that in Great Seljūq times there was any regular system, according to which iqtā's were granted. The situation was still extremely fluid; various types of iqtā' existed, and there were no clear lines of demarcation between them.

Māwardī recognises two kinds of iqtā', iqtā' ut-tamlīk and iqtā' ul-istighlāl. Lands which could be legally assigned under the former class were dead lands, dating either from pre-Islamic or post-Islamic times, and cultivated lands either in the dār ul-islām or in the dār ul-ḥarb, which, in the latter case, could be assigned before conquest by the muslims. In the case of the iqtā' ul-istighlāl, the land could be 'ushr or kharāj land.'² Among those to whom it was most fitting to grant an assignment of kharāj, Māwardī counted the people of the army (jaish). Lastly under the iqtā' ul-istighlāl he

¹ Becker's statement (p.243) that Nizām ul-Mulk abolished payment in cash of the military, giving the generals and soldiers the right, not only to the surplus of the taxes, but also ~~to~~ the taxes themselves, in return for which they were placed under the obligation to military service, does not fit in with the facts. Nizām ul-Mulk was concerned in these matters rather with regulation than innovation.

² 'Ushr land is strictly speaking property, but kharāj land is only possession: ushr is a tax, kharāj a rent (Becker p.226).

included the assignment of mineral deposits.¹ Ibn Jamā'a on the other hand distinguished three principal types of iqtā', the iqtā' ut-tamlīk,² the iqtā' ul-istighlāl³ and the iqtā' ul-irfāq.⁴ In the third class he put the assignment of mines, roads, and markets,⁵ thus the iqtā' ul-irfāq is really a farm (iltizām) scarcely differing in principle from the farming of tax-districts.

On the conquest of land held formerly by the Byzantine and Persian empires, large landed properties, which had been Byzantine and Persian crown lands, were acquired by the Arabs, who took over unaltered the former Byzantine and Sassanian administrative apparatus. In both cases the large landed proprietors had been responsible to the state for the rent of the land for themselves and for the colonies living in village communities on that land. On the Arab conquests, many of the powerful large landed proprietors fled or perished, and the domains of the Byzantine emperors and Persian kings became vacant, so that an abundance of productive and intensely colonised land was to be disposed of.

To the Byzantine and Persian state lands were added also

¹ Māwardī: Aḥkām as-Sultāniyya, chap. 17, pp.181-8.

² Ibn Jama'a. Islamica VI. 4. p.374.

³ ibid. p.380.

⁴ ibid. p.382-3.

⁵ Tischendorf: Das Lehnswesen .. pp.18-19.

all waste land, swamps and dead lands. These were collectively known as qatā'ī and were assigned to the Arabs as iqṭā' ut-tamlīk, and were recognised as inheritable property, liable to taxation. The jurists, such for example as Abū Yūsuf, held that such land could only be given with a permanent tenure, and could not be transferred as long as the first assignee had heirs and looked after the cultivation, but that if he let the land lie fallow, he lost his right to it. In practice these estates were conceived of as possessions, for they were saleable. The state was only interested in the payment of the rent; it did not bother about the juridical theory, which held that these lands were only given on a hereditary tenure, and let its domains also on a short or lifelong tenure. These assignments were known as ṭu'ma.¹

Becker emphasizes the similarity between this type of tenure and the Byzantine emphyteusis system and explains this development in Islam^{-ic} land tenures as being merely a revival or

¹ Becker, 238-9. In addition to these estates was land divided among the village communities, which were liable to taxation in a lump sum. These districts were farmed, as was the produce of whole provinces. The tax-farmer and the emphyteuticarius, or Arabic mugṭa' were very much alike, for there was hardly any difference between a tax-farmer who could collect taxes with force, and a private individual who, under state protection, was answerable for the taxes of the land he held as a tenant, hereditary or otherwise, from the state. The actual taxes were paid in both cases by the peasants; mugṭa' and tax-farmer were only the middle-men between the peasant and the state (p.239).

development of the latter.¹

The principal object in granting an iqṭā' of uncultivated lands, with possession conditional upon their cultivation, was clearly to promote cultivation and thereby to increase the revenue of the state treasury. Different motives on the other hand led to the granting of the second class of iqṭā' enumerated by the jurists, namely the iqṭā' ul-istighlāl. In this case the cultivation of the land was the concern of the conquered peasants who were liable to tribute, while the principal objects of such a grant were, firstly, to assure deserving members of the community, and especially the seasoned fighters for Islam, of a sure means of livelihood, to pay them for their services and to encourage them to further deeds by the prospect of such reward, and secondly, the desire to maintain in the hands of a powerful military aristocracy domination over the conquered peoples.²

Military assignments of a kind were therefore recognised by the jurists, and Māwardī, as stated above, considered that those entered in the dīwān, i.e. the members of the army (jaish), were the most fitting people to receive an assignment of kharāj. He stipulated, however, that such military grants (arzāq ul-jund) should not be hereditary.³

¹ Becker, 221.

² Tischendorf, 20-1; Balāzurī, 127.

³ Māwardī, 185-6.

With the growth of mercenary armies, which replaced the citizen armies of early Islamic times, soldiers and amīrs were assigned the rent of the land, either as a guarantee of their pay, or as part of their pay, and finally when the rent began to come in with increasing irregularity, they were gradually given the estates themselves.¹ In addition, the Turkish generals took over as emphyteuticarii or muqṭa's large landed properties, and as tax-farmers extensive districts. The sums due from them they frequently withheld, or only paid when compelled to do so by force.² These assignments must be distinguished from assignments to the soldiery;³ the latter grew out of the earlier and legally recognised assignments of kharāj, while the former were a development of the emphyteusis system, upon which was superimposed Turkish and, later, Mongol influences.

From the foregoing it will be seen that the muqṭa' had originally no military duties, and, according to Becker, it was only with the militarisation of the state that the military, by abuse, penetrated into the already existing system of assignments.⁴ In his view the cause of this was

¹ E.I. Article on Iqṭā'.

² Becker, 241.

³ cf. Ibn al-Athīr who distinguishes between assignments to the generals under Mu'izz ad-Dawla, the Būyid, and assignments to the army (VIII. 342). This distinction continued into Great Seljūq times (see below) and appeared in Egypt 150 years later (cf. Becker 242-3).

⁴ Becker, 240.

chiefly the breakdown in the financial economy of the state, which under the Umayyads and the early 'Abbāsids had been predominantly a gold economy.¹ Western feudalism was essentially an attempt to solve the problem of maintaining armies in a state, whose basis was a land economy, whereas in the East, the iqṭā' system grew up as an administrative and bureaucratic system, and changed into a military system as the result of an attempt to meet a military problem when the gold economy had broken down. Not only therefore did the iqṭā' system differ from western feudalism in various respects, notably that the muqṭa' originally had no military duties, but it also differed in origin.²

The seizure of power by the military on the breakdown of the financial economy of the caliphate had created a condition of anarchy. The revenue was largely diverted from the state treasury into the pockets of the military, who had no permanent interest in the land and were concerned in the main with squeezing in the shortest time as much as they could out of the land in their temporary possession.

Poliak, on the other hand, disputes Becker's theory that the military only penetrated into the already existing system of assignments on the breakdown of financial economy in Islamic countries. As proof of this, he mentions that the majority of

¹ Becker, 235.

² cf. Moreland: The Agrarian System of Muslim India (p.220), who clearly shows that the iqṭā' system in Mughal India was a bureaucratic and not a feudal organisation.

tax-farmers under the caliphs were members of the military classes. He further states that the revenue was the acknowledged right of the dominant class, and hence naturally went to the military. He considers that the difference in the development of the iqtā' system in muslim lands and feudalism in the west is to be ~~accounted~~ for, not, as stated above, by the fact that there was in the west^a/land economy and in the east a money economy, but by the concentration in the muslim world of assignees in cities, in opposition to their dispersal in castles in the west. This concentration was made possible, he holds, by more highly developed monetary conditions, resulting from a coincidence of historical and geographical factors. Among the former was the fact that the near East was not devastated to the same extent as the west during the decline of the Roman empire, and, secondly, that the natural antagonism existing in general between the foreign feudal class and the indigenous population forced the former to establish themselves in large isolated military cantonments in the towns, which became centres of economic activity. He admits, however, that this antagonism was not greater than that which existed, for example, in England between the Barons after the coming of William the Conqueror and the native population. Hence he is forced to the conclusion that the most important factor influencing the peculiar development of Islamic feudalism was the geographic one. The muslim world lay in an arid zone,

the population of which was mostly collected in oases, large fluvial valleys and mountain regions. The limited areas of these oases prevented their masters establishing themselves at a distance from one another. The mountain regions also were separated from one another by river valleys and stony slopes, which caused the growth of large villages rather than scattered settlements.¹

Poliak's statement that the criterion of the iqtā' system in muslim countries was the concentration of the assignees in towns seems, broadly speaking, to be borne out by the evidence at our disposal, but his rejection of Becker's theory that the military penetrated into the system subsequently and by abuse seems more doubtful. In the early period of both the Arab expansion and the Seljūq expansion the movement was a tribal one. The basis of the dominion of the orthodox caliphs and of the Umayyads was the "citizen" army, and not till 'Abbāsīd times was this replaced by a mercenary army. That is to say, prior to this the dominant class was not the "military" in the usual sense of the word (i.e. mercenaries) but those belonging to the conquering race, whose chief duty as citizens was to bear arms to defend and to extend the dominion of the community of the faithful. Similarly the basis of the Seljūq power during the period of expansion was the Turkomān tribes, and it was only after the initial expansion that the basis of

¹ Poliak: LaFeodalité Islamique, R.E.I. 1936 III.

the Seljūq power began to alter and the government came to rely more and more on armies composed of slaves and freedmen.

In the case of the Arabs, and subsequently of the Seljūqs, the dominant class probably did regard it their privilege to receive the revenue, but in the early period of expansion, in either case, the actual administration was left largely in the hands of local officials, belonging to the former administrations. Further, in both cases as the composition of the dominant class changed, the new masters - Turkish slaves and freedmen - appropriated to themselves such privileges as the former members of the dominant class had enjoyed, including the right to the revenue. Moreover, in view of the fact that the military were, in many cases, carefully trained, not only in the arts of war, but also in administrative affairs, it was natural they should take over, in a large measure, the administration of the country, until finally, as their power increased, they tended to divert the revenue from the central treasury into their own pockets.

The Seljūq migration, as stated in Chapter I., can be divided into various stages. At first the Turkomāns were looked upon as tribal auxiliaries by the local rulers, and as such they probably received at times assignments in accordance with the prevailing custom of making grants of land to the amīrs and soldiers.¹ Gradually, as the Turkomāns extended

¹ Alā ud-Dawla, for example, after Abū Sahl had refused to pay him tribute, offered in 420 (?), to grant the Ghuzz iqṭā's, and nearly 1500 of them under the leadership of Qizil joined him (I.A. IX.269).

their conquests and consolidated their power, they reduced many of the former local rulers to the position of vassals, and brought to an end the dominion of others. Lacking any administrative experience or organisation, the Seljūqs, during the early period of their expansion, made little attempt to rule the country directly, but left the administration largely in the hands of members of the former local ruling families and their officials, who became their vassals and governors. In the course of time they began to assign large areas of the empire also to their followers, Turks and Turkomāns.

As stated above, the iqtā' system in Great Seljūq times was far from being carefully regularised as it was later in the Ottoman, Mamlūk and Mughal empires. Nevertheless several different types of iqtā' can be distinguished, namely (1) the iqtā' granted to members of the Seljūq family, (2) the "administrative" iqtā', which was virtually a provincial governorship, and included also, as a sub-group, the iqtā' which was merely the grant of the right to farm the taxes of a given area, (3) the military iqtā', (4) the iqtā' granted to officials in lieu of salary, and (5) the iqtā' granted as a personal estate to a private person. It must not be supposed, however, that these were the only kinds of iqtā' - a notable exception is the iqtā' granted by the sultān to the caliph, which does not fit exactly into any of these categories - nor must it be supposed that all iqtā's belonging to the same type necessarily conformed to the

same pattern. There was, no doubt, a general tendency to follow accepted precedent, which would have resulted in a general similarity of usage, but this does not exclude the possibility of a variety of special provisions according to circumstances. Once the principle of conformity to the law had been abandoned, there was no check upon arbitrary action.

I The great Seljūqs conceived of the kingdom as the estate of the ruling khān, which he could dispose of as he wished, and it was an established practice for him to assign different parts of the kingdom to minor members of his family, sons, brothers and others.² A condition usually observed in the case of an iqṭā' assigned to a member of the Seljūq family was that the assignee should actually reside during his tenure of office in the province or district assigned to him. This condition differentiates this type of iqṭā' from all other types, none of which had any condition, implied or otherwise, of continued residence by the muqṭā' in his iqṭā'.

These assignments to members of the Seljūq family were probably not intended to be of a permanent nature, but there arose a tendency for one branch of the family to regard certain districts as its own iqṭā'. Arslān Arghū, who had been assigned Khwārazm by Alp Arslān,¹ had, by the reign of Barkyāruq, conquered Balkh, Tirmidh, Nāshāpūr and the whole of Khurāsān, and

¹ A.S.D. 40.

² See note 3, p.221.

so he sent to Barkyāruq and to his wazīr, Mu'ayyid ul-Mulk b. Nizām ul-Mulk demanding that he should be confirmed in the possession of Khurāsān, on the grounds that his grandfather Dā'ūd had held the district surrounding Nīshāpūr; he offered to make a payment for this, and guaranteed to refrain from fighting for the sultanate if his request was acceded to.¹ Arslān Arghū in addition was, during the reign of Malikshāh, the muqṭa' of a sum of 7,000 dīnārs in the neighbourhood of Hamadān and Sāva, and when after his death his son, a minor, came to Barkyāruq, he was given the iqṭā' which his father had held in the days of Malikshāh.² In this case it seems likely that this was merely a grant of the right to farm certain taxes in that area.³

This type of assignment was to some extent a survival of tribal tradition, according to which the ruling khān did not exercise power to the exclusion of the other members of his family, but rather as the head of a council of elders.⁴ It

¹ I.A. X.180.

² *ibid.* 179; Bu. 235; A.S.D. 84-5.

³ Ibn Balkhī, who wrote during the reign of Muhammad b. Malikshāh, states that Jahram in Fārs was part of the pension (mawājib) of the walī'ahd (F.N. 131).

⁴ In the Naṣā'ih Nāma it is stated that Nizām ul-Mulk said that while he was at the court of Alp Arslān many of the latter's relatives were at court receiving allowances. The amīrs considered it expedient to send them to provincial governments, so that the money spent on their allowances might be saved and the provincial taxes paid in regularly. Alp Arslān was favourably inclined towards the proposal. Nizām ul-Mulk, however, to deter him from acting upon it, told him a story of the caliph Mansūr, for he (Nizām ul-Mulk) thought

was no doubt also thought that if minor members of the ruling khān's family were given assignments, they would be less likely to dispute the position of the ruling khān. When Alp Arslān secured the recognition of Malikshāh as his heir apparent, he gave iqtā's to other members of his family, presumably with this idea in mind. Īnānj Baighū received Māzandarān, Sulaimān b. Dā'ūd Balkh, Arslān Arghū Khwārazm, his son Arslānshāh Merv, his brother Ilyās Chaghāniyān and Tukhānistān, Mas'ūd b. Irtāsh the governorship (wilāya) of Baghshūr, and Mawdūd b. Irtāsh the governorship (wilāya) of Asfuzār.¹ On his deathbed Alp Arslān made further assignments. He gave to Ayyāz, his son, what had belonged to his own father Dā'ūd in Balkh and ear-marked for him 500,000 dīnārs, but assigned the fortresses in those districts to Malikshāh, while he gave Fārs and Kirmān to Qāwurd b. Dā'ūd and allotted to him a sum of money also.² Subsequently Malikshāh on the death of Ayyāz assigned Balkh to his brother Shihāb ud-Dīn Takash and gave

(Note continued from previous page.)

such a practice would result in many evils (N. f.31b). This was not, however, the origin of the custom of giving provincial governments to Seljuq princes, which was much more probably a development of tribal practice.

¹ I.A. X.34.

² *ibid.* 52; Bu. 45. After Qāwurd's rebellion Malikshāh gave the governorships he had held to Sauteḡīn, giving him the laqab 'Imād ud-Dīn and the right to ballistas and drums (Bu. 47).

him also Tukhāristān.¹ To his other brother Tāj ud-Dawla Tutush b. Alp Arslān he assigned Syria in 470 (1077/8),² and to Burī Bars he gave Herāt and the neighbourhood of Ghūr and Gharjistān.³ Barkyāruq continued the policy of granting iqtā's to other members of his family. In 486 (1093) he assigned Ganja and its governorships to Muḥammad b. Malikshāh and appointed Qutlughtegīn (var. Ṣāliḥtegin) his atābeg.⁴ When Tughril b. Muḥammad and Kundoghdī intended to rebel against Maḥmūd b. Muḥammad, the latter sent to Tughril promising him numerous iqtā's, more than those which he already held, if he joined him.⁵ Maṣūd b. Muḥammad, who rebelled in 512 (1118), was subsequently assigned Ganja and its governorships by Maḥmūd in 524 (1130).⁶ The former, when he became sultān, assigned to Seljūqshāh b. Muḥammad, who joined him about 531, the country that had belonged to Sukmān al-Qutbī, namely Khalāt and its dependencies, Manāzkird and Arzan.⁷ To Muḥammad b. Maḥmūd he assigned Khūaistān and married him to his daughter.⁸ Sanjar

¹ I.A. X.64; A.S.D. 58. According to the A.S.D. Malikshāh gave Khurāsān to Takash (p.61).

² I.A. X.75¹

³ A.S.D. 59.

⁴ I.A. X.194.

⁵ *ibid.* 384.

⁶ *ibid.* 469.

⁷ Bu. 169.

⁸ Bu. 202.

in 512 (1118/9) assigned to Tughril b. Muḥammad Sāva, Āva, Sāruq, Sāmān, Qazwīn, Abhār, Zanjān, Gīlān, Dayālam and at-Tāliqān and to Seljūqshāh b. Muḥammad and his atābeg Qarāja as-Sāqī he gave Fārs and part of Iṣfahān;¹ and when he conquered Khwārazm in 533 (1138/9) he assigned it to Ghiyāth ud-Dīn Sulaimānshāh b. Muḥammad.² In the course of time, from the reign of Muḥammad b. Malikshāh onwards the assignment to a Seljūq malik tended to be replaced by the assignment to the atābeg of the prince rather than to the prince himself (see Chapter IV.).

To what extent the prince to whom a province was assigned had jurisdiction over that province to the exclusion of the sultān is not clear. Complete financial control seems to have been handed over to him. In a diploma issued by Alp Arslān for one of his sons for the possession of Fīlān and Khwārazm, these districts were given to the prince as his own property (ملك). He was instructed to look after the interests of the people of those parts and to observe former rules in the collection of taxes. The people were also commanded to regard him as the owner (mālik) of those districts and the officials of his dīwān as in charge of those districts, and ordered to pay their taxes in full and without delay.³ The

¹ A.S.D. 90; Bu. 122.

² I.A. XI.44.

³ Collection of Letters: Add. 7688, f.3a,b.

prince to whom such an assignment was made probably could and did assign districts in it to his own followers. The malik Mas'ūd, for example, assigned Marāgha and a district as far as Rahba to Qasīm us-Dawla al-Bursuqī, his atābeg (495). Āzerbāijān, however, had not been assigned to Mas'ūd - he had merely taken possession of it.¹ Tutush also made Urtuq b. Aksab governor of Jerusalem in 479² and assigned this city to the latter's son, Suqmān in 490 (1097).³ There is little doubt, however, that the maliks, as the other holders of iqṭā's had no rights as muqṭa's, and merely held the area under them at the will of the sultān, who could and frequently did revoke the assignment, the usual method being to assign the iqṭā' in question to a second person, who would then conquer or attempt to conquer it from the first assignee. When Tughril b. Muḥammad and Aqsunqur Aḥmadīlī rebelled in 515/6 (1121/2), Maḥmūd b. Muḥammad sent Jayūsh Beg to put down their rebellion and assigned to him the country.⁴

Not only did the Seljūqs make assignments to the male members of their family, but their wives and the other Seljūq women also held iqṭā's. These were rather in the nature of

¹ I.A. X.395.

² I.K. I.171; I.A. X.96.

³ I.A. X.193.

⁴ *ibid.* 421.

personal estates. Tughril Beg, when he married the caliph's daughter in 454 (1062), assigned to her Ba'qūba and what had belonged to his late wife in 'Irāq.¹ Malikshāh granted to his paternal aunt Şafiyya, the wife of Sharaf ud-Dawla Muslim b. Quraish, the city of Balad as an iqtā'.² Alp Arslān, after putting down the rebellion of Qarā Arslān in Kirmān gave to each of the latter's daughters 100,000 dīnārs and iqtā's and estates (? الامتراح).³ Samīram was part of Gawhar Khātūn, Muḥammad b. Malikshāh's wife's pension (معيته). Kamāl-al-Mulk 'Alī as-Samiramī's father contracted for its revenue.⁴

The second type of iqtā', which became perhaps the most important form of iqtā' in the Great Seljūq empire, was the "administrative" iqtā' (or tu'ma). The traditional distinction between the "administrative" iqtā' and the iqtā' ut-tamlīk was still preserved, the former not being hereditary except by usurpation. The distinction, however, tended to be obscured because the "administrative" iqtā' had by this time become militarised. The position of the holder of this type of iqtā' approximated to the position of a provincial governor, and the terms muqṭa' and wālī seem to have been used as roughly

¹ I.A. X.14.

² *ibid.* 150.

³ A.S.D. 41.

⁴ Bu. 102.

synonymous. In some cases a slight distinction may have existed, the governor possibly being under the obligation, at least in theory, to remit the surplus revenue to the central government. In general, however, there does not seem to have been any such distinction. The fact that the same man is called wālī of such and such a place in one source, and muqṭā' in another supports this view.

Nizām ul-Mulk probably brought about a general unification of the iqṭā' system, but it is with the "administrative" type of iqṭā' that he is especially concerned. The old idea of the promotion of cultivation, underlying the grant of the original iqṭā' ut-tamlīk seems, moreover, to have reappeared in the theory of Nizām ul-Mulk. He states that if attention is drawn to the ruin and dispersal of the inhabitants of any district, it must be at once investigated and the condition of the muqṭā' and the 'āmil enquired into, in order to prevent the land becoming waste, the peasants being dispersed and money being levied unjustly.¹

In practice it seems that the powers exercised by the muqṭā' of this type of iqṭā' were often far wider than those envisaged by Nizām ul-Mulk (see p. 258.). Various documents have come down to us in relation to the assignment of iqṭā's which show that the muqṭā' had in many cases complete control in the area assigned to him. Ibn al-Qalānisī gives a copy of

¹ S.N. 119.

the diploma for the civil and military administration of Damascus written by the tughrā'ī, Abū Ismā'īl al-Iṣfahānī on behalf of Muḥammad b. Malikshāh in Muḥarram 510 (1116) for Tughtegīn, by which the latter was given full control of that district. This document begins with a description of the worthiness of Tughtegīn, after which his diploma for the government (imāra) of Syria is renewed and the conduct of war, levying of contributions (البعار), land tax, tithe and other heads of taxation, the administration of police, the reviewing of the army, the payment of the salaries and the expenditure of courtiers, the administration of justice and all that a capable governor should look after are handed over to him. There follows an injunction to fear God, to obey Him and to lead a pious life. Tughtegīn is then commanded to treat well the officials and others under him, to consult them and to give every class its due. He is further commanded to appoint brave and able men over the frontier districts in relays and to furnish them with equipment and provisions. Treaties were to be faithfully kept. He was commanded to give security to all his subjects, to protect them in their lawful businesses and to guard their persons, children possessions and trades, to prevent the strong oppressing the weak, to choose the most upright among his subjects as officials ('ummāl) and governors (wullāt) and to order them to content

themselves with land taxes, instalments and shares (مقتات). Lastly, he was to mention in the khutba and the sikka the name of the Seljūq sultān and to remain loyal to the 'Abbāsid dynasty.¹ From this document it is clear that as far as Damascus was concerned at this time (i.e. 510) the central government retained no power in the administration with the exception of the nomination of the governor, which was probably little more than a matter of form, and the only demand it made was the mention of the sultān's name in the khutba and sikka.

In a collection of documents known as at-Tawassul ilā' t Tarassul by Bahā ud-Dīn Muḥammad b. Mu'ayyad al-Baghdādī, who was at one time head of the chancellory (dīwān ul-Inshā) of the Khwārazmshāh Takash, are a number of diplomas issued to muqta's. The documents according to Bart'old refer to the years 578-9 (1182-4). They belong thus to the period immediately following the Great Seljūq period, and probably do not differ substantially from similar documents belonging to Great Seljūq times. The style of these documents is, moreover, similar to that of Tughtegīn's diploma. They each begin with a preamble describing the bounty of God, the reward of devotion and service and similar matters, followed by a description of the excellence and deserving nature of the muqta', the grant to him of an assignment or the renewal of former grants, and

¹ Q. 193-7.

various injunctions and recommendations to him and the population of those living in his assignment.¹ These grants, with the possible exception of the assignment to Shihāb ud-Dīn and his father (see in), are all relating to "administrative" iqṭā's. By the grant of the assignments of Nasā to Aḍud ud-Dawla wa'd-Dīn Tughanshāh Abū Bakr b. al-Mu'ayyad² complete financial and administrative control of these districts was given him. He was commanded to piety and justice, to see to the welfare of his subjects (ra'āyā) and to practice moderation in the collection of taxes. These were to be collected by his own officials ('ummāl wa mutaṣarrifān), who were to levy only what was customary and were not to introduce any new taxes. He was further commanded to order the shihnas³ and officials (gumāштеgān) to promote religion. Lastly he was commanded to omit nothing in assuring the security of the roads in his iqṭā'. Finally, "the imāms, qāḍīs, 'ulamā, capable persons, amīrs, army commanders, great and important persons, other classes and all the subjects (ra'āyā) of the

¹ In the decree increasing the iqṭā's of Shihāb ud-Dīn and his father (pp.118-9) no mention is made of his or the population's duties. Perhaps this was the grant of a "personal" and not an "administrative" iqṭā'.

² at-Tavassul, pp.30-8.

³ The shihna was presumably no longer an official directly responsible to the sultān (see Chapter VI.), but perhaps a local official appointed by the muqta', corresponding to some extent perhaps to the earlier muhtasib.

of the villages of Nasā which were included in the iqtā' of his dīwān were commanded to obey the muqta' and to pay their taxes promptly and in full.

In another decree,¹ in addition to the land assigned to the muqta', the latter was given a grant of several thousand dīnārs for the expenses of his dīwān. Similar commands to piety, justice and compassion towards the people were made. There was also an injunction to follow former administrative practice, and a command to tell the shihnas "to revive the customs of good administration and not to permit the tyrannical to practice oppression upon those who are rightly guided, or the scandalous ones to commit excess against the pious", and finally the inhabitants of the iqtā' were commanded to obey the assignee and his officials, and to pay their taxes promptly and in full. A third decree² increasing the assignments of 'Imād ud-Dīn, governor (wālī) of Nasā, contains similar provisions and instructions. In addition to his iqtā', 'Imād ud-Dīn also received wages (mawājib) in cash, for these were increased by several thousand dīnārs, while the wealth (amwāl) of the places fixed by the dīwāni 'arz was assigned to him as an iqtā' over which he exercised full control. From this it seems that it was not the land itself that was assigned

¹ at-Tavassul, 90-5.

² ibid. 95-9.

to him, but merely its produce and the administration of that area, which is perhaps a theoretical rather than a practical distinction. In this document, moreover, the population of the district assigned are commanded to regard 'Imād ad-Dīn as their muqṭa' and wālī, which bears out the theory that there was practically no distinction between the terms wālī and muqṭa'.

It is noticeable that in none of these documents is there any specific reference to military duties or military obligations towards the ruler who made the grant.

Lastly, in the Tawassul there is a diploma issued for Abū Manṣūr Malikshāh for the governorship of Jand.¹ On examination this is found to differ little from the diplomas to muqṭa's except in so far as he is given certain instructions regarding his army. This difference may be due to the fact that Jand was a frontier district. After a preamble concerning the thanks due to God for His grace, the devotion to duty of the ruler on whose behalf the document ~~was~~ issued, mention is made of the special position of Jand, in view of its being a frontier district, and a description given of the worthiness of Abū Manṣūr Malikshāh, to whom full control of Jand is entrusted. He is then exhorted to piety and godliness, since leading personages have a greater obligation than others to cultivate these virtues, to hold public audiences at all times, to give

¹ at-Tawassul, 13-29.

justice and to redress grievances, permitting no distinction to be made between the different classes, to honour the sayyids and to give pensions to them, to show favour to the imāms and 'ulamā, not allowing their fatwās to be transgressed in matters relating to the sharī'a, and to seek their advice, to support the qāḍīs and ḥukkām, to give ṣadaqa to the righteous and to sūfīs and to show mercy to the leading shaikhs and their followers, to protect the cultivators and dihqāns from forced labour, and the artisans and small merchants (ahli sūq) from hardship. He is instructed to guard and treat in a friendly way his cortège and the soldiers, not to tolerate quarrels among them and to see they are paid fully and at the right time by the officials of the dīwān, to consider obligatory the reviewing of the army in person and the investigation of the condition of every soldier, and to demand from each, according to his pay, a mount and arms, to encourage the mujāhidīn and to establish on the frontier brave and experienced men, to assure the security of the roads and to protect the traveller from attack and pillage, to be vigilant in the punishment of criminals, to consult his trustworthy servants, to observe faithfully treaties, to appoint in his dīwān persons of integrity and to order them to take from the owners of estates only what is fixed by law. Finally the people of Jand are commanded to obey him and to pay their taxes in full at the

beginning of the solar year.

In a diploma issued for Tāj ud-Dīn 'Alī for Bār Chunligh Kunt, also a frontier district, similar conditions are made.¹ In this case the ribāt of Tughānīn, the most important place of that region, is granted to Tāj ud-Dīn as a present (in'ām), and the subjects of that place are instructed to pay to his officials the taxes and dues of the dīwān; for the rest there are no provisions relating to financial administration.

This practice of assigning administrative iqtā's to amīrs and others was common during the reign of Malikshāh. He assigned Syria, Diyār Bakr and Hilla to Qasīm us-Dawla Āqsunqur,² Ruḥā and Qazwīn to 'Imād ud-Dawla Būzān, Mawṣil to Jigirmish,³ and after him to the sons of Āqsunqur, Ḥisn Kaifā to Urtuq, Mārdīn to Aqtīmur, Fārs to Rukn ud-Dawla Khumārtegin⁴ and Antioch to Yāghī Siyān⁵, to mention some of the more prominent cases. The later Great Seljūq sultāns continued this practice, but as the power of the amīrs increased, the grant of an iqtā' tended to become merely an official recognition of the possession of a given district by an amīr. It was doubtless also inability to control the amīrs which led the sultān to play them off one against another, by assigning to them each other's domains, or even assigning the same district simultaneously

¹ at-Tavassul, 38-43.

² Q. 119; R.S. 129.

³ R.S. 129; T.G. 447.

⁴ T.G. 447.

⁵ A.M. 17.

to two persons.¹ Mawṣil is a case in point. In 500 (1106/7) Muḥammad b. Malikshāh assigned it to Jāwulī Saḡāwū together with Diyār Bakr and al-Jazīra, which places belonged to Jigirmish, who was at that time one of the most powerful amīrs in the empire.² But in 501 Mawdūd b. Altūntegīn went with other amīrs, at Muḥammad's suggestion to take Mawṣil from Jāwulī. The city fell in Ṣafar 502 (1108) and Mawdūd became governor of Mawṣil.³ Some years later (508) Mawṣil came into the possession of Āqsunqur al-Bursuqī,⁴ and in 509 (1115/6) Muḥammad b. Malikshāh assigned it to Jayūsh Beg.⁵ Saḡāwū was assigned Raḥba by Muḥammad b. Malikshāh in 501 (1107/8).⁶ The latter place was al-Bursuqī's iqṭā' in 509,⁷ while in 521 (1127) it belonged to Zangī.⁸ In 515 (1121) Maḥmūd b. Muḥammad assigned to Āqsunqur al-Bursuqī Mawṣil, al-Jazīra, Sinjār and what adjoined it, and al-Bursuqī went with a large army

¹ On occasion, however, the sultān would help a Muqta' to regain his iqṭā' after it had been usurped by another. 'Alī b. Sukmān seized Baṣrā, which had been assigned to Āqsunqur al-Bukhārī, and Maḥmūd b. Muḥammad sent an askar with the latter in 514 (1120/1) to retake it (I.A. X.394).

² I.A. X.291-2.

³ *ibid.* 319-21.

⁴ *ibid.* 350.

⁵ *ibid.* 360-1.

⁶ *ibid.* 318.

⁷ *ibid.* 361.

⁸ *ibid.* 454.

and took possession of what he had been assigned.¹ Jayūsh Beg meanwhile was assigned Azerbāijān by Maḥmūd b. Muḥammad in 515/16 (1121/2).² In 516 (1122) al-Bursuqī also received Wāsīt.³

It is evident that except in a case where an iqtā' was granted merely by way of acknowledgment of the conquest of an area by an amīr, i.e., an iqtā' by usurpation, the muqta' had, generally speaking, to take possession of his iqtā' by force, and frequently to turn out from it the previous holder. When the Banī Jahīr, who had been attached to the caliph's wazirate, came to Malikshāh in 476 (1083) after dismissal from the wazirate, the latter assigned Diyār Bakr to Fakhr ud-Dawla b. Jahīr, gave him a khil'a and granted him the right to have the kettledrums (al-kūsāt) played and sent him with troops to Diyār Bakr to take it from the Banī Marwān.⁴ Soon after Fakhr ud-Dawla b. Jahīr reached Diyār Bakr, Āmid fell into the power of his son Abū'l Qāsim Za'im ur-Ru'asā, and three months later he himself took/ ^{Mayyāfāriqīn} from Naṣīr ud-Dawla Maṣṣūr b. Naṣr ud-Dawla b. Marwān.⁵ In Ramaḍān 482 (1089) Fakhr ud-

¹ I.A. X.415.

² *ibid.* 421.

³ *ibid.* 426-7.

⁴ *ibid.* 83.

⁵ I.K. III.281-2.

Dawla occupied Naṣībīn and subsequently took possession of Mawṣil,¹ Sinjār, Raḥba and Khābūr.² When Mas'ūd b. Muḥammad assigned Ḥilla to Sālārkurd in 542 (1147/8) because of the disorders created by the troops of 'Alī b. Dubais in whose hands Ḥilla was, Sālārkurd marched with his 'askar on Ḥilla, which he took after putting 'Alī to flight.³ Sometimes, however, the transfer was effected peacefully. When Maḥmūd b. Muḥammad assigned Mayyāfāriqīn to Īlghāzī, Sukmān al-Qutbī, governor of Khilāt, in whose possession it was, handed it over to him.⁴ In some cases the dispossessed muqṭa' was given other assignments, Mawdūd b. Zangī, when taking al-Jazīra from Ghulbak, in 553 (1158), gave him in exchange many iqṭā's.⁵ When Zangī b. Urtuq was restored to his rank and set free from prison by the sultān Muḥammad b. Malikshāh in 499 (1105/6), his brothers were dismissed from their iqṭā's, namely Līshtar, Sābūr Khwāst, and others between Aḥwāz and Hamadān, and were given in place of these other iqṭā's, including Dīnawār.⁶

It is clear from the above that these administrative assignments were not in theory hereditary or assigned on a life-long tenure. As the power of the amīrs grew, however, a

¹ Bu. 71.

² I.K. III.284.

³ I.A. XI.80.

⁴ I.A. X.418.

⁵ I.A. XI.146.

⁶ I.A. X.274.

hereditary tendency began to appear, and there are several cases of amīrs, who succeeded in establishing themselves so firmly in their assignments as to assure the succession of their sons or dependents after them.¹ This happened in the case of al-Bursuqī, who was succeeded in Mawṣil by his son 'Izz ad-Dīn Mas'ūd.² Zangī, who founded the atābeg dynasty of Mawṣil, is a striking case in point. On his death his possessions were divided between his two sons, Nūr ud-Dīn, who became ruler of Aleppo, and Saif ud-Dīn, who held Mawṣil. A third son, Bīzāba, who was in the service of the sultāns of 'Irāq, was wālī of Fārs.³ Turkomān chiefs also succeeded in founding dynasties. Īlghāzī had obtained various possessions, including Mayyāfāriqīn, as stated above. On his death his domains were divided among his sons and nephews; Ḥusām ud-Dīn Tīmūrtāsh b. Īlghāzī took Mārdīn, his brother Sulaimān

¹ The hereditary tendency also appeared in the igtā's which were sub-assigned. After Diyār Bakr was conquered from the Banī Marwān, Fakhr ud-Dawla, to whom it had been assigned, gave Jubuq, who was the shihna of the country, Ḥiṣn Ziyād as an igtā. It remained in his hands and his children's until Bahram b. Urtuq took it, and it was given to Dā'ūd b. Suqman and his children (T.M. f.148b).

² I.A. X.453.

Izz ud-Dīn, after the assassination of his father in 520, took possession of Aleppo, and came in the following year to Maḥmūd b. Muḥammad in Baghdād and Maḥmūd wrote for him a diploma for his father's domains (Kaṁāl ud-Dīn, p.655).

³ T.G. 504.

Mayyāfāriqīn, and Badr ud-Dawla Sulaimān b. 'Abd ul-Jabbār b. Urtuq kept Aleppo until his cousin Balak b. Bahrām took it in 517 (1123).¹

Apart from hereditary transmission there are several cases recorded of the disposal of an iqṭā' by testament. Karbūqā, a muqṭa' of Mawṣil (d. 495 (1101/2)), on his deathbed nominated Sunqurja as his successor. The latter, however, was killed in a quarrel with Mūsā the Turkomān, governor of Ḥiṣn Kaifā on behalf of Karbūqā, who had also advanced on Mawṣil on the latter's death; Mūsā then took possession of Mawṣil, but died almost immediately (495), after which Mawṣil fell into the possession of Jigirmish.³ When Tughtegīn fell ill in 498 (1104/5) he conceived the idea of sending an invitation to Suqmān b. Urtuq to come to Damascus with his 'askar', in order that he might nominate him as his successor and that the defence of Damascus might be entrusted to him.⁴ Aḥmadīl (d. 510), governor of Marāgha, was apparently succeeded by one of his mamlūks, for one Aqsunqur Aḥmadīlī was governor of Marāgha in 515 (1121/2).² Although there was, as stated above,

¹ I.A. X.426,431.

² *ibid.* 424.

³ *ibid.* 236.

When Mūsā and Sunqurja met, the former said that "the offices and the decision in the matter (of appointing the governor of Mawṣil) were in the hands of the sultān, who would appoint whomsoever he chose (I.A. X.235), which indicates that the sultān still retained some voice in the matter.

⁴ Gibb: The Damascus Chronicle. p.66.

no established hereditary principle in the assignment of iqṭā's it is nevertheless probable that in the event of a muqṭa' dying, the claims of his family and dependents were favourably considered. When Sukmān al-Qutbī fell severely ill on the expedition led by Mawdūd to Syria in 505 (1111/2) Aḥmadīl determined to return to ask the sultān to assign him the districts belonging to Sukmān, to whom he was allied by marriage.¹

Included in the administrative iqṭā' are the assignments granted to members of former local ruling houses. These do not differ from the assignments made to the amīrs, except that the assignees had, in some cases, a connection in the past with the districts assigned to them. Various members of the former ruling houses had become Seljūq vassals, but in the course of time their status, in so far as they had not been entirely dispossessed, tended to be reduced to that of mere governors or muqṭa's. Tughril Beg assigned Kirmānshāh (Qirmīsīn) in 447 (1055/6) to Abū 'Alī b. Abī Kālījār² to whom he had already given an iqṭā' in Jūrbādhaqān together with two fortresses in that district in 445 (1053/4) when he married him to one of the women of his people.³ Subsequently Abū 'Alī was granted a revenue contract for the province of

¹ Q. 175. According to Ibn al-Athīr he also determined to demand Tughtegīn's iqṭā' (X. 342).

² I.A. IX.229, 432. Bowen: The Last Buwayhids, J.R.A.S./Pt.II. 243; Sibṭ b. Jawzī: Mir'āt az-Ẓamān, Paris Codex f.11b.

³ I.A. IX.404.

Baṣrā by Alp Arslān, whom he went to meet at Hamadān in 456 (1064), in return for which he surrendered the assignments of Qumm and Kāshān (for which he had perhaps exchanged that of Qirmisin in the interval).¹ Abū 'Alī hastened to Baṣrā, but Hazārasp, in whose hands it was, on learning of his approach, objected that the sultān had no good reason for evicting him. And he went on to argue that Abū 'Alī's appointment was ill advised; both he and his father Abū Kālījār had lorded it in the province: and he would be too hazardously popular with the inhabitants.² So Abū 'Alī was disappointed and although it is not stated explicitly that Alp Arslān revoked his order, it is to be presumed that he did, since Hazārasp remained in possession. However, Alp Arslān gave Abū 'Alī, perhaps in compensation, the assignment of Nawbandajān in Fārs.³ Abū Naṣr b. Jalāl ud-Dawla, the Būyīd, held al-Madā'in (Ctesiphon) and Dair al-'Aqul as an assignment from Malikshāh.⁴ Tughril Beg, after entering Baghdād in 447 (1055/6) assigned Arrajān to Hazārasp b. Bānkīr and farmed (صن) to him also Baṣrā and Ahwāz for 300,000 and 60,000 dīnārs respectively.⁵

¹ Unless qumm wa qāshān has been written here in error for qirmisin or qirmāsin.

² M.Z. Paris Codex, f.99b.; Bowen, p.244.

³ Mīr Khwānd, 57 (Extract published by Wilken, Berlin 1835): Bowen, pt. I. 243-4.

⁴ Bowen, pt.I. 245.

⁵ I.A. IX.422; F.N. 121.

Alp Arslān assigned Anbār, Hīt, Ḥarba as-Sinn and Bawāzīj to Sharaf ud-Dawla Muslim b. Quraish b. Badrān in 458 (1066).¹ Subsequently Malikshāh increased the assignments of Sharaf ud-Dawla Muslim b. Quraish and Bahā ud-Dawla Manṣūr b. Dubais and their followers for their help in defeating Qāwurd in 465 (1073), when his own army had desired to see the latter's victory.² Alp Arslān also farmed Fārs to Faḍlūya, a local tribal leader.³ Im 479 (1086/7) Malikshāh again increased Muḥammad b. Sharaf ud-Dawla's assignments, giving him the city of Raḥba and its districts, Ḥarrān, Sārūj, Raqqā and Khābūr when he married him to his daughter.⁴ In this case, as in the case of Abū 'Alī b. Abī Kālījār, the iqtā's assigned were perhaps part of the marriage settlement. When Faḍlūn b. Abī'l Aswār ar-Rawwādī rebelled, Malikshāh took Arrān from him, but assigned to him Astarābād.⁵ Saif ud-Dawla Ṣadaqa b. Manṣūr b. Dubais b. Mazyad, ruler of Ḥilla, was virtually a Seljūq vassal; outside Ḥilla, he held various iqtā's including Wāsīt, which was granted to him by the Seljūq sultān.⁶

¹ I.A. X.35. According to Bundārī this was in 457 (p.30).

² Bu. 47; I.A. X.53;

³ F.N. I66; Shīrāz Nāma f.45b.

⁴ I.A. X.105.

⁵ *ibid.* 194.

⁶ *ibid.* 306.

On Ṣadaqa's death in Rajab 501 (1108), his son, Dubais, was with Muḥammad b. Malikshāh, who gave him many iqtā's.¹ Surkhāb b. Kai Khusraw ~~was~~ another case of a local person holding an iqtā'. He had held Sāva/^{as}an iqtā', but Muḥammad had apparently repealed his iqtā', for Ṣadaqa stipulated the confirmation of Surkhāb in his iqtā' in Sāva as a condition of his obedience of Muḥammad b. Malikshāh in 501 (1107).²

In appointing governors and muqta's the sultān was not able altogether to ignore local opinion. After the assassination of al-Bursuqī and the death of his son Mas'ūd, Maḥmūd b. Muḥammad, who was then in Khurāsān, appointed Dubais b. Ṣadaqa governor of Mawsil. The commander of the citadel in Mawṣil, an amīr named Jāwulī, prompted by the desire of obtaining Mawṣil for himself, sent envoys to Baghdād to secure that end. They, however, plotted for the nomination of Zangī with al-Mustarshid, who was averse to the nomination of Dubais. To obtain this the caliph offered the sultān 100,000 dīnārs, while the envoys also engaged to pay him a certain sum of money, and as a result the nomination of Dubais was annulled.³

In Great Seljūq times there was no effective machinery

¹ I.A. X.373. Muḥammad had also promised iqtā's to Sābit b. Sultān b. Dubais b. 'Alī b. Mazyad, Ṣadaqa's nephew, who had taken refuge with Muḥammad in 501 (1107/8) (I.A. X.311-2)

² I.A. X.311.

³ I.K. I.540.

through which the central government could control the muqta's or provincial governors. Former administrations had maintained some kind of control through the barīd, or postal system, and spies, but this system, being repugnant to Seljūq tribal traditions, had been abolished.¹ Nizām ul-Mulk, who had been brought up in the Ghaznavid empire, deplored this fact. In the *Siyāsat Nāma* he stresses continually the importance of the supervision of all matters by the sovereign, maintaining that only by such supervision and the prompt punishment of extortion and rebellion by subordinate officials could the sovereign's rule be maintained and the kingdom be made flourishing.² He

¹ One day Abū'l Faḍl Sagzī asked Alp Arslān why he had no ṣāhib khabar. He replied, "How shall I appoint a ṣāhib khabar? He, who is my friend and is sincere in his friendship, integrity and sincerity, will give no weight to the ṣāhib khabar and will not bribe him, but he, who is my enemy, will make friends with him and give him money. Since it is so, the ṣāhib khabar will unavoidably always bring to our ears bad reports of our friends and good reports of our enemies. Good and bad words are like arrows. If you fire several arrows, finally one will hit the target. Our heart every day will become more disposed against our friends and more pleasantly disposed towards our enemies. In short, the friend will become estranged and the enemy closer until the friend is regarded as an enemy." (S.N. 65).

² To obtain information of the subjects and the soldiers, of that which happens far or near from him, and to know all affairs that take place, great or small, is obligatory upon the sovereign. If he does not, it is a shortcoming and will be attributed to negligence and injustice. It will be said, "It is one of two things, either the sovereign knows or he does not know of the disorders and exactions which take place in his kingdom. If he is informed of them and does not remedy them and forbid them, he is like the oppressors, and has given his approval to tyranny. If he does not know what happens, he is very negligent and ignorant". In either case it is bad. (S.N. 58.)

insisted also that spies should be sent to all parts of the kingdom in various guises, so that by means of the information transmitted by these spies the sovereign would be able to put down immediately any rebellion.¹ In addition he wanted to have at court an inspector (mushrif) who would have a deputy (nā'ib) in every town and district, who would inform him of all that happened.²

Originally the muqṭa's relation to the central government may have been merely a financial one, and theoretically this was perhaps still so in Great Seljūq times (see p. 258), but in actual practice, owing to the general militarisation of the administration, this financial obligation had largely been replaced by a military one. The muqṭa' was expected, in accordance with the size of his iqtā', to furnish the sultān with troops when required. Nizām ul-Mulk at the audience the caliph gave to Malikshāh in 489 (1087) presented over forty of the amīrs individually to the caliph stating the extent of each

¹ S.N. 68. In addition, the postal service was to be regularly established on the principal roads (p. 81).

² S.N. p. 57. The salaries of these officials were not to be levied from the people, but what they needed was to be paid from the public treasury so that they would not be tempted to commit treason or take bribes.

one's iqtā' and the numbers of his 'askar'.¹ In addition to the obligation of the muqta' to furnish the sultān with troops when required, he could also apparently be called upon for money. When Zahīr ud-Dīn Tughtegīn and Fakhr ul-Mulk b. 'Ammār wrote to Muḥammad b. Malikshāh in 500 (1106/7) asking for reinforcement against the Franks, Muḥammad sent Jāwulī Saqāwū with an 'askar and wrote to Saif ud-Dawla Ṣadaqa, ruler of Ḥilla, and Jigirmish, governor of Mawṣil, ordering them to reinforce him with money and men for a jihād and to exert themselves in helping him. Actually instead of doing this they combined and attacked Jāwulī, but were defeated.² Also it seems that the muqta' was expected to remit either goods or cash to the sultān in the event of his making fresh conquests. Ibn ul-Athīr states that when Jāwulī Saqāwū conquered (various) cities and obtained many goods from them, he did not transfer anything to the sultān.³ When Ḥusāin, son of the atābeg

¹ Bu. 74; I.A. X.144. Nizām ul-Mulk in the Siyāsat Nāma states that the muqta' must hold ready the pay of the army (p. 91), but this was merely the expression of a wish; the central government had no power to enforce this. In the R.S. it is stated that Kamāl ud-Dīn Muḥammad b. al-Ḥusain, Mas'ūd b. Muḥammad's wazīr, gave grants (nānpāra) according to the number and rank of the army (p. 230), which suggests that the "administrative" iqtā' had by this time become completely militarised.

² Q. 156.

³ I.A. X.319.

Qutlughtegin, came to Jāwulī Saqāwū in 502 (1108/9) to win him over to the sultān, Jāwulī said, "I am the mamlūk of the sultān and in his obedience, who took him money and clothes of great value."¹

It seems likely that the central government retained in some cases some kind of financial control in the territory administered by a muqṭa' or governor. It may be that certain heads of revenue were "reserved", or that within certain districts which had been assigned the sultān possessed private domains. Ḥusām ud-Dīn Tīmurtāsh said of Zangī that "neither he nor his 'askar transgressed the revenue (ḥāṣil) of the sultān in his (Ḥusām ud-Dīn's) territories, when attacking them."²

The sultān in certain cases had a nā'ib or deputy in a district which had been assigned. In 494 (1100/1) Ṣadaqa turned out the sultān's nā'ib from Abū'l Maḥāsin's assignment (muqāṭa'a) in Kūfa and annexed it.³ Maḥmūd b. Muḥammad had an overseer (nāẓir) in al-Baṭīḥa which was one of the iqtā's of Raihān Kākūya, his khādim.⁴ Neither of these cases, however were "administrative" iqtā's. Barkyāruq, when he assigned

¹ I.A. X.324-5.

² Ibid. XI.81.

³ ibid. X.210.

⁴ ibid. X.422.

Baṣrā to the amīr Qumāj, sent Ismā'īl b. Arslānjq to Baṣrā as his deputy.¹ In this case the sultān probably had private domains in Baṣrā, for Dubais, in 523 (1129), is said to have plundered what belonged to the sultān in Baṣrā.² Muḥammad b. Malikshāh similarly obtained revenue (dakhl) from Baṣrā, and he had in this city a nā'ib.³

In certain cases the provincial governor seems to have had a definite financial contract with the central government, either that he undertook to remit the surplus taxation to the central treasury or that he farmed the district for a definite sum of money. Tughril Beg, when he left Baghdād in 455 (1063), farmed Baghdād to Abū Saqd al-Qā'imī, who had formerly been in charge of the kitchen (maṭbakh) of 'Amīd ul-Mulk and the ustād of his residence, for 58,000 dīnārs.⁴ Fakhr ud-Dawla b. Jahīr was made governor of Diyār Bakr by Malikshāh in 476 (1083/4).⁵ Barkyāruq subsequently seized 'Amīd ud-Dawla and demanded from him 150,000 dīnārs on the pretext that his father, Fakhr ud-Dawla, owed this amount from the muqāṭa'a of Diyār Bakhr. 'Amīd ud-Dawla gave 50,000 dīnārs and

¹ I.A. X. 232.

² *ibid.* 461.

³ *ibid.* 461.

⁴ Bu. 25.

⁵ I.K. III.281.

al-Mustazhir, whose wazīr he was, produced for him a further 100,000 to obtain his release.¹

This type of iqtā' merges into the revenue farm. In such cases the farmer or muqṭa' was under a contract to remit to the central government a certain sum, but was free to collect over and above this sum in the area farmed. The difference between the position of the revenue-farmer and the muqṭa' of an "administrative" iqtā' was that, whereas the latter had complete control of the general administration of the district and maintained armed forces which he might be called upon to use in support of the sultān, the farmer was concerned merely with the collection of taxes.² A further

¹ T.S. 284. According to Ibn ul-Athīr the matter was settled in 493 for 100,000 dīnārs and 60,000 dīnārs, which 'Amīd ud-Dawla transferred to Barkyāruq.

Muḥammad b. Maṣṣūr an-Nāṣiri (d. Shawwāl 494/1101) who was in charge of the officials of the lamps (اصحاب المشعل) under Alp Arslān had collected the kharāj of Nīshāpūr and its environs, and also held the governorship of Khwārazm; on one occasion he was sent a receipt from the diwān by Nizām ul-Mulk, which suggests there was some kind of financial contract between Muḥammad and the government (A.S.D.33).

² The following suggests, however, that there was not a great difference between the status of a governor and a tax-farmer. Dubais b. Ṣadaqa on the death of his father had been assigned Ḥilla. After his rebellion, he took refuge from Maḥmūd b. Muḥammad with Ilghāzī in 515, and sent to the sultān offering to farm Ḥilla for 1,000 dīnārs per day (I.A. X.418).

difference is that, with rare exceptions, the tax-farmers were non-Turks, which perhaps partly accounts for the difference in obligation.

Tughril Beg in 451 (1059) farmed Wāsiṭ to Abū 'Alī b. Faḍlān for 200,000 dīnārs and Baṣrā to Abū Sa'd Sābūr b. al-Muẓaffar.¹ In 452 he farmed the city of Baghdād to Abū'l Fath al-Muẓaffar b. al-Ḥusain for three years for 400,000 dīnārs.² Three years later, in 455 (1063), he farmed it again to Abū Sa'id al-Qā'imī for 150,000 dīnārs.³ In the same year he seized the farmer of Baṣrā, al-A'rābī Sa'd, and made an agreement with Abū Ja'far b. Saqālīb to farm Wāsiṭ for 200,000 dīnārs.³ Alp Arslān farmed Wāsiṭ and Baṣrā to Hazārasp in 459 (1066/7) for 300,000 dīnārs.⁴ Malikshāh also farmed out the revenue in various places. Ibn 'Allān, the Jew, the farmer of Baṣrā, was drowned on Malikshāh's orders at the instigation of Gawhar A'in and Khumārtegin in 472 (1079/80), and Baṣrā was then farmed to Khumārtegin for 100,000 dīnārs annually and 100 horse.⁵ When Sharaf ud-Dawla b. Quraish, ruler of Mawṣil, conquered Aleppo in 472/3, he

¹ I.A. X.5.

² *ibid.* 6.

³ *ibid.* 16.

⁴ *ibid.* 37.

⁵ *ibid.* 75².

he sent to the sultān asking him to confirm him in the farming (ḍamān) of it. Malikshāh agreed to this and assigned to him Bālis in addition.¹ Sharaf ud-Dawla was also tax-farmer of Antioch on behalf of the Seljūq sultān. In the absence of the non-muslim ruler of Antioch, who had gone to 'Akkā to get a wife, Sulaimān b. Qutulmish seized the opportunity to take possession of Antioch. Sharaf ud-Dawla then demanded the kharāj of Antioch from Sulaimān. The latter refused to pay, saying that since Antioch had come into the possession of muslims it was no longer liable to pay kharāj. Sharaf ud-Dawla thereupon marched against Sulaimān but was defeated and killed.² The private domains of the sultān and the caliph were also farmed. Nizām ul-Mulk relates how he replenished the royal treasury, depleted by the cost of an expedition to Asia Minor, by imposing a levy of 10,000 dirams on a hundred of the amīrs, who held Alp Arslān's private estates, on ganāts and holdings, which had become newly productive and were not entered in the old register.³ Al-Khafājī farmed the private domains of the sultān in Kūfa in 452 (1060) for 40000 dīnārs annually.⁴ Ibn 'Allān farmed

¹ I.A. X.74².

² I.A. X.90; T.G. 480.

³ N. f.306b.

⁴ I.A. X.8.

the districts of the wakīls, which belonged to the private domains of the caliph for 6,000 kurr of grain and 100,000 dīnārs; he only obtained from them 1,000 kurr and 20,000 dīnārs and defaulted for the rest.¹


Except in the case of "reserved" taxes, if indeed such taxes existed, or in the case of private domains retained by the sultān in an assigned district, the muqta' seems to have had complete control. Theoretically the 'āmil, who is mentioned by Nizām ul-Mulk in the *Siyāsat Nāma*, together with the muqta' was probably concerned with the collection of taxes, but in practice the 'āmil was seldom found, and complete independence was, in most cases, exercised by the muqta'. He was, moreover, able to make assignments within the area of his own iqṭā' to his own followers and clients,² and their relation to him was similar to that existing between him and the sultān.³ The re-assignment of districts within an iqṭā'

¹ I.A. IX.454.

² cf. 'Uthmān, who made assignments, especially of ṣawāfī lands, and allowed such assignments to be made also by his governors, such as Mu'awiyya (Tischendorf, p.26).

³ Where the original muqta' had sub-assigned part of his iqṭā', the control was possibly even closer. When Abū Bakr, muqta' of Naṣībīn, fled from Zangī to Ḥusām ud-Dīn Tīmurtash, the latter refused Zangī's demand for his return. When Zangī then besieged Mardīn, Ḥusām ad-Dīn sent Abū Bakr to the sultān Masūd b. Muhammad's court. Zangī thereupon sent presents to the sultān and his wazīr and obtained Abū Bakr's surrender (A.M. 142).

by the muqṭa' is especially noticeable in the case of muqṭa's who attained to the virtual status of local rulers.

Suqṣmān b. Urtuq (d. Ṣafar 498/1104), after taking Mārdīn which had formerly been held by 'Alī b. Yāqūtī b. 'Urtuq, his kinsman, assigned Jabal Ḥaur to 'Alī.¹ This and other similar cases perhaps resemble to some extent the assignment by the Seljūq sultān of iqṭā's to minor members of his family. Mawdūd when he was muqṭa' of Mawṣil assigned an iqṭā' to Zangī,² and al-Bursuqī, when he sent Zangī and Altūntāsh al-Āburī to Wāsiṭ to fight Dubais b. Ṣadaqa in 516 (1122), assigned Wāsiṭ to Zangī.³ The latter, after he became ruler of Mawṣil, made numerous assignments to his family and followers. Saif ud-Dīn Ghāzī held Shahrazūr as an iqṭā'; Jāwulī was given Raḥba in 521 (1127) and 'Izz ud-Dīn ad-Dubaisī, another of Zangī's amīrs, held Duqāq among his iqṭā's.⁴ Saif ud-Dīn after his father's death assigned al-Jazīra to Abū Bakr ad-Dubaisī, in whose hands it remained until 552 (1157).⁵ Zain ud-Dīn 'Alī, after Zangī's death also began to assign the country. To Bazān (var. ) he assigned Shahrazūr,⁶ and the country

¹ I.A. X.270.

² A.M. 33.

³ A.M. 46.

⁴ I.A. XI.73.

⁵ I.A. XI.146.

⁶ I.A. XI.137.

of the Ḥakkāriyya to Qarāja, the ruler of the 'Imādiyya Kurds.¹

When Homs was handed over to Shihāb ud-Dīn in Rabī' I. 530 (1136), he assigned it to a mamlūk of his grandfather, one Mu'īn ud-Dīn Unar and placed in it a nā'ib from among his officers, and returned to Damascus.² Rukn ud-Dawla Khumārtegīn, the governor of Fārs, gave a small iqtā' (اقطاعي اذك) to the Mas'ūdiyān tribe in Fārs.³

In a similar way governors and muqṭa's also farmed the taxes of some of the territory under them. In 'Irāq especially this practice appears to have been common. When Ṣadaqa conquered Wāsiṭ in 497 (1103/4) he farmed it to Muhazzab ud-Dawla b. Abī'l Jabr (var. أبى جابر), governor of al-Baṭīha, until the end of the year for 50,000 dīnārs.⁴ Subsequently after Muḥammad b. Malikshāh had given Wāsiṭ to Ṣadaqa as an iqtā', he farmed it again to Muhazzab ud-Dawla. In this case, however it seems that the farmer exercised jurisdiction over the general administration, for Muhazzab ud-Dawla appointed his sons and followers over its governorships, and they oppressed the people. When the year was up, Ṣadaqa claimed from Muhazzab ud-Dawla the sum due from him, and imprisoned him when he

¹ I.A. XI.8.

² *ibid.* 24. The Damascus Chronicle, p.237-8.

³ F.N. 167.

⁴ I.A. X.259.

failed to pay it.¹ It appears, therefore, that the sum due from the farmer was paid at the end of the year, and not when the farmer took over the district. After Muhazzab ud-Dawla was seized, Hammād b. Abī'l Jabr farmed Wāsīt. Subsequently Badrān b. Ṣadaqa, who was related to Muhazzab ud-Dawla by marriage, obtained the latter's release and brought him back to al-Baṭīḥa of which town he had been governor.¹

The muqṭa' had a complete freedom of choice in the appointment of administrative officials and others in the country assigned to him. Where the muqṭa' had under his jurisdiction an extensive area, of necessity he appointed deputies and other subordinate officials to act for him. This was made doubly necessary by the fact that the muqṭa' was frequently absent from his iqtā' on military campaigns with the sultān or on the latter's behalf. Dād Ḥabashī b. Altūntāq, whom Barkyāruq appointed governor of Khurāsān in 490 (1097), made Muḥammad b. Anūshtegīn governor of Khwārazm.² When Muḥammad b. Malikshāh assigned Baṣrā to Aqsunqur al-Bukhārī, the latter appointed Sunqur al-Bayātī his deputy, who appears to have been generally responsible for the administration of Baṣrā. Subsequently in 514 (1120/1) 'Alī b. Sukmān seized Baṣrā. He confirmed Aqsunqur's officials ('ummāl) and deputies, and

¹ I.A. X.302; 107.

² *ibid.* 182. The former governor, Iknijī, appointed by Barkyāruq, had died (I.A. X.181-2).

wrote to Āqsunqur demanding to be made his nā'ib in Baṣrā; Āqsunqur refused his request and so 'Alī drove out Āqsunqur's nā'ibs and took possession of the city.¹ Zangī, when he obtained sovereignty over Mawṣil, conferred on Jamāl ud-Dīn al-Jawād al-Iṣfahānī the government of Naṣībīn and, in consequence of the able manner he fulfilled his duties, augmented his jurisdiction by the addition of Raḥba. Then, having been admitted into the intimacy of Zangī, he was appointed by him mushrif of the entire principality, and authorised to act with unlimited power. Finally, in the latter part of Zangī's reign he became head of his dīwān.² Deputies, moreover, even appointed their own subordinates. Naṣīr ud-Dīn Juqur (d. Ẓu'l Qa'da 539/1145) who was Zangī's deputy in Mawṣil nominated one al-Qazwīnī to a place of authority in Mawṣil.³ In some cases provincial officials did not take up their appointments in person, but appointed deputies, remaining themselves at court. Sa'd ud-Dawla Yaranqush, who was mutawallī of Iṣfahān, remained in the sultān Mas'ūd b. Muḥammad's camp and had a deputy (nā'ib) named Ghulbak in Iṣfahān.⁴

The military administration of the iqtā' or provincial

¹ I.A. X.393-4.

² I.K. III.296.

³ I.K. I.330.

⁴ Bu. 176.

governorship was naturally under the muqṭa', who maintained his own private army. In rare cases the sultān or whoever had appointed the muqṭa' reinforced him with troops. Tugh-tegīn, when he conquered Ḥamā in 517 (1123), established in it a governor and also provided an 'askar for its defence.¹ In time of emergencies there was a tendency for the amīrs to return to their assignments to protect them from others who might usurp them in their absence. When Būzāba sent an 'askar to attack the fortress of al-Māhkī in al-Liḥf in 542 (1147/8), the amīr Albaqish Kūn Khar, whose iqṭā' it was, went to defend it from Būzāba's 'askar.² When Sulaimānshāh b. Muḥammad advanced on Hamadān in opposition to Muḥammad b. Maḥmūd, a number of the latter's soldiers, who had estates in Hamadān, fled back to it,³ presumably to protect their possessions from Sulaimānshāh's army. Similarly during the siege of Baghdād in 552 (1157/8), when news arrived that Malikshāh had set out for Hamadān with Ildegiz, the army began to flee in tens and twenties for their estates in Hamadān,⁴ presumably again to protect them.

The financial relation of the muqṭa' towards the central

¹ I.A. XI.3.

² *ibid.* 78.

³ R.S. 263.

⁴ R.S. 267-8.

government has been discussed above. In the theory of Nizām ul-Mulk the rights of the muqṭa' over the population in his iqṭā' were only financial; he had no rights over the land or the cultivators, the ruler merely having delegated to him certain financial rights. He states, "let the assignees (muqṭa'ān) who have iqṭā's, know that they have no authority over the peasants beyond this, that they should take the due amount which has been assigned to them from the peasants in a good way, and that, when they have taken that, the peasants shall be secure in their persons, and their money, wives, children, goods and farms shall be secure, and the muqṭa's have no claim over them Let the muqṭa's know that the country and the subjects all belong to the sultān. The muqṭa's, who are set over them, and the wālīs are like shihnas in relation to the subjects, as the king is to others (i.e. subjects not on assigned lands), so that the subjects may be happy, and so that the muqṭa' may be safe from punishment and torment in the next world."¹

Nizām ul-Mulk further forbids the muqṭa' to prevent the subjects under him from coming to the court to represent their case, threatening him with punishment and the cancellation of his iqṭā' should he do so.¹ That such a warning was necessary suggests that it may have been the common practice for

¹ S.N. p.28.

muqṭa's to prevent those living in their assignments from going to court to obtain redress for their grievances. In practice the position of the peasants on assigned land varied considerably. Their freedom of movement was often restricted, and they were frequently subjected to forced labour.¹ A story is related about the treatment of the cultivators by Zangī and Ḥusām ud-Dīn Timurtāsh respectively, which throws some light upon the matter. A number of cultivators from the city of Mawṣil went to Mārdīn. Zangī thereupon sent to Ḥusām ud-Dīn demanding they should be sent back. Ḥusām ud-Dīn answered, "We treat the cultivators well, and take from them by way of a share of the grain crops (*في القسيمة الغلال*) one tenth, and if you had done likewise they would not have left you." Zangī replied in the following words to Ḥusām ud-Dīn, "Say to your master, 'if you took 1 per cent it would be too much, for you are occupied with your pleasures in Mārdīn, but we, if we took two thirds, it would be little in view of what we are charged with by way of jihād.' But for me, it would be a long time since your master had drunk water in security in Mārdīn, for the Franks would have taken it. If you do not return the cultivators, I will take every cultivator in Mārdīn to Mawṣil."

¹ cf. The diploma for the governorship of Ḥand, quoted above, p.232. Naṣīr ud-Dīn Jugur, who was governor of Mawṣil under Zangī, is said to have refrained from imposing forced labour upon the people (Q. 281).

Ḥusām ud-Dīn then sent back the cultivators in question.¹

While Mawdūd had been governor of Mawṣil also, many of the population had fled the country because of his tyranny. Subsequently, however, he is said to have reformed his conduct.²

There is little doubt that the general tendency of Turkish government was towards oppression. It may be that those of the muqṭa's who looked upon their iqṭā's as long term assignments made some attempt to govern well,³ but the majority, knowing their tenure would probably be a short one, exacted as much as they could in the shortest possible time from the land under them.⁴ The extent to which Nizām ul-Mulk stresses

¹ A.M. 141.

² Q. 188.

³ An example of this is the case of Jigirmish, who as governor of Mawṣil, was popular among the local population. He submitted to Muḥammad b. Malikshāh on the death of Barkyāruq and left the city to pay homage to Muḥammad, whom he had up to that time defied. When he left the city the people of Mawṣil "wept and put ashes on their heads". Muḥammad received him kindly and told him to return to his subjects, saying, "their hearts are yours and they are awaiting your return". (I.A. X.263-4.)

⁴ It is interesting to note that the Gūr Khān did not assign iqṭā's to the amīrs because he said, "when they take the iqṭā, they oppress" (I.A. XI.57). Ghazālī mentions the tyranny of the Turks and the general decay of morality under them. He ranks the Turks together with tax-collectors* and sultāns as tyrants, whose wealth was unlawful*(K.S. f.93b). He stresses the need for severity on the part of the ruler, because of the unruly and seditious nature of the population of his day, and their tendency towards oppression, in order that the people might be safe from one another (Naṣīḥat al-Mulūk, p.68; 79).

*('ummāl)

**(ḥarām.)

the tendency of officials, provincial or otherwise, to oppress the population of the country the moment control was relaxed is striking.¹ To combat this tendency he recommends a widespread use of spies. Such a policy, however, would perhaps merely have aggravated the lack of security in the position of the officials, to which their tendency to oppress was, in all probability, partly due. Hence, by increasing the general attitude of suspicion and distrust, the use of spies would have increased rather than decreased the tendency towards extortion. Officials, assuming their period of office was likely to be short, would have tended all the more to make the most of that opportunity to enrich themselves. How far the extortion of the muqṭa's and their subordinates was controlled and restrained depended largely upon the power of the sultān. The following anecdote suggests that Malikshāh attempted to exercise some degree of control. 'Abd us-Samī' b. Dā'ūd al-'Abbāsī related how two men from the town of al-Ḥaddādiyya in Lower 'Irāq having complained to him that their muqṭa', Khumārtegin, had extorted 1600 dīnārs from them, demanded that the sultān should exact retaliation for them. Malikshāh accordingly wrote a decree dismissing Khumārtegin from his iqṭā', returned the money to them both and gave them both 100 dīnārs.²

¹ Nizām ul-Mulk had perhaps an unhappy experience of the extortion of officials in his early career (see p. 82).

² I.A. X.144.

In any case, whether the muqṭa' governed the territories under him with justice or not, personal attention to the administration, and particularly to the collection of taxes, was essential if he wished to obtain the full benefit from his iqṭā'. Hence there was a tendency for the amīrs to return to their iqṭā's at harvest-time. ^{As mentioned in Chapter III} [When Muḥammad b. Maḥmūd decided to advance on Baghdād in the spring of 550 (1155), he was forced, after going several stages, to return to Āzerbāijān owing to the fact that the amīrs and the army would not leave their homes and iqṭā's because it was harvest time.¹

The payment of the standing army and of the various junds was largely by assignments. In making such assignments to their troops the Seljūqs were merely continuing the practice of the Būyids and others.² Bundārī's statement that Nizām ul-Mulk introduced the practice of assigning iqṭā's to the soldiery is thus hardly correct. He goes on to state that Nizām ul-Mulk, seeing the disorder of the country and the irregularity of the payment of taxes, assigned the country to the ajṇād, handing over to them its produce and the levy of taxes, the income from which they devoted to making the country prosperous.³

¹ Bu. 225.

² Ar-Rahīm's 'askar in Baghdād, for example, had iqṭā's. Tughril Beg seized these from their holders in 447 (1055/6) and commanded them to find means of subsistence for themselves (I.A. IX.421).

³ Bu. 55.

A unification of the military assignment and the administrative assignment was indeed taking place, but in Great Seljūq times there was still some slight difference between the two. In the latter case the amīrs, when not on campaigns, lived on and administered directly their assignments, which were granted not only in reward for past services, but also in the hope of future services, whereas in the former case, members of the standing army remained in service and merely received the produce of their assignments, which were granted for services actually being rendered at the time.¹ The iqtā's of the standing army, moreover, naturally tended to be smaller than those of the great amīrs. This was due partly to the fact that the standing army remained with the sultān under his direct control, whereas the great amīrs, who were either sent to the provinces or went of their own accord, were able to usurp the control of large areas. The distinction, however, is perhaps an artificial one.

A hereditary tendency also appeared in these military assignments, as in the "administrative" assignments, but it did not become the normal practice, according to Ibn ul-Athīr until the time of Nūr ud-Dīn b. Zangī, ruler of Aleppo (541-69/1146/73). The latter, when one of the ajnād died, would confirm his son

¹ Nizām ul-Mulk, for example, would assign to a jundī perhaps 1000 dīnārs, half on Samarqand and half on Asia Minor (A.S.D. 68).

in his late father's iqṭā'. If the new assignee had already attained to years of discretion, he would manage it independently, but if he was still a minor Nūr ud-Dīn would appoint someone to manage his affairs for him until he grew up. Thus, Ibn ul-Athīr states, the ajṇād, realising these estates (amlāk) were their own property inherited from father to son, were willing to fight for them and showed great firmness in battle.¹ Ibrahīm Yanāl, who went to Awāna in 496 (1102/3) plundered the country and assigned the towns (^{villages?} قري) to his soldiers.² Dubais b. Ṣadaqa also paid his troops by iqṭā'.³

In addition to the assignments to the individual members of the standing army, it seems that under Malikshāh there were a number of assignments throughout the country, which were reserved for the use of the army on campaigns. The Rāhat uṣ-Ṣudūr states that the iqṭā's of Malikshāh's standing army were scattered throughout the country so that wherever they arrived provisions, fodder and what was necessary for their immediate expenses were ready.⁴ Whether these were merely

¹ A.M. 308. cf. al-Makrīzī (Khitāt II.216) who quotes a statement of a jundī belonging to the army of Nūr ud-Dīn, "the assignment belongs to us, it is our property. We pass it on to our children, from father to son, and in return for it we are willing to run the risk of death."

² I.A. X.244.

³ I.A. X.423. After making peace with the caliph in 516 he ordered a body of his troops to go to their iqṭā's in Wāsiṭ.

⁴ R.S. 131; T.G. 449; U.H.S. 60.

stores bought or levied from the local population by the sultān and kept in royal storehouses at different points, or actually the produce of land directly administered ~~for~~ the benefit of the standing army is not clear. This system was, in all probability, largely responsible for the ease and success with which Malikshāh was able to carry out his campaigns and march large bodies of troops from one part of his empire to another. Under the later sultāns, with the weakening of central control, such stores or lands ceased to exist, and were no doubt usurped by amīrs.

For the upkeep of the ajnād or local militia a district or districts in the neighbourhood was assigned either to the individual members of the jund, or in some cases to the jund collectively.¹ Tughril Beg, when he entered Iṣfahān in 443 (1051) drove out the ajnād of the city and gave them assignments in the hill country.² Zangī, when he entered Aleppo in 522 (1128) assigned its districts to the ajnād and amīrs.³ Mas'ūd al-Bilālī, wālī (or shihna) of Baghdād, went to Hilla on the death of Mas'ūd and seized Sālārkurd, who was at that time in possession of it. He then assembled the soldiers and

¹ Shams ul-Khawāṣṣ was leader (^amuqaddim) of the 'askar of Aleppo and mutawallī of the iqṭā' of the jund in 508 (1114/5). This suggests that the iqṭā' was a collective one assigned to the jund as a body and not to the individual members (Kamāl ud-Dīn, 607-8).

² I.A. X.385.

³ *ibid.* 458.

assigned those districts ((الولايات)).¹

IV Fourthly, there were iqṭā's granted to administrative officials and others. A diploma issued by Alp Arslān for 'Amīd al-Mulk, one of the amīrs of the dīwān, in payment for good service has been preserved. The walāyat of Quhistān and its dependencies with the taxes and produce were conferred upon him as an iqṭā' and he was given full control in those districts. He was exhorted to look after the interests of the population and to demand only the customary taxes, and to collect them with civility and gradually (? تدريجاً).²

This was perhaps an "administrative" iqṭā' assigned to 'Amīd al-Mulk, who may have given up his position in the dīwān and became instead a provincial governor. The usual iqṭā' granted to the wazīrs in the Great Seljūq period, whether the sultān's wazīr or the wazīr of governors was, according to Ibn Khallikān, one tenth of the produce of the soil. Such was the iqṭā' of Jamāl ud-Dīn al-Jawād al-Iṣfahānī, who was wazīr to Zangī, and after his death to Saif ud-Dīn Ghāzī b. Zangī.³ This type of iqṭā' - the grant of a portion of the produce of the soil - is clearly something different from the military iqṭā'. Nizām ul-Mulk was accused by Abū'l Maḥāsin b. Kamāl ul-Mulk and his friends before Malikshāh of misappropriation of the state revenue. He admitted to taking one tenth of Malikshāh's

¹ Bu. 215; I.A. XI. 106.

² Collection of letters. Add. 7688. f.4b,5b.

³ I.K. III.297.

wealth which he spent upon the standing army, alms, gifts and wagfs.¹ This story may perhaps be the foundation of Ibn Khallikān's statement.

In addition the wazīr in most cases also held various assignments of land. Such assignments differed from the military and administrative assignments in so far as the holder was not under an obligation to furnish the sultān with troops, but since the maintenance of private armies by important persons was the general rule rather than the exception, the produce of these assignments was probably largely spent upon the upkeep of troops. It is clear also that the muqṭa' in such cases did not live in his iqtā'. In 456 (1064) Malikshāh assigned to Nizām ul-Mulk, his wazīr, iqtā's among which was Tūs.² It is, moreover, said that the assassin of Nizām ul-Mulk was suborned against him by Malikshāh, because the latter was tired of seeing his wazīr live so long and coveted the numerous assignments which he held in his possession.³ Muḥammad b. Malikshāh, when he appointed Sa'd al-Mulk Abū'l Maḥāsin wazīr, enriched him with iqtā's.⁴ Mu'ayyid

¹ I.A. X.84-5.

² ibid. 54.

³ I.K. I.415.

⁴ I.A. X.304.

ul-Mulk b. Nizām ul-Mulk held the fortress of Khalanjān, fifteen farsakhs from Isfahān, and after his death it passed into the hands of Jāwulī Saqāwū.¹ This, however, was perhaps a private estate and not part of his emoluments as wazīr.

Aitegīn as-Sulaimānī, shihna of Baghdād was given Takrīt as an iqṭā' by Nizām ul-Mulk;² Gawhar A'īn, who succeeded him as shihna of Baghdād in 464 (1071/2), also held Takrīt as an iqṭā' until Majd ul-Mulk al-Balāsānī took it from him.³ Subsequently it came again into the possession of the shihna of Baghdād when Mas'ūd al-Bilālī held it.⁴ İlghāzī b. Urtuq, another shihna of Baghdād was assigned Ḥulwān and other places,⁵ and Qasīm ud-Dawla al-Bursuqī, who became shihna of Baghdād in Jumādī I. 501 (1108), was assigned Wāsiṭ by Muḥammad b. Malikshāh.⁶

✓ Court officials also received assignments. Under Malikshāh, Khwārazm belonged to the tasht-khāna, and when Nūsh-tegīn became tasht-dār (cup-bearer) the governorship of Khwārazm devolved upon him.⁷ 'Alī Himyarī, governor of Herāt,

¹ I.A. X.217.

² *ibid.* 47.

³ *ibid.* 290.

⁴ R.S. 233.

⁵ I.A. X.255. Urtuq, however, had been governor of Ḥulwān under Malikshāh (I.A. X.86).

⁶ I.A. X.309.

⁷ T.G. 460.

who rebelled against the sultān in 544 (1149/50), had been a (court) jester.¹

The following assignment does not fall exactly within the class of assignments to amīrs or to administrative officials. Malikshāh gave the amīrs of Mecca and Madīna an iqtā' and a ^{2 294}grant (rasm) in place of the former practice of levying seven gold dīnārs on every pilgrim.²

It seems that various members of the religious institution also held iqtā's. In the case of qāḍīs, these may perhaps be included among the iqtā's granted to officials, since the qāḍī was appointed by the government to exercise official control over the religious institution. Zangī, when he appointed Bahā ud-Dīn ash-Shahrazūrī qāḍī-ul-quḍāt of all his domains, increased his assignments and personal estates (amlāk).³

V Fifthly may be distinguished "personal" iqtā's granted to private persons and others as a kind of gift. In many cases it is extremely difficult to distinguish these from other types of iqtā's; the same person frequently held not only a "personal" iqtā' but other types of iqtā' as well. The "personal" iqtā' may probably have been granted in some cases on a lifelong or hereditary tenure, but this was not always so.

¹ T.G. 460.

² R.S. 131.

³ I.A. X.454.

Yāghī Siyān, governor of Antioch, for example, seems to have held a "personal" and hereditary iqtā' in addition to his governorship. He was assigned during the reign of Malikshāh an iqtā' in the neighbourhood of Astarābād, and on his death, his son returned to the wilāyat of his father in those parts.¹ More striking is the case of Anūshtegīn Shīrgīr, who having been seized by Kundoghdī on the death of Muḥammad b. Malikshāh, was set free by Sanjar, whereupon he returned to his iqtā', Abhār and Zanjān.² Had this been an administrative iqtā', it would surely have been assigned to someone else during the interval. Unar also seems to have had a "personal" iqtā' in Azerbāijān, to which he returned from Iṣfahān in 492.³ Gawhar A'in, before he became shihna of Baghdād had been assigned Wasiṭ by Alp Arslān.⁴ Raihān Mahkūya, one of Muḥammad b. Malikshāh's khādims held Baṣrā as one of his iqtā's.⁵ Bark-yāruq further assigned Mārdīn and its governorships to a

¹ This seems undoubtedly to have been a "personal" iqtā'. Originally it appears to have been granted not by the sultān but by the amīr Būzān. Faḍlūn had rebelled against Malikshāh in Asterābād and been defeated by Būzān, who had assigned his territories to a number of amīrs, among whom was Yāghī Siyān, governor of Antioch (I.A. X.194).

² I.A. X.421.

³ *ibid.* 192.

⁴ *ibid.* 200.

⁵ *ibid.* 422.

singer.¹

Such "personal" estates were also known by the term amlāk.² Between these and other types of iqtā' some distinction was clearly drawn. Zangī forbade his followers from acquiring estates (amlāk) saying, "As long as we have the country, what need have you of "personal" estates? Iqtā's provide a sufficiency. If the country passes out of our possession, the estates (amlāk) will go too. When the followers of the sul-tān have estates they oppress the subjects, act tyrannically towards them and usurp their estates (املاكهم)."³ In Fārs there seems also to have been a distinction between milk and iqtā'. At Rūn, which was good meadow land with springs and villages, part was milk and part iqtā'.⁴

What were the rights of the owners of such landed estates over them is not clear. Barkyāruq's wazīr, the ustād 'Abd ul-Jalīl ad-Dihistānī, is said to have taken away estates (amlāk) from their owners and assigned them to others.⁵ This suggests they were hereditary.

¹ I.A. X.269.

² Cf. Nizām ul-Mulk who said, "I was desirous of having a village which should be my private domain (قرية خاصة) and a mosque ... (I.A. X.141).
The term khālīṣa, which subsequently became used in the sense of crown land, may have also been at this time a technical term for a private domain or personal estate.

³ A.M. 137.

⁴ F.N. 155, 124.

⁵ Bu. 82.

VI
 Lastly, in a different class to the iqṭā's previously mentioned is the iqṭā' assigned by the sultāns to the caliphs.¹ This was granted to him to meet the expenses of his position, and clearly carried with it no obligations. This practice of assigning an iqṭā' to the caliph was not introduced by Seljūqs but survived from the preceding period. When al-Qā'im demurred at complying with Tughril Beg's request for his daughter's hand, the latter wrote to 'Amīd ul-Mulk al-Kundurī instructing him to seize the caliph's iqṭā's, leaving him only what had formerly belonged to the imām al-Qādir. The caliph being powerless to prevent this told Tughril to assign these iqṭā's.² Maḥmūd b. Muḥammad, when he was sultān, sent to al-Muqtafī concerning the confirmation of the iqṭā' which belonged to the members of his court. The answer came back, "In the palace are eighty mules to transport water from the Tigris. Let the sultān consider what the people who drink this water need to be allotted," and it was agreed he should be assigned what had belonged to al-Mustarshid.³ Similarly Mas'ūd b. Muḥammad sent to al-Muqtafī to ask him the number of his followers and the amount of his expenses, so that he might give him districts which would suffice for his expenses.⁴ This iqṭā' was, as it were, the "personal" estate

¹ Ibn ul-Athīr's statement that the caliph had no iqṭā's, the revenues of which he collected, does not seem to be borne out by the evidence (A.M. 91).

² Bu. 20.

³ I.A. XI.28.

⁴ T.S. 304.

of the caliph. Originally the caliph's estates were not apparently re-assigned by the caliph. When Zangī was given Ṣarīfain, the Harūn Gate (quarter), and Jarā Malik in 530 (1135/6) by al-Muqtafī after he had become caliph, Ibn ul-Athīr relates that this was, according to his father, the first time one of the provincial leaders (زعماء الأطراف) was given a part of the "personal" estates of the caliph.¹

The caliph's iqṭā' was administered by the officials of his dīwān. When 'Amīd ul-Dawla came to Baghdād in 462 (1069/70) and became wazīr to the caliph, the latter charged him with the management of his iqṭā'.² There seems to have been a dīwān al-muqāṭa'āt in Baghdād.³ This was concerned perhaps with the administration of the caliph's iqṭā', or with the districts lying immediately round Baghdād, which were known at one time under the technical name of muqāṭa'āt.⁴

The caliph's wazīr, as the sultān's wazīr, also received assignments as part of the emolument of his office. Abū'l Fath Maṣṣūr b. Aḥmad b. Dārast, when seeking appointment to the caliph's wazirate in 453 (1061) offered to serve without an iqṭā'.⁵ Apparently the assignment granted to the caliph's

¹ I.A. XI.29.

² Bu.35. Ibn ul-Athīr states that al-Mustarshid dropped from the iqṭā' belonging to him all injustice and ordered nothing should be taken from it except what it had been the custom to take formerly (I.A. X.382).

³ Ibn at-Ta'āwizī (b.476, d.553, according to Y. b.519, d.583) was a kātib in the dīwān al-muqāṭa'āt at Baghdād. (I.K. III. 162. Y. VII.31).

⁴ cf. Nuzhat, p.43.

⁵ I.A. X.8-9; Bu. 21.

wazīr was made by the sultān, and not by the 'caliph. When Malikshāh sent Abū'l-¹ 'Alā Muḥammad b. al-Ḥusain to Baghdād as wazīr to the caliph in Rabī' I. 463 (1070), he assigned him half the iqtā' of the wazīr Fakhr ud-Dawla b. Jahīr.¹ This was perhaps a money grant of revenue rather than the assignment of land. The caliph's wakīls also held iqtā's, and these similarly were to some extent under the control of the sultān. In 479 (1086/7) the sultān commanded that the Barz² Canal of the Khurāsān road together with 10,000 dīnārs from the commercial transactions (المعاملات) of Baghdād should be added to the iqtā's of the caliph's wakīls.³

Towards the latter part of the Great Seljūq period, the caliph, as his power increased began himself to make assignments, which, in view of the fact that the caliphate became one of the succession states of the Great Seljūq Empire, is only natural. When the caliph conquered 'Irāq from Kūfa to Ḥulwān and from Takrīt to 'Abādān, he assigned Wāsīt and its governorships, Baṣrā and its canals, strongholds (المعسكرات), and districts (البلدات), Ḥilla, Kūfa, the Nahr ul-Malik, the 'Isā canal, Dujail, Rādān, and the Khurāsān road district up to the neighbourhood of Ḥulwān, while he granted to his wazīr 'Aun ud-Dīn b. Hubaira, all that had belonged to the sultān's

¹ Bu. 42.

² Var. برسى.

³ I.A. X.104.

wazīr and his officials in this district.¹

Abū'l Ma'ālī, who was appointed head (ṣāhib) of the caliph's dīwān in 501 (1107/8), mentioned how the caliph one year made many assignments to the amīrs and his intimates and that as a result several dams were split up, many cultivated places ruined and the revenue decreased.² Al-Mu'ayyad, the Baghdādī poet related to Usāma b. Munqiz in Mawṣil in 565 (1169/70) that the caliph had assigned to his father a village; this place was infested with highway robbers, and al-Mu'ayyad's father endeavoured to please them out of fear of them and in order to profit a little from what they seized.³ This corresponded perhaps to a "personal" iqtā', as does also the following case. Ibn at-Talmidh, a famous Christian physician in Baghdād held the Dār al-Qawārīr in Baghdād as part of his iqtā'.⁴ When Yahyā b. Hubaira became wazīr to the caliph, he took this away from him. Al-Muqtadī, when he learnt of this, gave Ibn at-Talmidh another iqtā'.⁴

¹ Bu. 215.

² T.S. 292.

³ Hitti: An Arab Syrian Gentleman and Warrior... p.100.

⁴ Y. VII. 243-4.

CHAPTER VI.

LOCAL ADMINISTRATION.

The administration of towns and cities was in all probability left largely in the hands of local officials. The governor was appointed by the central government in the directly administered area, or by the assignee in the indirectly administered area. In the various cities under the direct control of the central government there was a shihna or military governor. The precise meaning of this term is not absolutely clear, but in view of the fact that the references to shihnas in the sources are chiefly, if not without exception, concerning cities under the direct administration of the central government, including Baghdād, which, as stated in Chapter I., did not fall exactly into either of these categories, it may be that the shihna, generally speaking, was found only in directly administered territory. The appointment of a shihna to any specific region by a sultān or malik seems further to have been symbolic of the fact that he (the sultān or malik) had jurisdiction over that city.¹ Baghdād was especially

¹ The following references support this view. "Umān remained in the hands of the Seljūqs of Kirmān till the time of Arslānshāh b. Kirmānshāh b. Qāwurdshāh, and the shihna of Kirmān was always there" (Muḥammad Ibrāhīm, p.10). "Towards the end of the reign of Muḥammad b. Arslānshāh, the Ghuzz came to Khurāsān, and the governor of Tabas gave the city back to Kirmān and the shihna of Kirmān was in Tabas until the appearance of Mu'ayyad" (ibid. p.33).

important in this respect. One of the first actions of a Seljūq prince who sought to establish himself as sultān was to appoint a shihna of Baghdād. This frequently led to struggles in Baghdād between shihnas appointed by rival claimants to the throne. Tutush, although he was never generally recognised as sultān, nevertheless had a shihna, Aitegīn Ḥab, in Baghdād in 487 (1094), and in the following year he sent Yūsuf b. Abuq there as shihna.¹ Barkyāruq and his brother Muḥammad, during their struggles, were both intermittently represented by shihnas in Baghdād. Īlghāzī b. Urtuq was appointed by the latter in 494 (1100/1).² Gūmishtegīn al-Qaiṣarī reached Baghdād in 496 (1102/3) as shihna on behalf of Barkyāruq. Īlghāzī, hearing of his approach, sent to Suqmān b. Urtuq and Ṣadaqa for help. Finally the caliph agreed to Ṣadaqa's demand that Gūmishtegīn should be turned out.³ Local rulers such as Ṣadaqa, the Mazyadīd, also appointed shihnas,⁴ but, generally speaking, it does not seem that the "landed" amīrs established in the territory under them officials known as shihnas.

¹ I.A. X.166.

² *ibid.* 225.

³ *ibid.* 246.

⁴ e.g. When Ismā'īl b. Arslānjiq capitulated in Baṣrā in 499, Ṣadaqa set up a shihna and returned to Hilla (I.A. X.278). Subsequently Muḥammad b. Malikshāh sent a shihna and an amīd to Baṣrā and took it from Ṣadaqa (I.A. X.284).

Among the shihna's duties were the defence of the city and the maintainance of public order and security, and for this purpose he had a number of troops under him, who belonged to the 'askar and not to the jund or local militia. When Sulaimānshāh b. Muḥammad came to Iṣfahān in 549 (1154/3), the shihna prevented his entrance.¹ Similarly Īnānj, shihna of

Rei, defeated Malikshāh b. Maḥmūd and Īldegiz when they advanced on Rei in 552 (1157/8).² Ismā'īl b. Arslānjq, when shihna of Rei under Malikshāh, adopted severe measures towards the people and brought them under control.³ Turkān Khātūn, on her deathbed, ordered Unar and Surmuz, shihna of Iṣfahān, to hold the kingdom for her son Maḥmūd, which suggests that Surmuz was relatively powerful.⁴ When Seljūqshāh b. Muḥammad advanced on Baghdād in 532 (1157/8), ^{I?}Albaqish as-Silāhī, the shihna, came out against him with Nazar, the amīr hajj, and joined battle with him.⁵ The shihna of Baghdād had, moreover, a considerable force at his disposal, and was even expected to

¹ I.A. XI.136.

² ibid. 142.

³ I.A. X.232. The people of Rei and the country people (الريستاقية) had baffled those who had been set over them.

⁴ I.A. X.163. Surmuz subsequently tried to stir up rebellion against Barkyāruq (I.A. X.198).

⁵ I.A. XI. 40.

undertake military expeditions. Gawhar A'in in 478 (1085/6) went at the head of an 'askar to help Fakhr ud-Dawla b. Jahir in the siege of Mayyāfāriqīn.¹ In 480 (1087/8) he went to fight Muhazzab ud-Dawla b. Abī'l Jabr, governor of al-Baṭīḥa,² while in 485 (1092/3), he was sent at the head of an expedition to conquer the Ḥijāz and the Yemen.³ Bak Aba, who was the shihna of Baghdād during the rule of Mas'ūd b. Muḥammad, was ordered to attack Hilla on the death of Dubais b. Ṣadaqa, but he did not do so out of weakness and cowardice, and because of the formidable 'askar with Ṣadaqa b. Dubais in Hilla.⁴ İlghāzī, when shihna, was accompanied by Turkomāns, and there were frequent riots between them and the populace.⁵ After the outbreak of rioting between the Ḥanbalīs and the Ash'arīs in Baghdād in 470 (1077/8) Mu'ayyid ul-Mulk b. Nizām ul-Mulk, who was in the Nizāmiyya madrasa at the time, sent for the 'amīd and the shihna. They came with the jund and dispersed the people.⁶ When Gawhar A'in left Baghdād for

¹ I.A. X.94.

² *ibid.* 107.

³ *ibid.* 137.

⁴ I.A. XI.19.

⁵ e.g. In Rajab in 495 (1102). Gawhar A'in's troops were also unpopular. In Ṣafar 481 (1088), a woman was attacked by the people of the Azaj gate for giving water to the troops. She appealed to Gawhar A'in who happened to be passing, and he forbade the people to do this. A fight ensued between his troops and the mob, in which he took 800 persons, killed one and cut the sinews of three more (I.A. X.108-9).

⁶ I.A. X.73.

al-Baṭīḥa in 480 (1087/8), numerous disturbances broke out in the city,¹ which suggests that he was largely instrumental in preserving public order. During the riots in Baghdād in 482 (1089/90), Khumārtegin, the shihna, came to the Tigris at the head of a body of horsemen and infantry, but failed to stop the rioting.² In Jumādī I. of the same year, the people of Karkh went with the shihna to put down a disturbance between the people of the Dūjāj Canal quarter and the Sunnīs, who had attacked them.² In 487 (1094) Ibn Sinān, the kātib of the naqīb ud-nuqabā, Tīrād az-Zainabī, was killed and Tīrād went to the shihna, Aitegīn Ḥab, demanding that someone should be sent to exact punishment for him, and Aitegīn sent his hājib. The people of the Baṣrā gate reviled him, and he returned to his master and complained. Aitegīn then sent his brother to punish them. He accordingly went with a large body of followers and the people of Karkh followed them, burning and plundering. The caliph thereupon sent to the shihna ordering him to exact retribution from them, which he did.³ In 512 (1118/9), when the 'ayyārūn on the west side of Baghdād became numerous, the nā'ib of the shihna crossed with fifty Turkish ghulāms but was defeated. On the following day he returned with two hundred

¹ I.A. X.107.

² *ibid.* 117.

³ *ibid.* 163.

and still failed to gain a victory.¹ In 530 (1135/6) and subsequent years the shihna also undertook measures against the 'ayyārūn.² It was perhaps in his capacity as the guardian of public order and security that the shihna of Sāva seized twenty-eight Bāṭinīs, who had assembled one year at the 'Īd at the beginning of the movement.³ As such the shihna further perhaps was able to some extent to restrain injustice, whether committed by the people or by the sultān's troops and officials. This may have been the reason that the qādī of Wāsiṭ implored mercy for the people from Bakryāruq in 495 (1101/2) and demanded a shihna be sent to the town to reassure the minds of the people.⁴

This was not the case, however, in Baghdād after the death of Malikshāh, when the shihna's position became even less secure than it had been formerly. A change in the sultanate meant a change of shihna in Baghdād, and as stated above this sometimes led to war between the rival claimants.⁵ This fact further accentuated the lack of security in the shihna's position, which, owing largely to the prevailing custom of intrigue, was

¹ I.A. X.383.

² *ibid.* XI.29, 40, 59.

³ *ibid.* X.213. Subsequently he set them free.

⁴ *ibid.* X.226.

⁵ Siddiqi: I.C. XI.I. 38-9.

common to almost all offices in the Great Seljūq empire, and reflected unfavourably on his conduct. Īlghāzī and his followers frequently plundered, but they were admittedly Turkomāns, and hence particularly prone to plunder. After a riot between them and the populace in 495 (1101/2), the caliph sent the qādī ul-quḍāt and Alkiyā al-Ḥarrās to him to restrain him from plundering.¹ Mangubars, appointed shihna in 512 (1118/9), oppressed and fined the people. Those of the people who had wealth hid, while some took refuge in the ḥaram of the caliph's residence. The substance of the people was wasted, and his troops committed numerous acts of prostitution. When Mahmūd b. Muḥammad heard what he was doing, he sent to him urging him to join him, but Mangubars made excuses that he was collecting money and fines and delayed. The people of Baghdād having learnt the sultān's outlook towards Mangubars had changed, then desired his blood, and Mangubars, fearing they would take vengeance on him, fled.² Ibn Albaqish as-Silāhī, the shihna of Baghdād, oppressed the people of Baghdād in an unprecedented way and in 532 (1137/8) Mas'ūd b. Muḥammad seized him.³

In Baghdād, if not in other cities, the shihna was, in

¹ I.A. X.232.

² *ibid.* 380-1.

³ He was imprisoned in Takrīt and when he was about to be killed on Mas'ūd's orders, he threw himself into the Tigris and was drowned (I.A. XI.43).

addition to his other duties, to some extent concerned with the collection of taxes (see Chapter II.). The shihna of Baghdād further, in view of the fact that Baghdād was the seat of the caliph, had special duties.¹ Amongst his functions was that of ambassador from the sultān to the caliph. As such he arranged with the latter for the mention of the sultān's name in the khutba. For example, when Tutush demanded of the caliph that the khutba should be read in his name, Aitegīn Ḥab, his shihna, appeared continually at the dīwān until his demand was acceded to.² In 497 (1104) after Muḥammad b. Malikshāh and Barkyāruq had made peace, Īlghāzī appeared at the caliph's dīwān, and asked for the khutba to be read in Barkyāruq's name.³ After the latter's death, Īlghāzī again appeared at the dīwān and arranged for the khutba to be read in the name of Malikshāh b. Barkyāruq.⁴ On ceremonial occasions he probably represented the sultān in the absence of the latter or his wazīr, and had various duties.⁵ Not only

¹ in Baghdād
The first occasion a shihna was appointed/by a Seljūq was in 452 (1060), when Tughril Beg appointed a shihna before he left the city (I.A. X.6).

² I.A. X.158.

³ *ibid.* 254.

⁴ *ibid.* 262.

⁵ Gawhar Ā'in, the shihna of Baghdād and others escorted the bridal outfit of Malikshāh's daughter to the caliph's palace in 472 (1079/80) (I.A. X.106), and in 482 (1089/90) when the sultān demanded the return of his daughter because of the caliph's treatment of her, Gawhar Ā'in walked with her litter (I.A. X.116).

was the shihna the sultān's ambassador to the caliph, he had also to watch over the latter's power to see that it did not unduly increase. In 520 (1126) Yaranqush az-Zakāwī, the shihna of Baghdād went to the sultān, complained of the caliph's nā'ibs, between whom and Yaranqush discord had broken out, and warned him of the caliph's increasing power.¹ Later in that year when Maḥmūd b. Muḥammad prepared to leave Baghdād ^{against} he looked for someone to appoint shihna, who would secure him/ the caliph, and he appointed 'Imād ud-Dīn Zangī.² Probably because he was the ambassador or representative of the sultān, the shihna of Baghdād enjoyed a high status. When Gawhar Ā'īn reached Baghdād in Muḥarram 471 (1078), three nawbas, which was strictly speaking the insignia of a malik, were beaten at his gate at the times of prayer.³ Later this was forbidden. The shihna, although he was an ambassador to the caliph, did not always treat the latter with respect. In Ramaḍān 529 (1135), Bak Āba reached Baghdād as shihna on behalf of Mas'ūd b. Muḥammad, and his slaves seized the caliph's estates and took their crops.⁴ Subsequently when

¹ I.A. X.447-8.

² *ibid.* 452.

³ Bu. 50; I.A. X.72². Gawhar Ā'īn had demanded this privilege formerly, but had not received it because it was not customary.

⁴ I.A. XI.16. A number of the populace were roused at this, and fought the shihna's troops, and 150 of the people were killed.

ar-Rāshid refused to comply with Yaranqush az-Zakāwī's demand on behalf of Mas'ūd to pay the money settled by agreement with al-Mustarshid, Bak Aba prepared with Yaranqush to attack the dār ul-khilāfa.¹ Mas'ūd al-Bilālī, who also became shihna of Baghdād on behalf of Mas'ūd b. Muḥammad, used to behave with great impoliteness in the presence of the caliph, transgressing the rules of etiquette and permitting his licentious followers to spread disorder through the city. Qawām ud-Dīn Abū'l Qāsim 'Alī b. Ṣadaqa, who was at that time the caliph's wazīr, wrote a number of letters to the sultān, requesting him to reprimand al-Bilālī for his conduct, but could never obtain an answer. Subsequently 'Aun ud-Dīn b. Hubaira at the caliph's orders wrote to Mas'ūd about this matter and received an answer containing the sultān's excuses with a formal disapproval of al-Bilālī's conduct.²

The jurisdiction of the shihna of Baghdād seems to have varied. At times it included part, if not all, of 'Irāq as well. Indeed the shihna is sometimes called the "shihna of 'Irāq." Īlghāzī b. Urtuq, while shihna, appointed his nephew Balak b. Bahrām as 'āmil over the Khurāsān Road district in 'Irāq.³ Al-Bursuqī, when shihna, appointed Zangī shihna of

¹ I.A. XI.22.

² I.K. IV.115-6.

³ I.A. X.272.

Baṣrā and ordered him to protect the city.¹

The position of the shihna of Baghdād, apart from the usual insecurity attaching to office, was precarious for other reasons. Siddīqī states that on the one hand he was the representative of the sultān and had therefore to carry out his duties in accordance with the latter's orders; on the other hand he had to deal with a still higher authority than that of the sultān, i.e. the caliph, who still considered himself the supreme authority in all matters, at Baghdād at least. In cases of negligence or malpractices started by the shihna, the people instead of complaining to the sultān, approached the caliph, who was at Baghdād and thus easily accessible.² Theoretically this may have been so, but in practice, at least as far as the period up to the death of Malikshāh is concerned, the caliph had little power, and there does not seem to have been much friction in administrative matters between the shihna and officials of the caliph's dīwān, until the Seljūq empire had begun to break up, though there was no doubt some overlapping of jurisdiction. While Gawhar Ā'in was shihna the administration of Baghdād seems to have been in his hands, and the city was apparently well administered by him.³

¹ A.M. 46. On a former occasion the sultān appointed the shihna of Baṣrā (see above, p.276, note 4.).

² I.C. X.3. 406,7.

³ Bu. 42. He was appointed according to Bundārī in Rabī' II. 463 (1071), and according to Ibn ul-Athīr in 464 (1071/2) (I.A. X.47).

After the death of Muḥammad b. Malikshāh and the gradual re-emergence of the caliphate as a temporal power, the position of the shihna did, however, become increasingly difficult. On various occasions open quarrels arose. As stated above, discord broke out in 520 (1126) between Yaranqush and the caliph's nā'ibs. The caliph began as he increased in power to use the shihna to carry out his own plans.¹ On the death of Mas'ūd b. Muḥammad in 547 (1152), Mas'ūd al-Bilālī, the shihna, fled to Takrīt and the caliph took possession of his house and the houses of his followers and of the sultān's troops in Baghdād.²

The payment of the shihna of Baghdād was by iqtā' (see Chapter V.). There were no conditions limiting the appointment of the shihna. The majority were probably Turks. In Baghdād that office was filled by Turkomāns (Īlghāzī being the most prominent), Turkish amīrs and others. Mangubars, who became shihna in 512 (1118/9) was actually a member of the Seljūq family.³ Some of the most powerful amīrs of their time were also appointed shihna, notably al-Bursuqī, who became shihna in 498 (1104/5),⁴ 512 (1118/9)⁵ and 516 (1122/3).⁶

¹ After al-Bursuqī was re-appointed shihna in 516 (1122/3) the caliph proposed to him to turn Dubais b. Ṣadaqa out of Hilla (I.A. X.422), and when Dubais plundered Baṣrā in 517 (1123/4), the caliph reproached al-Bursuqī for having neglected the affair of Dubais (I.A. X.430).

² I.A. XI.106.

³ I.A. X.374,

⁴ *ibid.* 272¹.

⁵ *ibid.* 374.

⁶ *ibid.* 422.

and 'Imād ud-Dīn Zangī who became shihna in 521 (1127).¹ For a time, during the reign of Mas'ūd b. Muḥammad, Fakhr ud-Dīn b. 'Abd ar-Raḥmān b. Tughrā'īrak was shihna of Baghdād, which post he was no doubt given because of the influence of his father. On the latter's death he was dismissed.²

The caliph at times appears to have had some say in the appointment of the shihna of Baghdād. Al-Bursuqī was dismissed from the office of shihna in 518 (1124/5) at the caliph's request,³ while earlier the caliph had refused to accept the re-appointment of Aitegīn as-Sulaimānī as shihna, when he returned to Baghdād in 463/4 (1071/2). The reason for this was that the latter's son, whom Aitegīn had appointed to be his successor during his absence, had killed one of the mamlūks of the palace. When Nizām ul-Mulk saw the caliph was resolved that Aitegīn should not become shihna, he sent Gawhar A'īn to Baghdād as shihna.⁴

It does not seem that there was a shihna in all large cities in the directly administered area. The most important cases in which shihnās are mentioned relate to Baghdād, Isfahān, and Baṣrā. There was also a shihna of Rei, which was not in

¹ I.A. X.451-2.

² R.S. 238-9.

³ I.A. X.439.

⁴ I.A. X.47-8; Bu. 42.

fact directly administered towards the end of the period, though it may theoretically have been regarded as under the direct control of Sanjar's dīwān (see Chapter I.).¹ Elsewhere there was perhaps merely a local governor, as there was in cities in the indirectly administered areas. The tenure of office of local governors and of other local officials was subject to less instability than that of other officials in the empire. In some cases there appears to have been a family attachment to a local office. The family of Abū 'Alī Muḥammad Ja'farī, who became governor of Qazwīn after Hamza b. al-Yasā', held office some sixty years. To Fakhr ul-Ma'ālī zū's-Sa'ādat Abū 'Alī Sharafshāh b. Muḥammad b. Aḥmad b. Muḥammad Ja'farī (d. 484 (1091/2)), the last of them, and his followers belonged most of the villages in the neighbourhood and gardens and arable land of the city; and the annual revenue of his estates was 366,000 gold dīnārs.² When Malikshāh appointed 'Imād ud-Dawla Tūrān b. ^{Alfaqash} Alfaqash governor (ḥākim) of Qazwīn, he ordered him to transfer his house and belongings there, so that he should have greater care in its affairs.³

Other local officials included the muhtasib and the

¹ In the M.Z., however, 'Abbās, who is elsewhere called muqta' or governor of Rei, is mentioned as the shihna of Rei (p. 117).

² T.G. 841.

³ *ibid.* 837.

ṣāhib ush-shurṭa, who were both in a sense police officers. The former was probably no longer in the Seljūq period an important official, and is seldom mentioned in the sources.¹ His duties were chiefly ecclesiastical (see Māwardī), and the holder of the office was hence usually a jurist. In 501 (1108) the qādī, Abū'l 'Abbās b. Rāṭabī was appointed muḥtasib of Baghdād.² The ṣāhib ush-shurṭa's functions were purely civil as opposed to ecclesiastical, but there was nevertheless probably some clash of jurisdiction between the muḥtasib and the ṣāhib ush-shurṭa. During the riots between the people of the Ṭabaq Canal quarter and the Bāb ul-Arjā quarter in Baghdād in 487 (1094), the ṣāhib ush-shurṭa, Kamāl ud-Dīn Yumn killed a man and was after dismissed.³ When Ibn ul-Kāfī succeeded Kamāl ul-Mulk as-Samīramī as wazīr and ordered the return of allowances (rusūm) and pensions and alms received during the preceding two years (see **Chapter II.e**), the shurṭa were charged with this matter in the provincial towns.⁴ Further

¹ On one occasion when there were riots between the Sunnīs and Shī'as in Baghdād during the wazirate of Abū Shujā', the caliph ordered the latter to destroy the houses of ten of the leaders of the rioters. Abū Shujā' then summoned Abū Ja'far b. Kharaqī, the muḥtasib, and sent him to buy these houses so that when he destroyed them he would only be destroying his own property (T.S. 285-6).

² I.A. X.191.

³ I.A. X.162.

⁴ Bu. 126-7.

there were officials in charge of the city gates and possibly the neighbouring districts. Such an official was known as the hājib ul-bāb, and had apparently power to punish the people for disorders. When the fuqūhā rioted on the death of Ya'qūb, the kātib, in Baghdād in 547 (1152/3), the hājib ul-bāb siezed two of them, punished and imprisoned them.¹

In addition to the officials mentioned above, there was ra'īs of the town. He was the link between the government and the citizens. Al-Qalānisī gives an abstract of a diploma written on behalf of Tughtegin for Abū'l Majālī, son of Abū Muḥammad b. Aṣ-Ṣūfī, ra'īs of Damascus, and for Abū'l Dawād al-Mufarraǰ, the brother of Abū Muḥammad, for the sharing of the office of ra'īs of Damascus. He commanded them to manage the affairs of the subjects and not to fail to inform him of what was going on, so that he could favour the good and punish the bad.² It is possible also that the ra'īs had financial duties of some kind.³ It is unlikely that he received a salary from the central government, but he may have enjoyed certain exemptions from taxation, and if he had himself financial duties in the way of the collection of taxes, he no doubt

¹ I.A. XI.115.

² Q. 144-5.

³ In a diploma issued by the court of Khwārazm for Ṣadr ud-Dīn, ra'īs of Jurjān (at-Tavassul, 122-5), the latter was commanded to pay what was due to the diwān.

retained himself a proportion of these.¹ The appointment of the ra'īs was naturally in the hands of the sultān or his representatives in the directly administered area, and of the muqṭā' in the indirectly administered territory; the common practice was probably to appoint a local man, perhaps even merely to confirm the recommendation of the leading persons of the town.² A hereditary tendency was probably to be found in this office.³ The ra'īs was often a person of considerable importance locally. When the Nizāmiyya mamlūks took Barkyāruq from Iṣfahān to Rei and put him on the throne, Abū Muslim, ra'īs of Rei, suspended the jewelled crown above his head.⁴

The story of Abū Hāshim, ra'īs of Hamadān, has already been told (see Chapter II.). That he was able to produce the large sum demanded of him within the space of seven days (or, according to another account, within forty days) from his treasury, without asking help from anyone in the city shows

¹ In the diploma referred to in Note 3, p.290 above, the estates and goods (أشياء) or the ra'īs in Jurjān and Dihistān were exempted from taxation and his pensions and possessions (أرزاقه وأوقافه) in Jurjān and Dihistān and the districts belonging to them were to be as before.

² Support is given to this view by the above mentioned diploma in which mention is made of the desirability of holding in respect ancient families and the strengthening of their positions.

³ Families who held the local headship (إمارة) are mentioned in al-Batīha (I.A. X.302-3), and Hamadān (I.A. X.268). On the death of Abū Hāshim, ra'īs of Hamadān, Muhammad b. Malikshāh appointed his son to the office of ra'īs of the city (Bu. 93). The ra'īs of Amid, Murīd ud-Dīn b. Bisan (var. سبن) who died in 551 (1156/7) was succeeded by his son (I.A. XI.143).

⁴ R.S. 140-1.

he was a man of great wealth.¹ On the death of Abū Hāshim 250,000 dīnārs were transferred from his treasury to the sultān's, and so rich was he that this sum was not missed from his treasury.² The ra'īs of Tabrīz, Zārqān was also, it seems, a wealthy man, for as stated above (see Chapter II.) he was fined 70,000 gold dīnārs by ~~the~~ wazīr ad-Darkazīnī.³

¹ Bu. 89-90; I.A. 332-3. The R.S. gives a slightly different account and states that Abū Hāshim gave Muḥammad b. Malik-shāh 800,000 dīnārs to obtain his protection against Ahmad b. Nizām ul-Mulk, who had designs upon him, and that he paid the money in a week without making any loan or selling any property.

² Bu. 93.

³ Bu. 148.

CHAPTER VII.

THE CITY.

Urban life and development during Great Seljūq times no doubt underwent various fluctuations. In the first place the life of the cities cannot have been altogether unaffected by the influx into Persia and the neighbouring countries of large numbers of nomads. In so far as the city populations were not exterminated, it is probable they carried on their former occupations, but the presence of the nomads in the neighbourhood, although to some extent a source of profit in that they bartered the products of their flocks for grain and manufactured goods,⁽¹⁾ was a perpetual menace to the cities, which had to be continually prepared to defend themselves from the plundering inroads of these bodies.⁽²⁾ Secondly the presence of Turkish amīrs and their troops in many of the towns as assignees - not a new institution in Islamic lands, but somewhat extended in Great Seljūq times - cannot have been without effect on the economic and social life of the cities. Lastly there were no doubt also

(1) e.g. In 496 (1102/3) Suqmān b. Urtuq sent a body of Turkomāns to Takrīt with loads of gypsum, butter and honey; they sold what they had brought and pretended Suqmān had departed, whereupon the people of the city were reassured. This however was merely Suqmān's ruse, and that night the Turkomāns attacked and entered the town. (I.A.X.245).

(2) cf. Sauvaget R.E.I. 1934, IV. 429.

fluctuations in urban development dependent upon the political conditions prevailing under the individual sultāns; it is unlikely that periods of anarchy such as those following the death of Malikshāh and the death of Muhammad b. Malikshāh respectively coincided with periods of prosperity and progress in urban development.

The dominant factor in urban life, as in the whole structure of the Great Seljūq empire, was insecurity - not merely insecurity arising from a sudden crisis such as civil war or local nomadic raids, but a chronic state of insecurity.⁽¹⁾ To combat the arbitrary measures and injustice of officials and others - the protection of Qur'anic legislation being illusory, and appeals to the sultān usually impractical owing to great distances - the only effective defence of the population was mutual help: only by grouping themselves according to their religions, ethnical and above all professional affinities, were the people able to protect, if necessary by force, their lives and goods, or to buy intercessions and favours, which relieved to some extent their lot.⁽²⁾ This chronic insecurity thus played an important part in fostering the growth of corporations, which although not peculiar to or originating in the

(1) The people of the cities, in the case of Baghdād and perhaps elsewhere, went about armed. During a riot in Baghdād in 481 (1088), when the Turks struck the people with their cudgels (maqāri), the people drew their swords (I.A.X. 109).

(2) Sauvaget p.451,2.

Great Seljūq empire, were a marked feature in the life of the population of that empire.

There is a certain amount of evidence of the existence of a spirit of corporate feeling among the inhabitants of various cities, which manifested itself in rivalry between different towns,⁽¹⁾ and in the ability of a town to make settlements with individual leaders without reference to the central government or its officials.⁽²⁾ Further, in spite of local differences, there

(1) e.g. in 490 (1097) there was a great riot in Khurāsān between the people of Sabzawār and the people of Khusrawjird and large numbers of people were killed in the fighting, in which the people of Khusrawjird were routed (I.A.X. 184).

(2) The following are some examples of this. When the people of Baghdād heard of Tughril b. Muḥammad and Dubais b. Ṣadaqa's march on Baghdād in 519, (1125), they put on arms and remained on guard all night (I.A.X. 442). In 543 (1148/9) a number of amīrs left Mas'ud b. Muḥammad, and approached Baghdād, whereupon the populace co-operated in the defence of the city against them (I.A.XI. 88). On the other hand when Muḥammad b. Maḥmūd besieged Baghdād in 551/2 (1157), the people opened the gates to him (I.A.XI. 142).

When Barkyāruq had been deserted by his army in 492 (1098/9), he went from Rei to Iṣfahān, but the people of that city refused him entry (I.A.X. 195). Subsequently in 493 they seem to have invited him to Iṣfahān, but Muḥammad b. Malikshāh, learning of this preceded him there (I.A.X. 202). When Muḥammad returned to Iṣfahān in 495 (1102) with 100,000 men, after having left the city to collect reinforcements, the people opposed his entry (I.A.X. 229).

On the death of Karbūqā, the prominent men of Mawṣil wrote to Mūsā, the Turkomān governor of Ḥiṣn Kaifā, asking him to hasten to Mawṣil that they might submit the city to him. (I.A.X. 235). When the Banī Khafajā raided Kūfa in 485 (1092), the people defended the city (I.A.X. 147). In 496 (1102/3) when Ismā'īl Arslānjiq wanted to take Wasīṭ, the populace united with the jund and abused him (I.A.X. 233). Baṣrā, with the exception of one quarter, resisted Ṣadaqa in 499 (1105/6) after he defeated Ismā'īl Arslānjiq (I.A.X. 219).

was a marked tendency for the people of a city to unite in times of common danger. In Nīshāpūr for instance when it was besieged in 488 (1095) by one of the amīrs, the people united and fought fiercely until the siege was raised after forty days.⁽¹⁾ Unity was not always found however. When Ṭughril Beg's troops were attacked in Baghdād by the populace, the people of Karkh protected them, for which Ṭughril subsequently commanded the people of Karkh to be rewarded.⁽²⁾ Of the size and relative prosperity of the various towns, the evidence is somewhat fragmentary. Baghdād by the time of the Seljūqs had already begun to decay, and was rivalled at the beginning of the period by Nīshāpūr in numbers of population and in prosperity. One of the most important cities of the Great Seljūq empire was Isfahān which became the capital city. Nāsiri Khusraw, who gives an account of some of the towns he passed through on his journey, writes that in Persian speaking lands the most flourishing and populous city he saw was Isfahān,⁽³⁾ which he reached

(1) I.A.X. 171.

(2) I.A.IX. 420.

(3) It is difficult to make any accurate estimate of the numbers of the population. Little reliance can be placed upon the figures given in the sources, but a rough idea can perhaps be obtained from them. According to the R.S., when the Bāṭinī leader, Ahmād b. 'Attāsh, was led through Isfahān after his capture during the reign of Muḥammad b. Malikshāh more than 100,000 men, women and children came with different kinds of missiles to cast at him (p.161). Some idea of the

in 444.⁽¹⁾ This city was the centre of a fertile area, and had not lain in the main path followed by the Ghuzz invaders. Tughril Beg was much attached to Isfahān where he chiefly resided for twelve years, and expended in public buildings and improvements a sum exceeding 500,000 dīnars.⁽²⁾ Royal patronage was moreover continued under the later sultāns. Alp Arslān was greatly pleased with Isfahān and treated its people with marked favour,⁽³⁾ and Malikshāh chose it as his capital and built many buildings in the city and outside;⁽⁴⁾ others of the Great Seljūq sultāns also spent much time in Isfahān. This, together with the natural advantages of Isfahān, enabled it to hold its position throughout the Great Seljūq period as one of the most flourishing cities of the empire. The fact that the Great

(3 continued)

population of different cities can perhaps also be gained from the following figures. Nearly 50,000 people perished in an earthquake in Tabrīz in 434 (1042/3) (I.A.IX.351). It was said that during an outbreak of plague in Bukhārā in 449 (1057/8), 800 or 1,000 men died in one day in the dependencies of that city, and in the province during the outbreak 165,000 died, and similarly in Samarqand many perished (I.A.IX.438,9). Jāwulī Saqāwū, when preparing Mawsil for siege in 501, (1107/8), turned out over 20,000 young men (I.A.X.320).

(1) N.K. 92,3

(2) E.G. Browne: Account of a rare manuscript history of Isfahān ... J.R.A.S. 1901, p.667. Tughril Beg also built a new quarter of Baghdād on the Tigris, which included a jāmi' and bazaars (aswāq); it was surrounded by a wall (Bu. 10).

(3) *ibid.* p.668.

(4) R.D. 132; T.G. 449; U.H.S. 64,5.

Seljūqs changed their capital on various occasions probably gave to the towns they successively chose as their headquarters a transitory phase of prosperity.⁽¹⁾

Benjamin of Tudela, who travelled between the years 1167 and 1173, relates that Ghazna was a city of commercial importance and that the people of all countries and tongues went there with their wares.⁽²⁾ It is probable that Ghazna enjoyed this position also during Great Seljūq times⁽³⁾. Al-Gharnāṭī mentions that Shīrāz was flourishing.⁽⁴⁾ It is possible that the districts bordering on Asia Minor may have been, at the beginning of the Great Seljūq period, in a relatively flourishing condition. Nāṣiri Khusraw states that Arzan was a flourishing city in 438 (1046), well irrigated and with gardens, trees and good bazaars.⁽⁵⁾ Benjamin of Tudela also notes that Raḥba on the Euphrates was a very fine city, large and fortified and surrounded by gardens and plantations.⁽⁶⁾ That many towns were

(1) Tughril Beg made Rei his capital for a time (R.S. 111). Chaghri Beg Da'ūd made Marv his capital (Nuzhat p. 154). Malikshāh built Panj Dih, one of the suburbs of Marv ar-Rūd (Nuzhat p. 155).

(2) Jewish Travellers p. 53.

(3) c.f. The riches that Sanjar found in Ghazna when he took it in 510 (I.A.X. 355).

(4) Al-Gharnāṭī p. 204.

(5) N.K.7.

(6) Jewish Travellers, p.42.

comparatively prosperous at the beginning of the Great Seljūq period is suggested by the readiness and ease with which individual towns made payments to the Ghuzz in the hope of saving themselves from being plundered.⁽¹⁾ The following also suggests some cities had hidden sources of wealth. Abū Mun'a Khamīs b. Taghallub b. Ḥammād, governor of Takrīt, (d. 435 /1043/4) found in that city 500,000 dīnārs apart from gold and silver jewels (الصناعات).⁽²⁾ Various cities in Khurāsān on the other hand seem to have been in a state of decay at the beginning of the Great Seljūq period. Nāṣiri Khusraw states that Tūn, which he passed through in Rabī' II 444 (1052) "was a large city but when I saw it most of it was decayed."⁽³⁾

The town in most cases consisted of the bazaars or sūqs, residential quarters and the principal mosque; a fortified city wall defined the limits of the town and assured the

(1) Qazwīn made peace in 420 (1029) with the Ghuzz under Nāṣghulī for 7,000 dīnārs (I.A.IX.270), and Qirwāsh, ruler of Mawṣil attempted to buy them off in 420 (1029), promising 3,000 dīnārs; they refused this sum, and demanded 50,000 dīnārs, which sum was agreed to. However while the money was being collected the Ghuzz reached Mawṣil, and Qirwāsh with his army and the populace came out to fight them, and were eventually defeated. After capturing Mawṣil the Ghuzz laid an imposition of 20,000 dīnārs on the people of the cities and subsequently a further 4,000 dīnārs (I.A.IX.274). Takrīt in 448 (1056/7) made peace with Tughril Beg for money (I.A.X. 289).

(2) I.A.X. 289.

(3) N.K. 95.

safeguard of its population.⁽¹⁾ In many cases there was also a citadel, which was the residence of the governor; it was the last refuge of the defenders in case of siege, and a government stronghold in case of revolt.

Within the city wall, which afforded protection to the inhabitants irrespective of ethnical, social and religious differences, the city was divided into quarters.⁽²⁾ In the larger cities these were self-contained, having their own mosque, bazaar for primary necessities, public bath, and leader, and lived a largely separate life from the other quarters.⁽³⁾ Each quarter was usually enclosed within its own walls. Nāsiri Khusraw mentions that all the streets and quarters of Iṣfahān had strong bars and gates, (4) while Yāqūt describes West Baghdād

(1) Herāt, when all the cities of Khurāsān were plundered by the Ghuzz towards the end of Sanjar's reign, escaped because the Ghuzz failed to take the wall (R.S.183). Abū Kālījār built a wall round the city of Shīrāz in 436 (1044/5) (I.A.IX.359). Jigirmish coated the city wall of Mawail with plaster and reinforced it; he built in front of it a wall of enclosure and also dug a moat (I.A.X.293). Malikshāh built a wall round Marv (Nuzhat 154). When nine towers in the city-wall of Antioch were destroyed by an earthquake in 484 (1091/2) Malikshāh commanded these to be repaired (I.A.X.135). When Bazghash besieged the Ismā'īlīs in Ṭabas, he destroyed much of the city-wall with siege engines (manjanīq), but when he withdrew they began to repair what had been destroyed (I.A.X.221,2). In 489 (1096) Arslān Arghū destroyed the walls of the cities of Khurāsān including Sabzavār, Marv ash-Shāh, Jān and Shahrīstān, and the fortress of Sarakhs and the quhandiz of Nīshāpūr (I.A.X.180).

(2) Each bazaar in Iṣfahān when Nāsiri Khusraw passed through the city in 444 (1052) had a bar and a gate (N.K.92).

(3) cf. Sauvaget p.452,3.

(4) N.K.92.

in his day as consisting of a number of separate quarters, each enclosed by its own wall.⁽¹⁾ The grouping of the various quarters was in some cases religious, ethnical or occupational. The different Islamic rites and sects tended to have a topographical grouping, notably in Baghdād;⁽²⁾ in that city, the principal Shī'a quarter was Karkh, which however was not inhabited exclusively by Shī'as; there the suburb of Kāzīmāin, where was the shrine of Mūsā al-Kāzīm and Muḥammad al-Jawād, naturally became the rallying place of the Shi'a during their constantly recurring riots with the Sunnī.⁽³⁾ The ^{Dhimmi}zimmīs, Christians and Jews, in so far as they were found in any number were segregated in the city in their own quarters. The Christian quarter of Baghdād was commonly called the dār ar-rūm.⁽⁴⁾ There are numerous examples of quarters showing an occupational grouping. The 'Attābiyya quarter of Baghdād was famous for the manufacture of 'Attābī stuffs.⁽⁵⁾ In Karkh there was a district inhabited by the canal-diggers and reed-weavers,⁽⁶⁾ in the Sharqiyya quarter was the soapboilers' quarter.⁽⁷⁾ Yāqūt

(1) Le Strange: Baghdād During the 'Abbasid Caliphate p.336.

(2) cf. Sauvaget p.460,1.

(3) Baghdad. During the 'Abbasid Caliphate p.162.

(4) ibid. p.207.

(5) ibid. p.137.

(6) ibid. p.78.

(7) ibid. p.91.

mentions a quarter known as the darb al-qayyār (street of the pitch makers), which took its name from those who were in that trade.⁽¹⁾ Between the Baṣrā and the Khurāsān gates was the street of the water carriers.⁽²⁾ In Mawṣil Ibn ul-Athīr mentions the quarter of the plasterers and the gate of the butchers.⁽³⁾ The various quarters often lived in a condition of rivalry. This was in some cases due to sectarian differences and resulted in frequent riots between different quarters (see below). In others it was perhaps merely an expression of the corporate feeling which the inhabitants felt. Schefer states that the people of Marv were divided into two parties, and that the people of the quarter of the sūq al-‘Atīq and the people of the rest of the city lived in a state of perpetual rivalry.⁽⁴⁾ The following also clearly shows the spirit of rivalry between various quarters in Baghdād: when the caliph ordered a wall to be built round Baghdād in 517 (1123/4), the people worked in shifts, the people of each quarter working with drums (ṭubūl) and pipes (zumūr) and they decorated the city and made in it pavilions (القباب ؟)⁽⁵⁾

(1) *ibid.* p. 78.

(2) *ibid.* p. 27.

(3) I.A.IX. 274,5.

(4) N.K. transl.275. Schefer does not give his authority for this statement.

(5) I.A.X. 435.

The bazaar, which was the essential part of the city and the reason for its existence, was usually divided up into a number of sūqs; in these most of the craft guilds of the city had their separate quarters in which the majority of their members had their premises.⁽¹⁾ The craftsmen did not, however, live in the bazaar, and at night they used to lock or bar their premises. Access to the bazaars at night was also locked and barred.⁽²⁾ The following markets among others are mentioned in Baghdād by Le Strange: the markets of the paper-sellers, book-sellers,⁽³⁾ clothes-merchants⁽⁴⁾ and goldsmiths;⁽⁵⁾ among others were also the sūqs of the ṣāghat, ṣayārīf, mukhallatīn, and the raiḥāniyyīn, which were burnt in Jumādī I 485 (1092).⁽⁶⁾ A considerable part of the market of the perfumers, which had been at one time a place of considerable importance was thrown down during the alterations effected by al-Mustazhir between 503 (1109) and 507 (1113).⁽⁷⁾

In the bazaar, or on its outskirts were also a number of

(1) Various of the crafts had their place of work outside the bazaars. Some of the brickmakers and plasterers of Baghdād had their ovens and kilns respectively on the outskirts of Baghdād (cf. Bu. 202).

(2) See above, p.300, note 2.

(3) Baghdād, During the 'Abbasid Caliphate. p.92.

(4) ibid p. 77.

(5) ibid. p.218.

(6) I.A.X. 148.

(7) Baghdād, During the 'Abbasid Caliphate. p.272.

kāravānsarāis, at which goods on arrival at the city were unloaded,⁽¹⁾ and which merchants occupied during their stay in the city; local merchants also had rooms where they carried on their business in these kāravānsarāis. Nāṣiri Khusraw states that the kāravānsarāis of Iṣfahān (in 444) were pleasant (پاکیزه) and records that there was a street (kūcha) called Kū Tarāz in which were fifty good kāravānsarāis, and in each of these many merchants (bayyā'ān) and owners of rooms (hujra-dārān) sat.⁽²⁾ Ibn ul-Qalānisi mentions a khān or hostelry in Baghdād known as the makhāzin ut-tujjār, which was burnt together with many sūqs in 528 (1133/4), and he states that the merchants who were present and also those who were absent lost an unlimited amount of their goods and property in this fire.⁽³⁾

With the probable exception of Friday, trade was carried on daily in the bazaars. In addition there were, in some cities, also special markets, such as weekly food markets.⁽⁴⁾

(1) Goods were sent from city to city by caravan, with which caravans merchants and others travelled. Nāṣiri Khusraw travelled to Iṣfahān in 444 (1052) with a caravan taking 1,300 kharvār of goods (N.K. 92).

(2) N.K. 92.

(3) Q. 243.

(4) In Mamlūk times (i.e. 1260 onwards) an open market took place every Friday in Damascus in front of the north gate of the citadel, which attracted wholesale commerce in vegetables and fruit (Sauvaget, R.E.I. 1934 IV. 465).

In Baṣrā, when Nāṣiri Khusraw passed through in 443, (December/January 1051/2) there were three daily places for trade: At the beginning of the day trade was carried on in the sūq al-khaza'a, at midday in the sūqi'uthmān, and in the evening in the sūq al-qaddāhīn.⁽¹⁾

The urban population was composed of various elements. Two main divisions can be made: firstly the military element and the officials, and secondly the "civil" population proper. Poliak maintains that the towns were "feudal cantonments" and that the whole economic life of the country was controlled by "feudal urban society" compared to which the rest of the population remained citizens of second class.⁽²⁾ This was probably to some extent true, but the Turkish muqṭa'ān and their troops were in most cases a changing element in the population. They were frequently absent on campaigns, and further their tenure of a district was in many cases only temporary. The fact of their presence however no doubt added considerably to the general insecurity of the urban population. The amīrs and their troops probably did not take part in the local urban life, and there was, generally speaking, great hostility on the part of the local population towards the Turkish military

(1) N.K. 85.

(2) Poliak: La Feodalité Islamique R.E.I. 1936 III 252.

classes, who remained a foreign and dominant element. It is moreover possible that the relatively close contact between the Turkish military classes and other classes of the population during the Great Seljūq period had a bad effect on general standards. Ghazālī writes: "Formerly the people were asleep and the 'ulamā awake. Now the 'ulamā are asleep and the people dead, and to a dead people, what good is the word of sleepers? In these days the judgment of the people is ruined and the people have all become evil-doers and evil-intentioned."⁽¹⁾

The local officials were of two kinds. On the one hand were the military governors and tax-collectors sent by the central government, who usually belonged in the case of the large cities to the military classes and to the bureaucracy respectively, and on the other hand the ra'īs, who was in many cases a local man (see Chapter VI).

Of the local population proper the most respected and influential were the religious classes. The qāḍī was the chief local representative of the organised religious institution, and was to some extent almost a government official (see Chapter VIII). His position locally was often one of influence. In cases where there was no governor or other similar official in the town, the qāḍī was probably deferred to.

(1) Naṣīḥat ul-Mulūk p. 79.

The qādīs and the religious classes in general were also to some extent the spokesmen of the people. When Barkyāruq reached Wāsiṭ in flight from Muḥammad b. Malikshāh in 494/5, (1101) the 'askar of Wāsiṭ having fled at his approach, the qādī, 'Alī al-Fāriqī, came out to Barkyāruq's 'askar and implored from Ayyāz, Barkyāruq's leading amīr, and his wazīr, mercy for the people, and asked them to send a shihna to the town. They agreed and asked him to produce means for them to take their beasts and baggage over the river. The qādī accordingly assembled the populace, and Barkyāruq having crossed to the east side, he gave them abundant wages. The soldiers then began again to plunder and so the qādī returned to the 'askar and spoke earnestly about their being restrained. Someone was accordingly sent back with him to prevent the 'askar plundering.⁽¹⁾

When Atsiz came to Marv in 536 (1141/2), the imām Ahmad al-Bākharzī came to him and asked for mercy for the people. Similarly when he reached Nīshāpūr in Shawwāl of that year, a group of the fugahā, 'ulamā and zuhhād came out to him to ask him to spare the people.⁽²⁾ Again it was under the leadership of the members of the religious institution that the populace expressed their opposition to the Ismā'īlīs and their horror of this movement. Abū'l Qāsim Mas'ūd b. Mahmūd al-Khujandī,

(1) I.A.X. 225,6.

(2) I.A.XI. 58.

a Shafī'ī faqīh led an uprising against the Bāṭinīs in Iṣfahān after they had first established themselves in that city. He armed the people and they dug furrows, lit in them fires and killed many of them.⁽¹⁾ After the Bāṭinīs had attacked and plundered a caravan near Qāyin the people of that city⁽²⁾ hastened with the qāḍī al-Kirmānī⁽³⁾ to make a jihād upon them.⁽⁴⁾

The 'ulama were organised in corporations. At the head of each of the four Sunnī rites in each town was a ra'īs.⁽⁵⁾ In each of the large cities the 'Alids also formed a separate corporation under their own naqīb.⁽⁶⁾ There was probably a tendency for certain families to hold this office. Shams ud-Dīn Nāṣiḥ ul-Islām Abū 'Abdullah Muḥammad b. Muḥammad b. 'Ubaidullāh al-Husainī was the naqīb of the 'Alids in Baghdād in 543 (1148/9).

(1) I.A.X. 214,5; U.H.S. 88.

(2) Var. Kirmān

(3) Var. 'Alī al-Kirmānī.

(4) I.A.X. 213,4.

(5) e.g. Abū'l Latif b. al-Khujandī the ra'īs of the Shafī'īs in Iṣfahān has already been mentioned. Abū Wafā 'Alī b. 'Uqail b. Muḥammad b. 'Uqail (d.513/1119) was the shaikh of the Hanbalīs in Baghdād (I.A.X.395): Abū Bakr Muḥammad b. Mansūr b. Muḥammad b. Abd ul-Jabbār as-Sam'ānī (d.510/1116/7) was the ra'īs of the Shafī'īs in Marv (I.A.X.367). The leader of the Shafī'īs in Nīshāpūr in 489 (1096) was Abu'l Qāsim, son of the Imām ul-Haramain al-Juwainī, and the leader of the Hanafīs was the qāḍī Muḥammad b. Ahmad b. Sa'īd (I.A.X.171)

(6) e.g. the naqīb of the 'Alids in Mawṣil in 434 /1042/3) is mentioned (I.A.IX.351), also the naqīb in Tūs in 548 (1153/4) (I.A.XI 119); Abu's Sa'ādāt b. ash-Shajari (b.450/1058 d.452 (1148) was the naqīb of the 'Alids in Karkh (I.K.III 577)

and his brother Diyā ud-Dīn was the naqīb of the ashrāf in Mawṣil; his cousin had formerly been naqīb of the 'Alids in Baghdād, and another cousin was naqīb in Khurāsān.⁽¹⁾

Many of the 'ulamā had a considerable following among the people. Ardashīr b. Manṣūr Abū'l Ḥusain, the wā'iz had a great welcome when he came to Baghdād in Jumādī I 486 (1093), because al-Ghazālī and others of the imāms and great Sūfī shaikhs used to appear at his assembly (majlis); both men and women came to hear him.⁽²⁾ Al-'Abbādī, the wā'iz whom Sanjar sent as an envoy to the caliph in 541 (1146/7) also found great acceptance in Baghdād, where he preached. Mas'ūd b. Muḥammad and others came to hear him, and "as for the common people, they abandoned their occupations to be present at his assembly and to hasten to him".⁽³⁾ On one occasion when Abū Ishāq ash-Shīrāzī was sent on an embassy by the caliph to Malikshāh in 475 (1082/3) at every town through which he passed in Persia the people came out to him with their women and children anointing his stirrups and taking the dust of his mule for a blessing. The bakers also came out and scattered bread, and likewise the fruiterers, confectioners, shoemakers and others.⁽⁴⁾

(1) Q. 301.

(2) I.A.X. 153.

(3) I.A.XI. 78.

(4) I.A.X. 81.

There was probably about this period a development in the various Sūfī corporations, some of which were genuinely devoted to a life of religious devotion, while others used Sūfī garb as a means of obtaining their livelihood, and traded upon their supposed sanctity. Among such were the gilds of story tellers. Ibn Jawzī warns against these in the Devil's Delusion. He writes: "In our time the story-tellers act in a way, which has no connection with delusion, since it is an evident way of making the stories a source of livelihood and of getting gifts from tyrannical princes and obtaining the like from the gatherers of unlawful imposts and earning money by them in the provinces. Some of them go to the cemeteries where they dilate upon affection and parting with friends drawing tears from the women but not exhorting them to take warning."⁽¹⁾

Forming a kind of intermediary class between the artisans on the one hand and the bureaucracy and religious classes on the other, were the merchants. The more prominent of the latter had considerable influence and ranked among the a'yān or "notables" of the city, while the smaller merchants were probably little different from the more influential artisans. Broadly speaking there were three classes of merchants, the travelling merchant (rakkād), the wholesale merchant (khazzān)

(1) The Devil's Delusion I.C.X. 36.

and the exporting merchant (mujāhhiz).⁽¹⁾ The bureaucracy were probably favourably inclined towards the merchant and banking community, whose help was perhaps, as in former times, sometimes enlisted to make loans to the state. These however according to Poliak always remained, compared to the Turkish amīrs, citizens of second rank.⁽²⁾ Abū'l Maḥasin ad-Dihistānī, Barkyāruq's wazīr, treated the merchants well, and many people became rich through him. They asked him to do business with him, and when he was killed much of their money was lost.⁽³⁾

On occasion it seems likely that compulsory levies were made upon the merchants and other wealthy citizens. When 'Alī

(1) cf. H. Ritter: Ein Arabisches Handbuch der Handelswissenschaft, Der Islam VII p.58. According to al-Qalānisi, Naṣīr ud-Dīn Juqur, governor of Mawṣil on behalf of Zangī, pursued a policy of maintaining the balance between merchants and travellers (?=travelling merchants) p.281.

(2) Poliak: La Feodalité Islamique R.E.I. 1936. III. 252.

(3) I.A.X.230. It is related that a certain merchant sold Abū'l Maḥasin ad-Dihistānī goods worth 1,000 dīnārs. Abū'l Maḥasin said, "Take for them wheat (حب) from Radān 50 kurr, each kurr at 20 dīnārs." The merchant refused, saying, "I only desire dīnārs." On the next day the merchant entered in to him, and he said, "May it bring you joy, O such and such a one !" He said, "What for ?" He said, "About your wheat," He replied, "I have no wheat and I do not want it." He said, "Yes, and each kurr was sold for 50 dīnārs." He said, "I do not accept that for it." So the wazīr said, "I am not one to break an agreement, which I have made." He said, "I went out and I took the value of the wheat, 2,500 dīnārs and I added a like sum to it, and I did business with him." (I.A.X. 230).

b. Dubays and various amīrs attacked Baghdād in 543 (1148/9, or according to others 544) orders came from the caliph to compel the prominent persons, the wealthy and the merchants to spend their wealth as a loan on the construction of the city wall, moats and fortifications.⁽¹⁾ During the siege of Baghdād in 552 (1157), when Muḥammad b. Maḥmūd was about to leave Baghdād, the goods of the merchants (متاع تجار) were in the sulṭān's palace on the west side.⁽²⁾ This may of course have been only for protection, but it is possible that these goods had been commandeered for the use of the army.

Foreign merchants also came to the Great Seljūq Empire to trade. In 462 (1069/70) when there was a severe famine in Egypt, merchants came from that country to Baghdād. They brought the garments of the ruler of Egypt and his utensils (? ālāt), and many things which had been plundered from the caliph's residence in 381 (991/2), and articles that had been plundered during the revolt of al-Basāsīrī, and 80,000 large pieces of beryl and 75,000 pieces of ancient dībāj and 11,000 kuzāghand and 20,000 curved swords were brought out from their treasuries.⁽³⁾ There were also foreign merchants present at

(1) Q. 302; I.A.XI.87.

(2) R.S. 268. The text has 550 (p.267) which is probably an error for 552.

(3) I.A.X. 41,2.

Muhammad b. Malikshāh's court.⁽¹⁾

An important part was played in the life of the trading communities by brokers (ṣarrāf), through whose hands much of the buying and selling passed. In Baṣrā it appears, for example, that all monetary dealings went through the ṣarrāfs. Nāṣiri Khusraw who was in that city in 443 (Dec.-Jan.1051/2) relates that when anyone arrived in Baṣrā whatever he had (by way of money) he gave to a broker for anything he might buy while he was in the city, and gave nothing except the receipt of the broker.⁽²⁾ He was in Iṣfahān in 444 (1052), and records that he saw two hundred ṣarrāfs in one of the bazaars,⁽³⁾ which is a further indication of the importance of Iṣfahān as a trading centre.

Ibn Balkhī describes the system by which the cloth trade was carried on in Kāzarūn. He states, "An official of the dīwān oversees the work of the weavers of Kāzarūn, and there are honest merchants (^Abiyyā'ān) who place a just price on it, stamp it and sell it to foreigners. In former times the merchants sealed the loads of Kāzarūnī (cloth) and foreigners

(1) Muḥammad b. Malikshāh, when inspecting his treasury after his khāzin had been assassinated by a Bāṭinī, found some jewels belonging to some foreign merchants; he summoned them and returned to them the jewels (I.A.X. 369).

(2) N.K. 85,6.

(3) N.K. 92.

came and bought them thus sealed without opening them, because they relied upon the merchants, and at every town to which they took these bales of cloth, they showed the writing of the merchant and resold them unopened with profit. Thus a load of Kāzarūnī cloth would pass through ten hands unopened. Then, since fraud became ripe and people dishonest, confidence departed and treasury goods (māli dīwānī) are found deficient and foreigners avoid the merchandise of Kāzarūn."⁽¹⁾

Lastly there were the artisans and craftsmen, who organised themselves in corporations according to their several trades. By such organisations they were better able to withstand the demands of the unjust officials; nevertheless forced labour was probably a common imposition (see Chapter V).

Ghazālī, who may perhaps be regarded as representing trends of thought to be found among a certain section of society during the Great Seljūq period, has some interesting views upon different arts and crafts. He recommends the individual to regard it as his personal duty (از مروض کفایت) to engage in some craft in the bazaar, from which the muslims will benefit. He advises him to choose an occupation, which if left undone, would result in disorder and not such a craft as that of a goldsmith, painter or plasterer (gachkandagarī), all of which aimed at the adornment of this world, and were unnecessary, and

(1) F.N. 146.

indeed, according to him, were better left undone. He then mentions various unlawful crafts such as the making of brocade clothes (جامه ديا) and the decorating of saddlery with gold, and also a number of crafts and occupations, which were disliked by former generations, such as the selling of food, the selling of shrouds, qaṣṣābī (butchery) ṣarrāfī (money-changing), kannāsī (scavengering) dabbāghī (tanning) shuturbānī (camel-driving) and dallālī (broking). He further records that it is mentioned in the traditions that the best of trades was bazzāzī (drapery) and the best of crafts kharrāzī, namely the sewing of skins for carrying water. Four crafts he mentions as being held in contempt: jawlahagī (weaving), pamba-furūshī (selling cotton), dūktarrāshī (spinning) and mu'allimī (teaching), on the grounds that persons who engaged in those occupations would inevitably become weak in reason since their dealings and conversations were with women and children.⁽¹⁾

Among trades and arts to the exponents of which Ghazālī considered it illegal to give wages were the following: dyers who made cloaks of brocade (dībā) and silk (‘attābī vā abrī-shum) for men,⁽²⁾ hat-makers (kuḷāhdūzān) who made hats of brocade for men,⁽³⁾ ‘ayyārān, who made tattoos on the hand,⁽²⁾ jesters, singers, ^(professional) mourners and poets who composed satires.⁽³⁾

(1) K.S. f. 88b.

(2) K.S. f. 83a.

(3) K.S. f. 83b.

That the crafts and occupations mentioned above were in the view of Ghazālī undesirable, or unlawful, does not of course mean that they were not practised. Indeed the reverse is probably the case - it is very likely that he was expressing disapproval of what were actually the conditions of his time; further from his statement, it may perhaps be inferred that bazzāzī and kharrāzī were the occupation and craft respectively which enjoyed the greatest prestige at his time. Certain acts, such as grave-digging, washing the dead, carrying the coffin in a funeral procession could be legally rewarded by wages according to Ghazālī, although they were duties which were obligatory upon the community as a whole.⁽¹⁾

The most important of the corporations in Nīshāpūr, were the hosiers, silk merchants, leather workers and rope makers.⁽²⁾ In Sāva, among others, were shoemakers, whose speciality was the making of light sandals.⁽³⁾ In Ghundījān in Fārs there were many shoemakers⁽⁴⁾ (kafshgar), and of all the crafts in Qazwīn, also, they were the most numerous in 438 (1046).⁽⁵⁾ Weaving was probably carried on extensively in most provinces. In Tūn in 444 (1052) there were 400 factories (kārgāh),

(1) K.S. f. 84a.

(2) Schefer makes this statement (N.K. 280) but gives no reference or date.

(3) I.A.X. 81.

(4) F.N. 143.

(5) N.K. 4.

where zīlūs were woven.⁽¹⁾ zīlūs and kirbās were also made in Jahram in Fārs.⁽²⁾ The latter article was woven also in Juwaim⁽³⁾ and Kavār, which made in addition reed matting (ḥaṣīr)⁽⁴⁾. Yazd was an important centre for different kinds of cloth (فرخ , مشتی , دیا etc.)⁽⁵⁾; various towns in Fārs also produced cloth. In Kāzarūn garments known as tūzī, woven from the fibre of the flax plant, were made,⁽⁶⁾ and in Sīnīz linen cloths, the finest variety being called sīnīzī, which did not however wear well;⁽⁷⁾ in Ghundijān also there were many weavers (jawlāh).⁽⁸⁾ Apart from corporations concerned with provisions, weavers, shoemakers and others, there was probably a growth in corporations which made equipment used by the army - swordmakers, saddlers and so on. Iron and steel were produced in Ṣāha (Fārs) from which swords, known as chahlakī swords, were made.⁽⁹⁾ The caliph after the death of Mas'ūd b. Muḥammad in 547 (1152) demanded help from the skilled workmen

(1) N.K. 95.

(2) F.N. 131.

(3) F.N. 132.

(4) F.N. 134.

(5) F.N. 122.

(6) F.N. 145.

(7) F.N. 149, 50.

(8) F.N. 143.

(9) F.N. 125.

in arms,⁽¹⁾ which perhaps means that he forced them to work for him. Luxury trades or crafts also no doubt continued. It seems that Iṣfahān continued to make rose-water, the bottles for which were made in Baghdād.⁽²⁾

Some of the corporations had special functions, in relation to the state or local authorities, and while they were not "state" corporations, it is possible they enjoyed special privileges or immunities, in return for performing certain duties. The sagqā, for example, may have acted as the local 'fire brigade'. When fire broke out in Baghdād in 485 (1092), Amīd ud-Dawla b. Jahīr, the caliph's wazīr rode out and collected the sagqā and continued to ride until the fire was put out.⁽³⁾

There were rare cases of corporations working for the court, whether of the caliph or the sultān. In 512 (1118/9) the caliph abolished the system of farming out the spinning

(1) Bu. 226.

(2) cf. Levy: A Baghdād Chronicle, p. 223.

(3) I.A.X.148. On another occasion when fire broke out in Baghdād, and burnt the sultān's palace, the ghaṣṣāl (washers of the dead) salvaged gold and what else they could from the sultān's palace (I.A.X. 420.) A story is told of Ibn Jahīr and a sagqā, who on the re-appointment of Ibn Jahīr to the caliph's wazirate, sacrificed his only ox, on which he carried water, giving its meat as ṣadaqa. Ibn Jahīr, hearing of this, summoned him, and gave him a camel and a sum of money and the sagqā became rich (T.S. 257).

of gold thread, from which the skilled workers in siqlātūn and al-mumazzaj, and others who worked with it had met with severe treatment from the officials over them and suffered great injury.⁽¹⁾ In Kāzarūn the weavers by custom were allowed to use the water of a certain water-channel (kārīz), in return for which they wove garments for the royal treasury (dīwāni pādishāh), which were collected by a representative of the dīwān.⁽²⁾

Of the actual membership and methods of work of the various guilds, the sources do not tell us much. Some idea of the terms of their association may be obtained from al-Ghazālī. He states that there were three kinds of association which were customary and were wrong. One of these was the association of porters (ḥammālān), and artisans (pīshavarān), who made a condition of their association that they should pool their individual earnings. In the second type of association the parties to it pooled their capital and shared the subsequent loss or gain, while the third of these "illegal" associations was that in which one person put up the money and traded on the good name or some similar advantage of another person, with whom he shared the ensuing profits.⁽³⁾

(1) I.A.X. 382.

(2) F.N. 145,6.

(3) K.S. f. 84b.

It seems likely that the craft guilds had in many cases learned men among their members. Ibn Kattān, the poet (b.478 d.558) for instance was a druggist in Baghdād.⁽¹⁾ The guilds were probably largely hereditary, and their craft handed down by tradition. They had their own organisations and were represented with the state by their officials. There are indications that the individual corporations and the corporations of the different cities as a whole, possessed to a greater or less degree some kind of corporate spirit. This was used, as in later times, to protest against government measures and the lack of justice of government officials and others. On one occasion in 512 (1118/9) when one of the followers of Mangubars the shihna of Baghdād broke into the house of a newly-married couple, wounded the bridegroom several times and went in to his wife, the bazaars were closed by way of protest. The

(1) I.K. III 584. Abū Muhammad Ja'far b. Aḥmad b. al-Ḥusain as-Sarrāj al-Baghdādī (d.Ṣafar 500 /1106) was a great narrator, and wrote beautiful taṣnīfs and delightful poetry and was one of the prominent people of his time (I.A.X.305): Abū'l Fath Aḥmad b. Muḥammad b. Aḥmad b. Sa'īd al-Haddād (b. 408 (1017/18) d. 500 1106/7) was a famous relater of traditions (I.A.X. 305). It may of course be that these two persons, although called as-sarrāj and al-haddād respectively, did not actually carry on the trade of a saddler or an ironsmith.

offender was then taken to the caliph's residence and confined for a day.⁽¹⁾

In the large cities there were, as distinct from the standing army of the sulṭān and the troops of the "landed" amīrs and others who might be stationed in the city, a local militia, known as the jund. Their duty was to protect the city to which they belonged, from attack and to preserve internal order. They were probably only called up in emergencies.⁽²⁾ In some cases it seems that the jund was responsible for the safe conduct of travellers along the roads in the neighbourhood of the city to which it belonged. In 485 (1092) when the pilgrims left Kūfa they were accompanied by the jund. On this occasion the Khafāja attacked them, killed many of the

(1) I.A.X. 380. When the siege of Mawṣil in 501 (1107/8) became protracted a body of plasterers (جصّامين), led by a plasterer named Sa'dī, agreed to hand over the city, which indicates a certain amount of organisation among the plasterers (I.A.X.320). During the siege of Mawṣil in 527 (1132/3) also there were divisions among the people and the plasterers (الجصّامين مع الخصامين ?) agreed to hand over the town, but they were put to death and the defence continued (I.A.XI.2).

(2) When Muḥammad b. Malikshāh advanced to Za'farāniyya in Rajab 501 (1108) preparatory to attacking Ḥilla, Ṣadaqa went to Maṭar with his 'askar and commanded the jund to put on arms (I.A.X.311). Ḥusām ud-Dīn Timurtāsh b. Ilghāzī appointed a deputy over Aleppo in 518 (1124) and established for him a jund (I.A.X. 436,7). Zangī b. Jirgimish after the capture of Jigirmish by Jāwulī Saqāwū in 500 (1106/7) distributed goods (amwāl), horses and other things to the jund after he had been proclaimed in his father's stead in Mawṣil (I.A.X. 293).

jund and routed the remainder.⁽¹⁾ On rare occasions the jund were sent on expeditions. Šadaqa, for example, sent a body of the jund in 500 to help Hammād b. Abī'l Jabr take al-Baṭīḥa from Ismā'īl Arslānjiq.⁽²⁾ The official in charge of the jund seems to have varied locally. In Baghdād the caliph's wazīr appears to have called up the jund in emergencies⁽³⁾ while in Basrā the 'amīd seems to have been in command of the jund.⁽⁴⁾ Payment of the jund in some cases took the form of iqṭā's (see Chapter V). In Baghdād the jund were sometimes paid in cash and sometimes in kind. In 552 (1157/8) during the siege of Baghdād the caliph, fearing a scarcity of food, opened the granaries and dispersed to the troops in lieu of their allowances (الاعطيات) dates and grain; . they took this and sold it in the bazaars and bought with the proceeds what they needed of other things.⁽⁵⁾ The same difficulty was probably found in paying the jund as in paying the standing army. Muḥammad b. Malikshāh while being besieged in Iṣfahān by Barkyāruq in 495 (1102) was forced twice in succession to ask loans of the prominent people of the city to satisfy the demands of the

(1) I.A.X. 147.

(2) I.A.X. 303.

(3) See Chapter VIII.

(4) I.A.X. 293.

(5) Bu.229; see also I.A.XI.141 who states the caliph's wazīr dispersed wheat to the jund instead of dīnārs.

jund.⁽¹⁾ Similarly the jund like the standing army appear to have tended to oppress the people. Muḥammad b. Malikshāh in 498 (1105) restrained some of the jund of Iṣfahān from oppressing the people.⁽²⁾

Lastly in many of the large cities there were Jewish and Christian communities. These, as stated above, lived in their own quarters, had their own organisations and took little part in the life of the muslim community. They enjoyed freedom of religion and appointed their own officials, subject in the case of their leaders probably to the confirmation of the sultān or his officials.⁽³⁾ The Jewish community was probably largely occupied in trade and commerce. Benjamin of Tudela relates that the Head of the Captivity in Baghdād had a fixed weekly revenue arising from the hospices of the Jews, markets and merchants.⁽⁴⁾ The references in Arabic sources regarding Jewish commercial activity are scanty, but it is probable the Jews filled an important part in the life of the community as bankers and moneylenders (جُهْد)⁽⁵⁾ Many of the Jews and Christians were probably physicians. A well-known doctor was

(1) I.A.X. 228.

(2) I.A.X. 273.

(3) cf. Tritton: Islam and the Protected Religions, J.R.A.S. 1931.

(4) Jewish Travellers p.49.

(5) cf. Fischel: Jews in the life of Medieval Islam ... p. 2 et seq.

the Christian Ibn al-Talmid (d. Šafar 560, Dec.-Jan.1164-5).⁽¹⁾

Benjamin of Tudela, gives the numbers of the Jewish communities in various cities. He travelled, it is true, after the death of Sanjar, but from his figures an idea of the numbers of the Jewish communities in the cities of the Great Seljūq empire can nevertheless be formed, for it is unlikely that a very substantial change took place in the few years which elapsed between the Great Seljūq period and the travels of Benjamin of Tudela. In Baghdād Benjamin states there were about 40,000 Jews,⁽²⁾ in Karkisiya about 500, in Anbār 3,000, in Hadara (=Ḥaḍr ?) 15,000, in 'Ukbarā 10,000, in Raḥbā on the Euphrates 2,000, in Mawṣil about 7,000 and in Jazīra b. 'Umar 4,000.⁽³⁾ In Hamadān he records that there were 30,000 Israelites, in Iṣfahān 15,000,⁽⁴⁾ in Nihāvand 4,000,⁽⁵⁾ in 'Imādiyya in Kurdistān some 25,000,⁽⁶⁾ in Shīrāz 10,000,⁽⁴⁾ in Ghazna 80,000, in Samarqand 50,000⁽⁴⁾ and in Bahrein 5,000.⁽⁷⁾ These latter figures however were given by Benjamin on hearsay, and were probably much exaggerated. At the beginning of the

(1) I.K.III 601.

(2) Jewish Travellers p. 47.

(3) *ibid.* p. 42,3.

(4) *ibid.* 53.

(5) *ibid.* 49.

(6) *ibid.* 50.

(7) *ibid.* 57.

Seljūq period there were Jewish and Christian communities in Nīshāpūr also.⁽¹⁾

Under Tughril Beg and Alp Arslān the ^{dhimmīs} zimmīs, although free to carry on their own occupations and to have their own community life, took little part in the administration of the Great Seljūq empire. Under the subsequent rulers there was generally speaking probably little discrimination against the zimmīs, but from time to time there was a revival of anti-zimmī feeling. In 484 (1091/2) a Jew called Abū Sa'd b. Simhā, who was Malikshāh and Nizām ul-Mulk's wakīl in Baghdād, after a huckster had struck him in the street went with Gawhar Ā'in, the shihna, to the 'askar to complain of Abū Shujā', the caliph's wazīr. When they left, the caliph issued a decree enforcing the zimmī to wear distinguishing marks on their clothes, and thereupon the zimmīs began to flee from Baghdād.⁽²⁾ In 515 (1121/2) the sultān also made it obligatory for the zimmīs to wear distinguishing marks on their clothes.⁽³⁾

As distinct from discrimination by the government against the zimmīs, there may have also been popular outbreaks against them from time to time. In 542 (1147/8) the church of Takrīt was sacked.⁽⁴⁾ In 447 (1055/6) when the maphrian had entered

(1) cf. Abū Sa'īd b. Abī'l Khair: *Asrār ut-Tawhīd* pp.106; 107; 172.

(2) I.A.X. 123,4; cf. T.S. 283; Bu. 72.

(3) I.A.X. 420.

(4) Tritton p. 313.

Takrīt, he had been stoned by the muslims. Somewhat later the Christians of Takrīt were scattered and the maphrain fled to Mawṣil and did not return till 506 (1112/3), when a new governor, an Armenian, who was well disposed towards the Christians, had taken office.⁽¹⁾

The conditions of trade and industry during the Seljūq period no doubt showed considerable fluctuations. The state of insecurity and disturbance prevailing in Persia and the neighbourhood at the end of the Būyid period and the numerous expeditions and skirmishes in the early years of Great Seljūq rule can hardly have been favourable to trade, but under the comparative security of the rule of Alp Arslān and Malikshāh it would seem natural that there should have been a great revival in trade. If this was in fact the case, it no doubt declined again after the death of Malikshāh during the ensuing period of anarchy, and at no subsequent time during the dominion of the Great Seljūqs were conditions as favourable as during the reign of Malikshāh, although there were interludes of comparative security and order, when trade may once more have improved, notably towards the end of the reign of Muḥammad b. Malikshāh and part of the reign of Sanjar. The connection between security and prosperity is also seen within the various

(1) Tritton p. 322.

provinces and districts of the Great Seljūq empire. Kamāl ud-Dīn records that Qasīm ud-Dawla Āqsunqur, muqṭa' of Aleppo reproved evildoers, destroyed highway robbers, pursued brigands and thieves everywhere and exterminated them, and wrote to the surrounding districts to do likewise so that the roads should be safe. As a result the roads became secure and the people were able to go to places they had been unable to go to before for fear of robbers and Aleppo became prosperous in his days because of the arrival of merchants and importers (جلايلين) from all quarters.⁽¹⁾

Under Malikshāh the passage of his armies through the country was, to some branches of the trading community, a source of profit - particularly to those who dealt in provisions. His control was such that his followers paid for what they took. Ibn Khallikān relates that "when Malikshāh entered Iṣfahān, Baghdād or any other city, accompanied by his followers, the number of whom was immense, a great diminution ensued in the price of provisions and other objects, so that the persons who sought to gain their livelihood furnished provisions to the troops with much profit to themselves."⁽²⁾ Under the later Seljūqs however the position was different; the country was

(1) Kamāl ud-Dīn 704,5.

(2) I.K.III. 443.

impoverished by the frequent passage of armies - followers of the sultān, of minor members of the Seljūq family, of the individual amīrs, and unemployed soldiery - who, in most cases, lived upon the country as they passed through it. Under such conditions trade can hardly have prospered. Ibn Balkhī, the author of the Fārs Nāma, who wrote during the reign of Muḥammad b. Malikshāh comments upon the adverse effect of the lack of security and justice (in Fārs) upon trade (تجارت).⁽¹⁾ Taxes, such as customs, transit and market dues were levied on merchandise (see Chapter II), but it does not appear that these unduly hampered trade.

Ibn Balkhī gives various facts concerning the trade of Fārs. Fruits, cotton and flax were exported from Fārs.⁽²⁾ In Quṭruh there were iron mines, but it is not stated if they were worked.⁽³⁾ In the Persian Gulf there was a certain amount of sea trade carried on. Sirāf was dependent upon its sea-borne trade and when Khumārtegin, governor of Fārs, was unable to recapture Sirāf from the Khān of Qais Island, who had taken

(1) F.N. 146.

(2) Dried apricots (zard ālū) were exported from Surmaq and Arjūmān to all places (F.N. 124); nuts were taken from Tīr Murdān and Jūyakān to Shīrāz and other neighbouring districts (F.N. 144); much cotton was produced in Jahram and exported (F.N. 131); linseed (زرد) and flax were abundant in Mahrubān and were exported (F.N. 150).

(3) F.N. 168.

it, no merchant dared bring a ship to Sirāf for shelter on the way to Kirmān, Mahrubān, Dawraq or Baṣrā and only leather and pots and things the people of Fārs needed were brought by the road of Sirāf, which for this reason became ruined.⁽¹⁾ Rīshahr also depended chiefly on sea trade.⁽²⁾ Qais Island at the time of Benjamin of Tudela was an entrepôt for trade between Persia, India and Arabia. He mentions that "merchants who come from India and the Islands encamp there with their wares. Moreover men from Shinar, el-Yemen and Persia bring hither all sorts of silk, purple and flax, cotton, hemp, worked wool, wheat, barley, millet, rye and all sorts of food, and lentils of every description and they trade with one another whilst the men of India bring great quantities of spices thither. The islanders act as middlemen and earn their livelihood thereby."⁽³⁾

In addition to commodities for which there was always some demand, the silk trade was probably one of the most important. Silk and other materials from Khūzistān, of which the best known was probably Shustarī cloth, Balkh and elsewhere were dealt in. There may also have been trade in materials

(1) F.N. 136,7.

(2) "From Rīshahr only goods of the sea (مأكولات دریایی) which are brought in ships, and fish and dates and flax are produced and the people of that place mostly engage in sea trade." (F.N. 149).

(3) Jewish Travellers, p.57.

with Egypt and Byzantium.⁽¹⁾

The prices of various commodities fluctuated considerably.⁴
The main factors causing this were the passage of troops from one place to another and the consequent increase in the demand in the area in which the army was,⁽²⁾ and calamities such as drought and famine,⁽³⁾ the latter often the result of plunder

(1) cf. The qaṣīda by Anwarī beginning

ای مسلمانان فغان از دور پیغمبر منبری

in which he likens material to the work of the factory (kārgāh) of Shushtar, and states that owing to the skill of the people of Balkh he has on as a veil a fine linen garment of Egypt (لبی مصری) and has a Byzantine bed (روبی بستر) (Journal of Philology IV. p. 36-40).

(2) e.g. During Muhammad b. Malikshāh's stay in Baghdād in 505 (1111/2) prices rose, but fell on his departure from the city (Q.181).

(3) When Nāṣiri Khusraw reached Iṣfahān in 444 (1052) there had been a severe famine, but when he arrived, they were harvesting barley and $1\frac{1}{2}$ mann of wheaten bread (nāni gandum) was 1 dirham, as also was 3 mann of barley bread, and people there said they had never seen in the town less than 8 mann of bread for 1 diram (N.K. 93)

In 448 (1056/7) the roads were closed in 'Irāq for fear of plunder, and there was famine followed by plague in that province. 1 riṭl of meat sold for 1 qīrāt, and fowls, quince, and pomegranates all rose to 1 dīnār and everything in a like manner (I.A.IX. 434). In 449 (1057/8) there was again famine in Baghdād and 'Irāq, and a small bag of white flour sold for 30 dīnārs and a bag of barley and millet (?) for 8 dīnārs (I.A.IX. 438). In 493 (1099/1100) there was famine in 'Irāq and the kurr of wheat reached 70 dīnārs and greatly surpassed that on some occasions (I.A.X. 204). In 502 (1108/9) the Tigris flooded and prices greatly increased in 'Irāq and a bundle of flour mixed with bran (الكاء الدقيق المشكاز) exceeded 10 imāmi dīnārs, and bread was lacking and the people lived on dates, beans and greens, and as for the people of the Ṣawād, they only ate during the whole of Ramaḍān and half Shawwāl hashīsh and mulberries (I.A.X. 330).

(continued overleaf)

(4) See next page.

by the soldiery.⁽¹⁾ The relation of prices to security is illustrated in the following. In 543 (1148/9) a number of amīrs, who had deserted Mas'ūd b. Muḥammad, came to Baghdād. The people of the Ṣawād came in flight to Baghdād, their goods having been taken, and many perished from hunger and nakedness. Prices meanwhile rose in 'Irāq and food became scarce.⁽²⁾ The caliph and the populace opposed these amīrs, who dispersed and in 544 (1149/50) prices again fell in 'Irāq and the people of the Ṣawād returned to their villages.⁽³⁾ In 543 (1148/9) prices also rose in most of the provinces of Khurāsān and the Jibāl, and in Iṣfahān, Fārs, al-Jazīra and Syria.⁽²⁾

In 476 (1083/4) - a year during which there was in all provinces peace - cheapness was general; a kurr of excellent wheat fetched in Baghdād 10 dīnārs.⁽⁴⁾ In 454 (1062) also,

(Note 4 from previous page.

The best cord (rīsmān) in Nīshāpūr sold at 1 diram (weight) for 5 dirams, whereas in Egypt 1 diram of cord sold at 3 maghribi dīnārs (= $3\frac{1}{2}$ Nīshāpūrī dīnārs) (N.K. 52)

(1) e.g. High prices became general in Dāmghān after the Khurāsānī 'askar had sacked it in 494 (1100/1), so that the food of the people was corpses and dogs. (I.A.X. 207)

(2) I.A.XI. 90.

(3) I.A.XI. 96. In 517 (1123/4), a year when Dubais b. Ṣadaqa was plundering the countryside, prices rose in Baghdād until bread reached 1 dīnār per 6 riṭl (Q. 209).

(4) I.A.X. 85.

when all provinces were comparatively peaceful, there was a general lowering of prices throughout the whole country. In Baṣrā 1000 riṭl of dates sold for 800 qīraṭs.⁽¹⁾ On the other hand after the khutba had been read in Baghdād in the name of Barkyāruq in Jumādī I 497 (1104) high prices prevailed and prevented trade.⁽²⁾ In the domains of Sharaf ud-Dawla Muslim b. Quraish security was general and also cheapness.⁽³⁾ During the days of Naṣr ud-Dawla Ibn Marwān, who at the height of his influence was a powerful ruler, prices fell and the people made a show of wealth, presumably because they were fairly secure in their possessions.⁽⁴⁾

The social life of the urban population was probably largely connected with the religious institution: that is to say festivals and ceremonies were largely religious, and the mosque probably still played an important part in the life of the community as a general meeting place. The death of a member of the ruling house, or a prominent person was usually the occasion for public mourning.⁽⁵⁾

The accession of a sultān, his betrothal or marriage seems

(1) I.A.X. 15.

(2) I.A.X. 261.

(3) I.A.X. 91.

(4) I.A.X. 11.

(5) When Maḥmūd b. Muḥammad's grandmother died in Marv (515) (1121/2) he held an assembly to mourn her in Baghdād, the like of which the people had not seen. (I.A.X.419) ~~On the death of~~

to have been in Baghdād and probably also in the capital, and possibly in other large cities, the occasion of public rejoicing, the scattering of dīnārs among the people and of decorating the city. When Malikshāh's daughter's bridal outfit was transported to the caliph's palace in 480 (1087), Gawhar Ā'in, the amīr Bursuq and others preceded it and the people of the Mu'allī Canal quarter scattered dīnārs and garments for them.⁽¹⁾ On the betrothal of Fāṭima, Muḥammad b. Malikshāh's daughter to the caliph Muqtafī in 531 (1136/7) and on the betrothal of Muqtafī's daughter to Mas'ūd b. Muḥammad in 534 (1139/40) jewels and cash were scattered.⁽²⁾ When Muḥammad b. Malikshāh's sister was conducted to the caliph's palace on the occasion of her marriage to the caliph al-Mustazhir in Ramaḍān 504 (1111), rejoicings took place "the like of which the people had not seen",⁽³⁾ and when Fāṭima, Muḥammad b. Malikshāh's daughter was married to the caliph al-Muqtafī in Jumādī II 534 (1140), Baghdād was decorated for ten days.⁽⁴⁾

It was over religious questions that it was most easy to rouse public opinion and to incite the mob to acts of violence.

(1) I.A.X. 106.

(2) T.S. 305.

(3) I.A.X. 339.

(4) I.A.XI. 51.

(Note continued from previous page.)

Ahmad b. Malikshāh the walī 'ahh in 481 (1088/9), in Marv, the population in Baghdād held an assembly to mourn for him for seven days in the caliph's palace. No one rode a horse and the women went out wailing in the bazaars and many people collected in Karkh to walk about and to mourn, and they blackened their doors as a sign of grief (I.A. X.112).

In 504 (1111) when a deputation came from Aleppo to Baghdād to complain of the Franks, on the first Friday of Sha'bān, one of the sharīfs of Aleppo, a group of Ṣūfīs, merchants and faqīhs appeared at the jāmi' us-sultān calling for help. They broke the mimbars and prevented the people from prayers, and on the following Friday they behaved in a like manner at the jāmi' of the caliph.⁽¹⁾ In 534 (1139/40) Kamāl ud-Dīn b. ash-Shahrazūrī came from Zangī to Baghdād to ask for help against the Crusaders. He could obtain no satisfaction and eventually engineered a popular outcry. He went to a faqīh, gave him some money and told him to give it to the awbāsh and strangers in Baghdād with instructions to rise and demand help on the following Friday in the jāmi' ul-qaṣr when the khatīb got up in the mimbar and in the jāmi' us-sultān. His ruse was successful and Mas'ūd b. Muḥammad after this outcry agreed to send an expedition.⁽²⁾

Under the Great Seljūqs doctrinal dissensions and sectarian riots were a common occurrence, especially in Baghdād. These riots although not usually resulting in great loss of life were accompanied by looting and the destruction of buildings. In 443 (1051/2) there was a dispute between the Sunnīs and the

(1) Q. 173.

(2) A.M. 111.

Shī'as of west Baghdād, the latter wishing to put over a gate in Karkh an inscription in praise of 'Alī. A riot ensued in which the shrines of Kāzīmain were burnt and plundered.⁽¹⁾ In 469 (1076/7) there was a riot in the sūq of the Nizāmiyya during which the Ḥanbalīs killed a number of people.⁽²⁾ During the wazirate of Abū Shujā' to the caliph, rioting between the Sunnī and the Shī'a exceeded all limits, and the caliph al-Muqtadī ordered Abū Shujā' to destroy the houses of the leaders.⁽³⁾ In Jumādī I 482 (1089) there was rioting between the people of Karkh and other quarters and a large number of persons were killed between them. The people of (various) quarters gained the mastery over a large part of the quarter of the Dajāj Canal and plundered and burnt it. In the same year there was a second outbreak of rioting; the people of Karkh rose up and plundered the street of Ibn Abī Awf; they also sacked the house of Abū'l Faḍl Khairūn. The people of the Baṣrā Gate also took part in these riots. After the second outburst of rioting in Baghdād in 482 had subsided, the people of Karkh wrote on their mosques "the best of men after the prophet of God is Abū Bakr then 'Umar then 'Uthmān then 'Alī.⁽⁴⁾

(1) I.A.IX. 394-6.

(2) Bu. 50.

(3) T.S. 285,6.

(4) I.A.X. 117,8.

The caliphs, sultans and shihnas all failed in persuading the Sunnīs and Shī'as of Baghdād to live in amity, but in Sha'bān 502 (1109) the two parties made peace. In this month the Sunnīs prepared to make a pilgrimage to the tomb of Mus'ab b. az-Zubayr, which they had abandoned for many years, to prevent the occurrence of riots on that account. They equipped themselves to go, and expressed their intention of passing through Karkh, and the people of that district agreed to abandon their opposition to them. The Sunnīs then began to send the people of all quarters alone, and with them decorations and weapons and many things. The people of the Bāb al-Marātib quarter came out with a wooden elephant mounted by men with arms, and they all set out to pass through Karkh. The inhabitants of that district came out to meet them with smoke and perfume, water and cloths (المبرد), and many weapons, showed joy, and accompanied them until they left the district. The Shī'a then went out at night from Karkh to the tomb of Mūsā b. Ja'far and other shrines and none of the Sunnīs opposed them, and the people wondered at this. When the Sunnīs returned from the pilgrimage to Mus'ab, the people of Karkh again met them with rejoicing, and the people of the Bāb al-Marātib quarter broke their elephant at the bridge at the Ḥarb Gate and a group of people read for them "Did you not see what your Lord did to the people of the elephant" to the end of the sūra.⁽¹⁾

(1) I.A.X. 329.

In Sha'bān 509 (1116) there was rioting among the Sunnīs, which spread to the people generally.⁽¹⁾ In 517 (1123/4) after the caliph had defeated Dubais b. Ṣadaqa the populace of Baghdād sought to avenge themselves on the Shī'a and plundered the shrine at the Bāb al-Tibn,⁽²⁾ and in 529 (1134/5) the populace again fell upon the Shī'a after the shihna had seized the caliph's estates.⁽³⁾

Sectarian riots were not however confined to Baghdād. In Nīshāpūr riots were also frequent. After the siege of Nīshāpūr by an amīr had been raised in 489(1096), riots broke out between the Karāmiyya and other sections of the people, and many were killed. Victory was to the Shāfi'īs and Ḥanbalīs.⁽⁴⁾ When the Ghuzz left Khurāsān for Jam after the capture of Sanjar, there were riots in Nīshāpūr every night in one quarter or another, because of religious differences and ancient hatreds.⁽⁵⁾ At āshūra 510 there was a great riot in Tūs at the shrine of 'Alī b. Mūsā ar-Riḍā, which had arisen from a quarrel between an 'Alid and one of the faqīhs of Tūs. The people of Tūs appeared, surrounded the shrine and destroyed it,

(1) I.A.X. 360.

(2) A.M. 49, 50.

(3) A.M. 90.

(4) I.A.X. 169, 171.

(5) R.D. f. 250a. R.S. 182.

killing whoever they found in it and plundering. The people of Mashhad (then) abandoned the khutba on Fridays in it.⁽¹⁾ As suggested above it was through membership of a corporation that the individual citizens were able to give voice to their corporate feeling and indeed to enjoy civic functions. There remains one other interesting form of corporate expression which was fairly widespread in Great Seljūq times, namely the 'ayyār. Owing to the repressive measures of the Turkish rulers any attempt by the citizens to influence the course of events was ruthlessly repressed and the energies of the citizens tended to find expression in secret societies such as the Ismā'īlīs and undisciplined mobs which from time to time broke out in Baghdād, and in other cities.⁽²⁾ These bodies, usually known as 'ayyār and in Syria as aḥdath, had their own leaders, organisation and rites of initiation. The latter resembled those

(1) I.A.X. 366.

(2) When the Ghuzz plundered Nīshāpūr in 548/9 (1153/4) the 'ayyār also plundered the city but more severely than the Ghuzz (I.A.XI. 120). Jevdet quotes an outbreak of the 'ayyār in Nīshāpūr on the rise of the Seljūqs circa 430 which is mentioned in the Masālik al-Abṣār of Shihāb ud-Dīn b. Fadlullah al-'Umarī (Ms. Aya Sofya 3419 f.25) on the authority of an earlier work, no longer extant, but the former existence of which Jevdet confirms by its mention in a manuscript of as-Siyāq (Istanbul Köprülü 1152 f.32), (L'Education aux foyers des Gens des Métiers en Asie Mineure et Syrie au XII^e siècle jusqu'à notre temps, Vol.I, Supplement à un chapitre de la Relation du Voyage d'Ibn Battuta, Istanbul 1350/51/1932, p.35,6.

of the futuwwa organisations of which the 'ayyār were in origin probably an offshoot.⁽¹⁾

In Baghdād, in Great Seljūq times, the 'ayyār had lost altogether the moral aspect of the earlier bodies, and were no more than mobs who took up arms, robbed and murdered the population and spread terror through the city when opportunity offered.⁽²⁾ These bodies threatened at times to completely disorganise local life, and at times were even a threat to the state. In 532 (1137/8) the 'ayyār increased in power. The wālī of Baghdād, Abū'l Karam feared their leader Ibn Bakrān,

(1) cf. Qābūs Nāma, Chapter XLIV.

(2) On the death of Tughril Beg the 'ayyār became numerous (I.A.X. 17). In Jumādī I 482 (1089) rioting in Baghdād was so bad that the caliph sent to Ṣadaqa b. Mazyad, who sent an army to Baghdād; this pursued the seditious persons and 'ayyārīn who fled (I.A.X. 118). In Sha'bān 493 (1100) the importance of the 'ayyār in the western quarter of Baghdād increased and the caliph ordered Kamāl ud-Dawla Yumn to cleanse the city; he accordingly seized a number of the prominent 'ayyār and the remainder fled (I.A.X. 204). In 497 (1103/4) there was a riot in Baghdād and the 'ayyār spread abroad (I.A.X. 259). In 512 (1118/9) the 'ayyār became numerous in the west side of Baghdād. The nā'ib of the shihna crossed to them with fifty Turkish ghulāms but was defeated and the following day he attacked them with two hundred ghulāms, but failed to defeat them and the 'ayyār plundered Quṭuftā (I.A.X. 383). When Mas'ud b. Muḥammad besieged Baghdād in 530 (1135/6) there were outbreaks of plundering and murder by the 'ayyār especially in the western quarters of the city (I.A.XI. 26; 29). In 532 (1137/8) also, during the fighting between Albaqish the shihna of Baghdād and Seljūqshāh b. Muḥammad, the 'ayyār, plundered, murdered and increased in power so that they attacked the rich openly, taking from them what they wanted and seizing goods from the heads of the porters (I.A.XI. 40).

and ordered his nephew Abū'l Qāsim, the warden (ḥāmī) of the Bāb ul-Azaj to put on the sarāwīl of his futuwwa (i.e. to be initiated into his order) so that he (Abū'l Karam) should be safe from his (Ibn Bakrān's) evil. Meanwhile the power of Ibn Bakrān and his companion Ibn Bazzāz continued to increase, and reached such a pitch that they wanted to strike coins in their own names in Anbār. At this the shihna and the caliph's wazīr Sharaf ud-Dīn az-Zainabī sent to the wālī threatening to kill him if he did not kill Ibn Bakrān. The latter was in the habit of coming to the house of Abū'l Karam's nephew and drinking with him, and so one night when Ibn Bakrān came, he killed him. Ibn Bazzāz was then also taken and killed, together with a body of ruffians (ḥarāmiyya) and the people lived again in security.⁽¹⁾ In 538 (1143/4) the question of the 'ayyār once more became serious. The reason for this was that the son of the wazīr and the son of Qāwurd, the brother of a wife of the sultān, had made a league with them, sharing what they took. Bihruz the shihna was for this reason unable to restrain the 'ayyār and probably did not dare to report the matter to the sultān.⁽²⁾ Finally Ildegiz, the nā'ib shihna, brought the matter to Mas'ūd b. Muḥammad's knowledge and was authorised by him to seize the son of the wazīr and Ibn Qāwurd. The former

(1) I.A.XI. 41,2.

(2) I.A.XI. 51; 63.

fled but the latter was seized and crucified, and those of the 'ayyār, who did not fly, were also seized.⁽¹⁾

In Syria the aḥdath were a similar movement to the 'ayyār, but had more the character of town bands who defended the city alongside the regular troops. These bodies were found especially in Damascus and Aleppo.⁽²⁾ In 487 (1094) when Āqsunqur Qasīm ud-Dawla set out against Tutush, with him were a group of the aḥdath of Aleppo, Dailam and Khurāsān.⁽³⁾ A man known as al-Mijann, the ra'īs ul-aḥdath in Aleppo in 489 (1096) had many followers and attained to considerable power. He appeared before Junāḥ ud-Dawla Husain one day, asked and received permission to kill Yūsuf b. Abaq who, he said, was stirring up trouble. After killing Yūsuf he remained in Aleppo doing what he pleased; he then desired to govern alone and to exclude the authority of the king Ruḍwān. He said to Junāḥ ud-Dawla, "The king Ruḍwān commanded me to kill you, so take heed to yourself," and Junāḥ ud-Dawla accordingly fled to Homs which belonged to him. After however al-Mijann had established himself and begun to govern alone, Ruḍwān became jealous of him and killed him.⁽⁴⁾

(1) I.A.XI. 63. The M.Z. also mentions outbreaks of the 'ayyār in Baghdād in this year (pp.110,11).

(2) Gibb: The Damascus Chronicle of the Crusades pp. 36,7.

(3) Kamāl ud-Dīn 708.

(4) I.A.X. 174. This ra'īs ul-aḥdath was originally a wood-cutter.

CHAPTER VIII.

THE SELJŪQS AND THE CALIPHS OF BAGHDAD.

From the point of view of the history of Islām, the importance of the Great Seljūq period is that, following as it did a period of Shī'ite supremacy, it not only restored Sunnī rule, but to some extent also organised the religious institution. The Seljūqs had been converted to or become familiar with Islām at the time of Seljūq, who was converted when he migrated to the dār ul-islām.¹ While there is little reason to doubt the sincerity of the belief of the Seljūq royal house in Islām, there is little evidence to show that the Ghuzz hordes as distinct from the Seljūq family were much influenced by Islām. Further the attitude of the Seljūqs themselves towards Islām, sincere though it probably was in some aspects,² was nevertheless governed by political motives. Their natural

¹ I.A. IX.322.

² Holy men were treated with respect by various members of the Seljūq family. It is related that Tughril Beg and Chaghri Beg made a pilgrimage to Abū Sa'id b. Abī'l Khair before the battle of Dendengān (Abū Sa'id b. Abī'l Khair: *Asrār ut-Tawhīd*, p.129). Ibrāhīm Yanāl also visited Abū Sa'id on another occasion (*ibid.* 193). Tughril Beg once when passing through Hamadān alighted with al-Kundurī before Bābā Tāhir, Bābā Ja'far and Shaikh Hamsha (R.S.98-9). Sanjar also accorded great respect to the 'ulamā and was intimate with them, and used to have private sessions with hermits and ascetics (R.S. 171). He wore the robe (*khirqā*) of a certain Qutb al-Chālūsī and visited his retreat. His *wazīr*, Naṣīr ud-Dīn Muḥammad b. Abī Tawba, hated and persecuted Qutb al-Chālūsī and was always trying to persuade his master that he was a hypocrite and an impostor (*Ibn Isfandiyyār*, 80-1). Sanjar and his army are said to have been the followers (*murīd*) of Shaikh Mahdī M'arvāzī (*Asrār ut-Tawhīd* 308).

tendency as Turks was probably towards orthodoxy, but be that as it may, for political reasons, since they were in opposition to the Shi'a Būyids, they were pro-Sunnī and anti-Shī'a. Alp Arslān is reported by Nizām ul-Mulk to have said, "We have taken the country by conquest; we are all pure muslims and these 'Irāqīs are of bad religion and partisans of the Dailamites. To-day God most High has made the Turks exalted on this account that they are pure muslims and do not recognise desire and innovation."¹ This is a political valuation, and perhaps illustrates the attitude of the early Seljūqs. It is, moreover, significant that the strict orthodoxy of the early Seljūq sultāns was considerably modified later, apparently from the time of Malikshāh onwards, by which time the Būyids had been defeated and deprived of their power. Nizām ul-Mulk protests against this relaxation and states that "in the time of Maḥmūd, Mas'ūd, Tughril Beg and Alp Arslān, no Zoroastrian, Jew, Christian or rāfiḍī, had the audacity to come into the open country (ṣaḥrā) or before the great ... and the Turks never gave them an office, saying, 'these are the co-religionists of the Dailamites and their well-wishers.' ... But now the matter has reached such a pitch that the dargāh and dīwān are full of them, and every Turk has ten or twenty of them round him, and they follow a policy of allowing few Khurāsānīs to enter their door and court to find means of subsistence.

¹ S.N. 140.

Tughril and Alp Arslān, when they heard a Turk or an amīr had admitted a rāfiḍī, reproached him."¹

The religious policy of the Great Seljūqs can be divided broadly into negative and positive measures. Among the former were measures against the Shi'a, which were largely, as suggested above, the outcome of political circumstances. Similarly, the opposition of the Great Seljūqs to the Fāṭimids was dictated primarily by political motives. Among the latter was the organisation of the religious institution and of the madrasas, which during the Great Seljūq period were Sunni strongholds.² By the strict observance of religious rites and duties, and by public manifestations of respect³ the

¹ S.N. 139.

² The organisation of the madrasas will not be dealt with here.

³ Every Friday at the regular hours Tughril Beg attended the five prayers (in the mosque); he fasted every Monday and Thursday (I.A. X.18; I.K. III.227), wrought numerous works of charity, founded mosques and used to say, "I should be ashamed to appear before God were I to build for myself a dwelling and not erect a mosque beside it (I.K. III.227). Both Tughril Beg and Alp Arslān were accompanied by a "private" imām on expeditions (cf. I.A. IX.445; X.44). When the Seljūqs entered Nishāpūr in Ramaḍān in 429(1038), Tughril Beg forbade his followers to plunder on the ground that it was the month of Ramaḍān, and ordered them to delay until the breaking of the fast (Bu. 7). Malikshāh was apparently zealous in the cause of religion. Among his good works were the construction of tanks and inns (نظارة) on the road to the Hijāz, and the abolition of protection (khafārat) on the pilgrim road; he also gave an iqṭā' and grant to the amīr of Mecca and Medina and presents to the Arabs of the desert employed in the Ka'ba (R.S. 131; T.G. 444; Nuzhat ul-Qulūb 162-3). He built in Baghdād the jāmi' us-sultān which was commenced in Muharram 485 (1092) (I.A. X.134-5; I.K. III.441). In the territory which he conquered from

Seljūqs sought to increase the prestige of the religious institution and to strengthen it against further reverses. Religious affairs generally were placed under the supervision of the wazīr as stated in Chapter II. Further the qādī, whose appointment was theoretically vested in the caliph, was in most cases appointed by the temporal ruler and was, in fact, a servant of the state.¹ Nizām ul-Mulk makes it clear that his appointment and dismissal was in the hands of the temporal ruler: the qādīs were the nā'ibs (deputies) of the sultān, but at the same time he admits - perhaps as a concession to orthodoxy - that they were the nā'ibs also of the caliph; it is evident, however, from his exposition that their responsibility was in fact to the sultān and not to the caliph. "All the qādīs," he states, "are the nā'ibs of the sovereign and it is indispensable for the latter to implement the authority of the qādīs and the respect in which they are held must be complete, for they are the nā'ibs of the caliph, whose mantle has devolved upon them. They are the delegates and representatives of the ruler and do his work."²

(Note continued from previous page.)

Byzantium he placed fifty minbars (Bu. 52). Together with Nizām ul-Mulk he visited various shrines including those of 'Alī and Husain, Mūsā b. Ja'far, Ahmad b. Hanbal, Abū Hanīfa and others in 479 (1087) (I.A. X.103), and the tomb of the Imām Riḍā in Tūs (I.A. X.143).

¹ The use of qādīs as envoys by the Seljūqs is noticeable. This was perhaps partly due to the respect in which the qādīs were held by the population; on the other hand it was possibly partly due to the policy of the Seljūqs in incorporating the religious hierarchy within the framework of the government.

² S.N. 40-1.

Nizām ul-Mulk also regarded the qāḍī as an important link in the system by which justice and security ~~was~~ maintained in the kingdom, and stressed the necessity of preserving intact his prestige.¹ In fact, the main function of the qāḍī was probably to watch over the religious institution on behalf of the government. Not only was the qāḍī included among the ranks of the officials of the temporal government, but an attempt was made to incorporate also the religious classes generally. By this means control of the religious institution was to be centralized. This policy, although perhaps inspired partly by respect for religion, was primarily due to political motives. Nizām ul-Mulk considered it obligatory upon the sultān to hold the jurists in respect and to give them means of subsistence from the public treasury; the sovereign was also to honour and respect those who abandoned themselves to the practice of devotion and abstinence. Nizām ul-Mulk further maintained that it was necessary for the sultān to admit to his proximity once or twice a week doctors of religion and to listen to the commandments of God from them and to hear the commentaries of the Qur'ān, the traditions of the prophet and the stories of just kings.² The 'ulamā', in fact, under the early Great

¹ S.N. 38.

² S.N. 54-5.

Seljūq sultāns received generous patronage and many of them became famous thereby.¹ In Ramaḍān learned disputes between the 'ulamā used to take place in Alp Arslān's audience between afternoon prayer and iftār.² It is interesting to note that Nizām ul-Mulk apparently desired to extend to the religious field also the system of espionage which he recommended so strongly in the general administration of the country. In order that subordinate officials should conduct their affairs in accordance with the commands of religion, he proposed the ruler should appoint in every town a god-fearing man to watch over and to give information about the condition of the 'āmil, qāḍī, muḥtasib, and the subjects.³

The establishment of the religious institution by the Great Seljūqs led to a reconsideration of the position of the sultān vis-à-vis the caliph. The office of caliph was a stumbling-block to the attempt of the Seljūqs to centralize and to control the religious institution. Except for a period during the reign of Malikshāh (see below) the Great Seljūqs nevertheless do not appear to have contemplated the abolition of the caliphate. Indeed, it was politically important for them to preserve the institution. By adopting

¹ R.S. 19-20.

² N. f.35a.

³ S.N. 43.

the rôle of defenders of Sunnism they were able to acquire a certain prestige, while by obtaining the sanction of the caliph, their rule received legal validity. Further, since the Ghaznavids had received diplomas from the caliph, the Seljūqs, perhaps in order to place themselves on a level with the Ghaznavids, also insisted on receiving diplomas.¹ The Seljūqs, however, while maintaining the caliphate in existence, made it clear that the caliph was to exercise no temporal power, and sought further to control him by installing their own nominees in his wazirate and by marriage alliances.

It may be that al-Qā'im at first saw in the Seljūqs a possible means of ridding himself of the Būyid domination and was hence prepared to encourage them. Any hopes he may have had, however, of restoring his own power as a result of this, must have been rapidly disillusioned by their subsequent conduct.² After the Seljūqs entered Nīshāpūr in Ramaḍān 429 (1038), al-Qā'im sent Abū Bakr at-Tūsī as an envoy to them. They welcomed him and presented him with robes of honour;³ subsequently after their defeat of Mas'ūd

¹ As far as the sultāns after Malikshāh were concerned; they endeavoured to obtain the caliph's recognition in order to strengthen themselves against rivals.

² This view is supported by Bundārī's statement that al-Qā'im intended by his marriage with Arslān Khātūn, Tughril Beg's niece, to strengthen the sultān's prestige and cement his friendship with him (p. 11).

³ Bu. 7.

b. Maḥmūd in 431 (1040), they wrote to the caliph reporting this, and requested him to bestow on them the sovereignty of the already conquered lands.¹ When this letter reached the caliph, he sent back an answer with Hibatullāh Muḥammad al-Ma'mūnī, inviting Tughril Beg to come to Baghdād, and ordering Hibatullāh to remain with Tughril until he could bring him to that city. For three years Hibatullāh remained with Tughril, who had no leisure, in view of his preoccupation in conquering the kingdom, to comply with the caliph's request.² In 435 (1043/4) al-Qā'im sent al-Māwardī to Tughril in Jūrjān, with the purpose of making peace between Tughril, Jalāl ud-Dawla and Abū Kālījār; in the following year al-Māwardī returned to Baghdād and informed the caliph of Tughril's submission to him and his respect for his command.³ Gregory Abū'l Faraj mentions that al-Qā'im sent an envoy to Tughril Beg in 436 (1044). His message contained four

¹ Siddiqi: I.C. X.3. p.392-3; R.S. 103.

² R.S. 105; U.H.S. 38. According to the T.G. there was an interval of eighteen years between the caliph's invitation to Tughril Beg to come to Baghdād and his arrival in that city in 447 (1055/6) (p.437). If this is so, the caliph must have invited Tughril to Baghdād in 429 (1038) on the occasion of his first embassy to the Seljūqs.

³ I.A. IX.357. According to Bundārī, al-Māwardī was sent on an embassy to Tughril Beg in 433 (1041/2), and on that occasion al-Qā'im wrote a letter to al-Māwardī abusing Tughril (p. 26).

stipulations: 1) that Tughril had made sufficient conquests and should not hanker after the countries of the rest of the governors of the Arabs; 2) that he should hold himself in strict subjection as a vassal and that he should swear legal oaths concerning the divorce of his wives, and the freeing of his slaves and undertake to give dues of all his possessions if he resisted the caliph's command; 3) that he should act righteously and not set men of error over the faithful; 4) that he should send each year the tribute of the countries he had taken according to the custom of his predecessors. According to Abū'l Faraj, Tughril did not accept any of these conditions.¹ Eventually in 447 (1055/6) Tughril Beg came to Baghdād.² When he reached that city, the caliph sent him money and presents.³ but it was not till he returned a second time to Baghdād in zū'l Qa'da 449 (1058) that the caliph gave a personal audience to him.⁴

¹ Gregory Abū'l Faraj, ed. Budge, 203-4.

² I.A. IX.419.

³ R.S. 105.

⁴ Gregory Abū'l Faraj, ed. Budge, 209, 211-2. Tughril on this occasion was crowned, and adorned with a necklace and bracelet, and seven black khil'as were given to him. He desired to kiss the ground, but could not because of the crown on his head. He then sought to kiss the caliph, who raised his hands to him twice, after which he girded on Tughril another sword, which marked the end of the audience (Bu. 13-4; I.A. X.103-4).

450
 In 550 (1058) when al-Basāsīrī marched on Baghdād, the caliph sent an urgent message to Tughril Beg, who was absent putting down the revolt of Ibrahīm Yanāl, asking him to return.¹ Before Tughril arrived, the caliph left Baghdād with Quraish,² and the khutba was read in the city in the name of al-Mustanşir, the 'Alid. At the approach of Tughril, al-Basāsīrī departed from the city (zū'l Qa'da 451 (Dec.-Jan. 1059/60)) and Quraish entrusted al-Qā'im to Muhārish b. Badrān. Tughril then brought the caliph back to Baghdād.³ After this Tughril summoned 'Amīd ul-Mulk al-Kundurī, his wazīr, and told him to tell the caliph that he must assign a grant in the neighbourhood of Baghdād for the expenses of his (Tughril's) army, since he had come to Baghdād in the interests of the state. 'Amīd ul-Mulk expressed the opinion that the caliph would make a similar demand for means of subsistence upon Tughril. He set out on his mission, and it is reported that he met the caliph's wazīr on the way. 'Amīd ul-Mulk returned with him to the sultān's court, and it turned out as he had anticipated; the caliph's wazīr had come to ask a grant from the sultān. Tughril, on the prompting of al-Kundurī, pretended that he had been about to arrange this.

¹ R.B. 107.

² I.A. IX.440-3.

³ *ibid.* 445-6.

Al-Kundurī then asked for the records of the administration of Baghdād (kitābi qānūn), fixed the amount of the grant of the caliph,¹ and took charge of the whole of the official correspondence of Baghdād.²

Tughril Beg's attitude, both in deferring his coming to Baghdād until 447, in spite of the caliph's invitation, and in taking over the administration of Baghdād, suggests that his relations with the caliph were governed predominantly by political motives. Throughout the Great Seljūq period, until the caliphate began to re-emerge as a political force in 'Irāq and the neighbourhood during the reign of al-Mustarshid (512/1118 - 529/1135), the caliphate was deprived of all temporal power. In so far as the caliph refrained from interfering in political or temporal affairs, the sanctity of his office was increased. He was, moreover, no longer liable, as he had been in the Būyid period, to arbitrary deposition by the temporal ruler, and he was allowed to enjoy his allowance and the income of his personal estates without fear of any demand being made on him, or his estate being confiscated.³ Further, by emphasizing the sanctity of the caliph's office, the Seljūqs restored to some extent the dignity and the good name of that office.⁴ This prepared the way for that increase

¹ R.S. 110-1; T.G. 438. The succeeding caliphs also received grants from the sultān (see Chapter V.)

² R.D. f.240a.

³ Siddiqi: I.C. X.3. p.397-8.

⁴ cf. A.M. 91.

in the power of the caliphate which revealed itself towards the end of the Great Seljūq period, but once ~~again~~ the caliph began to exercise temporal power again, the sanctity of his office declined, and like any other temporal leader he became subject to attack and siege.

At times it would seem that Tūghril Beg had a genuine respect for the caliph. When negotiating with al-Basāsīrī for the return of the caliph to Baghdād in 451 (1059/60), he was apparently prepared to agree that he (Tūghril) should not enter 'Irāq, and should merely have his name mentioned in the khutba and on the coinage.¹ Nevertheless, as stated above, once the caliph had returned to Baghdād, al-Kundurī successfully planned for Tūghril to take over the administration of the city. On the occasion of the caliph's return to Baghdād Tūghril Beg came out to meet him at Nahrawān to do him homage. He then went in advance to Baghdād, and when the caliph arrived he arose and took the bridle of his mule until he reached the gate of his private apartments.² In 455 (1063) when Tūghril came again to Baghdād, the caliph wanted to go to meet him in person, but Tūghril excused him from this, and his wazīr Ibn Jahīr came instead.³ It apparently became the

¹ I.A. IX.451.

² *ibid.* 446-7. On a later occasion Mas'ūd b. Muḥammad is said, when he made peace with the caliph in 529 (1134/4), to have carried the saddle-cloth before the caliph, who was riding (I.A. XI.16).

³ I.A. X.15.

regular custom for the caliph's wazīr, the qādī ul-quḍāt and the naqībs to meet the sultān when he arrived in Baghdād.¹

On the other hand Tughril Beg did not treat the caliph with respect when insisting that al-Qā'im's daughter should be given him in marriage (see below). On other occasions also it seems that the respect of the Great Seljūqs for the caliphate did not go beyond formalities. Whereas in Būyid times the caliph's residence was a refuge for all who feared the Būyids, this was not tolerated in the Great Seljūq period. When Rasūltegīn, Tughril Beg's half-brother, took refuge with the ra'īs ur-ru'asā, and the caliph summoned 'Amīd ul-Mulk to command him to inform the sultān of Rasūltegīn's position, 'Amīd ul-Mulk said Rasūltegīn ought to be surrendered out of respect for the sultān; eventually it was agreed that the caliph should keep Rasūltegīn in chains.² Malikshāh on a subsequent occasion actually violated the caliph's ḥaram. Alp Arslān's murderer had been killed by a man named Jāmi' Farrāsh. One of the caliph's ghulāms subsequently killed Jāmi's son, and fled to the caliph's ḥaram. Malikshāh happened to be in Baghdād, and Jāmi' asked him to exact vengeance for his son, as he, Jāmi', had for his, Malikshāh's, father's murderer. The sultān thereupon sent the amīr ḥājib, Qumāj, to bring the ghulam out of the ḥaram. The caliph offered 10,000 dīnārs to avoid this,

¹ Bu. 220.

² I.A. IX.437.

but Malikshāh refused.¹ It seems clear therefore that the respect of the Great Seljūqs for the caliph was a strictly limited one, and only effective in so far as it did not interfere with their own political aspirations or personal wishes.

During the reign of Alp Arslān an attempt was made to control the caliphate through his wazirate; and Nizām ul-Mulk sought to make Fakr ud-Dawla b. Jahīr, al-Qā'im's wazīr, his tool. Up to 460 (1068) his relations with Fakhr ud-Dawla became more and more cordial.² In that year, however, al-Qā'im dismissed Ibn Jahīr because of his too subservient attitude to the Seljūq court. Nizām ul-Mulk thereupon sought to impose a nominee of his own, ar-Rūdrawārī, the father of Abū Shujā'; he died, however, before reaching Baghdād, and Fakhr ud-Dawla was reappointed in 461 (1068/9),³ on condition that his relations with the Seljūqs should in future be more correct. As it happened they in fact soon grew strained, until Nizām ul-Mulk came to attribute any unwelcome event in Baghdād to Fakhr ud-Dawla's influence.⁴ In 469 (1076/7) there was a

¹ R.S. 121-2; U.H.S. 53-4.

² Bowen in his article on Nizām ul-Mulk in the Encyclopaedia of Islam describes Nizām ul-Mulk's relations with the caliph and with the Banī Jahīr. I have largely drawn upon this article in describing these events.

³ I.A. X.39; Bu. 34.

⁴ E.I. According to Bundārī, Abū Shujā' came to Baghdād in Rabi' 1.464 (1071) from the sultān to serve the caliph. The sultān had given him the laqab wazīr ul-wuzarā and assigned him half of Fakhr ud-Dawla's iqṭā'. When he arrived the caliph refused to receive him (p. 42-3).

riot in the sūq of the Nizāmiyya Madrasa, which Nizām ul-Mulk attributed to the Banī Jahīr, and when in Shābān 470 (1078) Nizām ul-Mulk's daughter, the wife of 'Amīd ud-Dawla b. Jahīr, died, relations were broken off between them;¹ Nizām ul-Mulk then sent Gawhar A'īn back to 'Irāq as shihna, with a letter to the caliph requesting the dismissal of Fakhr ud-Dawla from the wazirate, and he commanded Gawhar A'īn to seize the Banī Jahīr and their friends. In 471 (1078/9) Gawhar A'īn gave this letter to the caliph and Fakhr ud-Dawla was confined to his house, Al-Muqtadī, who had become caliph by this time, being forced to agree. 'Amīd ud-Dawla had meanwhile gone to the sultān's court to try to conciliate Nizām ul-Mulk. He succeeded in doing so and the wazīr married him to another of his daughters, and sent him back to Baghdād with instructions to the caliph to make him wazīr.² The caliph, however, refused, ordered Fakhr ud-Dawla and 'Amīd ud-Dawla b. Jahīr to remain in their houses, and appointed Abū Shujā' b. Muḥammad b. al-Ḥusain to the wazirate. Nizām ul-Mulk then wrote again to the caliph concerning the return to office of the Banī Jahīr, and

¹ E.I. T.S. 283. According to the latter the quarrel arose over the property of Nizām ul-Mulk's daughter, 'Amīd ud-Dawla having produced a number of witnesses to show that his wife, who had died in childbirth, had died before her infant son, to whom therefore her inheritance went.

² Bu. 51; I.K. III.281; I.A. X.75.

and finally 'Amīd ud-Dawla was appointed wazīr in Ṣafar 472 (1079).¹ Some years later in Ṣafar 476 (1083) 'Amīd ud-Dawla was dismissed by al-Muqtadī and replaced by Abū Shujā'.² The Banī Jahīr thereupon took refuge at the Seljūq court; they were then sent to attack the Marwānids.³ Bowen suggests ~~that~~ this was possibly intended to be a preliminary step in the abolition of the caliphate.⁴ In the following year, however, Nizām ul-Mulk's hostility towards the caliph, which had been roused by these events, was transformed as a result of his first visit to Baghdād and the caliph's gracious reception of him on the occasion of his (al-Muqtadī's) wedding to Malik-shāh's daughter.⁵

It was not only during the wazirate of Nizām ul-Mulk that the sultān or his wazīr appears to have had some control over the appointment and dismissal of the caliph's wazīr. In 534 (1139/40) quarrels arose between al-Muqtafī and his wazīr, 'Alī b. Tīrād az-Zainabī, because the latter opposed his wishes. 'Alī eventually fled to the sultān's palace. The

¹ I.A. X.75.

² I.A. X.83.
Abū Shujā' was dismissed at the sultān and Nizām ul-Mulk's orders in 484 (1091/2) because of his oppression, after which the caliph sent to them to ask if he might make 'Amīd ud-Dawla wazīr (I.A. X.124; Bu. 72).

³ I.A. X.85.83.

⁴ E.I.

⁵ E.I. See also p.85 above.

caliph then sent to the sultān, who gave permission for the dismissal of 'Alī.¹ Subsequently when Mas'ūd b. Muḥammad came to Baghdād in 532 (1137/8), az-Zainabī asked him to intercede for him with the caliph. The sultān accordingly sent his wazīr to the caliph, with the result that az-Zainabī was given permission to return to his residence, while his brother was reinstated as naqīb un-nuqabā.²

An important aspect in the policy of the Great Seljūqs towards the caliphate, as noted above, was the making of marriage alliances with the caliphate. By this means they hoped in the first place to increase their own prestige, and secondly to curtail still further the power of the caliph. In Muḥarram 448 (1056) Arslān Khātūn, Dā'ūd's daughter, was betrothed to the caliph.³ With increasing power, Tughril's aspirations grew, and in 453 (1061), he sent the qādī of Rei to Baghdād to demand the hand of al-Qā'im's daughter in marriage. This demand caused the caliph great vexation, - even the Būyids had never forced him to such an action. He tried to get it withdrawn, and commanded his envoy to demand of Tughril, if he persisted in the marriage, 300,000 dīnārs.

¹ I.A. XI.50; T.M. f.173b.

² I.A. XI.59.

³ I.A. IX.424. According to al-Qalānisi the 'aqd was first made for al-Qā'im's son, Zahr ud-Dīn, and when he died it was transferred to al-Qā'im (p. 86).

Al-Kundurī, however, told the caliph's envoy bluntly that refusal was out of the question, and reported to Tughril that the caliph had agreed. The sultān rejoiced at this, and sent 'Amīd ul-Mulk with Arslān Khātūn, who had been betrothed to the caliph in 448, with 100,000 dīnārs and jewels to Baghdād. The caliph refused to assent to the marriage and al-Kundurī returned to Hamadān. Tughril then wrote to the qādī ul-quḍāt and Abū Manṣūr b. Yūsuf, reproaching them and complaining of the caliph's ingratitude towards him after his exertions in the cause of the caliphate. He further ordered al-Kundurī to seize the caliph's iqṭā' and to leave him only what al-Qādir had formerly held under the Būyids. Tughril then demanded the return of Arslān Khātūn, and the caliph, realising the matter was serious, repented of his refusal, and the marriage contract was ratified in Sha'bān 454 (1062) outside Tabrīz.¹

¹ Bu. 18-20; I.A. X.12-14; I.K. III.227. The caliph's daughter's marriage payment was, according to the R.S., 400 silver dirhams and one gold dīnār (p.111), but according to other accounts it was 1000 dīnārs (A.S.D. 21; I.A. XI.51). The ṣadāq of Muḥammad b. Malikshāh's sister, when she married al-Mustazhir in 504 (1110/11), was 100,000 dīnārs (A.S.D. 81). After the ʿaqd was celebrated between Tughril Beg and al-Qā'im's daughter, the sultān sent to Baghdād with the caliph's envoy Ibn al-Muhallabān and the ra'īs of the two 'Irāqs thirty Turkish ghulāms for the caliph and Turkish slave-girls on thirty horses, servants and horses with golden bridles and saddles set with precious jewels and 10,000 dīnārs, and for his bride 10,000 dīnārs, and he assigned her Ba'qūbā and what his late wife (who had died in zū'l Qa'da 452/1060) had held in 'Irāq, and a necklace of thirty pearls, each of which weighed a mithqāl, and for 'Uddat ud-Dīn 5000 dīnārs, and for the bride's mother 3000 dīnārs.

In the following year Tughril Beg came to Baghdād, and 'Amīd ul-Mulk went to the caliph to demand his daughter. It was pointed out that it had been understood that the object of Tughril's marriage was honour and not union, and that if she was to be seen by Tughril, it was to be in Baghdād, in confirmation of which there was a statement in the hand of al-Kundurī. The sultān accepted this, and in Ṣafar the caliph's daughter was taken to the sultān's palace.¹ Nevertheless she did in fact leave Baghdād shortly afterwards. In Rabī' I. 455(1063) al-Kundurī went to the caliph's palace to ask formal permission for Tughril to depart, and for Arslān Khātūn and the caliph's daughter to go with him (al-Kundurī), saying that they would shortly return. The caliph gave permission for the departure of Arslān Khātūn, who had complained of his (al-Qā'im's) treatment of her,² and unwillingly permitted his daughter to go also.³

Subsequently, in 464 (1071/2) al-Qā'im sent Ibn al-Jahīr

¹ I.A. X.11-12; Bu. 24; I.K. III.227-8. She sat on a golden throne when Tughril entered to her; he kissed the ground, paid her homage, and sat opposite her on a silver throne. She did not unveil before him. He remained seven days paying her homage daily.

² I.A. X.16. She returned to Baghdād in 459 (1066/7) (X.37).

³ Bu. 24-5. She was sent back by Alp Arslān in 456(1064) (I.A. X.23). Al-Mustazhir, al-Muqtadī's successor compelled her to remain in her house, lest she should intrigue for his overthrow (I.A. X.251). She died in Muharram 496 (1102).

to ask for the hand of Alp Arslān's daughter for his walī 'ahd al-Muqtadī, to which the sultān agreed.¹ Al-Muqtadī, also, after he had become caliph, sent Ibn Jahīr to Malikshāh to ask the hand of his daughter. Nizām ul-Mulk went with Ibn Jahīr to Turkān Khātūn, the princess' mother, to discuss this matter with her. She said that the Ghaznavid ruler and the Khāqān had already asked her hand in marriage and each had given 400,000 dīnārs, but that if the caliph would give her this sum, she would agree. Arslān Khātūn, however, pointed out to the princess that such a union was an honour for her, and that it was unseemly to demand money from the caliph, and eventually she agreed.² She was taken to the caliph's residence in 480 (1087/8).³ Subsequently she wrote to Malikshāh complaining of the caliph's neglect of her, and so the sultān sent to the caliph demanding her return, "in such a way that there was no escape from compliance", and she returned to Iṣfahān.⁴ This lead to Malikshāh conceiving a hatred against al-Muqtadī (see below).

¹ I.A. X.48.

² Bu. 67; I.A. X.77; I.A. states she (Malikshāh's daughter) made it a condition that she should receive a preliminary payment of 50,000 dīnārs, which was agreed upon.

³ I.A. X.109.

⁴ *ibid.* 116. She died in Iṣfahān in 482 (1089/90).

In Sha'bān 502 (1109) al-Mustazhir was betrothed to Muḥammad b. Malikshāh's sister,¹ and in 518 (1124/5) al-Mustarshid married Sanjar's daughter;² al-Muqtafī in 531 (1136/6) asked the hand of Fāṭima, the daughter of Muḥammad b. Malikshāh and the sister of Mas'ūd,³ while in 534 (1139/40) Mas'ūd b. Muḥammad asked the hand of al-Muqtafī's daughter.⁴ For the caliph to give his daughter in marriage to the Seljūqs was apparently no longer a great concession. Once the principle had been granted that the caliph should give his daughter in marriage to the sultān, it ceased to be the important event that it had been during the time of Tughril Beg.

Under the Būyids, the caliph had not exercised any power, but the separation between the temporal and religious functions of the caliphate had not, as yet, taken place. During the Great Seljūq period there was, however, a complete severance.

¹ I.A. X.330. She was taken to the caliph's palace in Ramaḍān 504 (1111) (I.A. X.339).

² M.Z. 69.

³ I.A. XI.31. Fāṭima was conducted amid much pomp to the caliph's palace three years later (Jumādī II. 534/1140). The bridal outfit of Malikshāh's daughter on the occasion of her marriage to the caliph in 480 (1087) consisted of 130 camels, adorned with brocade (dībāj ar-rūmī), while most of their trappings were gold and silver, and 74 mules adorned with brocade (dībāj al-mulkī), with gold and silver bells and headropes, twelve boxes containing innumerable ornaments, and 33 fine horses with golden saddles set with jewels. She was also accompanied by 200 Turkish slave girls (I.A. X.106-7).

⁴ I.A. XI.31,51; T.S. 305; I.K. III.234.

Temporal affairs were delegated to the sultān, while the caliph remained the supreme authority in matters relating to legal administration. The clearest instance of this is the following. The sultān issued a diploma to Tughtegīn for the province of Syria in Muḥarram 510 (1116) (see Chapter V.),¹ but in order to carry out certain adjustments in land tenure, Tughtegīn obtained a formal decree from the caliph.² For the rest the caliph's function was merely to occupy himself with the performance of prayers (namāz) and religious leadership.³ When, however, the Seljūq power began to disintegrate, strong or capable caliphs tended to revert to the earlier position, and finally, under al-Muqtafī, the caliphate actually became one of the succession states of the Great Seljūq empire.

¹ Q. 193.

² Q. 219. The qādīs of Syria, although appointed by the local rulers, received investiture from the caliph. Abū Ghānam, qādī of Aleppo received, it seems, a diploma for the office of qādī and muhtasib from the qādī ul-quḍāt 'Alī ad-Dāmghānī at the order of al-Mustazhir in Ṣafar 496 (1102) (Y. VI.30). Abū'l Faḍl Hibatullāh b. Abī Ghānam, who succeeded his father as qādī in 534 (1139/40) had a deed of investiture from Zangī b. Aqsunqur and subsequently received a diploma from the qādī ul-quḍāt az-Zainabī at the order of al-Muqtafī (Y. VI.31).

³ Siddiqi: I.C. XI.I. 48-9.

The administration of Baghdād, as stated above, was handed over to Tughril Beg during the wazirate of al-Kundurī. Broadly speaking thenceforward down to the reign of al-Mustarshid, administrative authority (الحكم والشمى) in 'Irāq, the farming of the country and the tribute levied upon the nomads, was under the sultān and his officials.¹ Within Baghdād itself, there was to some extent a conflict of authority. The population, not unnaturally, tended to refer to the caliph, who was always accessible to them, rather than to the sultān, who was often absent from Baghdād, but the caliph could do little but refer back to the sultān.² In 464 (1071/2) the people, including many of the imāms, complained to the caliph of the number of singing girls and drunkards in the city, asking him to destroy the taverns, and he promised he would write to the sultān concerning this;³ in 475 (1082/3) the caliph complained to Malikshāh and Nizām ul-Mulk of the 'amīd of 'Irāq, which resulted in the dismissal of the 'amīd.⁴

¹ A.M. 91. cf. I.K., who states that Baghdād was part of Malikshāh's domains and that the caliph had only nominal authority there (III.444).

² In conflicts between the caliph and the sultān, there was a general tendency for a large part of the population to support the caliph. When the caliph threatened to leave Baghdād in Muharram 521 (1127), if Mahmūd b. Muḥammad continued to advance on the city, the people abused the sultān and 30,000 men of Baghdād and of the Sawād assembled to fight him (I.A. X.449).

³ I.A. X.63.

⁴ I.A. X.81.

On the other hand the caliph still seems to have retained some power to levy taxes locally. Jizya in so far as it was paid, was apparently collected by the caliph's wazīr. Abū Shujā', al-Muqtadī's wazīr, forced the zimmīs to pay jizya, and subjected them at the same time to humiliation.¹ However, when a levy was made on the zimmīs of Baghdād in 515 (1121/2), 20,000 dīnārs went to the sultān and 4000 to the caliph.² In ṣafar 517 (1123) al-Mustarshid made a levy upon the people for the cost of the repairs to one of the city walls. This caused distress among the people, and the caliph then ordered what had been collected from them to be returned.³ In 530 (1135/6) the caliph, ar-Rashīd, repaired the city wall,⁴ while, as stated in Chapter VII., when 'Alī b. Dubais and various amīrs attacked Baghdād, the caliph began to build a city wall, to dig a moat and to fortify the city, to pay for which he imposed a levy upon the inhabitants.⁵

¹ Bu. 72.

² I.A. X.429.

³ I.A. X.435. Ahmad b. Nizām ul-Mulk, his wazīr, gave 15,000 dīnārs for this, and paid the rest by instalments upon the rich. According to the T.S. al-Mustarshid wanted to levy 15,000 dīnārs from the people for the expenses of repairing the city wall, but Ahmad b. Nizām ul-Mulk, his wazīr, gave this sum from the treasury (p.301).

⁴ I.A. XI.23.

⁵ Q. 302; I.A. XI.87. According to Bundārī al-Muqtafī, after the death of Mas'ūd b. Muḥammad, fortified the walls of Baghdād and dug a moat (p. 215).

The caliph's wazīr seems to have had some kind of judicial authority. Abū Shujā' used daily, after the mid-day prayer, to hold a mazālīm court till the evening prayer, and had a proclamation made to the effect that anyone who had a grievance or need should come to the dīwān; if he learnt that one of the sultān's followers had committed oppression, he would summon him and speak severely to him.¹ The responsibility for local order and security, although technically vested in the shihna, seems to some extent to have been shared by the caliph and his officials (see also Chapter VI.). When rioting broke out in Baghdād in 478 (1085/6) between the people of Karkh and the people of other districts, Abū Shujā', the caliph's wazīr, sent a group of the jund to restore order.² When, however, there was rioting and looting at the shrine at the Bāb at-Tibn in 517 (1123/4), the caliph sent Nazar the amīr ḥājj to punish those responsible.³ During the floods in 466 (1073/4) Aitegīn as-Sulai-mānī told the wazīr that the ferrymen were practising extortion upon the people, and so the wazīr sent for them, commanded them to take only the customary fees and threatened

¹ T.S. 285.

² I.A. X.94.

³ *ibid.* 430.

them with death if they disobeyed.¹

Tughril Beg's attitude to the caliphate has been briefly described. During the reign of Alp Arslān a relatively conciliatory policy was pursued under the guidance of Nizām ul-Mulk.² It has also been shown how the latter's feelings towards the caliph during the reign of Malikshāh altered, and how this was followed by a reconciliation with the caliph. Malikshāh, on the other hand, as a result of his daughter's unfortunate marriage with al-Muqtadī, conceived a hatred of the caliph. In 484 (1091) when he came to Baghdād, he ignored the caliph's presence, and even contemplated the termination of the caliphate of al-Muqtadī, perhaps as a prelude to uniting the caliphate and the sultanate. It is probable, however, that his subsequent actions were actuated solely by personal dislike of the caliph, and that any political motives he may have had were subsidiary. Al-Muqtadī had designated as his successor his elder son, who subsequently became al-Mustazhir, but Malikshāh insisted that he should revoke this nomination and declare Abū'l Faḍl Ja'far, who was the son of Malikshāh's daughter, heir to the caliphate, put him in possession of

¹ I.A. X.62-3.

² The latter was rewarded for this by the laqabs Qiwām ud-Dīn and Raḍī Amīr il-Mu'minīn (Bowen E.I.).

Baghdād and then remove himself to Baṣrā. The caliph felt the greatest repugnance to execute this, and used every effort to change the sultān's determination, but finding all remonstrance fruitless, he asked and obtained a delay of ten days in order to make the necessary plans for his departure. Meanwhile in Rabī' I. 485 (1092) Malikshāh left Baghdad for Iṣfahān, and took Abū'l Faḍl Ja'far with him. Shortly afterwards before the delay given to al-Muqtadī had elapsed, Malikshāh died, and al-Muqtadī was relieved of the necessity of complying with his command.¹ According to some accounts it seems that the intention had been to set up the caliphate in Iṣfahān,² which project in the view of Rashīd ud-Dīn might well have succeeded, but for the death of Malikshāh.³

Turkān Khātūn, on the death of Malikshāh, asked the caliph to recognise her son, Maḥmūd, as sultān. The caliph agreed, somewhat unwillingly, to her request, and she sent Abū'l Faḍl Ja'far back to him.³ Maḥmūd was a minor and hence his government, from the point of view of the sharī'a,

¹ I.K. III.445; Gregory Abū'l Faraj, ed. Budge, p.231. Bundārī states Malikshāh suggested that al-Muqtadī should choose either Damascus or the Hijāz as his residence (p. 65). The T.S. merely relates that Malikshāh on his arrival in Baghdād sent someone to the caliph to tell him to leave the city (p.283).

² U.H.S. 72-3; R.S. 140.

³ R.D. f.244a.

was illegal. The agreement of the caliph to her request shows his weakness; he did, it is true, stipulate that the amīr Unar should be in charge of the leaders of the army, and the protection of the cities, and that he should act on the advice of Tāj ul-Mulk Abū'l Ghanā'im, the wazīr, who was to be in charge of taxation and administration.¹

The struggle for the sultanate following the death of Malikshāh gave an unexpected opportunity to the caliph to assert his independence. That he failed to do so, can only be attributed to the great weakening of his power during the wazirate of Nizām ul-Mulk.² ^{Nevertheless} / After the death of Malikshāh with the decline of the sultanate, the caliphate ^{gradually} began ~~then~~ to reap the benefit of the strengthening of the religious organisation which had been the policy of the first three sultāns. The caliph from that time onwards began to take part in the struggles for temporal power, but it was not until after the death of ^{b. Malikshāh} Muḥammad in 511 (1117) that the caliphate became an important factor in this struggle, from which it ultimately emerged successful; this was marked by the establishment in 'Irāq of a state over which the caliphate exercised full control, temporal as well as religious. There were two main aspects in the

¹ I.A. X.145.

² cf. Siddiqi: **I.C. XI. I. p.37.**

policy of the caliphs directed towards this end. In the first place they took sides in the family quarrels of the Seljūqs, hoping thereby to weaken them, and secondly they tried to build up their own armed forces.

It was only gradually that the caliph emerged as a military power. Towards the end of the period he had his own standing army. Ibn ul-Athīr mentions the ghilmān ad-dāriyya with the caliph in the battle with Mas'ūd b. Muḥammad in Ramaḍān 529 (1135),¹ and these were presumably members of the caliph's standing army. Al-Muqtafī, when he succeeded apparently ~~swore~~ not to buy any Turkish mamlūks, and hence had only Armenian and Byzantine (rūmī) slaves. The elect of these were known as the khailiyya and were charged with high positions.² The first of the caliphs to assemble an army during the Great Seljūq period and to lead it in person was al-Mustarshid. In 517 (1123/4) he led an army against Dubais, whom he defeated.³ Moreover, as the caliph began to have his own army, the amīrs tended to join

¹ A.M. 89.

² Bu. 215. The caliph's wazīr also began to have military functions. In 547 (1152/3) Aun ud-Dīn b. Hubaira, al-Muqtafī's wazīr, dispatched armies to Kūfa and to Wāsit, which cities they captured (I.A. XI.106); in 549 (1154/5) he was given the laqab sultān of 'Irāq, Malik ul-Jaish (I.A. XI.130).

³ I.A. X.429.

him as they joined the temporal leaders. In 527 (1132/3) a number of amīrs joined the caliph while the Seljūqs were preoccupied with family struggles.¹ Two years later in 529 (1134/5) after Mas'ūd b. Muḥammad had conquered Hamadān, Yaranqush Bāzdār, Qizil Ākhur, Sunqur al-Khumārteginī, wālī of Hamadān, 'Abd ar-Raḥmān b. Tughrā'īrak, Dubais b. Ṣadaqa and other amīrs sent to the caliph for permission to come and pay him homage. When they reached Baghdād the caliph welcomed them and sent them provisions (عطا) and robes of honour. Mas'ūd b. Muḥammad's name was then left out of the khutba, and these amīrs encouraged al-Mustarshid to oppose him. The caliph then left Baghdād to attack Mas'ūd, and was joined also by Bursuq b. Bursuq, after which the forces with him numbered 7,000 horse, while Iqbāl al-Murshidī remained behind in 'Irāq with 3000 horse. Amīrs in the neighbourhood of Hamadān had meanwhile written to the caliph offering him obedience, but when he delayed most of them made peace with Mas'ūd.² After the murder of 'Abd ar-Raḥmān b. Tughrā'īrak, 'Abbās, his ally, who was in Baghdād at the time, united with al-Muqtafī against the sultān. Their plot failed, however, and 'Abbās was himself murdered while trying

¹ I.A. XI.2.

² *ibid.* 14-15.

to flee from Baghdād.¹

The struggle of the caliphate to emerge as the dominant temporal force in 'Irāq was not a simple battle with the Seljūqs, but was complicated by the existence of the Mazyadids of Hilla and the Atābegs of Mawṣil. During the period of anarchy following the death of Malikshāh the caliph was not strong enough to stand alone, and he supported first one and then the other of the Seljūq leaders according to circumstances.² During the reign of Muḥammad b. Malikshāh, the caliph's power was limited by the existence of the Mazyadid Ṣadaqa. The latter was the only ruler at this time to whom the caliph could turn for help against the Seljūqs. But Ṣadaqa was a Shi'a, and probably aimed himself at obtaining possession of 'Irāq; hence, as stated in Chapter I., he checked any tendency of the caliphate to

¹ R.S. 238-9. They had determined to seize the sultān when he went into the country outside Baghdād to celebrate the 'īd. As it happened heavy rain fell that day, and the sultān did not leave his residence.

² In Muḥarrām 487 (1094) the khutba was read in Barkyāruq's name in Baghdād (I.A. X.155), but when Barkyāruq was defeated by Tutush in the same year, the latter's request to have the khutba read in his name was acceded to (I.A. X.158). In zu'l Hijja 492 (1099) the khutba was read in Muḥammad b. Malikshāh's name (I.A. X.196); but when Barkyāruq came to Baghdād in Ṣafar 493 (Dec.- Jan. 1099/1100) his name was once more mentioned in the khutba (I.A. X.198). The following year, however, saw the khutba being read in Muḥammad b. Malikshāh's name again (I.A. X.210). In zu'l Qa'da 497 (1104), after Barkyāruq and Muḥammad had made peace the khutba was read in the name of Barkyāruq in Baghdād (I.A. X.254).

to reassert itself.¹ On various occasions the caliph did in fact turn to Ṣadaqa for help,² but the Maẓyadid ruler showed little real readiness to cooperate with him against the Seljūqs. In 501 (1108) Ṣadaqa was killed. Dubais, who succeeded his father had neither the power nor the ability of the latter. Thus a stumbling-block to the expansion of the caliphate as a temporal power was removed, and when Muḥammad b. Malikshāh died in 511 (1117) an opportunity arose for an energetic caliph to increase his power. A kind of triangular struggle then ensued for the possession of 'Irāq between the caliph and al-Bursuqī against Dubais, who was subsequently joined by Zangī, with the sultān playing an uneasy part in the background. On the death of Muḥammad b. Malikshāh, Maḥmūd b. Muḥammad appointed both al-Bursuqī and Mangubars to the office of shihna of Baghdād. The former appealed to

¹ It is interesting to note, however, that the caliph appointed various Shi'as to his wazirate during the Great Seljūq period, namely, Abū'l Ma'ālī Hibatullāh, whom Rashīd ud-Dīn states was a Shi'a (Athār ush-Shi'at il-Amāmiyya, p.36), Anūshīravān b. Khālīd, and Jalāl ud-Dīn 'Alī b. Ṣadaqa.

² During the riots in Baghdād in 482 (1089/90), the caliph appealed to Ṣadaqa, who sent an army to Baghdād and put down the rioting (I.A. X.117-8). Malikshāh was at that time absent on an expedition to Khurāsān and Transoxania, and hence it was impossible for the caliph to receive help from the sultān immediately, and secondly he may have appealed to Ṣadaqa because the Shi'a of Karkh were involved in this rioting.

the caliph, who wrote concerning this to Maḥmūd.¹ The details of the ensuing struggle between al-Bursuqī and Mangubars, who was joined by Dubais b. Ṣadaqa, are involved. Mangubars finally established himself as shihna in 512 (1118/9).² Dubais subsequently again began to create disturbances in 'Irāq, and in 516 (1122/3) Maḥmūd b. Muḥammad made peace with him and determined to leave Baghdād. The caliph was displeased at this and suggested Dubais should be sent away from 'Irāq. The sultān instead reappointed al-Bursuqī as shihna, and ordered him to fight Dubais if he interfered in the affairs of 'Irāq.³ Nevertheless when Maḥmūd left Baghdād, Dubais returned to his evil ways, and so the caliph proposed to al-Bursuqī to turn Dubais out of Ḥilla. Dubais, however, defeated al-Bursuqī, after which he made peace with the caliph on condition the latter dismissed Jalāl ud-Dīn 'Alī b. Ṣadaqa, his wazīr.⁴ Dubais then sent an army to Wāsīt, which, after an initial victory, was defeated. He then again made peace with the caliph, but shortly afterwards began once more to plunder.⁵ The

¹ I.A. X.374.

² *ibid.* 378-80.

³ *ibid.* 422.

⁴ T.S. 297.

⁵ I.A. X.423-4.

caliph finally determined to march against Dubais. He assembled the ajnad of Baghdād in 516 and set out with Sulaimān b. Muhārish, governor of al-Ḥadītha, Qirwāsh b. Muslim, the 'Uqailid, al-Bursuqī and others. The 'askar of Wāsiṭ also joined them, and they defeated Dubais.¹ Meanwhile in 518 (1124/5) al-Bursuqī was dismissed from the office of shihna at the request of the caliph,² who perhaps was beginning to see in him an obstacle to his own aggrandisement. Dubais, after his defeat, joined Ṭughril b. Muḥammad and advanced upon Baghdād again in 519 (1125/6). The caliph ordered the shihna, Yaranqush az-Zakāwī, to prepare for war, assembled the soldiers and set out from Baghdād. Rumour spread that Dubais had captured Baghdād, and the caliph's army fled, and he himself would have been destroyed by Ṭughril, had the latter not fallen sick and been delayed. Finally Dubais and Ṭughril left 'Irāq³ and went to Sanjar.

Mahmūd b. Muḥammad himself advanced towards 'Irāq in 520 (1126). The caliph, who was perhaps beginning to feel his new power, sent to Mahmūd to ask him to delay his coming, on the grounds that the country was in a state of ruin after the invasion of Dubais and Ṭughril, and he gave Mahmūd much

¹ I.A. X.428-9; M.Z. 67-8.

² I.A. X.439.

³ ibid. 441-3.

money to obtain this. Maḥmūd, however, feared the caliph's growing power, which fear Yaranqush, the shihna, had confirmed, and so he hastened on to 'Irāq. The caliph, thereupon, threatened to leave Baghdād if Maḥmūd advanced. The sultān tried to conciliate him, but the latter was adamant in his demand that Maḥmūd should leave 'Irāq; the sultān becoming angry at this, marched on Baghdād, sending at the same time to Baṣrā Zangī, who defeated the caliph's khādim, 'Afīf.¹ On reaching Baghdād, Maḥmūd sent to the caliph to negotiate for peace. The latter refused to do so, whereupon Maḥmūd summoned Zangī and prepared to fight.² Al-Mustarshid then decided to make peace; an agreement was made and the caliph gave Maḥmūd money, arms, and other gifts.³

In 523 (1129), Maḥmūd b. Muḥammad came again to Baghdād with instructions from Sanjar to obtain Dubais' re-instatement in Ḥilla. Although Dubais, in addition, gave the caliph 100,000 dīnārs to this end, al-Mustarshid refused to agree, and began to muster troops.⁴ Dubais, thus having

¹ I.A. X.448.

² According to Bundārī, it was due to the instigation of ad-Darkazīnī, his wazīr, that Maḥmūd determined to march on the dār ul-khilāfa (p. 138).

³ I.A. X.448-50. Al-Qalānisī states that the cessation of hostilities was brought about by the mediation of Jalāl ud-Dīn 'Alī b. Ṣadaqa, the caliph's wazīr (p. 216). When Maḥmūd fell ill in Baghdād and left the city for Hamadān in 521 (1127), he sent an envoy to the caliph to ask his forgiveness for what had happened (Q. 217-8).

⁴ I.A. X.460.

failed to obtain his re-instatement, went to Syria. In 525 (1131) he was captured by Tāj ul-Mulūk, and the caliph when he heard this sent to the latter demanding the surrender of Dubais. He was too late, Dubais having meanwhile been handed over to Zangī.¹ The following year (526) Dubais and Zangī advanced on Baghdād, but were defeated by the caliph.²

On the death of Maḥmūd in 525, both Dā'ūd b. Maḥmūd and Mas'ūd b. Muḥammad sent to the caliph to have the khutba read in his own name. The caliph refused their demands, and wrote to Sanjar asking him to have the khutba read in his name alone.³ In doing so al-Mustarshid no doubt hoped to obtain a virtually free hand in 'Irāq, thinking that Sanjar would remain in Khurāsān. Sanjar, however, refused to agree to this proposition, and the caliph accordingly supported first one and then another of the Seljūq princes, and thereby weakened the sultanate, until finally he succeeded in re-establishing the supremacy of the caliphs in 'Irāq.

When Seljūqshāh b. Muḥammad arrived in Baghdād in 526 (1132) with Qarāja as-Sāqī, the caliph joined them against Mas'ūd b. Muḥammad and Zangī. The latter was put to flight, whereupon Mas'ūd sent to the caliph to negotiate for peace;

¹ I.A. X.470.

² *ibid.* 478.

³ *ibid.* 474.

he induced the caliph to believe Sanjar, who had come to Rei, was determined to attack him (al-Mustarshid). Accordingly they made an alliance against Sanjar, by the terms of which 'Irāq was to belong to the caliph's wakīl, and the sultanate to Mas'ūd, while Seljūqshāh was to be his walī'ahd (Jumādī I.526).¹ They then set out against Sanjar who advanced himself to Hamadān, while ordering Zangī and Dubais to attack 'Irāq. The caliph accordingly returned to defend the province, and defeated Zangī and Dubais on 8th Rajab, 526.² Mas'ūd meanwhile was defeated by Sanjar, who, after appointing Tughril b. Muḥammad sultān and sending Mas'ūd to Ganja, returned to Khurāsān. Dā'ūd b. Maḥmūd, after being defeated by Tughril, entered Baghdād with his atābeg Aqsunqur Aḥmadīlī (zū'l Qa'da 526) and was welcomed by the caliph.³ In the following year Mas'ūd joined Dā'ūd in Baghdād and the khutba was read in the name of the former.⁴ It was then agreed Mas'ūd and Dā'ūd should go to Azerbāijān, and that the caliph should send an army with them.⁵

¹ I.A. X.475. According to Bundārī, al-Mustarshid sent envoys on the accession of Tughril b. Muḥammad in Jumādī II.526 (1132) to the latter, but they failed to make any treaty, owing to the intrigues of the wazīr, ad-Darkazīnī, who sought to obtain bribes from them (p.136).

² I.A. X.478.

³ *ibid.* 480.

⁴ *ibid.* 482; Q. 237.

⁵ I.A. X.482.

Al-Mustarshid meanwhile sent an insulting letter to Zangī. The latter seized his envoy, whereupon the caliph set out for Mawṣil in Sha'bān 527 (1133) at the head of 30,000 warriors and besieged the city for three months. He finally raised the siege because he heard Mas'ūd intended to attack Baghdād.¹ In 529 (1134/5), when Zangī was in Damascus, al-Mustarshid sent to him commanding him to abandon his interference in the affairs of Damascus, to read the khutba in the name of Alp Arslān b. Maḥmūd and to return to 'Irāq to administer its affairs.² Probably the caliph thought that he had by this time got the upper hand of Zangī in the struggle for the possession of 'Irāq, otherwise he would hardly have summoned him back to 'Irāq, unless perhaps he intended to utilise him in bringing an end to the rule of the Seljūqs.

Mas'ūd had meanwhile fled from Tughril b. Muḥammad near Qazwīn in Ramaḍān 528 (1134) and received permission from the caliph to enter Baghdād. Seljūqshāh also came to Baghdād arriving shortly before Mas'ūd.³ Al-Mustarshid then ordered Mas'ūd to go to Hamadān to fight his brother Tughril. Ma'sūd promised to do so, but put the matter off, until finally

¹ I.A. XI. 2.

² Q. 248; I.A. XI.12,13.

³ I.A. XI.6.

the caliph promised to go with him. A number of the caliph's amīrs at this time deserted him for Mas'ūd. Al-Mustarshid demanded their return, but Mas'ūd made excuses. Insults passed between them and the caliph again ordered Mas'ūd to set out for Hamadān. News meanwhile arrived of Tughril b. Muḥammad's death and Mas'ūd went to Hamadān, and established himself as sultān.¹ Subsequently some of Mas'ūd's amīrs deserted him for the caliph, who then determined to fight Mas'ūd.² On 20th Rajab 529 (1135), he set out but was delayed by the rebellion of the governor of Baṣrā, and did not finally leave until Sha'bān, at the head of 7000 horse. He was defeated and captured by Mas'ūd at Dāyimarj on 10th Ramaḍān.³ Dā'ūd b. Maḥmūd had meanwhile rebelled in Āzerbāijān, and so Mas'ūd went to Marāgha, taking the caliph with him. There Mas'ūd made peace with al-Mustarshid on condition that he promised him a sum of money,⁴ and that he would not again assemble soldiers nor leave his residence. Before, however, al-Mustarshid had been sent back to Baghdād he was assassinated.

¹ I.A. XI.10-11.

² I.K. states that Mas'ūd's officials in 'Irāq, after he became sultān, began to encroach upon the possessions of the caliph, who eventually took the field against them (III. 355).

³ I.A. XI.14-15; Q. 249; Bu. 161.

⁴ The sum was apparently 400,000 dīnārs, for in 530 (1135/6) Yaranqush az-Zakāwī demanded on behalf of the sultān from ar-Rāshid 400,000 dīnārs, which had been settled by agreement with al-Mustarshid (I.A. XI.22-3).

by a Bāṭinī (17th zū'l Qa'da 529).¹

Ar-Rāshid succeeded his father as caliph. He agreed, on his accession, that he would resign if he levied troops or opposed the sultān with the sword.² In spite of this ar-Rāshid continued the policy of his predecessor of interfering in the family quarrels of the Seljūqs. Dā'ūd b. Maḥmūd came to Baghdād, and in Ṣafar 530 (1135) ar-Rāshid read the khutba in his name, and made an alliance with him and Zangī, to whom he sent 200,000 dīnārs.³ The latter then went to Wāsiṭ and made peace with Seljūqshāh b. Muḥammad. Mas'ūd b. Muḥammad meanwhile advanced on Baghdād in zū'l Qa'da. 530 (1136). Ar-Rāshid determined to fight Mas'ūd from within the walls of Baghdād,⁴ and after fifty days Mas'ūd raised the siege. The caliph then joined Zangī and went with him to Mawṣil. This was contrary to the agreement he had made on his accession and so Mas'ūd b. Muḥammad ordered his dismissal.

¹ I.A. XI.16; T.S. 295; Q. 249.

² I.A. XI. 26-7.

³ I.A. XI.22-3. The caliph's wazīr, Halāl ud-Dīn 'Alī b. Ṣadaqa, meanwhile took refuge from ar-Rāshid with Zangī.

⁴ I.A. XI.24.

and appointed al-Muqtafī in his place.¹ Ibn al-Azraq al-Fāriqī gives an account of the election of al-Muqtafī, and states that Mas'ūd obtained personal sureties of high standing for his good conduct.² Mas'ūd also ordered all the gold, silver, jewels, arms and quadrupeds to be taken away from the caliph's palace, for fear lest al-Muqtafī should be tempted to lead an army against him.³ This precaution

¹ I.A. XI.27. The dismissal of ar-Rāshid was no doubt facilitated by his personal unpopularity. Al-Mustarshid's wazīr Sharaf ud-Dīn 'Alī b. Tirād and the sāhib makhzan, Kamāl ud-Dīn al-Baqshalānī, and Ibn Anbārī, who had been with the sultān since his capture of al-Mustarshid, spoke ill of ar-Rāshid, and the officials of Baghdād confirmed this, for they feared him, he having seized some of them and fined others. For a while after his dismissal, Mas'ūd apparently regarded ar-Rāshid as a potential and likely centre of opposition (I.A. XI.30). The latter eventually left Mawṣil in 531 (1136/7) for Azerbāijān. Mangubars, governor of Fārs, Būzāba, Abd ar-Rahman Tughrā'irak and Dā'ūd b. Maḥmūd offered to join him and to return him to the caliphate. Ar-Rāshid agreed, but would not join them in person. After Mas'ūd b. Muḥammad had met Dā'ūd in 532 (1138), on which occasion both sides fled, some of ar-Rāshid's amīrs advised him to set out for 'Irāq, while others counselled him to pursue Mas'ūd. He did neither, but joined Dā'ūd in Khūzistān; thence he went to Isfahān, where he was assassinated in Ramaḍān 532 (1138) (I.A. XI.40-1).

² Q. 260 note.

³ T.S. 403.

turned out to be of little avail. On the death of Mas'ūd in 547 (1152), al-Muqtafī was the dominant force in 'Irāq, and became ruler of the province. He turned out of Baghdād Mas'ūd al-Bilālī, the sultān's shihna and other officials of the sultān, and took possession of their allowances and iqṭā's.¹ He appointed his own governors and officials over the districts of 'Irāq and sent spies (الصوايس والعيون) and ṣāhib khabars to all the cities.² In 549 (1154) a number of the amīrs who had been deprived by the caliph's action of their iqṭā's determined to march against the caliph with Arslān b. Tughril, in spite of Muḥammad b. Maḥmūd's effort to prevent them. They were defeated by the caliph at Bakmaza (Sha'bān). For this event the caliph, according to Bundārī, never forgave the Seljūqs.³

Al-Muqtafī continued to increase in power. In 550/1 (1155/6) Sulaimānshāh b. Muḥammad came to Baghdād to ask help of al-Muqtafī. After a time, the latter read the khutba in Sulaimānshāh's name. Sulaimānshāh in return agreed not to encroach upon 'Irāq in any way. Al-Muqtafī then went to Ḥulwān, sent to Malikshāh b. Maḥmūd, who was at Hamadān

¹ I.A. XI.106; T.M. f.175b; Levy: A Baghdad Chronicle, p. 22.

² Bu. 215.

³ Bu. 219.

inviting him to agree. Malikshāh accordingly joined the caliph, who appointed him walī 'ahd to Sulaimānshāh. He then gave them money and weapons and they went off to Azerbaijan to join Ildegiz.¹ The respect shown to Sulaimānshāh in Baghdad as sultān was strictly limited. When he arrived in Baghdad, he was not met, as was customary, by the caliph's wazīr, the latter merely sending his son. Further the caliph appointed his (Sulaimānshāh's) wazīr in the person of Sharaf ud-Dīn al-Khurāsānī,² and also made Quwīdān, governor of Hilla, his amīr ḥājib.³ Subsequently after Sulaimānshāh had been put to flight by Muḥammad b. Maḥmūd in Jumādī I. 551 (1156), the latter asked the caliph to read the khutba in his name, which demand the caliph refused.⁴ Thus the caliph had emerged victorious in the struggle for the possession of 'Irāq. It was, however, only by virtue of the sword, and on account of the weakness and preoccupation of his rivals that he was able to do so.

¹ R.S. 265-6; U.H.S. 141-2; I.A. XI.136.

² Bu. 220-1.

³ A.M. 193.

⁴ Bu. 215-6. In ⁵⁵¹~~552~~ (1157) Muḥammad set out to besiege Baghdad. During the ensuing siege the caliph's wazīr sent to Ildegiz to urge him to go with Malikshāh or Arslānshāh to Hamadān to create a diversion. As a result, when Malikshāh went to Hamadān, Muḥammad raised the siege of Baghdad in Rabī' I. 552, after which he tried without success to conciliate the caliph (I.A. XI.142; Bu. 231). For an account of this see also Le Strange: Baghdad during the caliphate, pp. 328-30; Levy: a Baghdad Chronicle pp. 223-7.

BIBLIOGRAPHY.

PRINTED SOURCES

Persian.

- Abū'l Ma'ālī Muḥammad al-Ḥusainī al-'Alawī: Bayāni Adyān, ed. 'Abbās Iqbāl, Teherān 1312 (shamsī).
- Abū Sa'īd b. Abī'l Khair: Asrār ut-Tawḥīd fī Maqāmāt ash-Shaikh Abī Sa'īd, Teherān 1313 (shamsī).
- 'Alī b. Zaid (Zāhīr ud-Dīn) al-Baihaqī: Tārīkhi Baihaq, Teherān 1938 (shamsī).
- Tatimma Siwān al-Ḥikma, ed. Muḥammad Shafī', Lahore 1935, 2 Vols.
- Bahā ud-Dīn Muḥammad b. Mu'ayyad al-Baghdādī: at-Tavassul ilā't Tarrasul, Teherān 1315.
- Baihaqī (Abū'l Faḍl): Tārīkhi Baihaq, ed. W.H.Morley and W. Nassau Lees, Calcutta 1862.
- Ghazālī (Muḥammad b. Muḥammad): Naṣīḥat ul-Mulūk, Teherān 1315-17 (shamsī).
- Ḥamdullāh Mustawfī Qazwīnī: Nūzhat ul-Qulūb, ed. Le Strange, G.M.S. London 1915.
- Tārīkhi Guzīda, ed. Browne, G.M.S. London 1910.
- Hindū Shāh b. Sanjar: Tajārib us-Salaf, Teherān 1313 (shamsī).
- Ibn Bakkhī: Fārs Nāma, ed. Le Strange, G.M.S. London 1921.
- Ibn Bībī: Seljūq Nāma, ed. Houtsma, Leiden 1902.
- Ibn Isfandiyār: History of Tabaristan, abridged translation, E.G.Browne, G.M.S. London 1905.
- Khawādamīr (Ghiyāth ud-Dīn b. Humām ud-Dīn): Dastūr ul-Wuzarā, Teherān 1317 (shamsī).

Minhājī Sirāj Jūzajānī: Ṭabaqāti Nāṣirī, translation, H.G. Raverty, Bibliotheca Indica, London 1873-6.

Muḥammad Ibrahīm: Ṭarīkhi Seljūqiyāni Kirmān, ed. Houtsma, Leiden 1886.

Muḥammad b. Muḥammad called Ibn an-Nizām al-Ḥusainī: al-'Urāḍa fī'l Hikāyat as-Saljūqiyya, ed. Sussheim, Leiden 1909.

Nāṣir ud-Dīn Yahyā: Quelques Chapitres de l'Abrégé du Seldjouq Namēh composé par l'emir Nassir ed-Din Yahia, ed. Schefer, Recueil de textes et de Traductions publié par les professeurs de l'école des langues orientales vivantes ..., Paris 1889.

Nāṣiri Khusraw: Safar Nama, ed. Schefer, Paris 1881.

Nizām ul-Mulk: Siyāsat Nāma, ed. Schefer, Paris 1891.

Ar-Rāwandī (Muḥammad b. 'Alī b. Sulaimān): Rāḥat uṣ-Ṣudūr wa Āyat us-Surūr, ed. Iqbāl, G.M.S. London 1921.

Zahīri Nīshāpūrī: Seljūq Nāma, Ismā'īl Khān Afshār, Mihr, 1313, I., II., III.

Ṭarīkhi Sīstān, Teherān, 1314.

Arabic.

Abū Bakr at-Turtūshī: Sirāj ul-Mulūk, Alexandria 1289 A.H.

Aḥmad b. 'Abdallah al-Qalqashandī: La Syrie à l'époque des Mamelouks, Gaudefroy-Demombynes, Paris 1923.

Bundārī (Muḥammad al-Iṣfahānī): Dawlat as-Saljūq, ed. Houtsma, Leiden 1889; Cairo 1318 A.H.

Al-Gharnāṭī (Abū Ḥamīd al-Andalūsī): Le Tuhfat al-Albāb de
Abū Ḥamīd al-Andalūsī al-Gharnāṭī, G. Ferrand, J.A.
1925, Vol. CCVII.

Ibn ul-Athīr: al-Kāmil fī't Tārīkh, ed. Tornberg, Vols. IX.
X., XI.

ad-Dawlat al-Atābakiyya Mulūki 'l Mawṣil, Receuil des
Historiens Croisades: Sources Arabes, Vol. II. pt.2.

Ibn Jama'a (Badr ud-Dīn): Tahrīr al-Aḥkām fī Tadbīri Ahli'l
Islām, Islamica VI.

Ibn al-Jawzī: Tablīsi Iblīs, translation, D.S.Margoliouth,
I.C. Vols. IX.,X.,XI.,XII.

Ibn Khallikān: Wafayāt al-A'yān, Translation, de Slane, 4
Vols, Paris and London, 1842-71.

Ibn al-Qalanisī: Zail Tārīkh Dimishq, ed. Amedroz, Leyden 1908

Māwardī: Aḥkām as-Sultāniyya, Cairo, 1298 A.H.

Kamāl ud-Dīn: Tārīkh Ḥalab, Receuil des Historiens des
Croisades Sources Arabes, Vol. III.

Biographical Dictionary, do.

Sayyid Ṣadr ud-Dīn: Akhbār ad-Dawlat as-Saljūqiyya, ed.
Muḥammad Iqbāl, Lahore, 1933.

Sibt Ibn al-Jawzī: Mir'āt az-Zamān, ed. J.R.Jewett, Chicago,
1907.

Yāqūt: Irshād al-Arīb ilā Ma'rifat al-Adīb, ed. Margoliouth,
7 Vols. G.M.S. London, 1908-13.

Mu'jam al-Buldān, 6 Vols. Wüstenfeld, Leipzig, 1866.

Miscellaneous.

Gregory Abū'l Faraj (Bar Hebraeus): The Chronography of Gregory Abū'l Faraj, translated from the Syriac by Wallis Budge, Oxford, 1932.

MANUSCRIPT SOURCES.

Persian.

Abū'l 'Abbās Aḥmad b. Abī'l Khair: Shirāz Nāma, B.M., Add. 18,185.

Abū'l Fath al-Khāzin: Zīji Sanjarī, B.M., Or. 6669.

Abū'l Qāsim Ivaghli Haidar: Collection of letters written by or addressed to the sovereigns of Persia and the neighbouring countries and their wazīrs, B.M., Add. 7688.

Ghazālī (Muḥammad b. Muḥammad): Kimyā as-Sa'adat, B.M., Add. 25,026.

Muḥammad Awfī: Jawāmi' ul-Ḥikāyāt wa Lawāmi' ur-Riwāyāt, Or. 2676.

Munshī Bhagchand: Jāmi' ul-Inshā, B.M., Or. 1702.

Nizām ul-Mulk: Naṣā'ih Nāma, manuscript in my possession.

Rashīd ud-Dīn Faḍlullāh: Jāmi' ut-Tawārīkh, B.M., Add. 7628.

Shukrullāh: Bahjat ut-Tawārīkh, B.M., Or. 1627.

Arabic.

Ibn al-Azraq: Tārīkh Mayyāfāriqīn, B.M., Or. 5803.

SECONDARY AUTHORITIES.

Adler, Elkan: Jewish Travellers, Broadway Travellers, London, 1930.

Amedroz: The Marwanid Dynasty, J.R.A.S. 1903.

The Office of Qādī in the Ahkām as-Sultāniya of
Māwardī, J.R.A.S. July, 1910.

Bart'old: Turkestan down to the Middle Ages, G.M.S. London, 1928.

12 Vorlesungen über die Geschichte der Turken Mittel-
asiens (translated into German by Theodor Menzel, 1935).

Becker, C.H.: Islamstudien, 2 Vols. Leipzig, 1924-32.

Björkman, W.: Beiträge zur Geschichte der Staatskanzlei im
Islamischen Agypten, Hamburg University, Abhandlungen
aus dem Gebiet der Auslandskunde, Vol. 28, Series B.
Vol. 16.

Bowen, H.: The Last Buwayhids, J.R.A.S. 1929, pt. II.

The sargudhashti sayyidnā and the waṣāya of Nizām
ul Mulk, J.R.A.S. 1931.

Browne, E.G.: Account of a rare MS. History of Isfahan...
J.R.A.S. 1901.

The Tajārib us-Salaf..., J.R.A.S., October 1924.

Cahen, C.: Diyar Bekr au Temps du Premiers Ortuqids, J.A.
1935.

La Campagne de Mantzikert d'après les Sources Musulmanes,
Byzantion 1934.

La Djazira au Milieu du Treizième Siecle d'après 'Izz-ad
Din Ibn Chaddad, R.E.I. 1934.

Cahun, L.: Introduction à l'Histoire de l'Asie, Turcs et Mongols des origines à 1405, Paris 1896.

Czaplika, M.A.: The Turks of Central Asia in history and at the Present Day, Oxford 1918.

Defremrey, C.: Recherches sur le Règne du Sultan Seldjoukide Barkiarok, J.A. 1853.

Encyclopaedia of Islam.

Fischel, W.J.: Jews in the Economic and Political Life of Medieval Islam, R.A.S. monograph, 1937.

The Origin of Banking in Medieval Islam: A Contribution to the Economic History of the Jews of Baghdad in the Tenth Century, J.R.A.S., April and July, 1933.

Gibb, H.A.R.: The Damascus Chronicle of the Crusades, London 1932.

Grousset, R.: Histoire des Croisades, 3 Vols., Paris 1935.

Gurland, A.: Grundzüge der Muhammedanischen Agrarverfassung und Agrarpolitik, Dorpat 1907.

Hitti, K., An Arab-Syrian Gentleman and Warrior in the Period of the Crusades. Memoirs of Usamah Ibn-Munqidh, Columbia University Press 1929.

Houtsma, M.: The Death of Nizām ul-Mulk and the Consequences, Journal of Indian History, Vol. 3, pt.II., serial no.6, Sept. 1924.

Über eine Türkische Chronik zur Geschichte der Selgügen Klein Asiens, VI. International Congress of Orientalists, Leiden 1885.

Zur Geschichte der Selgügen von Kerman, Z.D.M.G. 1885, XXXIX.

Ibn Hasan: The central Structure of the Mughal Empire and its practical working up to the year 1657, London 1936.

Jawāhir al-Kalām ('Abd al-'Azīz): Athār ush-Shi'at il-Amāmiyya, Teherān 1307 (shamsī)

Jevdet: L'education aux Foyers des Gens des Metiers en Asie Mineure et Syrie au XII^{me} Siècle jusqu'à Notre Temps, Vol. I. Supplement à un Chapitre de la relation du Voyage d'Ibn Battuta, Istambul 1350/1/1932.

Kazimirsky, Biberstein: Menoutchehri poète Persan du 11^{me} Siècle de notre ère, Paris 1886-7.

Köprülü, Fuad: Les Institutions Juridiques Turques au Moyen-Age, 11^{me} Congres Turc d'Histoire.

Laurent, J.: Byzance et les Turcs Seldjoucides dans l'Asie Occidentale jusqu'en 1081, Nancy 1913.

Le Strange: Baghdad during the 'Abbasid Caliphate, Oxford 1924.

Levy, R.: A Baghdad Chronicle, Cambridge 1929.

Moreland: The Agrarian System of Muslim India, Cambridge, 1929.

Morgan, J. de: Feudalism in Persia, its Origin, Development, Present Condition. Report Smithsonian Institution, 1913.

Muhammad Nāẓim: The Life and Times of Sultan Mahmud of Ghazna, Cambridge 1931.

Poliak: Le Caractère Colonial de l'Etat Mamelouk, R.E.I. 1935 III.

La Féodalité Islamique, R.E.I. 1936 III.

Poole, Stanley Lane: Coins of the Urtuki Turkumans, The International Numismata Orientalia 1875.

Ritter, H.: Ein Arabisches Handbuch der Handelswissenschaft, der Islam VII., (1917).

- Sanaullah, Mawlawi Fadil: The Decline of the Saljuqid Empire, University of Calcutta 1938.
- Sauvaget, J.: Esquisse d'une Histoire de la ville de Damas, R.E.I. 1934 IV.
- Siddiqi, Amīr Husain: Caliphate and Kingship in Medieval Islam, I.C. Vol.X. No.3, XI. I.
- Sussheim, K.: Das Geschenk aus der Seldchukengeschichte, Leiden 1909.
- Tischendorf, P.A. von : Das Lehnswesen in den moslemischen Staaten, Leipzig 1872.
- Tripathi, R.P.: Some Aspects of Muslim Administration, Allahabad 1936.
- Tritton, A.S.: Islam and the Protected Religions, J.R.A.S. 1931.
- Zaydān, J.: Tārīkh ut-Tamaddun ul-Islāmī, 5 Vols., Cairo 1902-6; Omayyāds and 'Abbasids, transl. Margoliouth, G.M.S., London 1907.

ABBREVIATIONS.

For the sake of convenience the following abbreviations have been used:-

- A.M. Ibn ul-Athīr: ad-Dawlat al-Atābakiyya Mulūki'l Mawṣil.
- A.S.D. Sayyid Ṣadr ud-Dīn: Akhbār ad-Dawlat as-Saljūqiyya.
- B. Baihaqī (Abū'l Faḍl): Tārīkhi Baihaq.
- Bu. Bundārī (Muḥammad al-Iṣfahānī): Dawlat as-Saljūq.
Cairo edition unless otherwise stated.
- D.V. Khwāndamīr (Ghiyāth ud-Dīn b. Humām ud-Dīn): Dastūr
ul-Wuzarā.
- F.N. Ibn Balkhī: Fārs Nāma.
- I.A. Ibn ul-Athīr: al-Kāmil fi't Tārīkh.
- I.K. Ibn Khallikān: Wafayāt al-A'yān.
- J.H. Muḥammad Awfī: Jawāmi' ul-Ḥikāyāt wa Lawāmi' ur-
Riwāyāt (Or. 2676 unless otherwise stated).
- K.S. Ghazālī (Muḥammad b. Muḥammad): Kimyā as-Sa'ādat.
- M.Z. Sibṭ^{kn} al-Jawzī: Mir'āt az-Zamān.
- N. Nizām ul-Mulk: Naṣā'ih Nāma.
- N.K. Nẓsiri Khusraw: Safar Nāma, Persian text unless
otherwise stated.
- Q. Ibn al-Qalānisī: Zail Tārīkh Dimishq.
- R.D. Rashīd ud-Dīn Faḍlullāh: Jāmi' ut-Tawārīkh.
- R.S. ar-Rāwandī (Muḥammad b. 'Alī b. Sulaimān): Rāḥat uṣ-
Ṣudūr wa Āyat us-Surūr.
- S.N. Nizām ul-Mulk: Siyāsat Nāma, Persian text.

- T.G. Ḥamdullāh Mustawfī Qazwīnī: Tārīkhi Guzīda.
- T.M. Ibn al-Azraq: Tārīkh Mayyāfāriqīn.
- T.N. Minhāji Sirāj Jūzjajānī: Ṭabaqāti Nāṣirī.
- T.S. Hindū Shāh b. Sanjar: Tajārib us-Salaf.
- U.H.S. Muḥammad b. Muḥammad called Ibn an-Nizām al-Ḥusainī:
al-‘Urāḍa fī’l Hikāyat as-Saljūqiyya.
- Y. Yāqūt: Irshād al-Arīb ilā Ma‘rifat al-Adīb.

Subsidiary Paper 1.

Subsid. 1

[Reprinted from the BULLETIN OF THE SCHOOL OF ORIENTAL
STUDIES (UNIVERSITY OF LONDON), Vol. IX, Part 3.]

UNIVERSITY OF LONDON.

~~To be returned to the Academic Registrar,
UNIVERSITY OF LONDON, W.C.1.
with the Examiners' Report.~~

LAMBTON (A.K.S.)

Ph.D. 1939.

PERSIAN.



LOAN COPY.

The Regulation of the Waters of the Zāyande Rūd

By ANN K. S. LAMBTON

THE Zāyande Rūd, from Lenjān to the Gāv Khūnī, was regulated by an elaborate system, which is said to go back to Safavid times. This system remained in force until A.H. 1315 (*shamsī*, A.D. 1936), when it underwent alteration, owing to the fact that, on government orders, the cultivation of cotton was substituted in the lands watered by the Zāyande Rūd for the cultivation of rice.

The details of this regulation are found in an interesting document, popularly known as Shaikh Bahā'ī's *tūmār*, to be found in the Finance Ministry of Isfahan. The precise date of the origin of the *tūmār* is uncertain. The following words are written at the beginning of the document: "Written in the sealing office of the late Shah Tahmasp 923." This is clearly an error, for Shah Tahmasp did not ascend the throne until A.H. 930 (A.D. 1524). Further, if the date A.H. 923 is correct, the *tūmār* cannot have been the work of the well-known Shaikh Bahā'ī, who was not born until A.H. 953. It is quite possible and even probable that the *tūmār* was not the work of the famous Shaikh Bahā'ī, but because he was a well-known man, learned in mathematics and other sciences, was subsequently attributed to him, in the same way that many old buildings are, at the present day, popularly attributed to Shah 'Abbās.

Mention is made in the *tūmār*, in some cases, of an original allotment of a share (*aṣl*) in the waters, where this differed from the share allotted by the *tūmār* (*eṣāfe*), and mention is also made in various instances of the share given to such and such a place by the late *ṣadr* (*marḥūme ṣadr*). Shaikh Bahā'ī became the *ṣadr* of Isfahan under Shah 'Abbās, and it is possible therefore that the Zāyande Rūd had been regulated some time prior to the reign of Shah 'Abbās and that Shaikh Bahā'ī revised this regulation. That the *tūmār*, as it exists at present, is not the original copy is moreover evident, for mention is made of various *mādis* which had no share assigned to them, because they were built after the regulation of the waters of the river.

The main interest of the *tūmār* lies in the description it gives of the regulation of the Zāyande Rūd, but it also has a subsidiary topographical interest, for in the *tūmār* are recorded in detail the names

of the villages and districts watered by the Zāyande Rūd from Lenjān to the Gāv Khūnī.

The Zāyande Rūd rises in the Kūh Rang mountains in the Bakhtiyārī country, some thirty *farsakhs* south-west of Isfahan. It flows north-east for seven *farsakhs* through the Bakhtiyārī country, watering the lands of the Īl Bābādī and then, passing through the Sūdegān gorge, enters the *bolūk* of Farīdan. There the Zāyande Rūd is joined by a tributary stream called the Pelāmāson, which drains the *bolūk* of Farīdan, and contributes a tenth of the volume of the water of the Zāyande Rūd. The river then waters some ten villages (*gorā*) of the *bolūk* of Farīdan and, leaving that district, five or six villages of the Chahār Maḥāll, after which it enters the *bolūk* of Lenjān, and one district of the *bolūk* of Lenjān, named Āydoghmesh, from the cultivated lands of the river (*chamhā*) to the Kalle Bridge, is also watered by the river. The regulation of the water begins from the Kalle Bridge and continues to Varzāne near the Gāv Khūnī where water is sold.

The waters of the Zāyande Rūd were allotted under three different rules, *āzād*, *mokhtaṣṣ* and *moshtarek*, so that having been divided according to location, with due regard for the needs and extent of the cultivation of each *bolūk*, the division was not subject to any variation, and being based on the water at the sources of the river, even in years of drought or scarcity of water, it required no alteration.

1. *Āzād*.—From the beginning of Āzor until the 15th of Khordād the water was not regulated, so that in winter every *bolūk* could make good any previous deficiencies in the irrigation of its crops. In the first month of spring, when the flood water was at its height, the surplus, after the wheat crops had been irrigated, flowed down to the Gāv Khūnī. From the second month of spring until the 15th of Khordād if the water was abundant, it was sufficient for the irrigation of the wheat crops of all the *bolūks*, but if it was scarce, from the 20th of Ardī Behesht onwards, it did not reach the *bolūks* of Rūdashtain and Barā'ān, for which special provisions were made. (See below.)

2. *Mokhtaṣṣ*.—*Mokhtaṣṣ* prevailed at two seasons of the year: the first was from the 14th of Khordād to the end of Khordād when, the wheat in the other *bolūks* having been irrigated, the water was reserved for the final irrigation of the wheat crops of the *bolūks* of Rūdashtain and Barā'ān; and the second period was from the 14th of Ābān until the end of Ābān, during which the water of the river was reserved for the cultivation of these two *bolūks*. In each of these two periods of fifteen days it was reserved for ten full days for the

sole use of Rūdashtain and then for five days the *bolūk* of Barā'ān also shared it. During the first of these two periods of fifteen days a little water from seven or eight places was also allowed to flow into the irrigation channels (*nahrhā*) of Alenjān, to be given to the newly planted rice.

3. *Moshtarek*.—From the 1st of Tīr to the 18th of Mehr the water was shared in two ways. Firstly in six periods of fifteen days, and secondly in one period of eighteen days, the water from the Kalle Bridge to the Mārnan Bridge was shared among five *bolūks* in four *keshīks*¹ by turns according to the following system. During the periods of fifteen days from the 1st of Tīr, Lenjān had the right to the water to wherever it reached for three days, and Alenjān up to the Falāvarjān Bridge for four days; secondly Lenjān had the right to the water for two days and Mārbīn, Jay and Barzerūd up to the Mārnan Bridge for six days. During the period of eighteen days it was shared from the 1st of Mehr by Lenjān and Alenjān, in three *keshīks*, for eleven days and for seven days by Mārbīn, Jay and Barzerūd in one *keshīk* so that the summer rice should be irrigated. From the 19th of Mehr to the 15th of Ābān, which was the beginning of the second period when the water was appropriated for Rūdashtain, the water was also shared by seven *bolūks* as follows: Lenjān and Alenjān ten days, Mārbīn, Jay and Barzerūd ten days, Karārej three days, and Barā'ān four days. The sharing of the water in rotation was known as *tanāvobī*.

The regulation of the water by the *mokhtaṣṣ*, *moshtarek* and *tanāvobī* principles was in accordance with the exigencies of the cultivation and the need for water of the crops sown in each *bolūk*. Thus the water was appropriated for Rūdashtain and Barā'ān, at the time when the crops there were in the greatest need, and would be completely destroyed if they did not have water, whereas the wheat and opium of the *moshtarek* lands had no need of water at that time, for during the *āzād* period, the wheat crops of the *moshtarek* *bolūks* had, by the 15th of Khordād, been irrigated four times and therefore required no further water and suffered no harm. In the *mokhtaṣṣ* lands, on the other hand, in years when water was scarce, from the 20th of Ardī Behesht onwards the water was cut off from their wheat crops after they had been irrigated only once or twice, and hence if

¹ The area watered by the river was divided into six *keshīks* and an official known as the *sar keshīk* was responsible for the regulation of the water in each *keshīk*.

the last water were not to reach the wheat crops of these *bolūks* they would naturally be destroyed. Similarly in the *moshtarek bolūks*, when it was the turn of the *bolūk* of Alenjān and Lenjān to be irrigated, Mārbīn Jay, and Barzerūd, did not go without water for more than three periods of nine days, during which time they did not require water.

The *tanāvobī* principle which prevailed in the *moshtarek bolūks* was also in accordance with their needs, because during the time that the seeds were taking root in Lenjān and Alenjān, which was from the 10th of Ardī Behesht to the end of the month, and until the end of the *āzād* period, i.e., the 15th of Khordād, the ground was inundated and therefore able to do without water for six or seven days.

On the 1st of Tīr when the transplantation (تولگی) of the rice began, the seeds planted in the land belonging to Rūdashtain, having been flooded, were ready to be transplanted, and then the lands of Lenjān and Alenjān were in their turn flooded two, three or four times, and the rice was transplanted. While the water was being thus distributed in rotation, the periods during which Lenjān had no water did not exceed four or six days, but Alenjān was without water for eleven days when the water belonged to Mārbīn, Jay and Barzerūd, and during that time careful attention had to be paid to the rice cultivation of Alenjān.

The above regulation of the waters of the Zāyande Rūd according to special rights (*ekhteṣāṣ*), joint rights (*eshterāk*) and rights by rotation (*tanāvob*), was the basis of the system, and each of these was divided according to three further principles, by district (*bolūk*), by streams (*anhār*) and by villages (*qorā*).

1. By District.—The water allotted to the *bolūks* or to a *bolūk*, the boundaries of which were limited by a *keshūk*, was regulated according to shares allotted to the streams within its boundaries.

2. By Streams.—Each village or hamlet (*mazra'e*) received the water according to its rightful share by means of the systematic regulation of the irrigation channels.¹

3. By Villages.—The water allotted to some *bolūks* such as Mārbīn, Jay and Barzerūd, was regulated by *tāq*, i.e., one day or one night's water, and each *tāq* referred to a certain portion of the village lands (*arāzī va ṣahrā*) and was divided into *fenjāne*, *peng* or *piyāle*, with reference

¹ The heads of the channels were blocked by stones, mud, mortar and plaster (*sārūj*) up to a certain height and width for a certain time.

to the lands of the *tāq*, so that finally each cultivator in the *bolūks* knew what days of the week and for how many hours and how many minutes each *jarīb* of cultivation, which he possessed, had water and cultivated his land accordingly.

THE TŪMĀR OF SHAIKH BAHĀ'Ī

He is God most high. His power is mighty.

The sealing office of the late prince, may his resting-place in paradise be eternal, Shāh Tahmāsp, may God make light his tomb.

The royal command was given that, since differences had arisen in the villages and the water shares of the Zāyande Rūd of Isfahan, the competent authorities of the State should appoint a few persons of the reliable and aged men to establish, under the signatures of the exalted and honourable *mostawfīs* and the confirmation of the *kadkhodās* and *rīsh-safīds* of the *bolūks*, which share the water of the Zāyande Rūd, honestly and to the best of their knowledge, the shares and lot of each village and hamlet (*mazra'e*) in each *bolūk*, according to its capacity and need, and to enter these in the registers under guarantee, so that that regulation (of the waters) should be put into execution. Since the *bolūk* of Jay is in the middle of the *bolūks* watered by the Zāyande Rūd, it has been the custom from former times that one of the reliable and trustworthy *kadkhodās* of that *bolūk* should be charged with the responsibility of the office of *mīrāb*; and the same procedure as was followed in former days must be followed at the present time. It is hereby established that the honourable officials and government representatives in the villages and *kadkhodās* and *rīsh-safīds* of the above-mentioned *bolūks* and the *mīrābs*, *mobāshers*, *mādīsālārs* and subordinate officials (*'amala*) of the river, in obedience with this high command, having established, according to the instructions in the *tūmār*, the water rights of every place according to its share, shall not act contrary to this, and having avoided being punished and called to account by the high authorities of the State shall honour the agreement.

Written in the month of Rajabo 'l-Morajjab, A.H. 923.¹

The agreement for the regulation of the water of the Zāyande Rūd of Isfahan among the cultivators of the above-mentioned *bolūks*, according to the command of the world-conquering prince

¹ 20th July—18th August, 1517.

(*navāb*) and the signature of the *mostawfīs* and the confirmation of the *kadkhodās* and *rīshsafīds* for one solar year.

The agreement is as follows, that each of the villages ¹ of Lenjān and Alenjān, which give the equivalent (of the produce) of 1,000 *man* of covered rice ² to the State Treasury,³ should have the right to cultivate thirty-three *jarībs* of rice, and if an area greater than this is cultivated by them, the cultivators of Mārbīn and Jay also are permitted to increase the area they plant to the same extent. Every year the water is assigned for two periods to Rūdashtain and cut off from the other *bolūks*. (The regulation of) the water of the first period, which is the *dūn āb*,⁴ is from the eve of the seventy-sixth day of the Nawrūz, which is the middle of Gemini, until the fifteenth day, and is as follows : on the seventy-sixth day *qāšeds* are stationed at the head of all the *mādīs* ; before sunrise they stop the flow of water into all the *mādīs* from the head of the Kalle Bridge to the last of the *mādīs* of Barā'ān ⁵ until the tenth day, and then for five days they open the *mādīs* and let a little water through,⁶ and, in order that severe damage may not befall the newly planted crops of the district, a little water ⁷ is let into the *mādīs* from the head of the Kalle Bridge to the last *mādī* of Barā'ān on the sixth and seventh day. The second period of *vonesh* is during the *khāk āb*, and in the same way as during the first *vonesh*, the flow of water into the *mādīs* is blocked and then a little water is let through,⁶ and, because the Fedā *mādī* ⁸ flows into the town, three-quarters of a *sang* of water is let into it, and, because the Nayāšarm *mādī* of Jay waters some of the State domains, it is important and has the following assignment : one day before the *vonesh* of Rūdashtain, the *mīrāb* increases its *shūrābe* and entrusts it to the *kadkhodās*, *mādī sālārs* and *qāšeds*, so that this regulation shall be maintained without alteration until the end of the *vonesh*, and during the five days when a little water is let into the *mādīs* ⁹ a share is also given to Barā'ān.

There follows a description of the regulation of the waters of the Zāyande Rūd according to the *āzād*, *mokhtaṣṣ* and *moshtarek*

¹ قراء.

² شلتوک.

³ دیوان.

⁴ دون آب. Water given to wheat when it is nearly ripe.

⁵ برا آن.

⁶ سرکرده نمایند.

⁷ گوشه آبی.

⁸ فدین at the present day called فدی.

⁹ شورابه آنرا داغ بگذارد.

principles with reference firstly to time and secondly to the shares of each *bolūk*. The method of regulation during the *mokhtaṣṣ* and *moshtarek* periods is then described in the following words :—

The regulation (of the water) is as follows : one day before the *vonesh*, the *mīrāb*, having assembled the *qāseḍs* of Mārbīn and Jay, who are set forth below, on the Falāvarjān Bridge, divides the water of the *kesḥīks* of Alenjān and Lenjān, and entrusts these to the servants¹ of each *kesḥīk*, to guard the entrance to the *mādīs*, that the grass² and stubble³ may be collected, and stations the *qāseḍs* of the Nayāṣarm *mādī* in the *kesḥīk* of Mārbīn, and goes himself into the districts of Oshyān. In the morning, before sunrise, the servants of the *mīrāb* of every *kesḥīk* block all the *mādīs* under their care, so that two hours after sunrise all the *mādīs* of the three *kesḥīks* are closed. After water flows from the water-mills at the head of the Falāvarjān Bridge, the servants of the *mīrāb* of the *kesḥīk* of Mārbīn close the *mādīs* of Mārbīn, and the *mīrāb* from the Kalle Bridge seals all the *mādīs* that have been closed, and goes down as far as the entrance to the Nayāṣarm *mādī* of Jay. When the water, after reaching the head of the Nayāṣarm *mādī*, has ground one *man* of flour in the mill of Mo'men Āqā, which is situated at the head of the Mārmānān Bridge, the *mīrāb* goes upstream and seals the water of every *mādī* according to the shares in the regulation which he has in his possession, and the *mīrāb* (then) goes into the middle of the *kesḥīks* and tours them until the morning of the sixth day, when the flow of water into the *mādīs* is stopped, a dam being put across the mouth of each *mādī* and, whether the water suffices for the needs of Alenjān and Lenjān so that it reaches everywhere, or whether it is scarce, a *vonesh* is made : for five days it goes to Lenjān as follows : after the *vonesh* of Mārbīn and Jay it goes towards Oshyān for three days to every *mādī* which it reaches, and then four days to Alenjān, and after that Lenjān takes it for two days, and then it is the *vonesh* of Mārbīn and Jay which is as above. Thus, if there is not a great scarcity of water, the *mādīs* in Alenjān and Lenjān are opened a little⁴ so that water should reach all the *mādīs* of the three *kesḥīks*. As regards the water rights⁵ of Mārbīn and Jay, the *mīrāb* must take into consideration the rice of Alenjān (i.e. he must not be bound strictly by the regulation but give the rice a little water if necessary), provided that not more than the stipulated amount (of rice) has been sown. The *mādīs* of Kūshk and Qarṭemān

¹ نوکر.² مرغ.³ شوش.⁴ سرکرده نمایند.⁵ حقايقه.

of Mārbīn, since they are situated in the *keshīk* of Alenjān, share the water of Alenjān, and in their place the *mādīs* of Shahābābād and Darjazīn, which are situated in the *keshīk* of Mārbīn, share the allotment of Mārbīn. On the first day of *jolbandī*, the removal of the dams at the heads of the *mādīs* is begun; for three days all the *mādīs* of Alenjān, Lenjān and Mārbīn, are blocked, so that the water may reach the *mādīs* of Jay, then all the dams are removed, that a restricted flow of water may go into the *mādīs*,¹ and *qāšeds* are taken from Mārbīn and Jay for twenty days and sit at the heads of the *mādīs* of the four *keshīks*, so that they shall not be blocked until the moment of the *vonesh* of the *khāk āb* of Rūdashtain. If in any year the water should be scarce, so that the newly sown crops of Mārbīn and Jay are not irrigated, from the 15th of Scorpio thirty or forty *sangs* of water are added to the *shūrābe* of Karārej and Barā'ān, so that they may plant their crops, and after five days a *vonesh* is made, but since the *shūrābe* of Karārej is sufficient for their autumn crops² they have no fixed *vonesh* except in the *vonesh* of Mārbīn and Jay, so that if the water is abundant the *mīrāb* helps them and in the *vonesh* of the *khāk āb* of Rūdashtain also a little water³ is given to them. The distribution of the *qāšeds* of each *bolūk* and district is according to what is entered in the *vonesh*. All the *bolūks* are subdivided under each village as follows and the water-mills pay 1,000 *dīnārs* per *sang*, and *bīrūn āb*⁴ 350 *dīnārs* per *jarīb*.

A list is then given of the engagement of the *qāšeds* and their station in every *bolūk*, with reference to *bolūks* and *mādīs*. This is followed by a detailed statement of the regulation of the waters of the Zāyande Rūd according to the shares of the *bolūks* and the subdivisions with reference to villages and *mādīs*. Each of the seven *bolūks*, Alenjān, Lenjān, Mārbīn, Jay, Barā'ān, Rūdashtain and Karārej, has allotted to it so many shares as a *bolūk*, and each *bolūk* is subdivided into *mādīs*, to which are given their respective shares, and each *mādī* waters a number of villages, each of which have similarly a share or shares in the water. Particulars follow of the wages of the *mīrāb* and his servants, which amounted to 630 *tūmāns* 2 *krāns* 12 *shāhīs*.⁵ Each *bolūk* paid towards these a certain sum which was

¹ سرکرده ییاید. ² صیفها. ³ گوشه آبی

⁴ i.e., land which has not a right to water from the Zāyande Rūd.

⁵ This was the sum paid to the *mīrāb* about a hundred years ago; more recently it was in the neighbourhood of 6,000 *tūmāns*.

divided in the *bolūk* among the villages belonging to it. Finally a list is given of the *mādīs* of the river from its source to its end.

A GLOSSARY OF TERMS USED IN SHAIKH BAHA'Ī'S TŪMĀR

بلوك	<i>bolūk</i>	A district.
بند کنان	<i>band-kanān</i>	Taking away the dams at the mouths of <i>mādīs</i> .
بیرون آب	<i>bīrūn āb</i>	Land which had no right to water from the Zāyande Rūd.
پنگ	<i>peng</i>	A water clock, hour-glass. Some villages had no fixed share of the water, and the <i>mīrāb</i> used to open the <i>mādī</i> and let water through as he thought fit. This opening was called a <i>tambūshe</i> .
پیاله	<i>piyāle</i>	
تمبوشه	<i>tambūshe</i>	
تولکی	<i>tūlakī</i>	The transplantation of rice.
جلبندی	<i>jolbandī</i>	The period beginning with the 18th of Mīzān, when the weather becomes cold and the peasants wear their felt coats.
چشمه پل	<i>chashmeye pol</i>	The arch of a bridge.
چم	<i>cham</i>	Cultivated land by the side of the river.
حقابه	<i>haqqābe</i>	The right to a share of the water (of the Zāyande Rūd).
خاک آب	<i>khāk āb</i>	The first water given to wheat.
داغ گذاشتن	<i>dāgh gozāshtan</i>	To let through (more or less) water into a <i>mādī</i> (cf. T. داغان کردن to disperse.)
در میرابی	<i>dare mīrābī</i>	If it was difficult to dam a <i>mādī</i> at its junction with the river it was dammed below the junction and such a dam was known as a <i>dare mīrābī</i> .
دون آب	<i>dūn āb</i>	Water given to wheat when it is nearly ripe.
ده کده	<i>deh-kade</i>	A village.
ساروج	<i>sārūj</i>	Material used to block the head of a <i>mādī</i> , stones, mud, mortar and plaster, etc.

سر کرده نمودن	<i>sar karda namūdan</i>	To open the heads of the <i>mādīs</i> a little from the Kalle Bridge to the last <i>mādī</i> of Barā'ān for the last five days of the <i>vonesh</i> of Rūdashtain.
شبر	<i>shabr</i>	A span.
سورابه	<i>shūrābe</i>	Water which trickles through the head of a <i>mādī</i> which is blocked.
شوش	<i>shūsh</i>	Stubble.
شهرگیری	<i>shahr-gīrī</i>	(Water appropriated) for watering the streets.
صیفها	<i>saif-bahā</i>	Autumn crops (cf. صیفی, melons, marrows, cucumbers, etc).
ضباط	<i>ẓabbāt</i>	The government representative in a village.
طاق	<i>tāq</i>	One day or one night's water.
فنجانہ	<i>fenjāne</i>	A water-clock, hour-glass.
قاصد	<i>qāṣed</i>	An official in charge of the regulation of the water of a <i>mādī</i> or a portion of a <i>mādī</i> . The <i>qāṣeds</i> were appointed by the people locally to look after their interests. At the period of the <i>vonesh</i> in every district to which the <i>qāṣeds</i> went, each one in whatever <i>keshīk</i> he was gave 1,000 <i>dīnārs</i> as a due (رسوم) to the servants (نوکری) of the <i>mīrāb</i> .
قورق	<i>qūroq</i>	Property on the banks of the river which is mostly fertile and partly unproductive (لم یزرع).
کدخدا	<i>kadkhodā</i>	In some districts <i>kadkhodās</i> were appointed to oversee the <i>qāṣeds</i> . For example in Rūdashtain from each of the three <i>mādīs</i> there were ten <i>kadkhodās</i> appointed to oversee the <i>qāṣeds</i> , who numbered sixty. One of the <i>kadkhodās</i> of Jay was, according to custom, appointed to the office of <i>mīrāb</i> .
کَشِک	<i>keshīk</i>	The area watered by the river is divided into six <i>keshīks</i> .

گره	<i>gere</i>	A sixteenth part of a <i>zar'ī shāh</i> .
لت	<i>lat</i>	A division at the head of a <i>mādī</i> for the regulation of the water.
مادی	<i>mādī</i>	An irrigation channel leading off from the main river, and subsequently subdivided.
مادی سالار	<i>mādī-sālār</i>	The official in charge of a <i>mādī</i> .
مباشر	<i>mobāsher</i>	The representative of the owner of a village.
محله	<i>mahalle</i>	The subdivision of a village.
مرغ	<i>margh</i>	Grass growing near a stream.
میراب	<i>mīrāb</i>	The official in charge of the regulation of the waters of the Zāyande Rūd.
ونش	<i>vonesh</i>	The reservation of the water for Rūdashtain, during the first ten days of which no water flowed into the <i>mādīs</i> before it reached Rūdashtain.